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What Movies Show: Realism, Perception and Truth in Film
Abstract
Film-viewing is a unique aesthetic experience, and it seems to possess a unique sort of tension. On the one
hand, a film’s story seems to just be there before us: we’re directly presented with sights and sounds and can
perceive the objects, people, and places depicted in the same sort of way we perceive things in the world. On
the other hand, there’s an important sort of constructedness in film. Film-viewers have to cognize what’s
represented by a film’s perceptual prompts; we have to bring our awareness of convention to understand shot-
transitions and montage; and we have to extrapolate from what’s shown in order to pick up on what’s implied
by the shots we see. These two aspects—perceptual immediacy and constructedness—seem opposed. And
theorists typically treat them as opposed, with cinematic realists focusing on film’s perceptual content,
semioticians focusing on how movies communicate, and narrative theorists focusing on how we cognize a
film’s fiction, and each of them engaging in those analyses independent of the others. In this dissertation, I
argue for nuanced ways in which what we see and hear, what we know, and what we imagine interact
throughout film-viewing. I argue that film’s perceptual content and representational content entwine insofar as
we perceive a film’s fictional world. I argue that because movies show (in ways that other art forms, like novels,
cannot), they have an epistemic directness—they present their fictional truths immediately. I argue that
movies communicate, in a roughly Gricean way, and that they do so partly through showing—with their
perceptual content helping imply certain fictional truths. My analyses pave the way for a full theory of film
meaning that does not treat as separate different, intertwining layers of meaning. I use and apply concepts
from philosophy of perception, philosophy of language, and epistemology in order to clarify what precisely
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WHAT  MOVIES  SHOW:  REALISM,  PERCEPTION  AND  TRUTH  IN  FILM  
Lindsey  Fiorelli  
Michael  Weisberg  
Film-­viewing  is  a  unique  aesthetic  experience,  and  it  seems  to  possess  a  unique  sort  of  tension.  
On  the  one  hand,  a  film’s  story  seems  to  just  be  there  before  us:  we’re  directly  presented  with  
sights  and  sounds  and  can  perceive  the  objects,  people,  and  places  depicted  in  the  same  sort  of  
way  we  perceive  things  in  the  world.  On  the  other  hand,  there’s  an  important  sort  of  
constructedness  in  film.  Film-­viewers  have  to  cognize  what’s  represented  by  a  film’s  perceptual  
prompts;;  we  have  to  bring  our  awareness  of  convention  to  understand  shot-­transitions  and  
montage;;  and  we  have  to  extrapolate  from  what’s  shown  in  order  to  pick  up  on  what’s  implied  by  
the  shots  we  see.  These  two  aspects—perceptual  immediacy  and  constructedness—seem  
opposed.  And  theorists  typically  treat  them  as  opposed,  with  cinematic  realists  focusing  on  film’s  
perceptual  content,  semioticians  focusing  on  how  movies  communicate,  and  narrative  theorists  
focusing  on  how  we  cognize  a  film’s  fiction,  and  each  of  them  engaging  in  those  analyses  
independent  of  the  others.  In  this  dissertation,  I  argue  for  nuanced  ways  in  which  what  we  see  
and  hear,  what  we  know,  and  what  we  imagine  interact  throughout  film-­viewing.  I  argue  that  film’s  
perceptual  content  and  representational  content  entwine  insofar  as  we  perceive  a  film’s  fictional  
world.  I  argue  that  because  movies  show  (in  ways  that  other  art  forms,  like  novels,  cannot),  they  
have  an  epistemic  directness—they  present  their  fictional  truths  immediately.  I  argue  that  movies  
communicate,  in  a  roughly  Gricean  way,  and  that  they  do  so  partly  through  showing—with  their  
perceptual  content  helping  imply  certain  fictional  truths.  My  analyses  pave  the  way  for  a  full  
theory  of  film  meaning  that  does  not  treat  as  separate  different,  intertwining  layers  of  meaning.  I  
use  and  apply  concepts  from  philosophy  of  perception,  philosophy  of  language,  and  epistemology  
in  order  to  clarify  what  precisely  goes  on  when  we  watch  movies  and  to  motivate  ties  between  
philosophy  of  film  and  other  areas  of  philosophy.  
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Film-­viewing  is  a  unique  aesthetic  experience.  In  a  movie  scene,  media  that  are  associated  with  
other  art  forms  individually—sound,  language,  images,  narrative—  act  together,  with  their  
distinctive  varieties  of  meanings  informing  one  another.  This  richness  poses  a  challenge  to  
philosophers  of  film:  given  this  complex  union,  how  do  we  start  uncovering  what  a  movie  as  a  
whole  means?  How  can  we  do  justice  to  such  an  integrated  experience?  Too  often,  theorists  
attend  only  to  one  aspect  of  film—its  perceptual  presentation  or  its  ability  to  communicate  or  its  
narrative  construction—thereby  overlooking  the  extent  to  which  these  features  (or  layers)  interact  
with  one  another.  In  this  way,  theorists  typically  do  not  work  towards  a  theory  of  film  meaning  that  
does  justice  to  film’s  aesthetic  complexity.    
   Cinematic  realists  argue  that  film  has  an  especially  strong  tie  to  reality  because  of  
(various  aspects  of)  its  visual  and  aural  presentation  of  information.  Extreme  versions  of  the  view  
claim  that,  because  of  film’s  photographic  basis,  we  see  objects,  people,  and  places  in  or  through  
the  movie  screen.1  Less  extreme  versions  either  point  to  how  our  perceptual  experiences  during  
film-­viewing  are  very  much  like  our  ordinary  perceptual  experiences,2  or  they  claim  that  a  movie’s  
realism  centers  on  its  ability  to  comment  on  or  express  thoughts  about  reality.3  While  they  vary  in  
highly  divergent  ways,  all  versions  have  one  thing  in  common:  they  prioritize  film’s  perceptual  
nature,  pointing  to  the  sights  and  sounds  movies  actually  show  us.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1  See,  for  instance:  (1)  Walton,  Kendall  L.  “Transparent  Pictures:  On  the  Nature  of  Photographic  
Realism.”  Critical  Inquiry  11.2  (1984):  246-­277.  P.  251.  (2)  Bazin,  André.  What  is  Cinema?  Ed.  
Hugh  Gray.  Berkeley:  University  of  California  Press,  1967,  1971.  And  (3)  Kracauer,  Siegfried.  
Theory  of  Film:  The  Redemption  of  Physical  Reality.  London:  Oxford  University  Press,  1960.  
2  This  sort  of  ‘psychological  realist’  approach  is  adopted  by:  (1)  Francesco  Casetti,  and  Daniel  
Leisawitz,  “Sutured  Reality:  Film,  from  Photographic  to  Digital”  in:  Digital  Art  138,  October  (Fall  
2011):  95-­106.  (2)  Gregory  Currie,  “Film,  Reality,  and  Illusion”  in:  Post-­Theory:  Reconstructing  
Film  Studies.  Ed.  David  Bordwell  and  Noël  Carroll  (Madison,  WI:  University  of  Wisconsin  Press,  
1996).  And  (3)  Stephen  Prince,  “The  Discourse  of  Pictures:  Iconicity  and  Film  Studies”  in:  Film  
Quarterly  47.1  (Autumn,  1993):  16-­28.  
3  Miriam  Bratu  Hansen  interprets  Siegfried  Kracauer  as  holding  such  an  expressionist  account.  
See:  Hansen,  Miriam  Bratu.  Cinema  and  Experience.  Berkeley:  University  of  California  Press,  
2012.  Daniel  Morgan  interprets  André  Bazin  similarly  in:  “Rethinking  Bazin:  Ontology  and  Realist  
Aesthetics”  in:  Critical  Inquiry  32  (Spring  2006):  443-­81.  
	  vi	  
	  
At  the  other  end  of  the  spectrum  are  semiotic  theories  that  prioritize  the  use  of  convention  
in  film.  For  semioticians,  film  is  a  coded,  sign-­based  medium  much  like  language.  Individual  shots  
in  a  movie  are  connected  and  given  meaning  via  various  transitions  to  form  sequences;;  this  gives  
film  (1)  a  syntactical,  or  grammatical,  structure  and  (2)  conventional  meaning,  insofar  as  our  
familiarity  with  film  conventions  is  required  for  our  deciphering  what  those  shots  (and  sequences)  
mean.  According  to  semiotic  theories,  when  we  try  to  make  sense  of  what  a  movie  means,  we  
move  away  from  the  particular  perceptual  nature  of  its  medium  and  analyze  it  as  we  would  any  
other  art  form  (and  any  language).  In  this  respect,  semioticians  prioritize  convention  and  code  
over  perceptual  presentation.    
Another  focus  for  film  theorists  and  philosophers  of  film  is  on  what  Noël  Carroll  calls  
“nominal  portrayal:”  film’s  representation  of  fictional  characters,  worlds,  and  events.4  This  
theoretical  focus  centers  on  film’s  narrative  constructedness:  its  ability  to  tell  stories.  Rather  than  
constitute  a  separate  theory—like  cinematic  realism  or  semiotics—this  ‘representationalist’  
approach  tends  to  exist  in  various  accounts  of  various  theories.  Cinematic  realists  acknowledge  
that  fiction  films  show  us  real  people,  objects,  and  places  in  order  to  represent  fictional  people,  
objects,  and  places;;  and  semioticians  discuss  the  ways  in  which  movies  use  convention  and  
editing  techniques  in  order  to  build  their  narratives  (and  in  order  to  enable  us  to  understand  those  
narratives).    
In  analyzing  film’s  narrative  construction,  theorists  generally  discuss  how  we  cognitively  
engage  with  a  film’s  narrative:  how  we  either  falsely  believe  (during  film-­viewing)  that  narrative  
events  are  occurring,  or  how  we  imagine  that  those  narrative  events  are  occurring.  Thus  theorists  
like  Gregory  Currie,  Noël  Carroll,  and  George  Wilson  provide  accounts  of  imaginative  
engagement;;5  theorists  like  Amy  Coplan  and  Murray  Smith  flesh  out  accounts  of,  more  narrowly,  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4  Carroll,  Noël.  Theorizing  the  Moving  Image.  Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  1996.  P.  
46.  
5  (1)  Currie,  Gregory.  “Visual  Fictions.”  The  Philosophical  Quarterly  41.163  (Apr.,  1991):129-­143;;  
(2)  Walton,  Kendall.  Mimesis  as  Make-­Believe:  On  the  Foundations  of  the  Representational  Arts.  
Harvard:  Cambridge,  1990;;  (3)  Wilson,  George.  Seeing  Fictions  in  Film.  Oxford:  Oxford,  2011.  
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empathetic  engagement  with  characters;;6  and  accounts  of  illusionism  maintain  that  we  falsely  
believe  that  what’s  fictionally  depicted  is  occurring.7  In  each  of  these  cases,  theorists  generally  
attend  to  cognitive  engagement  in  a  way  that  excludes  perceptual  engagement.  They  focus  on  
how  we  imagine  or  falsely  believe  or  feel  when  we  engage  with  a  movie’s  fiction,  and  they  fail  to  
examine  how  we  see  throughout  that  engagement.  More  specifically:  they  don’t  examine  how  we  
perceptually  experience  the  fictional  as  we  cognitively  experience  it.  Even  theorists  who  
emphasize  film’s  perceptual  presentation—as  cinematic  realists  do—typically  turn  towards  an  
analysis  of  the  purely  cognitive  when  they  acknowledge  nominal  portrayal,  in  precisely  the  way  
that  imaginative  engagement  and  illusionism  theorists  do.    
Within  this  discussion  of  narrative  construction  and  engagement,  theorists  spell  out  
notions  of  ‘fictional  truth:’  what  settles  the  facts  of  a  fictional  world.  Here,  discussion  of  ‘principles  
of  generation’  is  common,  with  theorists  like  Kendall  Walton  and  Anthony  Everett  specifying  that  
whatever  is  true  in  a  fiction  is  whatever  we’re  prescribed  to  imagine  about  the  fictional  world.8  
There  isn’t  much  specific  focus,  here,  on  the  fictional  facts  of  a  movie;;  and,  when  there  is,  
theorists  generally  do  not  change  their  commitments  or  clarify  them  in  light  of  film’s  perceptual  
nature.  The  idea  that  a  movie’s  perceptual  content  helps  it  construct  its  fictional  facts  or  the  idea  
that  our  perception  of  a  film’s  sights  and  sounds  allows  us  to  pick  up,  directly,  on  fictional  facts:  
both  are  generally  overlooked.  
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Each  of  these  approaches  gets  something  right  about  film.  Movies  do  have  an  important  
tie  to  reality,  and  that  tie  consists  in  how  they  can  show  us  the  world  in  a  way  that  other  art  forms  
can’t.  In  order  to  analyze  movies,  and  work  towards  a  proper  theory  of  film  meaning,  we  need  to  
acknowledge  film’s  presentation  of  sights  and  sounds,  and  how  that  presentation  makes  it  
importantly  unique.  We  also  need  to  try  to  make  sense  of  a  concept  of  film  communication,  and—
all  the  while—we’d  be  very  mistaken  in  talking  about  fiction  film  without  talking  about  the  fiction:  
without  making  sense  of  how  movies  are  narrative  art  forms  that  tell  stories  with  their  images  and  
sounds  and  construct  facts  within  those  stories.    
It  isn’t  problematic  to  adopt  elements  of  each  of  these  aforementioned  approaches,  then.  
What  is  problematic  is  treating  each  of  these  aspects  separately:  with  cinematic  realists,  only  
focusing  on  the  perceptual;;  with  semioticians,  only  focusing  on  the  communicative  and  
conventional;;  with  narrative  theorists,  only  focusing  on  cognitive—and  not  also  perceptual—
engagement  with  the  nominal;;  or  focusing  on  fictional  truth  independent  of  filmic  ‘showing.’  
  Not  only  do  these  approaches  fail  in  capturing  film’s  aesthetic  complexity;;  they  fail  in  
capturing  its  aesthetic  uniqueness.  From  the  start,  we  might  be  wary  of  any  claims  of  medium  
specificity—according  to  which  film  is  somehow  distinct  from  other  art  forms  in  virtue  of  its  
medium;;  indeed  Noël  Carroll  has  raised  important  objections  against  it.9  But  I  think  we  can,  and  
should,  maintain  a  version  of  medium  specificity  that  avoids  Carroll’s  objections.  The  above  
approaches  generally  don’t  do  so.  Extreme  versions  of  cinematic  realism  don’t  distinguish  movies  
from  photographs,  and  weaker  versions  (which  appeal  to  the  expression  of  thought  or  the  ability  
to  comment  on  reality)  don’t  distinguish  movies  from  other  expressive  works  of  art.  Semioticians  
don’t  distinguish  film  from  language  or  from  any  other  art  form;;  typically  for  them  (e.g.,  for  Nelson  
Goodman)  all  art  is  coded  in  just  the  way  that  film  is.  And  imaginative  engagement  theorists  (who  
attend  to  our  cognitive  engagement  with  a  film’s  fiction)  don’t  distinguish  between  how  we  interact  
with  a  movie’s  fiction  and  how  we  interact  with  a  book’s  fiction.  What  this  means  is  that  cinematic  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




realism  isn’t  really  cinematic  realism;;  that  semioticians  haven’t  mapped  out  a  communicative  
ability  peculiar  to  film;;  and  that  imaginative  engagement  theorists  aren't  really  talking  about  our  
interaction  with  a  movie’s  fiction.  
I  remedy  these  shortcomings  in  the  following  four  chapters.  I  provide  analyses  of  film  that  
do  justice  to  its  multi-­modal,  aesthetically  complex  nature  by  emphasizing  how  different  layers  of  
meaning  interact  with  one  another—so  that  the  perceptual,  communicative,  representational,  and  
epistemic  intertwine—and  how  those  interactions  make  movies  different  from  other  art  forms.  
There  are  three  central  threads  that  run  throughout  these  chapters:  (1)  how  the  perceptual  and  
representational  intertwine  throughout  film-­viewing;;  (2)  how  films  are  able  to  ‘show’  in  various  
ways;;  and  (3)  how  movies  are  unique  compared  to  other  narrative  art  forms  like  literature  and  
other  perceptual  art  forms  like  paintings,  photographs,  and  drawings.  
In  my  first  chapter,  I  defend  a  novel  version  of  cinematic  realism  according  to  which  film’s  
relation  to  natural  meaning—its  ability  to  possess  it,  and  to  call  on  our  knowledge  of  it—gives  film  
a  tie  to  reality  that  other  art  forms  lack.  I  argue  that,  insofar  as  movies  can  show  us  cues  of  
natural  meaning—via  actors’  facial  expressions  and  gestures,  and  natural  information  in  real  
weather  and  scenery—they  can  (a)  show  us  ordinary  expressive  and  emotional  cues  that  we  
encounter  in  daily  life  and  (b)  enable  us  to  employ  ordinary  perceptual  recognition  capacities  by  
calling  on  our  knowledge  of  natural  meaning  immediately.  I  argue  that,  in  this  way,  movies  
engage  in  a  Gricean  form  of  showing,  according  to  which  we  pick  up  on  natural  meaning  
automatically  and  without  reference  to  intention.10  I  also  argue  for  two  further  conclusions  that  
distinguish  my  version  from  unsuccessful  theories  of  cinematic  realism:  that  this  makes  movies  
distinct  from  other  art  forms,  and  that  a  focus  on  cinematic  realism  need  not  come  at  the  expense  
of  a  focus  on  nominal  portrayal  (i.e.,  portrayal  of  fictional  characters,  events,  and  worlds).  With  
regards  to  the  former,  I  claim  that  nonperceptual  art  forms  like  literature  cannot  employ  ordinary  
recognition  capacities  to  enable  us  to  pick  up  on  cues  of  natural  meaning,  and  that  other  
perceptual  art  forms  (like  photographs  and  paintings)  do  not  enable  us  to  pick  up  natural  meaning  
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as  frequently  or  as  immediately  as  movies  do  insofar  as  they  lack  motion  and/or  sound.  With  
regards  to  the  latter—i.e.,  a  focus  on  the  fictional  alongside  of  a  focus  on  the  ‘realistic’—I  argue  
that  the  very  cues  of  natural  meaning  that  give  film  its  tie  to  reality  help  constitute  its  fictional  
level.  Actors’  expressions  and  gestures  make  up  their  characters’  expressions  and  gestures;;  real  
weather  and  scenery  is  used  to  depict  fictional  places  and  worlds;;  and  cues  of  natural  meaning,  
like  smoke  rising  out  of  a  building  or  a  dog  barking  off-­screen,  inform  us  about  past,  current,  and  
future  narrative  events.  In  these  ways,  this  paper  analyzes  the  perceptual  and  representational  
together  while  making  sense  of  a  strong  sort  of  ‘showing’  in  which  only  films  engage.    
In  my  second  chapter,  I  argue  for  a  stronger  sense  of  ‘showing’  and  a  stronger  interaction  
of  the  perceptual  and  representational,  by  arguing  that  we  perceive  the  fiction  in  a  fiction  film.  I  
argue  that  there  are  three  seeing-­as  experiences  we  engage  in  during  film-­viewing,  and  that  
noticing  them  enables  us  to  grasp  just  how  complex  our  perceptual  experience  is  when  we  watch  
movies.  We:  (1)  see  the  images  on  the  screen  as  recordings  of  ordinary  objects,  people,  and  
properties;;  (2)  see  the  screen  images  as  recordings  of  production-­level  entities  like  actors,  props,  
and  sets;;  and  (3)  see  the  screen  images  as  recordings  of  fictional  characters,  events,  and  worlds.  
With  regards  to  (3),  I  argue  that  imaginative  engagement  theorists  are  right  to  make  sense  of  our  
engagement  with  a  film’s  fiction  as  imaginative;;  in  particular,  I  argue  that  theorists  like  George  
Wilson  and  Kendall  Walton  are  right  to  specify  this  engagement  as  one  of  imagining  seeing—i.e.,  
imagining  seeing  characters  and  fictional  worlds.  Such  theories,  though,  make  our  engagement  
with  a  film’s  fiction  cognitive  and  non-­perceptual.  For  them,  we  imagine  that  fictional  events  are  
happening,  and  we  even  imagine  seeing  those  fictional  events,  but  we  don’t  perceive  those  
fictional  events.  Wilson  seems  to  exclude  the  possibility  of  seeing  the  fictional,  as  he  deems  such  
talk  metaphorical  or  nonliteral.  Similarly,  Walton  provides  an  account  of  seeing-­as  according  to  
which  we  see  a  depictive  representation  as  the  nonfictional  object  it  depicts  (e.g.,  seeing  a  picture  
of  a  mill  as  a  mill),  but  he  doesn’t  extend  his  account  to  our  seeing  the  fictional  objects  depicted  in  
a  work.  I  argue  that  we  need  to  move  beyond  Walton’s  and  Wilson’s  theories  in  order  to  do  justice  
to  how  what  we  imagine  becomes  a  part  of  what  we  perceive  when  we  watch  a  fiction  film.    
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More  specifically,  in  chapter  two,  I  argue  that  we  see  the  movie  images  on  the  screen  as  
recordings  of  characters,  narrative  events,  and  fictional  worlds.  In  this  way,  our  perceptual  
experience  and  cognitive  experience  are  “integrated  into  a  single  complex  phenomenological  
whole.”11  This  chapter  takes  two  central  claims  from  the  first  paper  and  bolsters  them.  Here,  
rather  than  merely  being  shown  things  in  the  world,  we’re  shown  the  fictional.  And,  whereas  the  
first  chapter  links  the  perceptual  and  representational  via  the  concept  of  portrayal  or  depiction,  
this  chapter  links  them  by  arguing  that  during  imaginative  engagement  the  representational  
becomes  a  part  of  perceptual  experience.  In  making  these  two  central  claims,  this  chapter  
distinguishes  film  from  other  narrative  art  forms  like  literature:  I  argue  that  the  latter  engages  in  
telling  (via  a  fictional  narrator)  rather  than  showing  and  thus  removes  us  from  the  sort  of  
phenomenologically  immediate  engagement  with  the  fictional  that  films  enable.  
The  third  and  fourth  chapters  build  upon  the  claims  of  the  first  two  in  order  to  draw  
epistemic  consequences  from  the  previous  analyses.  I  argue  that  movies  are  phenomenologically  
immediate,  and  that  this  consists  in  a  combination  of  (1)  their  ability  to  engage  in  Gricean  
showing  and  (2)  their  ability  to  show  us  their  fictions.  I  use  this  thesis  to  argue  for  a  notion  of  
epistemic  directness,  according  to  which  movies  show  us  the  truths,  the  facts,  of  their  fictional  
worlds  directly.  The  directness  stems  from  film’s  perceptual  presentation:  the  fact  that  we  just  see  
narrative  events,  characters,  and  fictional  worlds  by  utilizing  our  ordinary  perceptual  recognition  
capacities  and  our  knowledge  of  natural  information.  The  epistemic  nature  of  that  directness  
consists  in  how  fiction  films  cannot  lie  to  us  about  their  fictions,  and  how  they  cannot  mislead  us  
about  their  fictional  truths;;  I  cash  this  out  as  a  form  of  reliability.  To  defend  this  conclusion,  I  
compare  fiction  film  to  nonfiction  film.  In  chapter  three,  I  outline  the  ways  in  which  documentaries  
can  be  unreliable  by  engaging  cognitive  processes  that  tend  to  produce  false  beliefs.  I  argue  that  
documentaries  can  be  unreliable  in  two  chief  ways:  they  can  lie  and  they  can  mislead.  
My  chief  claim  in  the  fourth  chapter  is  that  fiction  films  are  incapable  of  both  types  of  
unreliability  and  that  this,  combined  with  their  phenomenological  immediacy,  makes  their  fictions  
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epistemically  direct.  I  outline  accounts  of  fictional  truth  which  utilize  the  notion  of  ‘principles  of  
generation’  to  clarify  that  fictional  truths—i.e.,  facts  about  narrative  events,  people,  and  places—
consist  in  the  propositions  we’re  prescribed  to  imagine.  Insofar  as  they  do,  I  argue  that  fictional  
truths  are  constructed  by  the  film  itself  and  that  a  film  cannot  prescribe  us  to  (fictionally)  believe  
something  (fictionally)  false  about  its  fictional  world.  This  holds  even  for  films  that  mislead  us  in  
order  to  shock  or  trick  us  in  their  finales—e.g.,  The  Usual  Suspects,  Fight  Club,  and  Memento.  
Fiction  films  cannot  present  as  true  facts  (about  their  fictions)  that  are  false;;  and  they  cannot  
mislead  us  by  pretending  to  take  on  perspectives  (toward  their  fictional  worlds)  that  they  are  not  
actually  taking.  They  are  thus  incapable  of  the  types  of  unreliability  documentary  films  are  
capable  of,  and  they  (generally)  engage  reliable  cognitive  processes.    
Chapter  four,  then,  turns  to  an  epistemic  sense  of  ‘showing’  and  thus  argues  for  an  
intertwinement  of  the  epistemic  and  the  perceptual.  It  also  offers  the  most  fully  fleshed-­out  
account  of  medium  specificity.  I  argue  that  only  perceptual  art  forms  (like  paintings,  photographs,  
and  movies)  possess  phenomenological  immediacy,  and  that  literary  art  forms  thus  lack  the  
‘directness’  necessary  for  ‘epistemic  directness.’  I  also  argue  that  other  perceptual  art  forms  
cannot  ‘show  us  fictional  truths’  in  quite  the  same  way  as  movies  insofar  as  they  do  not  engage  
ordinary  perceptual  processes  (despite  the  fact  that  they  do  engage  ordinary  perceptual  
capacities).  In  concluding,  I  defend  a  medium  specificity  thesis  that  is  descriptive  and  not  
normative  and  that  avoids  the  pitfalls  of  other  established  versions.  
These  three  chapters,  thus,  carry  claims  of  medium  specificity  throughout  and  progress  
from  a  (primarily)  perceptual  sense  of  filmic  ‘showing’  to  an  epistemic  sense  of  filmic  ‘showing.’  
They  also  bring  us  closer  to  understanding  how  movies  communicate.  I  discuss  film  
communication  explicitly  in  the  third  and  fourth  chapter,  where  I  make  sense  of  documentaries  
and  fiction  films  as  Gricean  communicative  utterances:  texts  that  communicate  partly  through  
explicit  showing  and  saying  and  partly  through  the  interpretive  additions  of  audience  members  
(who  bring  conventional  and  real-­world  knowledge  to  pick  up  on,  among  other  things,  
implicature).  We  can’t,  I  maintain,  deem  films  full  Gricean  communicative  utterances  because  of  
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the  extent  of  showing  they  engage  in—and  thus  the  natural  rather  than  nonnatural  meaning  they  
possess.  It’s  worth  it  to  delve  deeper  into  this  analysis,  in  order  to  elucidate  similarities  to  and  
differences  from  linguistic  forms  of  implication.  This  comparative  analysis,  in  addition  to  
examining  film’s  use  of  editing  techniques  and  convention,  can  make  us  more  sympathetic  to  
semiotic  approaches  and  enable  us  to  connect  the  ‘communicative’  and  ‘conventional’  level  to  the  
perceptual  and  representational  levels  in  a  way  that  semioticians  typically  do  not—i.e.,  by  
elucidating  how  movies  communicate  in  part  by  showing,  and  how  their  use  of  convention  and  
implication  is  intricately  bound  up  with  their  direct  presentation  of  narrative  information.  What’s  
more,  looking  closely  at  editing  techniques—which,  I  maintain  in  chapter  three,  at  times  seem  to  
produce  a  natural  as  well  as  nonnatural  form  of  meaning—can  further  this  nuanced  analysis.  
Taken  together,  these  papers  pave  the  way  for  a  full  theory  of  film  meaning.  They  provide  
an  integrated  approach  to  film  analysis:  one  that  is  fundamental  to  our  being  able  to  do  justice  to  
film’s  nuances,  to  how  what  we  see,  what  we  know,  what  we  cognize,  and  what  we  imagine  
interact  throughout  film-­viewing.  Some  of  the  key  concepts  at  work  in  these  papers—e.g.,  natural  
meaning,  seeing-­as,  and  reliability—also  provide  us  with  the  conceptual  resources  we  need  to  (1)  
connect  the  philosophy  of  film  to  various  other  philosophical  disciplines  and  (2)  analyze  the  full  
nature  of  film’s  epistemic  and  perceptual  aspects.  Continuing  with  this  integrated  and  
interdisciplinary  approach  will  enable  us  to  understand  movies  more  deeply  and  to  recognize  just  











A  NEW  DEFENSE  OF  CINEMATIC  REALISM  
  
Cinematic  realists  propose  that  films  can  get  at—or  show—reality  in  a  way  that  other  art  forms  
can’t.  The  strongest  versions  of  cinematic  realism  prioritize  physical  reality  by  making  the  bold  
claim  that  by  virtue  of  the  mechanical,  photographic  process  of  their  creation,  films  put  us  in  
perceptual  contact  with  things  in  the  world.    Thus,  according  to  Kendall  Walton,  when  we  look  at  a  
movie  screen,  we  see  objects,  people,  and  places  in  or  through  that  screen.12    Weaker  versions  
appeal  to  something  other  than  physical  reality,  either  by  discussing  a  truth  beyond  mere  
appearance13  or  by  endorsing  psychological  realism,  a  view  according  to  which  films  are  realistic  
insofar  as  they  engage  our  ordinary  perceptual  processes.14  While  not  always  explicitly  stated,  
cinematic  realists  generally  propose  that  film  is  more  realistic  than  other  art  forms.  That  is,  they  
endorse  some  version  of  a  medium  specificity  thesis  according  to  which  film  has  something  
unique  about  it  in  virtue  of  its  tie  to  reality.  
This  paper  presents  a  novel  version  of  cinematic  realism,  which  focuses  on  film’s  relation  to  
what  H.P.  Grice  calls  “natural  meaning.”15  I  will  suggest  that  my  view  avoids  some  of  the  biggest  
pitfalls  of  established  versions,  and  in  particular  that  it  motivates  cinematic  realism  in  a  way  they  
do  not.  My  theory  focuses  on  film’s  relation  to  natural  meaning  in  two  ways:  how  films  trade  on  
our  knowledge  of  natural  meaning,  and  how  they  themselves  have  natural  meaning.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12  Walton,  Kendall  L.  “Transparent  Pictures:  On  the  Nature  of  Photographic  Realism.”  Critical  
Inquiry  11.2  (1984):  246-­277.  P.  251.  
13  See:  Bazin,  André.  What  is  Cinema?  Ed.  Hugh  Gray.  Berkeley:  University  of  California  Press,  
1967,  1971;;  and  Kracauer,  Siegfried.  Theory  of  Film:  The  Redemption  of  Physical  Reality.  
London:  Oxford  University  Press,  1960.  
14  See  (1)  Francesco  Casetti,  and  Daniel  Leisawitz,  “Sutured  Reality:  Film,  from  Photographic  to  
Digital”  in:  Digital  Art  138,  October  (Fall  2011):  95-­106;;  Gregory  Currie,  “Film,  Reality,  and  
Illusion”  in:  Post-­Theory:  Reconstructing  Film  Studies.  Ed.  David  Bordwell  and  Noël  Carroll  
(Madison,  WI:  University  of  Wisconsin  Press,  1996);;  and  (3)  Stephen  Prince,  “The  Discourse  of  
Pictures:  Iconicity  and  Film  Studies”  in:  Film  Quarterly  47.1  (Autumn,  1993):  16-­28.  
15  Grice,  H.P.  “Meaning.”  The  Philosophical  Review  66.3  (1957):  377-­388.  
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Natural  meaning  exists  where  one  thing  or  property  is  a  reliable  indicator  or  sign  of  
something  else:  stable  correlations  between  information  states  allow  one  state  to  show  something  
about  another.  We  observe  natural  meaning  everywhere:  in  facial  expressions  (smiles  mean  
happiness,  frowns  mean  sadness),  in  physical  symptoms  of  illnesses  (bumps  mean  measles),  in  
features  of  nature  (rain  clouds  mean  rain),  and  in  things  that  stem  from  more  culturally  specific,  or  
conventional,  relations  (“the  recent  budget  means  that  we  shall  have  a  hard  year”).16  
This  idea  of  “showing”  plays  a  central  role  in  the  characterization  of  natural  meaning.  
Because  natural  meaning  is  just  there  in  the  world  apart  from  our  purposes  or  aims,  we  engage  
with  it  by  seeing  or  hearing  it,  or  by  being  shown  it.  With  regards  to  the  latter,  someone’s  
intentions  can  come  into  play  in  pointing  natural  meaning  out  to  us.  For  instance,  Herod  presents  
Salome  with  the  head  of  St.  John  the  Baptist  to  show  that  he’s  dead.17  Despite  Herod’s  aim,  
though,  the  meaning  itself—the  information  delivered  by  the  head—is  independent  of  it;;  Herod  is  
merely  showing  it  to  Salome.    
We  can  understand  the  notion  of  showing  more  clearly  by  distinguishing  it  from  how  
nonnatural  meaning  is  communicated:  via  telling.  Here,  we’re  picking  up  on  what  someone  
means  by  the  words  that  she  utters  or  by  the  actions  she  partakes  in,  and  this  requires  attending  
to  her  intentions.  When  we  say  that  x  naturally  means  y,  we  cannot  say  “any  conclusion  to  the  
effect  that  somebody  or  other  meant”  y  by  x,  and  this  is  precisely  what  we  do  in  grasping  
nonnatural  meaning.18  
Relatedly,  the  sort  of  showing  in  cases  of  natural  meaning  requires  stable  correlations  
between  what  does  the  showing  and  what  is  shown—rain  clouds  generally  are  accompanied  by  
rain,  and  someone  who  smiles  typically  is  happy;;  the  connection  between  them  is  robust  enough  
that  the  presence  of  the  first  “entails,”  as  Grice  says,  the  existence  of  the  other.19  It’s  important  to  
note  that,  while  the  meaning  is  natural,  the  correlation  can  arise  from  convention  or  custom.  This  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16  Grice  (1957,  p.377)  
17  Grice  (1957,  p.382)  
18  Grice  (1957,  p.377)  
19  As  he  puts  it:  “in  cases  like  the  above  [cases  in  which  we  state  that  x  naturally  means  or  
naturally  meant  that  p]  x  meant  that  p  and  x  means  that  p  entail  p.”  (p.377)  
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is  true  in  the  recent  budget  example:  there,  convention  creates  the  initial  relation  between  the  
budget  and  the  sort  of  year  we’ll  have;;  nonetheless,  once  the  relation  exists  stably,  the  meaning  
is  natural;;  the  cue—the  budget  itself—means  what  it  means  independent  of  convention.  The  
same  is  true  with  regards  to  a  cultural  norm  like  putting  on  a  topcoat  naturally  means  that  I  will  go  
outside—it  means  this  because  the  relation  between  the  act  of  putting  on  the  coat  and  the  act  of  
going  outside  is  reliable;;  generally  the  former  is  followed  by  the  latter.  Despite  the  fact  that  
custom  created  this  relation,  its  meaning  is  just  there,  independent  of  societal  purposes.      
Natural  meaning  is  much  more  complicated  than  all  of  this.20  This  brief  summary,  though,  
highlights  the  key  issues  that  will  be  relevant  for  my  purposes  here.21  So  let’s  turn  to  how  this  
relates  to  film.  I  mentioned  that  there  are  two  ways  in  which  film  is  related  to  natural  meaning:  that  
it  trades  on  our  knowledge  of  it  and  that  it  can  have  it.  Let’s  start  by  examining  the  former.  
Movies  consist  in  projections,  into  2-­D  format,  of  things  that  either  are  in  the  3-­D  world  or  
would  be  (if  they  existed).  This  projection  is  perceptual,  consisting  in  an  array  of  images,  and  we  
can  think  of  it  as  an  isomorphic  projection  of  scenario  and  analog  content.22  With  respect  to  
analog  content,  films  show  us  an  abundance  of  specific,  fine-­grained  properties—determinate  
colors  and  shapes—and  a  rich  array  of  specific  relations  among  those  properties.23  As  a  depictive  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20  In  particular,  there  are  issues  regarding  how  to  reconcile  the  idea  of  entailment  with  the  fact  
that  the  relation  in  question  only  needs  to  be  reliable  in  general.  Grice  doesn’t  explicitly  state  the  
latter  claim,  but  many  interpret  his  theory  as  requiring  it,  so  that  he  is  aiming  to  get  at  how  types  
of  cues  indicate  other  types  of  cues,  but  need  not  require  that  each  instance  of  the  former  bring  
an  instance  of  the  latter.    
21  While  this  paper  will  focus  on  Grice’s  account  of  natural  meaning,  I  think  Fred  Dretske’s  
account  of  natural  meaning—or  natural  signs—would  work  as  well  (i.e.,  that  we  can  use  his  
theory  in  order  to  elucidate  the  ways  in  which  film  is  related  to  natural  information).  He  presents  
an  account  of  natural  meaning  in  his  article  “Misrepresentation”  in:  Belief:  Form,  Content,  and  
Function,  ed.  Radu  J.  Bogdan  (Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press,  1986).  While  his  theory  is  not  
identical  to  Grice’s,  it  bears  important  similarities—and  it  endorses  the  key  claims  that  I  will  center  
my  discussion  on.  For  him,  as  for  Grice,  natural  meaning  exists  where  some  information  state  
reliably  indicates  another  because  the  latter  typically,  regularly,  causes  the  former.  As  for  Grice,  
Dretske  takes  this  natural  meaning  to  be  independent  of  our  aims  or  intentions;;  it’s  just  there  
because  of  the  law-­like  relations  that  exist  among  information  states.  
22  For  a  fuller  discussion  of  scenario  and  analog  content  see:  Christopher  Peacocke,  A  Study  of  
Concepts  (Cambridge,  MA:  MIT  Press,  1992).  
23  Fred  Dretske  discusses  fineness  and  richness  of  grain  in  perceptual  experiences  in  Knowledge  
and  the  Flow  of  Information  (Cambridge,  MA:  MIT  Press,  1981).  
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representation  of  scenario  content,  every  point  in  the  movie  screen  displays  phenomenal  
properties  and  the  positions  they  would  have  if  they  existed  in  a  space  around  the  film  viewer.  
This  perceptual  projection  imbues  our  viewing  experience  with  deep  causal  and  
phenomenological  ties  to  everyday  perception,  in  at  least  two  ways.  First,  films  require  us  to  
deploy  natural  recognitional  capacities  in  identifying  objects  and  their  features;;  as  Noël  Carroll  
puts  it,  “audiences  do  not  need  any  special  training  to  deal  with  the  basic  images  in  movies,  for  
the  capacity  to  recognize  what  these  images  are  about  has  evolved  part  and  parcel  with  the  
viewer’s  capacity  to  recognize  objects  and  events.”24    Being  able  to  identify  objects  and  their  
properties  (and  events)  in  images  is  the  same  capacity  at  work  in  our  ordinary  perceptual  
experiences.25  In  addition,  during  film-­viewing,  we  utilize  everyday  perceptual  capacities  in  
employing  our  knowledge  of  natural  meaning.    
Films  contain  the  same  basic  sorts  of  cues  for  natural  meaning  as  we  encounter  in  real  life,  
and  our  understanding  of  those  cues  plays  a  central  role  in  our  grasping  a  film’s  narrative.    For  
instance,  we  interpret  what  a  character  is  thinking  or  feeling  in  part  by  seeing  her  facial  
expressions  and  gestures.  When  a  character  cries,  we  know  she’s  sad;;  when  she  gasps,  we  
know  she’s  scared26.  We  know  all  of  this  because  those  expressions  and  actions  naturally  mean  
sadness  and  anger  and  fear.  The  same  is  true  of  natural  meaning  that  doesn’t  involve  people:  we  
infer  what  has  happened  or  will  happen  from  hearing  the  sound  of  thunder  or  the  sound  of  a  dog  
barking  off-­screen,  say.    
We  do  all  of  this  via  everyday  perceptual  processes,  and  this  just  falls  out  of  the  fact  that  
films  present  the  same  basic  sorts  of  cues  as  we  encounter  in  real  life—sights  and  sounds  of  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24  Carroll,  Noël.  “The  Power  of  Movies.”  The  Moving  Image  114.4  (Fall,  1985):  79-­103.  P.  84.  
25  Of  course,  higher-­level  interpretive  work  often  requires  an  understanding  of  film  conventions,  
and  isn’t  just  a  matter  of  employing  our  everyday  perceptual  processes.  Carroll’s  thesis  centers  
on  the  more  basic  level  of  film-­viewing—the  level  of  object  and  event  identification—or  at  least  
that’s  where  I  agree  with  him.  
26  I  simply  assume  here  that  we  do  see  and  hear  the  characters  in  a  movie.  Roughly:  I  think  
there’s  a  place  for  the  notion  of  “seeing-­as”  in  film-­viewing,  which  is  substantiated  by  a  proper  
theory  of  imaginative  filmic  engagement.  We  know  that  we’re  literally  seeing  actors  and  props  
when  we  watch  a  film.  But,  as  George  Wilson  argues  in  Seeing  Fictions  in  Film,  we  imagine  we’re  
seeing  what  those  people  and  things  represent  in  the  story:  characters,  settings,  etc.  As  a  result,  
we  see  the  non-­fictional  elements  as  their  fictional  counterparts.    
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objects  and  their  properties.  We  gather  information,  including  natural  meaning,  by  seeing  and  
hearing—by  seeing  tables,  hearing  dogs  barking,  or  seeing  a  character  grimace.  Film-­viewing  
and  3-­D  experience  are  causally  importantly  similar:  both  call  on  processes  that  involve  gathering  
information  perceptually,  and  the  former  does  so  by  presenting  the  same  sorts  of  cues  (in  2-­D),  
including  cues  of  natural  information.  
Moreover,  films  don’t  just  trade  on  natural  meaning;;  they  can  actually  have  it.  We  find  
extreme  cases  of  this  where  films  show  behaviors  that  are  fully  unintended,  even  involuntary.  For  
instance,  method  actors  tap  into  their  characters’  mental  states  by  systematically  transforming  
their  own  behaviors  off-­screen,  strongly  embodying  their  characters.  Feeling,  thinking,  and  acting  
like  a  character  off-­set  leads  to  behaving  like  that  character  on  set,  where  that  behavior  stems  
from  real  emotions  and  thus  serves  as  a  natural  sign  of  the  corresponding  internal  states.    
Similarly  extreme  cases  of  filmic  natural  meaning  stem  from  on-­set  accidents.  For  instance,  while  
filming  The  Godfather,  Lenny  Montana,  who  was  playing  Luca  Brasi,  was  nervous  about  working  
with  Marlon  Brando  and,  in  every  take  of  their  first  scene  together,  forgot  his  lines.  Francis  Ford  
Coppola  liked  the  idea  of  Brasi  being  nervous  and  purposely  used  one  of  those  takes  in  the  film.27  
Similarly,  Keenan  Wynn  and  James  Whitmore  have  a  dance-­duet  to  “Brush  Up  Your  
Shakespeare”  in  the  movie-­musical  Kiss  Me  Kate  (1953);;  they  made  numerous  mistakes  during  
production,  and  the  director—thinking  they  were  intentional—left  that  take  in  the  film.28    
These  cases  demonstrate  that  films  can  actually  possess  natural  relations  between  
information  states  insofar  as  they  show  us  actual  natural  cues.  But  more  moderate  cases  of  filmic  
natural  meaning  are  pervasive.  Natural  meaning  need  not  spring  from  (or  consist  in)  fully  
involuntary  actions.  Indeed,  many  of  Grice’s  own  examples  involve  the  voluntary  showing  of  
natural  information:  Herod  presents  Salome  with  the  head  of  St.  John  the  Baptist  to  show  that  he  
is  dead;;  a  child  lets  its  mother  see  that  it  is  pale  to  show  that  it  is  sick;;  a  father  leaves  the  broken  
china  on  the  ground  for  his  partner  to  see  that  their  child  has  broken  it.    All  of  these  cases  involve  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27  Phillips,  Gene  D,  and  Rodney  Hill.  Francis  Ford  Copolla  Interviews.  Mississippi:  University  
Press  of  Mississippi,  2004.  Print.  
28  From  supplemental  information  on  the  DVD,  “Kiss  Me  Kate.”  
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voluntary  actions  that  have  meaning  whose  informational  content  doesn’t  depend  upon  anyone’s  
intentions;;  it’s  just  there  to  be  seen.  In  the  same  way,  we  also  find  filmic  natural  meaning  where  
actors  are,  in  a  sense,  voluntarily  showing  information  to  us.    
Such  cases  include  the  most  common  instances  of  character  portrayal,  where  an  actor  takes  
her  character  to  think  and  feel  certain  things  during  a  scene,  and  wants  to  show  those  thoughts  
and  emotions  to  us.  To  do  this,  she  chooses  not  to  control  every  expression  or  gesture,  to  just  let  
things  happen  in  order  to  depict  her  character  in  a  certain  way.  Her  actions  here  aren’t  entirely  
involuntary;;  she’s  highly  conscious  of  the  portrayal  she  wants  to  inhabit,  and  hasn’t  embodied  her  
character  as  method  actors  do.  But  her  actions  still  allow  for  natural  meaning  insofar  as  her  
expressions  and  gestures  result  from  her  acting  according  to  her  general  motivations  and  aren’t  
fully  controlled.  She  lets  a  smirk  show,  or  lets  her  eyes  water,  or  lets  her  fists  clench,  thereby  
expressing  the  emotions  she  takes  her  character  to  have,  and  these  expressions  have  natural  
meaning,  separate  from  the  aims  surrounding  them,  in  the  same  sort  of  way  that  the  broken  china  
has  a  meaning  independent  of  the  voluntary  act  of  showing  it.29  
Similarly,  films  are  rife  with  nonhuman  natural  meaning.  Filmmakers  film  on  location  in  order  
to  use  real  weather  and  scenery  in  constructing  the  represented  content:  what  is  true  within  the  
world  of  the  fiction.  Filming  horror  films  in  the  fall  helps  to  make  the  plot  more  gloomy  and  tense.  
The  real  landscape  of  New  Zealand  makes  the  fictional  setting  in  Lord  of  the  Rings  look  majestic.  
The  garbage  on  the  streets  in  Taxi  Driver  helps  to  set  the  film’s  tone  and  shows  Travis  Bickle’s  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29  Mitchell  Green  discusses  this  idea  of  letting  things  happen  in  order  to  express  mental  states  in  
Self-­Expression  (Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press,  2007).  He  claims  that  actions  need  not  be  fully  
involuntary  in  order  to  be  expressive—we  can  either  let  the  expressive  behaviors  out,  or  even  
voluntarily  engage  in  them.  For  Green,  what’s  important  is  that  acts  of  expression  serve  as  
signals  that  show  our  internal  states,  and  they  can  serve  as  these  signals  as  long  as  there  are  
natural,  conventional,  or  even  idiosyncratic  relations  between  the  behaviors  and  the  mental  
states.  The  existence  of  this  signaling  relation  makes  something  an  act  of  self-­expression,  and  
that  relation  can  exist  even  where  our  aims  or  intentions  are  at  play.  I  think  his  theory  can  help  us  
make  sense  of  natural  meaning  in  these  common  cases  of  character  portrayal—although  
intention  is  a  play,  and  although  the  gestures  and  behaviors  aren’t  fully  involuntary,  there’s  still  a  
sense  in  which  the  actors  can  be  engaging  in  expression  by  using  cues  that  signal  the  internal  
states  of  their  characters.    
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cynical  perspective.  Filmmakers  almost  invariably  exploit  the  natural  information  carried  by  actual  
environments  to  build  tone  and  reflect  a  distinctive  perspective.    
Filmic  natural  meaning,  then,  is  pervasive.  As  viewers,  we  pick  up  on  it  perceptually—by  
deploying  our  everyday  recognitional  processes.  Insofar  as  natural  meaning  exists  in  the  world—
regardless  of  our  desires  or  aims—it  is  tied  to  reality.  And  in  turn,  film  is  realistic  because  it  
pervasively  trades  on  and  presents  us  with  instances  of  natural  relations  among  information  
states.  
There  is  an  important  sense  in  which  what  I’ve  said  about  film  is  true  of  other  art  forms  as  
well.  Novels  frequently  trade  on  our  knowledge  of  natural  meaning,  presenting  characters  whose  
actions  and  gestures  indicate  their  mental  and  emotional  states,  and  describing  plot  events  with  
everyday  natural  meaning,  drawing  on  our  knowledge  of  the  latter  to  inform  our  understanding  of  
the  former.    
However,  the  particular  perceptual  nature  of  film  gives  it  a  distinctively  strong  tie  to  natural  
meaning.  I’ve  outlined  how  this  ‘nature’  connects  film-­viewing  to  everyday  perceptual  experience.  
But  it’s  necessary  to  delve  more  deeply  in  order  to  understand  how  all  of  this  makes  film’s  tie  to  
natural  meaning  unique.  I  will  argue  that  it  allows  film  to  trade  on  our  knowledge  of  natural  
meaning  more  immediately,  more  frequently,  and  more  credibly  than  other  art  forms.  Let’s  start  
by  comparing  it  to  literature.    
Movies  present  us  with  perceptually  fine-­grained  and  rich  images  of  scenes.  These  allow  
us  to  take  in  facts  (including  natural  information)  about  the  characters,  environment,  and  
atmosphere,  that  are  highly  determinate;;  particular  colors,  particular  houses,  particular  facial  
expressions,  etc,  are  shown  to  us  visually  and  audibly.  This  perceptual  presentation  allows  
viewers  to  gather  natural  information  immediately,  in  part  because  the  cues  are  so  specific  
(specific  gestures,  weather  conditions,  and  the  like),  in  part  because  they’re  shown  perceptually  
and  embedded  within  whole  scenes  which  are  also  presented  perceptually,  and  in  part  because  
viewers  deploy  ordinary  perceptual  capacities  in  recognizing  them.  All  of  this  makes  it  seem  as  if  
the  whole  truth  is  just  there  before  us—that  we’re  quite  passively  observing  everything.  Of  
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course,  this  passivity  is  only  at  the  basic  level  of  film-­viewing:  the  level  of  object,  event,  and  
behavior  recognition  capacities  and  the  natural  meaning  those  things  have  (beyond  this  sort  of  
identification  level,  there’s  often  much  interpretive  work  necessary  during  film-­viewing).    
By  contrast,  literary  narrators  can  only  describe  facts  bit  by  bit,  making  our  experience  of  
the  fictional  world  more  piecemeal.    This  linear,  digital  mode  of  presentation  forces  authors  to  be  
more  selective,  and  to  rely  more  heavily  on  implication.    Partly  as  a  result,  literary  narrators’  
descriptions  are  rarely  straightforward  statements  about  mental  or  emotional  states  (and  the  like);;  
they  employ  literary  strategies  like  metaphor  and  imagery  which  call  on  rich  background  
knowledge  just  to  identify  the  basic  actions  and  events  as  they  happen.    Take,  for  instance,  this  
passage  from  Slaughterhouse-­Five:  
  
“The  main  thing  now  was  to  find  the  steering  wheel.  At  first,  Billy  windmilled  his  arms,  
hoping  to  find  it  by  luck.  When  that  didn’t  work,  he  became  methodical,  working  in  such  a  
way  that  the  wheel  could  not  possibly  escape  him.  He  placed  himself  hard  against  the  
left-­hand  door,  searched  every  square  inch  of  the  area  before  him.  When  he  failed  to  find  
the  wheel,  he  moved  over  six  inches,  and  searched  again.”30  
  
The  metaphor  requires  us  to  understand  the  way  in  which  windmills  typically  move  before  we  can  
picture  just  what  Billy’s  actions  are;;  and,  generally,  the  passage  doesn’t  specify  his  movements—
how  has  he  “placed  himself”?  How  is  he  searching?  What  does  he  look  like  while  doing  so?  We  
have  to  fill  in  these  gaps.  This  all,  despite  the  fact  that  this  passage  is  an  example  of  imagistic,  
concrete  literary  description.  On  the  other  hand,  if  we  were  watching  this  scene,  we  would  see  his  
precise  facial  expressions,  gestures,  and  actions.  
Thus,  literary  description  frequently  fails  to  provide  concrete,  rich,  details  that  allow  us  to  
utilize  our  knowledge  of  natural  meaning  directly;;  instead  it  requires  us  to  do  significant  inferential  
work  to  grasp  the  most  basic,  straightforward  facts  of  the  story.  This  causes  different  readers  to  
conjure  up  different  mental  images  of  the  narrative  events,  and  imposes  an  intermediary  between  
the  initial  presentation  and  deploying  our  knowledge  of  natural  meaning.    Rather  than  being  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30  Vonnegut,  Kurt.  Slaughterhouse-­Five.  New  York:  Dell,  1966.  P.  47.  
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directly  shown  concrete,  literal  sights  and  sounds,  we’re  offered  descriptions  that  require  our  
interpretive  additions.  In  this  sense,  film  calls  on  our  knowledge  of  natural  meaning  more  
immediately  than  literature  and  more  frequently  by  showing  ample  information  (perceivable  facts  
about  a  number  of  things)  directly.  
   Literature  and  film  don’t  merely  differ  with  respect  to  how  much  time  they  take  to  convey  
information,  or  how  much  information  they  convey;;  they  differ  with  respect  to  how  they  convey  
that  information.  This  fact  centers  on  Grice’s  distinction  between  showing  and  telling.  The  
difference,  for  Grice,  between  showing  “Mr.  X  a  photograph  of  Mr.  Y  displaying  undue  familiarity  
to  Mrs.  X”  and  drawing  “a  picture  of  Mr.  Y  behaving  in  this  manner”  and  giving  it  to  Mr.  X  is  that  
the  former  is  showing;;  we’re  being  presented  with  information  that’s  independent  of  any  
perceptual  or  mental  filter.  This  is  why  “Mr.  X  would  be  led  by  the  photograph  at  least  to  suspect  
Mrs.  X  even  if  instead  of  showing  it  to  him  I  had  left  it  in  his  room  by  accident;;”  because  the  
information  itself  (the  meaning  of  the  photograph)  is  independent  of  context  and  the  shower’s  
intentions.31  The  latter  is  telling—we’re  being  presented  with  information  that  depends  for  its  
meaning  on  the  aims  of  the  shower;;  we  have  to  grasp  why  the  shower  drew  the  picture  before  we  
can  conclude  anything  about  Mrs.  X  and  Mr.  Y  from  it.32    
   Film  engages  in  showing,  allowing  it  to  retain  a  credibility  that  literature  lacks.  This  
credibility  is  not  photographic  credibility.  It  doesn’t  have  to  do  with  film  images  giving  us  access  to  
the  real  world.  It  centers,  instead,  on  the  narrative  level  of  film—that  we  trust  that  the  images  and  
sounds  depict  things  that  are  true  in  the  narrative  (e.g.,  that  a  character’s  gestures  indicate  her  
mental  state).  Because  a  movie  shows  us  certain  objects  and  events,  it  allows  for  precisely  the  
unmediated,  direct,  perceptual  access  to  narrative  natural  meaning  that  Grice  articulates  is  a  part  
of  the  concept  itself.  We  directly  see  x  (a  smile),  which  naturally  means  y  (happiness),  and  in  that  
sense  we  have  direct  access  to  y,  where  directness  is  a  lack  of  epistemic  mediation  by  another  
agent.    This  holds  even  in  cases  of  nonphotographic  film:  even  if  it’s  digitally  constructed  and  we  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31  Grice  (1957,  p.383)  
32  Grice  (1957,  p.382)  
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know  this,  there  is  no  (or  little)  room  for  doubt  about  what  we  have  been  shown  simply  because  
we  see  the  events  and  characters  with  our  own  eyes.  
   Literature,  however,  engages  in  telling.  Literary  narrators  are  our  only  access  to  narrative  
meaning,  natural  or  nonnatural;;  and  so  our  engagement  with  that  information  is  more  indirect—
rather  than  seeing  or  hearing  it,  we  read  a  narrator’s  account  of  it.  What  we  have  here  is  
something  akin  to  the  drawing  of  Mr.  Y  and  Mrs.  X:  informational  content  being  filtered  through  
someone  else.  Here,  there  are  two  dimensions  of  filtering:  (1)  potential  unreliability  insofar  as  the  
narrator  might  be  lying  to  us,  and  (2)  selectivity  insofar  as  we’re  only  shown  part(s)  of  the  
scene(s).    
   Of  course,  this  isn’t  to  say  that  narrators  are  always  unreliable  in  literature  or  that  films  
always  lack  narrators  who  can  also  be  unreliable.  My  point  centers  on  the  difference  between  
description  and  perceptual  presentation,  not  between  narrator  and  non-­narrator.  Even  if  we  have  
reason  to  trust  a  literary  narrator,  narrative  natural  meaning  still  only  gets  to  us  through  her,  and  
we  still  have  to  find  her  credible  before  we  find  her  descriptions  credible.  Instead  of  being  
presented  with  information  directly,  we’re  being  told  about  it,  allowing  for  precisely  the  perceptual  
and  mental  filtering  of  (1)  and  (2),  and  preventing  a  lack  of  automatic  credibility.  
   Relatedly,  even  when  there  are  narrators  in  film,  they  have  a  different  relationship  to  the  
stories  they’re  presenting  than  do  literary  narrators,  because  they’re  showing  their  stories.  Rather  
than  filter  every  piece  of  information,  they  give  us  access  to  a  full,  fine-­grained,  perceptual  world;;  
in  doing  so,  they  show  us  aspects  of  the  world  beyond  their  descriptions.  The  perceptual  nature  
of  our  engagement  with  the  narrative  makes  us  assume  that  at  least  some  of  the  information  is  
true  independent  of  the  narration.  Filter  (2)  might  become  a  worry  insofar  as  we  might  doubt  that  
their  perspectives  exhaust  the  whole  story,  and  (1)  might  become  a  worry  insofar  as  we  might  
think  that  things  aren’t  quite  as  the  narrator  is  showing  them  to  us,  but  we’re  still,  regardless  of  
unreliability  and  selectivity,  shown  information  that  seems  to  just  be  there.  This  makes  it  generally  
implausible  to  assume  that  we  aren’t  seeing  any  of  the  truth  at  all.  Cases  of  hallucinations  and  
dreams,  for  instance,  are  rare,  and  typically  only  exist  in  portions  of  a  movie.  Even  in  the  film  The  
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Sixth  Sense,  in  which  the  protagonist  sees  ghosts,  we  might  initially  assume  that  he’s  imagining  
or  hallucinating  what  he  “sees”,  but  we  don’t  assume  that  all  of  the  scenes  between  him  and  his  
mom  are  hallucinatory.    
   Grice’s  example  of  Mr.  X  and  Mrs.  Y  shows  that  this  difference  in  credibility  extends  even  
to  imagistic  media  like  painting.  Like  a  movie  or  photograph,  paintings  depict  fine-­grained  scenes  
in  a  way  that  calls  directly  on  our  perceptual  recognitional  capacities.  But  the  painter’s  intentions  
play  a  role  much  like  the  drawer’s  intentions  in  Grice’s  example;;  our  access  to  the  scenes  is  not  
epistemically  immediate  because  it’s  filtered  through  the  artist.  Second,  unlike  both  literature  and  
painting,  movies  are  perceptually  multi-­modal,  allowing  for  a  rich  stream  of  natural  information  
cues  produced  by  sounds.  And  unlike  paintings,  movies  also  move,  allowing  them  to  depict  
gestures  and  action.33  Both  features  make  film-­viewing  more  like  the  process  of  real-­life  
perception,  and  allow  films  to  depict  more  natural  meaning.  The  same  is  true  of  photography.  
While  it,  unlike  painting  and  literature,  can  possess  natural  meaning  (because  it  can  causally  
replicate  information  from  its  source),  its  restricted  frame,  its  lack  of  motion,  and  its  lack  of  sound,  
all  prevent  it  from  trading  on  our  knowledge  of  natural  meaning  as  much  as  film  does  through  its  
two-­hour  long  depictions.    
In  light  of  these  differences,  the  phrase  “films  trade  on  natural  meaning”  is  far  too  vague;;  
it  doesn’t  specify  what  film-­viewing  actually  consists  in,  which  is  seeing  and  hearing  cues  of  
natural  information  directly,  and  it  doesn’t  specify  what  film  does—that  it  shows  us  those  cues,  
and  allows  for  immediacy  and  credibility.  So  we  might  say  that,  instead  of  merely  trading  on  our  
knowledge  of  natural  meaning,  film  provides  us  with  as-­if  natural  meaning—because  movies  
show  us  the  sorts  of  information  states  we  find  in  real  life  in  an  epistemically  unmediated  way,  it’s  
as  if  we’re  genuinely  encountering  them.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33  Of  course,  this  doesn’t  make  it  impossible  to  portray  motion.  Some  would  say  that  Renaissance  
painters  work  very  hard  to  depict  motion  in  bodies,  scenes,  etc.  Despite  these  techniques,  
however,  the  static  nature  of  the  canvas  constrains  painting  in  a  way  that  moving  images  don’t  
constrain  movies.  At  the  very  least,  the  specificity  and  amount  of  motion  that  paintings  can  depict  
is  significantly  weaker  in  paintings  than  in  films.  
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So  far,  I  have  argued  that  film,  as  a  medium,  has  an  especially  intimate  tie  to  reality,  
because  of  the  distinctively  pervasive  and  direct  manner  in  which  it  exploits  natural  meaning.    
This  is  an  important  advantage  for  my  version  of  cinematic  realism:  realism  reveals  something  
fundamental  about  how  film,  as  opposed  to  other  media,  works.  I  thus  think  my  theory  gives  us  
reason  to  endorse  a  version  of  medium  specificity  (hereafter  referred  to  as  MS):  that  is,  the  theory  
that  art  forms,  in  virtue  of  their  physical  media,  have  certain  unique  artistic  ends.  Medium  
specificity  is  controversial;;  in  this  section,  I  address  Noël  Carroll’s  arguments  against  it.34    
Carroll  mostly  argues  against  a  particularly  strong  version  of  MS,  derived  from  Clement  
Greenberg,35  according  to  which  “each  art  form  should  pursue  those  effects  that,  in  virtue  of  its  
medium,  it  alone—i.e.,  of  all  the  arts—can  achieve.”36  He  takes  issues  with  the  basic  idea  that  
looking  to  physical  media  can  illuminate  artistic  ends,  arguing  that  each  media  has  several  
distinct  qualities,  with  distinct  accompanying  ends,  and  our  purposes  prioritize  some  above  
others.  His  focus,  though,  is  primarily  on  the  normative  claims  of  MS  theories.  These  claims  state,  
roughly,  that  each  art  form  should  pursue  the  ends  that,  in  virtue  of  its  physical  medium,  
differentiate  it  from  other  art  forms,  or  the  ends  that  it  achieves  best.  Typically,  the  two  are  
conflated;;  MS  assumes  that  what  is  unique  to  an  art  form  is  also  what  it  excels  at  doing  (among  
all  of  its  traits).  Here  Carroll  points  to  the  fact  that  the  two  don’t  always  co-­exist—and  when  they  
don’t,  when  both  movies  and  books  excel  at  narration,  say,  the  options  MS  leaves  are  
unattractive:  that  one  art  form  shouldn’t  narrate,  or  that  neither  should.  Both  of  these  decisions  
impinge  upon  creativity.  In  fact,  the  same  sort  of  problem  arises  with  the  more  moderate  claim  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34  Carroll,  Noël.  “The  Specificity  of  Media  in  the  Arts.”  The  Journal  of  Aesthetic  Education  19.4  
(Winter,  1985)  
35  Greenberg  proposes  a  medium  specificity  thesis  for  modernist  painting  in  his  essay  “Modernist  
Painting,”  (in  the  Voice  of  America  pamphlet  and  radio  broadcast,  1960),  and  later  published  in  
Art  and  Literature  (Paris,  spring  1965  and  in  The  New  Art  (1966),  ed.  Gregory  Battcock.    
36  Carroll,  “Specificity  of  Media,”  p.6  
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about  excellence:  we  shouldn’t  care  about  a  medium  doing  only  what  it  excels  at  doing—it  should  
do  what  it  does  “well,”  even  if  it  does  something  “better.”37    
I  think  Carroll  has  pinpointed  precisely  the  shortcomings  this  version  of  MS  encounters.  
But  my  theory  doesn’t  face  the  problems  he  articulates  because  it’s  not  normative.  I  agree  that  a  
medium  doesn’t  specify  which  ends  should  be  pursued—here,  an  interest  in  cinematic  realism  
makes  film’s  relation  to  natural  meaning  important;;  merely  examining  the  filmic  medium  doesn’t  
necessarily  highlight  this  feature  above  others.    I  also  haven’t  argued  that  film’s  relation  to  natural  
meaning  is  essential.  Nor  have  I  contended  that  films  excel  at  particular  ends  (that  certain  filmic  
effects  are  better  than  other  filmic  effects),  or  that  they  should  only  do  what  differentiates  them.  
Indeed,  I  don’t  think  that  movies  should  only  exploit  their  relation  to  natural  meaning.  There’s  
plenty  of  nonnatural  filmic  meaning—usually  in  the  relations  between  shots  (like  jump  cuts,  and  
montage  sequences),  or  genre  conventions—and  that  meaning  certainly  matters.  My  point  is  that  
natural  meaning  (and  as-­if  natural  meaning)  constitutes  an  especially  rich,  perceptually  and  
epistemically  immediate  base  for  meaning  in  film  more  generally.  
Having  said  all  of  this,  though,  I  am  at  odds  with  Carroll.  For  I  have  contended  that  film’s  
tie  to  reality  is  unique,  and  Carroll  is  against  even  this.  As  he  puts  it:    
“Even  when  analysts  are  not  concerned  with  saying  how  a  medium  should  be  used  but  
are  only  attempting  to  describe  the  unique,  artistically  pertinent  features  of  a  medium,  I  
suspect  that  they  are  really  speaking  of  styles  within  the  medium...”38  
  
My  particular  uniqueness  claim  is  different  from  most,  however.  Rather  than  centering  on  one  
difference  that  stems  from  one  unique  feature  of  the  medium,  my  uniqueness  argument  hinges  on  
a  combination  of  features.  What’s  unique  about  film  is  how  it  has  a  particular  bundle  of  
characteristics,  none  of  which  is  individually  peculiar  to  film,  but  all  of  which—together—make  film  
special.  These  characteristics  are:  it  has  the  potential  to  causally  replicate  information  from  its  
source  (which  photography  shares);;  it  is  perceptual  (which  painting  and  photography,  among  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37  “If  a  medium  does  something  well  and  the  occasion  arises,  why  should  an  art  form  be  inhibited  
especially  just  because  there  is  something  that  the  art  form  does  better  Carroll,  “Specificity  of  
Media,”  p.14  
38  Carroll,  “Specificity  of  Media,”  p.18  
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others,  are);;  it  can  have  a  narrative  form  (similar  to  literature  and  theater);;  and  it  is  made  up  of  
moving  images  (perhaps  this  feature  does  differentiate  it,  but  this  isn’t  relevant  for  my  purposes,  
since  it  alone  doesn’t  make  movies  most  realistic).  Having  all  of  these  features  gives  film  a  unique  
tie  to  reality.  With  this  in  mind,  I  think  we  should  agree  with  Carroll  that  the  more  extreme  version  
of  MS  is  false,  but  nonetheless  endorse  this  more  modest  version.  
               Common  Pitfalls  
In  this  section,  I  motivate  my  view  by  highlighting  how  it  avoids  some  pitfalls  faced  by  other  
versions  of  cinematic  realism.    The  most  extreme  form  of  realism  holds  that  films  are  sequences  
of  photographs  and  that,  in  virtue  of  their  indexicality  (i.e.,  cameras  have  direct,  causal  access  to  
things  in  front  of  them,  creating  a  physical  relation  between  those  things  and  their  corresponding  
images),  they  put  us  in  direct  perceptual  contact  with  the  world.  Theorists  explicate  this  
perceptual  contact  in  different  ways.  André  Bazin  claims  that  the  photographic  image  just  is  its  
referent,  so  that  seeing  the  former  is  seeing  the  latter.  He  states:    
The  photographic  image  is  the  object  itself,  the  object  freed  from  the  conditions  of  time  and  
space  that  govern  it.  No  matter  how  fuzzy,  distorted,  or  discolored,  no  matter  how  lacking,  in  
documentary  value  the  image  may  be,  it  shares,  by  virtue  of  the  very  process  of  its  
becoming,  the  being  of  the  model  of  which  it  is  the  reproduction;;  it  is  the  model.39    
  
Kendall  Walton  argues  that  photography  “deserves  to  be  called  a  supremely  realistic  medium”.40  
This  realism  centers  on  the  transparency  of  the  photographic  medium:  the  fact  that  we  see  
through  photographs  (and  photographic  films).  As  Walton  puts  it:  
  
With  the  assistance  of  the  camera,  we  can  see  not  only  around  corners  and  what  is  distinct  
or  small;;  we  can  also  see  into  the  past.  We  see  long  deceased  ancestors  when  we  look  at  
dusty  snapshots  of  them.  To  view  a  screening  of  Frederic  Wiseman’s  Titcut  Follies  (1967)  in  
San  Francisco  in  1984  is  to  watch  events  which  occurred  in  1967  at  the  Bridgewater  State  
Hospital  for  the  Criminally  Insane.  Photographs  are  transparent.  We  see  the  world  through  
them.41    
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39  Bazin,  André,  and  Hugh  Gray.  “The  Ontology  of  the  Photographic  Image.”  Film  Quarterly  13.4  
(Summer  1960):  4-­9.  P.  8  
40  Walton,  Kendall  L.  “Transparent  Pictures:  On  the  Nature  of  Photographic  Realism.”  Critical  
Inquiry  11.2  (1984):  246-­277.  P.  251.  
41  Walton  (1984,  p.251)  
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The  point,  then,  is  not  just  that  we  see  copies  of  people,  places,  and  objects,  when  we  see  
photographic  images  of  them—we  see,  in  a  very  strong  sense,  them.  
Bazin’s  view  faces  an  immediate  objection:  seeing  an  image  is  different  from  seeing  in  3-­D,  
so  his  comments  either  can’t  be  taken  literally  or  must  immediately  be  dismissed.  Walton  himself  
admits  this:  “it  is  simply  and  obviously  false  that  a  photographic  image  of  Half  Dome,  for  example,  
is  Half  Dome.  Perhaps  we  shouldn’t  interpret  Bazin’s  words  literally.”42  Stanley  Cavell,  too,  wants  
to  make  Bazin’s  claim  but  finds  it  “false  and  paradoxical,”  as  “obviously  a  photograph  of  an  
earthquake,  or  of  Garbo,  is  not  an  earthquake  happening  (fortunately),  or  Garbo  in  the  flesh  
(unfortunately).”43    
While  Walton’s  version  seemingly  avoids  this  absurdity,  insofar  as  it  doesn’t  hold  that  a  
photograph  is  its  referent,  it  faces  a  similar  objection—surely  we  don’t  see  people,  actual  people,  
when  we  look  at  a  photograph.  Surely  seeing  my  grandma  in  the  flesh  is  not  the  same  as  seeing  
an  image  of  her.  Walton  hints  at  such  a  difference  but  insists  that  his  claims  be  taken  literally.  He  
states,    
“I  must  warn  against  watering  down  this  suggestion,  against  taking  it  to  be  a  colorful,  or  
exaggerated,  or  not  quite  literal  way  of  making  a  relatively  mundane  point…my  claim  is  
that  we  see,  quite  literally,  our  dead  relatives  themselves  when  we  look  at  photographs  of  
them.”44  
  
  We  seem  to  be  left  with  the  slightly  unspecified  claim  that  we  really  do  see  objects  when  we  look  
at  photographic  images  of  them.  Perhaps  this  sense  of  “see”  differs  from  others,  but  because  of  
Walton’s  reluctance  to  elucidate  these  different  senses,  it’s  hard  to  read  him  in  a  less  extreme  
way.45    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42  Walton  (1984,  p.249)  
43  Cavell  raises  this  issue  in  The  World  Viewed:  Reflections  on  the  Ontology  of  Film  (Harvard:  
Harvard  University  Press,  1979.  P.  17).    
44  (Walton,  1984,  p.  251-­252).  
45  When  discussing  the  potential  for  the  different  senses  of  “see,”  he  states  that  he  might  be  
extending  the  use  of  the  word,  but  that  it  is  a  very  natural  extension  and  need  not  imply  any  strict  
difference  between  seeing  in  the  flesh  and  seeing  in  a  photograph.  He  states  “our  theory  needs,  
in  any  case,  a  term  which  applies  both  to  my  ‘seeing’  my  great-­grandfather  when  I  look  at  his  
snapshot  and  to  my  seeing  my  father  when  he  is  in  front  of  me.  What  is  important  is  that  we  
recognize  a  fundamental  commonality  between  the  two  cases,  a  single  natural  kind  to  which  both  
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To  avoid  these  ontological  claims,  some  theorists  propose  the  humbler  claim  that  films  are  
especially  realistic  because  their  images  stem  from  direct  causal  access  to  the  world,  and  that  
they  should  exploit  that  access  by  producing  images  that  are  as  similar  as  possible  to  what  is  in  
front  of  the  camera  during  production.  This  means  eliminating  as  many  editing  techniques  as  
possible,  and  producing  photographic  films  that  don’t  distort  the  appearance  of  the  actors,  sets,  
props,  etc.  In  short,  “the  world  of  a  realist  film”  looks  like  “what  was  before  the  camera  when  and  
where  the  film  was  made.”46  Siegfried  Kracauer  is  typically  placed  within  this  theoretical  camp.47  
He  argues  that  photographic  films  are  uniquely  capable  of  showing  us  physical  reality:  “film  is  
essentially  an  extension  of  photography  and  therefore  shares  with  this  medium  a  marked  affinity  
for  the  visible  world  around  us,”  and  should  therefore  capture  “transient  material  life”  that  happens  
to  be  in  front  of  the  camera.48  This  version  of  cinematic  realism  focuses  on  indexicality  as  Bazin’s  
does—it’s  in  virtue  of  the  indexical  relation  between  image  and  referent  that  the  former  stems  
from  direct  causal  access  with  the  world,  and  it’s  in  virtue  of  this  relation  that  film  is  capable  of  
capturing  actual  physical  life.  But  it  doesn’t  move  to  the  ontological  claim  about  our  seeing  the  
referent  itself  as  a  consequence  of  this  fact.    
Even  this  less  extreme  version,  commonly  called  direct  realism,  is  problematic.  First,  it  
deems  anything  other  than  purely  photographic  films  to  be  unrealistic,  drastically,  and  
implausibly,  reducing  the  scope  of  realism.  Second,  as  Carroll  argues,  it  misconstrues  what  our  
focus  in  viewing  films  is  (and  should  be)  on.  In  watching  a  movie,  our  attention  is  not  directed  at  
the  things  in  front  of  the  camera,  but  rather  toward  the  “nominal  portrayal”—what  those  things  
represent.  Direct  realism  (which  Carroll  calls  “re-­presentationalism”):  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
belong”  (252).  He,  thus,  wants  the  two  cases  to  be  aligned;;  and  he  doesn’t  endorse  the  sort  of  
attempt  we  might  make  to  appeal  to  notions  of  perception  or  indirect  seeing  in  order  to  note  
relevant  differences  between  the  two.  
46  Daniel  Morgan  provides  this  sort  of  characterization  of  direct  realism  in  “Rethinking  Bazin:  
Ontology  and  Realist  Aesthetics”  in:  Critical  Inquiry  32  (Spring  2006):  443-­81.  p.  455.  
47  Kracauer,  Siegfried.  Theory  of  Film:  The  Redemption  of  Physical  Reality.  New  York:  Oxford  
University  Press,  1960.  
48  Kracauer  (1960,  p.13)  
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“seems  to  say  that  what  is  important  about  any  photographic  image—whether  in  a  fictional  
context  or  otherwise—is  what  it  re-­presents.  Yet  what  is  literally  re-­presented  in  a  
photographic  fiction  may  be  completely  irrelevant  to  what  the  fiction  represents.  That  is,  
when  confronted  with  fiction,  the  re-­presentationalist  theory  implies  strange  results  by  
ontologically  misplacing,  so  to  speak,  the  focus  of  our  attention...”49  
  
My  theory  avoids  both  these  problems.  First,  by  centering  on  how  films  can  uniquely  present  
as-­if  natural  meaning  or  possess  natural  meaning,  my  version  is  applicable  to  photographic  and  
nonphotographic  movies.  Film-­viewing,  like  everyday  perceptual  experience,  deploys  our  
perceptual  recognitional  capacities,  and  it  continues  to  do  so  even  when  the  images  themselves  
have  been  enhanced  or  constructed.  Even  in  a  thoroughly  CGI-­laden  movie  like  300,  we’re  often  
watching  a  projection  of  actual  3-­D  objects.  And  even  when  the  objects  depicted  are  themselves  
constructed,  we  still  recognize  them  and  their  properties  using  basic  everyday  perceptual  
processes.    For  instance,  we  still  recognize  the  Spartans—or  the  actors  who  portray  the  
Spartans—as  people,  who  are  grimacing,  leaping,  and  so  on.  This  allows  us  to  both  pick  up  on  
the  sorts  of  features  Carroll  points  to,  as  well  as  the  natural  meaning  inherent  in  them.  
Such  films  also  heavily  present  as-­if  natural  meaning.  Even  if  the  facial  expressions  or  
actions  in  the  film  are  constructed,  they’re  still  shown,  and  we  thus  still  perceive  them  and  the  
natural  information  they  possess  just  as  we  do  in  daily  life.  We  see  a  character  crying  and  thus  
see  her  sadness,  or  see  a  character  clenching  her  fists  and  thus  see  her  anger,  even  if  we  know  
her  tears  and  fists  are  partially  or  wholly  computer-­generated,  as  with  King  Kong,  the  Na’vi  in  
Avatar,  or  Shrek.  Now,  nonphotographic  movies  won’t  themselves  have  natural  meaning  because  
they  won’t  show  us  actual  cues  of  natural  information.  But  movies  needn’t  maintain  both  of  the  
relations  that  I  outlined  to  be  realistic,  and—in  any  case—both  photographic  and  nonphotographic  
films  are  uniquely  realistic  when  compared  to  other  art  forms.    
Turning  to  Carroll’s  objection  about  the  importance  of  nominal  portrayal,  we  can  also  see  
that  a  focus  on  natural  meaning  needn’t  conflict  with  attention  to  nominal  portrayal.  When  movies  
possess  natural  meaning,  it  intimately  affects,  and  significantly  constitutes,  the  film’s  nominal  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




content:  what  is  true  in  the  fiction.  The  garbage  in  Taxi  Driver  affects  its  tone  and  
characterization;;  Montana’s  nervousness  makes  Brasi  nervous;;  Wynn  and  Whitmore’s  confusion  
makes  their  characters  silly.  Actors’  actions  partially  constitute  their  characters’  behavior,  
affecting  how  we  interpret  those  characters’  emotions  and  thoughts.    
The  point  extends  to  the  idea  of  as-­if  natural  meaning.  An  integral  part  of  our  interpretations  
of  characters  involves  identifying  their  emotional  and  cognitive  states  by  appeal  to  the  
expressions  and  gestures  that  we  see.  Actors  act  accordingly—with  those  expressions  and  
gestures.  Even  when  the  performances  of  actors  are  completely  digitized,  as  in  the  new  Planet  of  
the  Apes  movies,  their  gestures  and  facial  expressions  have  as-­if  natural  meaning.  All  of  this  is  to  
say:    film’s  relation  to  natural  meaning  isn’t  separate  from  its  nominal  portrayal;;  in  fact,  attending  
to  the  latter  typically  requires  attending  to  the  former.  
Carroll’s  objection  emphasizes  something  that  cinematic  realists  don’t  always  emphasize  
enough:  that  we  are—during  fiction  film-­viewing—observing  a  fictional  world.  My  response  to  
Carroll  illuminates  that  our  following  the  fictional  narrative  need  not  be  separate  from  our  
employing  basic  perceptual  processes  to  pick  up  on  natural  information.    In  fact,  the  latter  helps  
us  move  from  what  we  literally  see  to  what  is  fictionally  shown.  We  see  and  hear  certain  qualities  
at  the  non-­fictional  level—e.g.,  the  actor’s  gestures—and  consequently  recognize  certain  qualities  
at  the  fictional  level—e.g.,  the  character’s  feelings  and  thoughts.    
So  my  theory  is  more  inclusive  than  direct  realism,  and  allows  for  an  intimate  interaction  
between  the  natural  meaning  level  and  nominal  level.  At  the  same  time,  it  articulates  a  
considerably  more  robust  realism  than  the  alternatives  that  theorists  have  offered  to  meet  the  two  
aforementioned  objections  to  direct  realism.  Stephen  Prince,  Gregory  Currie,  and  Francesco  
Casetti  all  propose  versions  of  psychological  realism,  holding  that  film-­viewing  mirrors  our  
psychological  engagement  with  the  world.  “Psychological  engagement”  here  can  be  quite  broad,  
though  these  theorists  typically  focus  on  perceptual  engagement  (i.e.,  visual  and  auditory  
experience).  Importantly,  they  don’t  prioritize  photographic  cinema—indeed,  one  merit  of  
psychological  realism  is  that  it  acknowledges  that  digitally-­based  films  can  engage  our  perceptual  
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processes  in  the  same  basic  ways.  In  elucidating  what  this  ‘mirroring’  consists  in,  some  theorists  
are  quite  general,  focusing  on  how  seeing  images  of  things  is  very  much  like  seeing  things  
themselves.    Some  point  more  specifically  to  editing  techniques,  like  depth  of  field,  that  depict  
physical  relations  between  images  that  mirror  physical  relations  between  3-­D  versions  of  those  
images.50  Others  focus  on  something  akin  to  perceptual  or  cognitive  illusion,  according  to  which  
film’s  perceptual  nature  makes  us  either  imagine  that  we’re  in  the  screen  or  falsely  believe  that  
we  are.    Thus,  Walton  argues  that  spectators  often  put  themselves  imaginatively  into  characters’  
perceptual  perspectives:  the  spectator  “participates  in  a  visual  game  of  make-­believe  using  part  
or  all  of  the  depiction  as  a  prop,  and  it  is  fictional  that  she  sees  in  a  way  in  which,  fictionally,  the  
character  does—whether  through  the  character’s  eyes  or  her  own;;  she  imagines  seeing  thus.”51    
My  view  also  emphasizes  how  our  experience  of  film-­viewing  is  similar  to  our  everyday  
perceptual  experience.  Still,  my  view  is  at  least  a  bit  stronger,  for  it  invokes  a  tighter  tie  that  
movies  can  have  to  reality:  movies  can,  and  often  do,  pervasively  deliver  natural  information.  
Relatedly,  psychological  realism  doesn’t  elucidate  the  stark  difference  between  film’s  tie  to  reality  
and  painting’s:  that,  while  both  visual  art  forms  draw  on  perceptual  recognitional  capacities  and  
knowledge  of  natural  meaning,  only  film  has  the  capacity  to  do  so  in  an  epistemically  unmediated  
way—by  partaking  in  showing  (like  the  photograph  of  Mr.  X  and  Mrs.  Y)  rather  than  telling  (like  
the  drawing  of  Mr.  X  and  Mrs.  Y).    
Cinematic  realism  need  not  come  in  the  ‘direct’  or  ‘psychological’  forms  I’ve  laid  out,  
however.  In  fact,  one  other  camp  differs  from  those.  It’s  one  that  deems  movies  realistic  insofar  
as  they  comment  on  or  express  thoughts  about  reality.  I’ll  present  this  as  a  camp  constructed  
from  charitable  interpretations  of  André  Bazin  and  Siegfried  Kracauer.  Both  Bazin  and  Kracauer  
are  generally  considered  to  be  extreme  or  direct  realists,  because  many  of  their  comments  either  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50  Bazin,  1967.  
51  For  Walton,  properly  engaging  with  fiction  film  involves  imaginatively  projecting  ourselves  into  
the  action  on  the  screen,  pretending  that  we  are  surrounded  by  the  characters  and  events.  We  
use  the  screen  images  as  props  in  a  game  of  make-­believe,  which  connects  film-­viewing  to  more  
ordinary  games  of  pretense.  He  develops  this  theory  in  full  in  Mimesis  as  Make-­Believe  
(Cambridge:  Harvard  University  Press,  1990.  The  quote  I’ve  provided  is  on  pp.  346-­7.  
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explicitly  say,  or  at  least  suggest  they’re  interested  in,  accounts  of  cinematic  realism  that  center  
on  photographic  indexicality.  But  some  commentators  present  more  complicated  interpretations,  
drawing  on  significant  textual  and  contextual  evidence.  So,  it’s  worth  looking  at  a  species  of  
cinematic  realism  that  Bazin  and  Kracauer  at  least  might  have  held.    
  In  her  interpretation  of  Kracauer,  Miriam  Bratau  Hansen  claims  that  especially  in  his  earlier  
works,  Kracauer  is  motivated  by  modernist  concerns.52    Thus,  he  advocates  that  films  should  
show  us  the  fragmentation  of  the  world  by  presenting  fragmented  images  of  it,  calling  Die  Straβe  
a  “manifesto  of  metaphysical  malaise”  which  shows  “the  suffering  of  the  languishing  soul  in  the  
lifeless  bustle”  of  modern  existence.53  The  film  expresses  how  isolating  and  distorting  modern  
society  can  be  by  presenting  piecemeal  images  of  the  things  the  protagonist  encounters  on  the  
street—a  “vertiginous  sequence  of  futurist  images”—and  by  anthropomorphizing  inanimate  
things—“a  lime  wall  announces  a  murder,  an  electric  sign  flickers  like  a  blinking  eye.”54  
For  Kracauer,  a  movie  “mechanically  recomposes  the  world”;;  serving  as  a  “distorting  mirror;;”  
it  can  exaggerate  the  world’s  “unreality  and  thus  point  toward  true  reality,”  reach  for  a  “deeper  
meaning”  to  existence,  and  serve  as  a  vehicle  of  “material  expression.”55  That  is,  films  do  (and  
should)  depict  reality,  by  expressing  or  showing  what  the  world  is  like:  illuminating  how  it  feels  to  
live  in  a  modern  world,  say.  For  Kracauer,  cinematic  realism  doesn’t  consist  in  reproducing  
images  of  real  physical  things,  but  rather  in  showing  us  a  deeper,  sometimes  nonphysical  reality.  
And  that  involves  (1)  interpreting  the  world  rather  than  merely  photographing  it,  (2)  commenting  
on  it,  and  (3)  sometimes  using  the  nonphotographic  tools  at  its  disposal  to  depict  that  
interpretation56.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52  Hansen,  Miriam  Bratu.  Cinema  and  Experience.  Berkeley:  University  of  California  Press,  2012.  
9.  
53  Hansen  (2012,  p.9)  
54  Hansen  (2012,  p.10)  
55  Hansen  (2012,  pp.  8,  10,  and  12).  
56  It’s  more  difficult  to  make  these  claims  with  respect  to  Theory  of  Film,  as  that  book  is  generally  
considered  to  be  an  account  of  direct  realism.  But  Hansen  thinks  that,  even  there,  Kracauer’s  
theory  is  more  complicated  than  it’s  given  credit  for.  In  particular,  she  argues  that  our  imagination  
and  private  associations  have  a  place  in  Kracauer’s  theory—that  he  contends  that  we  should  use  
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Daniel  Morgan  interprets  Bazin  along  similar  lines,  claiming  that  Bazin’s  realism  centers  on  
acknowledging  the  physical  world.57  As  he  puts  it:    
  
“A  film,  if  it  is  to  be  realist,  must  construct  a  style  that  counts  as  an  
acknowledgement  of  the  reality  conveyed  through  its  photographic  base…in  the  
acknowledgement,  a  film  produces  a  particular  reading  (an  articulation  or  
interpretation)  of  the  reality  in  the  photograph,  thereby  generating  what  Bazin,  in  
his  discussion  of  neorealism,  calls  a  fact  (a  social  fact,  a  political  or  moral  fact,  a  
spiritual  fact,  an  existential  fact,  and  so  on).”58    
  
Inasmuch  as  movies  are  photographically  based,  they  must  acknowledge  their  ontological  
foundation  in  reality.  They  do  this  by  depicting  certain  objects,  people,  or  places  in  the  world  and  
doing  something  with  them—expressing  thoughts  about  them,  or  interpreting  them.    
Morgan  is  quite  abstract  in  his  discussion,  but  he  supports  his  interpretation  with  a  shot-­by-­
shot  analysis  of  Roberto  Rossellini’s  Viaggio  in  Italia  and  explaining  how  Rossellini’s  camera  work  
attempts  to  evoke  moods  and  thoughts  about  its  images.  Its  goal  isn’t  merely  to  show  us  the  
world:  it  raises  questions  about  what  it  is  showing  us,  and  uses  the  objects  in  its  shots  (art  
objects,  in  particular)  to  characterize  the  film’s  protagonist,  for  instance,  “the  capacity  of  the  
statues  to  provoke  Catherine’s  imagination.”59  
What’s  more,  according  to  Morgan,  the  movement  of  the  camera  often  mirrors  the  
protagonist’s  psychology  and  “responds  to  and  evokes  her  mood.”60  Essentially,  the  film  is  
involved  in  “judging,  and  interpreting  the  fact  of  Bergman’s  physical  and  imaginative  encounter  
with  each  statue.”61    All  of  this  goes  beyond  mere  physical  reproduction.  Insofar  as  Bazin  
considers  this  movie  “realistic,”  Morgan  thinks  we  have  reason  to  attribute  to  him  a  cinematic  
realism  that  depends  not  on  photographic  indexicality  but  on  “acknowledgment”,  a  process  
whereby  films  turn  features  of  physical  reality  into  facts  by  interpreting  them.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
them  to  imbue  filmic  images  with  more  meaning  than  they  possess  photographically—and  that  
purely  photographic  films  aren’t  the  only  ones  he  advocates  for  (Hansen  2012,  253-­279).  
57  Morgan,  2006    
58  Morgan  (2006,  p.471)  
59  Morgan  (2006,  p.465)  
60  Morgan  (2006,  p.467)  
61  Morgan  (2006,  p.469)  
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Although  there  are  important  differences  between  Bazin  and  Kracauer,  Morgan’s  and  
Hansen’s  analyses  argue  that  each  proposes  a  version  of  cinematic  realism  on  which  a  realistic  
movie  says  something  about,  responds  to,  or  interprets  the  world.  Sometimes  this  requires  going  
beyond  mere  physical  reproduction  to  distort  physical  reality.  I  think  this  account  of  cinematic  
realism  is  very  plausible.  Movies  do  accomplish  the  sorts  of  things  Bazin  and  Kracauer  discuss.  
They  comment  on  society,  on  politics,  on  modernity,  on  cultural  issues,  showing  us  what  racism,  
prejudice  or  certain  cultural  events  are  (or  were)  like,  or  what  it’s  like  to  be  human:  how  we  can  
err,  love,  struggle,  etc.  Their  approach  applies  to  movies  in  general,  and  gets  at  something  
important  about  why  we  watch  movies.  The  problem  is  that  because  of  its  very  generality,  it  
doesn’t  capture  anything  distinctive  about  movies,  something  that  film  can  do  better  than  any  
other  art  form.  As  such,  their  realism  applies  just  as  well  to  literary  fictions  as  to  films.      
The  novel  Native  Son  shows  what  it’s  like  for  a  black  boy  to  live  in  a  racist  society  and  the  
inevitable  consequences  of  that  society.  The  Stranger  elucidates  the  absurdity  of  the  universe  
and  our  irrational  search  for  meaning.  Crime  and  Punishment  depicts  the  extreme  psychological  
effects  of  murder.  These  books  utilize  literary  techniques  to  accomplish  these  things.  Richard  
Wright  uses  copious  descriptions  of  Bigger  Thomas’s  living  conditions:  his  cramped,  poor,  home;;  
his  social  interactions  with  racists;;  and  his  psychology  before  and  after  he  commits  murder.  The  
Stranger  uses  first-­person  narrative  to  illuminate  Meursault’s  psychology—his  apathy,  
confusion—and  depict  the  meaningless  of  his  crime  as  well  as  the  irrationality  of  society’s  
attempts  to  rationalize  it.  And  Crime  and  Punishment  gets  at  the  psychological  effects  of  murder  
by  dedicating  hundreds  of  pages  to  describing  the  guilt  Raskolnikov  feels  after  his  crime.    
These  novels  do  just  what  Kracauer  and  Bazin  emphasize:  they  express,  respond  to,  and  
interpret  various  aspects  of  reality  (murder,  irrationality,  racism,  etc).  Literature  in  general  does  
this;;  indeed,  it’s  one  of  the  primary  things  we  take  art  to  do.  Thus,  if  we  follow  this  minimal  version  
of  realism  in  deeming  films  realistic  because  (or  when)  they  say  something  about  the  world,  then  
we  should  admit  that  songs,  novels,  and  paintings  are  realistic  in  just  the  same  way.  Of  course,  
each  art  form  expresses  in  different  ways—via  language,  images,  paint,  instruments.  And  
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perhaps  film’s  perceptual,  imagistic  nature  makes  its  expressive  powers  special  or  better.  But  if  
so,  it  remains  to  be  articulated  how  this  is.  By  contrast,  my  view  holds  that  film  bears  a  particularly  
strong  tie  to  natural  meaning.  It  is  true,  and  important,  that  other  media  can  trade  on  knowledge  
of  natural  meaning,  but  film  trades  on  natural  meaning  both  more,  and  with  more  credibility,  than  
other  art  forms  do.    
Thus,  my  version  of  cinematic  realism  avoids  the  implausible  commitments  of  extreme  and  
direct  realism  while  identifying  a  moderate  form  of  medium  specificity  that  can  underwrite  a  form  
of  realism  distinctive  to  film:  it  is,  in  short,  a  version  of  cinematic  realism.  Much  remains  to  be  
filled  in  yet,  especially  with  regards  to  my  claims  about  immediacy  and  the  general  perceptual  
processes  we  engage  in  during  film-­viewing.  But  at  least  I  think  it  puts  us  on  the  right  track.  
My  chief  aim  in  this  paper  has  been  to  argue  that  turning  to  Grice’s  concept  of  natural  
meaning—film’s  relation  to  it,  and  our  interpretation  and  perception  of  it—can  help  us  make  better  
sense  of  cinematic  realism.  It  can  allow  us  to  understand  how  movies  are  singularly  tied  to  reality  
and  to  specify  what  that  connection  amounts  to.  It  can  provide  us  with  some  resources  that  
competing  versions  lack—the  ability  to  motivate  cinematic  realism  by  elucidating  how  movies  are  
more  realistic  than  other  art  forms,  and  the  ability  to  connect  the  ‘realistic’  level  to  the  nominal  
level,  thus  making  the  former  seem  to  matter  insofar  as  it’s  tied  to  how  we  watch  and  interpret  
filmic  fictions.  In  the  end,  then,  considerations  regarding  natural  meaning  can  substantiate  a  









WHAT  WE  SEE  AT  THE  MOVIES  
  
Philosophers  of  film  often  discuss  how  film  is  a  perceptual  medium—how  it  shows  us  sights  and  
sounds,  how  it  engages  our  perceptual  processes.  When  they  do  so,  they  center  their  
discussions  on  the  nonfictional  level  of  film—the  people,  places  and  things  that  films  in  fact  show  
us,  and  how  their  ability  to  show  differentiates  them  from  other  art  forms.    
   Treatment  of  the  nonfictional  diverges  strongly  from  treatment  of  the  fictional.  With  
respect  to  the  latter—to  what  Noël  Carroll  calls  “nominal  portrayal,”  or  what  is  depicted  by  the  
nonfictional—the  conversation  typically  moves  from  a  focus  on  the  perceptual  to  a  focus  on  the  
cognitive;;  theorists  discuss  how  we  think  of  or  imagine  characters,  fictional  worlds  and  the  like.  
   In  this  way,  a  division  is  marked  between  the  fictional  and  the  nonfictional  content  in  a  
movie;;  we  (supposedly)  engage  with  latter  perceptually  (and  cognitively),  and  with  the  former  
cognitively.  Intuitively  this  makes  sense.  What,  for  instance,  do  we  see  when  we  watch  The  Lord  
of  the  Rings?  One  answer  perhaps  immediately  come  to  mind:  that  we  see  scenes  made  up  of  
countryside,  mountains,  castles,  cottages,  actors  like  Elijah  Wood  and  Cate  Blanchett  in  their  
costumes  and  attire,  and  the  landscape  of  New  Zealand.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  we’re  asked  
whether  or  not  we  see  Frodo,  Samwise,  Gandalf,  and  the  continent  of  Middle-­Earth,  many  of  us  
would  (I  think)  say  that  it’s  (at  most)  in  a  figurative  or  metaphorical  sense  that  we  do  so.  Fictional  
entities  are  only  represented  by  what  is  on  the  screen,  and  this  makes  their  very  existence  
tenuous  or  confusing.  We  seemingly  have  to  admit  that,  however  it  is  that  we  get  to  know  nominal  
portrayal,  it  isn’t  by  seeing  it.  
   Theorists  maintain  this  intuition,  either  failing  to  discuss  how  we  perceptually  engage  with  
fictional  content  or  denying  such  a  possibility.62  But,  as  intuitive  as  this  distinction  might  seem,  it  is  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62  George  Wilson  does  so  in  Seeing  Fictions  in  Film,  p.  147.  And  imaginative  engagement  
theorists  like  Noël  Carroll  and  Gregory  Currie  deny  that  we  even  imagine  seeing  the  depicted  
content  in  a  fiction  film,  let  alone  that  we  see  it  in  any  genuine  respect.  
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mistaken.  In  fact,  there  is  no  such  obvious  divide  between  our  engagement  with  a  film’s  
nonfictional  and  its  fictional  content  because  the  latter  is  also  perceptual  in  nature.    
   In  this  paper  I  will  argue  that  there  are  various  perceptual  experiences  audiences  have  
during  film-­viewing—specifically  seeing-­as  experiences—one  of  which  is  seeing  a  film's  images  
as  images  of  fictional  entities.  I  will  argue  that,  insofar  as  we  perceptually  experience  the  fictional,  
we  ought  to  recognize  how  our  engagement  with  it  is  more  similar  to  our  engagement  with  
nonfictional  content  than  is  typically  acknowledged.  
               Seeing-­as  
Ludwig  Wittgenstein  introduces  the  concept  of  “seeing-­as”  in  The  Investigations.63  It  
consists,  he  claims,  in  a  fusion  of  thought  and  perception—interpreting  an  object  and  
simultaneously  seeing  it  according  to  that  interpretation.  His  famous  example  is  the  duck-­rabbit  
diagram—if  we  think  of  it  as  a  duck  (or  rabbit),  and  that  thought  fuses  with  our  perceptual  
experience,  we  thereby  see  it  as  a  duck  (or  rabbit).    
Despite  the  fact  that,  for  Wittgenstein,  we  can’t  analyze  our  subjective  experience  here—
e.g.,  by  positing  the  existence  of  some  inner  mental  impression—in  order  to  determine  that  this  is  
a  genuinely  visual  experience,  we  can  do  so  by  appeal  to  the  behaviors  we’re  likely  to  engage  in  
while  seeing-­as.  I’m  likely  to  point  to  pictures  of  ducks  while  I’m  seeing  the  duck-­rabbit  as  a  duck,  
to  identify  his  beak  and  eye  in  the  diagram.  What  I’m  seeing-­as  affects  how  I  act  towards,  
respond  to,  the  picture—where  I  focus  my  attention,  and  what  sorts  of  comparisons  I  draw.  And  
these  activities  show  that  my  visual  impression  is  of  whatever  I’m  seeing-­as  (e.g.,  is  of  a  duck).64  
Wittgenstein  focuses  primarily  on  cases  like  the  duck-­rabbit  diagram,  cases  in  which  we  
look  at  some  image  or  picture  and  see  it  as  one  thing  rather  than  another.  With  this  focus  on  
alternative  aspect  availability,  Wittgenstein  seemingly  leaves  out  of  his  analysis  ordinary  cases  
that  consist  in  simply  seeing  an  object  as  the  object  it  is  of.  Other  theorists  consider  these  more  
simple  instances.  P.F.  Strawson,  for  instance,  takes  all  seeing  to  involve  seeing-­as  because,  he  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63  Wittgenstein,  Ludwig.  Philosophical  Investigations,  3rd  ed.  Blackwell:  Oxford,  2001.    
64  (Wittgenstein,  197).  
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argues,  the  imagination  is  a  part  of  perception  itself.65  And  for  many  conceptualists  about  
perception,  perceiving  something  requires  thinking  of  it  in  a  certain  way  and  thus  necessarily  
consists  in  a  fusion  of  cognition  and  perception.66  So  it’s  important  to  note  that,  despite  
Wittgenstein’s  interest,  seeing-­as  might  include  all  cases  of  perception.  
At  the  other  end  of  the  seeing-­as  spectrum  are  cases  of  make-­believe,  in  which  we  
imagine  or  pretend  that  what  we’re  looking  at  is  very  different  from  what  we  know  it  to  be.  The  
sorts  of  childlike  games  of  pretense  that  Kendall  Walton  discusses  in  Mimesis  as  Make-­Believe  
fall  under  this  heading.67  As  children,  we  pretend  that  a  rock  is  a  bear,  or  that  the  sticks  we’re  
holding  are  swords,  or  that  the  grassy  field  is  a  sand  dune.  In  doing  so,  we  see  those  objects  as  
the  objects  we’re  imagining  them  to  be.    
Additionally,  seeing-­as  can  occur  in  visual  art  contexts.  As  Kendall  Walton  argues,  we  
can  see  a  depictive  representation  as  whatever  it’s  depicting;;  and,  as  Berys  Gaut  argues,  we  can  
see  a  depictive  representation  as  possessing  certain  qualities.68  These  accounts  of  artistic  
seeing-­as  normally  identify  the  imagination  as  the  cognitive  faculty  that  fuses  with  perceptual  
experience.  For  Walton,  depictive  representations  are  props  in  games  of  make-­believe,  such  that  
we  imagine  seeing  the  object  represented  in  the  work  and  see  the  latter  as  the  former.  For  Gaut,  
we  can—through  the  use  of  metaphorical  language—imagine  that  a  work  possesses  a  certain  
quality  and  see  it  as  possessing  that  quality.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65  Strawson,  P.F.  “Imagination  and  Perception.”  Freedom  and  Resentment  and  Other  Essays.  
London:  Methuen,  pp.  45-­65  (1974).  Roderick  Chisholm  also  makes  a  similar  claim  in  Perceiving,  
a  Philosophical  Study,  as  does  Noel  Fleming  in  “Recognizing  and  Seeing  As”  in  Phil.  Rev.,  1957.  
66Two  of  the  most  thorough  defenses  of  conceptualism  are:  (1)  McDowell,  John.  Mind  and  World.  
Cambridge:  Harvard,  1996;;  (2)  Brewer,  Bill.  Perception  and  Reason.  Oxford:  Clarendon,  1999.  
Roger  Scruton  also  assumes  a  conceptualist  framework  in  his  explanation  of  seeing-­as,  stating  
“what  is  essential  to  seeing  is  the  thought  (or  belief)  that  there  is  an  object  (answering  to  some  
description).”     Scruton,  Roger.  “The  Imagination  II.”  Art  and  Imagination.  Routledge:  London,  
1982,  p.  115.  
67Walton,  Kendall.  Mimesis  as  Make-­Believe:  On  the  Foundations  of  the  Representational  Arts.  
Harvard:  Cambridge,  1990.    
68  (1)  Walton,  Kendall.  Mimesis  as  Make-­Believe:  On  the  Foundations  of  the  Representational  
Arts.  Harvard:  Cambridge,  1990.  (2)  Gaut,  Berys.  “Metaphor  and  the  Understanding  of  Art.”  
Proceedings  of  the  Aristotelian  Society,  New  Series  97  (1997):  223-­241.  
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The  phenomenon  of  seeing-­as  is  highly  varied.  But  my  aim  here  isn’t  to  examine  the  
concept  itself.  It’s  to  see  how  it  works  in  film,  something  that—even  in  analyses  of  artistic  seeing-­
as—is  neglected.  With  regards  to  how  my  claims  will  relate  to  the  accounts  I’ve  outlined  so  far:  
(1)  I  will  be  assuming  a  broader  account  than  Wittgenstein’s  insofar  as  I  will  argue  that  we  see-­as  
when  we  engage  ordinary  perceptual  recognition  capacities;;  and  (2)  I  will  be  focusing  primarily  on  
a  type  of  seeing-­as  that  enables  us  to  see  the  fiction  in  a  film.  (2)  puts  me  in  line  with  typical  
theories  of  artistic  seeing-­as,  like  Walton’s  and  Gaut's,  as  it  focuses  on  how  the  imagination  fuses  
with  perception  when  we  look  at  a  depictive  representation.  It  also  separates  me  from  them  as  I  
examine  filmic  seeing-­as  in  particular  and  utilize  the  concept  to  ground  a  sense  in  which  we  see  
the  fictional—where  most  theorists  (Walton,  Scruton,  Gaut)  center  their  arguments  on  how  we  
see  the  nonfictional  object  depicted  in  a  work  or  the  expressive  or  metaphorical  properties  of  a  
work.    
I’ll  focus  most  on  this  fiction-­based  seeing-­as,  but  I’ll  outline  two  other  types  of  filmic  
seeing-­as  first,  both  of  them  consisting  in  the  utilization  of  perceptual  recognition  capacities.  My  
primary  aims  in  this  paper  are  to  (1)  argue  that  we  see  a  film’s  fiction;;  and  (2)  illuminate  the  
different  types  of  perceptual  experiences  we  have  during  film-­viewing  and  how  they  intertwine  in  
intimate  ways.  Through  my  analyses,  I’ll  elucidate  just  how  much  we  see  when  we  watch  movies  
and  just  how  complicated  that  seeing  is.  
         The  Phenomenological  Question  
When  we  watch  a  film,  we  see  a  “series  of  still  images,  known  as  frames  projected  onto  a  
screen  at  a  rate  of  24  frames  per  second;;”  these  frames  “are  stationary  and  are  momentarily  
blanked  as  a  new  frame  replaces  the  old  one.”69    The  question  I’m  interested  in  this  chapter  is  a  
question  of  phenomenology,  namely:  how  do  we  perceive  these  frames  during  film-­viewing?  The  
focus  here  is  not  on  what  we  know  is  on  the  film  screen  or  what  we  see  at  some  basic,  sensory  
level;;  it’s  about  our  experience,  perceptually,  of  that  screen.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69  Smith,  Tim.  “Film  (Cinema)  Perception.”  Encyclopedia  of  Perception,  ed.,  E.  Bruce  Goldstein.  
Pittsburgh:  Sage,  2010.  
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So,  what  is  this  experience?  What  do  we  see  the  images  as?  Some  theorists,  among  
them  George  Wilson,  suggest  that  this  experience  includes  a  strong  sort  of  medium  awareness.  
Wilson  focuses  chiefly  on  our  imaginative  experience  of  the  fictional:  how  we  see  the  images  
when  we’re  engaged  in  a  movie’s  pretense.  He  states  that  we  see  “the  fictional  through  the  
images  which  have  been  transparently  derived,”  imagine  seeing  “‘motion  picture-­like  shots’  that  
have  been  derived  in  a  fictionally  indeterminate  manner  from  pertinent  segments  of  the  fictional  
narrative  worlds,”  and  see  the  fictional  “through  the  mediation  of  the  on-­screen  moving  images.”70  
Through  his  discussion,  Wilson  suggests  that  we  remain  perceptually  aware  of  the  “on-­screen  
moving  images,”  aware  of  the  nature  of  the  “image-­track”  throughout  our  filmic  experience:  both  
when  attending  to  the  nonfictional  and  when  attending  to  the  fictional.71  
Similarly,  when  discussing  how  we  experience  the  fiction  in  a  film,  Rob  Hopkins  argues  
for  a  thesis  of  “collapsed  seeing-­in,”  according  to  which  we  perceive  the  images  on  the  screen  as  
representations  of  the  fictional  (rather  than  as  representations  of  the  nonfictional  depicting  the  
fictional).72  For  Hopkins,  during  fiction  film-­viewing,  “seeing-­in  collapses,  so  that  what  we  see  in  
the  picture  is  simply  whatever  the  ‘inner’  representations  represent.  What  we  see  in  the  cinema  
images  before  us  will  be  nothing  more  than  the  story  told.”73    
Like  Wilson,  Hopkins  argues  for  a  perceptual  experience  of  the  fictional  (although  
Hopkins’s  account  establishes  a  stronger  sort  of  perceptual  engagement,  which  we’ll  discuss  in  a  
bit)  alongside  a  perceptual  medium  awareness.  With  regards  to  the  latter,  Hopkins  states:    
      I  have  not  claimed  that  the  images  projected  on  the  cinema  screen  are  illusionistic.  At  no  
point  have  I  said  that  our  experience  of  those  images  matches  what  we  would  have  
before  ordinary  events.  I  have  thus  not  denied  that  when  we  watch  movies  we  always  
experience  what  is  before  us  as  pictures…I  reject  the  claims  of  those  who  see  cinema  as  
sustaining  the  illusion  that  certain  nonpictorical  events  are  before  us.  We  seem  to  see  
directly  neither  the  events  filmed  nor  the  events  of  the  story  told.  We  are  always,  plainly,  
looking  at  pictures,  and  so  our  experience  of  those  events  is  only  ever  seeing  them  in  the  
image  before  us.74    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70  Wilson,  George.  Seeing  Fictions  in  Film.  Oxford:  Oxford,  2011.  P.  88,  
71  Wilson,  p.  90.  
72  Hopkins,  Robert.  “What  Do  We  See  in  Film?”  The  Journal  of  Aesthetics  and  Art  Criticism  66.2  
(Spring,  2008):  149-­159.  
73  Hopkins,  p.  151.  




So  Hopkins  maintains,  with  Wilson,  that  we  perceive  the  film  screen.  And  although  he,  
too,  focuses  on  the  fictional,  the  medium  awareness  he  discusses  holds  throughout  film-­viewing;;  
for  Hopkins,  we  are  “always,  plainly,  looking  at  pictures.”    
With  Wilson  and  Hopkins,  I  reject  the  transparency  thesis  proposed  most  prominently  by  
Kendall  Walton—according  to  which  we  look  through  the  film  screen  and  “see  directly”  the  
objects,  people,  and  places  depicted  (nonfictional  or  fictional)  as  though  they  are  in  3-­D  before  
us,  having  an  experience  that  “matches  what  we  would  have  before  ordinary  events.”75  I  thus  
endorse  a  perceptual  medium  awareness  as  well—an  awareness  of  the  recording.  But  I  think  
neither  Wilson  nor  Hopkins  does  enough  to  specify  what  our  experience  of  the  recording  is  like.  
Indeed,  if  we  think  of  ‘images’  as  ‘still  frames,’  there’s  an  important  respect  in  which  we  don’t  
perceive  the  images  as  images  or  as  pictures.  So  we  need  to  argue  for  a  form  of  perceptual  
medium  awareness  that  doesn’t  commit  us  to  the  claims  Wilson  and  Hopkins  seem  to  make.  In  
this  section,  I’ll  argue  for  two  main  theses:  (1)  we  do  not  perceive  the  images  as  images  because  
we  perceive  depth  and  motion  on  the  film  screen;;  and  (2)  the  perception  of  movie  depth  and  
motion  is  compatible  with  a  perceptual  medium  awareness.  After  laying  out  both  (1)  and  (2)  I’ll  
claim  throughout  this  chapter  that  we  see  a  film’s  images  as  cinematic  recordings.    
Let’s  start  with  (1)  by  turning  to  the  perception  of  movie  depth,  a  phenomenon  various  
theorists  point  to.  As  Donald  Laird  puts  it:  
At  the  outset  it  is  evident  that  we  are  certain  of  our  perception  of  the  third  dimension  in  
the  photoplay.  The  actors  not  only  walk  from  right  to  left  but  enter  and  exit  through  a  door  
at  the  rear  just  as  they  would  on  a  real,  three-­dimensional  stage.  Then  we  see  the  screen  
troopers  gallop  away  and  out  of  sight  into  the  distant  hills.  There  is  no  denying  the  fact  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75  A  thesis  he  explains  in  “Transparent  Pictures:  On  the  Nature  of  Photographic  Realism.”  For  
Walton,  as  we  discussed  in  chapter  one,  photographic  depictions  allow  us  to  see  through  the  
photographic  surface  to  the  thing  photographed.  He  also  supports  a  transparency  thesis  with  
regards  to  nonphotographic  depictions  in  Mimesis  as  Make-­Believe,  where  he  discusses  our  
imagining  seeing  a  depiction  as  whatever  it  depicts.  As  Walton  puts  it:  the  spectator  of  
Hobbema’s  Water  Mill  with  the  Great  Red  Roof  “imagines  that  [he  sees  a  red-­roofed  mill].  And  
this  self-­imagining  is  done  in  a  first-­person  manner:  he  imagines  seeing  a  mill,  not  just  that  he  
sees  one,  and  he  imagines  this  from  the  inside…he  imagines  of  his  looking  that  its  object  is  a  
mill”  Mimesis  as  Make-­Believe,  p.  293.  By  imagining  “of  his  looking  that  its  object”  actually  is  a  
mill,  the  spectator  lacks  the  perceptual  medium  awareness  Hopkins  and  Wilson  endorse.  
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that  we  receive  the  impression  of  depth;;  and  there  is  no  denying  the  fact  that  as  an  
objective  quality  depth  is  lacking  in  the  motion  pictures.76    
  
Laird  is  intuitively  right  here.  When  we  watch  a  film,  we  don’t  just  perceive  the  screen  as  
consisting  in  2-­D  color  patches  that  make  up  certain  shapes  and  sizes.  Objects  look  like  they  are  
in  front  of  our  behind  one  another;;  trains,  cars,  and  airplanes  look  like  they  are  moving  toward  or  
away  from  one  another.    
Indeed,  movie-­depth  perception  is  something  filmmakers  work  hard  to  create.  At  a  very  
basic  level,  they  choose  lenses  that  either  enhance  or  eliminate  depth  perception,  wide  angle  
lenses  being  used  for  the  former  and  telephoto  lenses  used  for  the  latter.  More  specifically,  
filmmakers  use  techniques  to  achieve  the  perception  of  depth  which  entail  showing  real-­world  
depth  cues  we’re  accustomed  to  picking  up  on  every  day.  One  primary  technique  here  is  the  
employment  of  perspective.  As  Laird  puts  it:  “distant  objects  are  smaller  than  near  objects;;  the  
lines  in  the  visual  field  converge  toward  a  vanishing  point.”77  Because  we’re  used  to  interpreting  
distant  objects  as  being  a  usual  size,  despite  the  fact  that  they  cast  a  smaller  impression  on  the  
retina,  we  do  the  same  when  we  perceive  the  content  of  film  images.  Indeed,  perspective  has  
been  widely  used  in  all  forms  of  visual  art.    
More  broadly,  theorists  (like  Laird  and  James  Cutting)  maintain  that  filmmakers  show  
everyday  depth  cues  like:  height  in  the  visual  field,  relative  size,  aerial  perspective,  
accommodation,  and  motion  perspective.  Not  only  does  it  seem  to  us  like  a  film  screen  has  
depth;;  this  is  a  substantive  part  of  what’s  shown  to  us,  a  part  of  what  filmmakers  intentionally  
construct  in  their  cinematic  depictions.  And,  insofar  as  they  employ  everyday  depth  cues,  this  is  
yet  another  way  in  which  film-­viewing  draws  upon  everyday  perceptual  capacities  and  processes,  
bringing  us  back  to  one  of  the  main  points  I  emphasized  in  chapter  one.    
In  addition  to  depth,  we  perceive  motion  on  the  film  screen.  The  phenomenon  of  apparent  
motion  is  widely-­accepted  by  theorists  (indeed,  we’d  be  hard-­pressed  to  find  a  theorist  who  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76  Laird,  Donald  A.  “Why  the  Movies  Move.”  The  Scientific  Monthly  14.4  (April,  1922):  364-­378.  P.  
376.  
77  Laird,  p.  376.  
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denies  its  existence)  and  it’s  a  phenomenon  any  movie-­goer  recognizes.  Despite  the  fact  that,  as  
Tim  Smith  puts  it,  “the  frames  are  stationary  and  are  momentarily  blanked  as  a  new  frame  
replaces  the  old,”  the  images  look  like  they’re  moving—or,  to  be  more  precise,  “we  experience  
film  as  a  continuous  image  containing  real  motion.”78  For  Smith,  the  perception  of  motion  involves  
two  things:  “persistence  of  vision  and  apparent  motion;;”  the  former  amounts  to  a  continuous  
perception  of  light,  which  overlooks  the  “blanking”  between  movie  frames,  and  the  latter  amounts  
to  the  perception  of  motion  “based  on  static  visual  information”  rather  than  “real  motion.”79  
Filmmakers  most  often  use  what  Smith  calls  “short  range  motion”  which  occurs  “when  static  
images  depicting  only  slight  differences  in  object  location  are  presented  very  rapidly.”80  He  puts  
the  point  more  solidly  here:  
Motion  detectors  in  the  early  visual  system  respond  in  the  same  way  to  the  retinal  
stimulation  caused  by  real  motion  by  rapidly  presented  static  images  that  depict  only  
slight  differences  in  object  location.  This  results  in  a  sensory  experience  of  film  that  is  
indiscernible  from  reality.”81    
  
For  Smith,  the  perception  of  apparent  motion  in  film  amounts  to  a  combination  of  three  
things:  (1)  the  perceptual  cues  we  use  to  perceive  motion  in  real  life;;  (2)  the  speed  at  which  a  
film’s  images  are  shown  in  succession  and  (3)  the  merely  slight  variation  in  the  content  of  those  
images.  Additionally,  according  to  Smith,  filmmakers  employ  editing  techniques  to  further  
enhance  apparent  motion.  He  discusses  primarily  continuity  editing  here  where  the  aim  is  to  
“make  the  viewing  process  effortless  and  the  editing  ‘invisible.’”82  To  achieve  the  perception  of  
continuity,  filmmakers  use  “natural  attentional  cues  such  as  off-­screen  sounds,  conversational  
turns,  motion,  gaze  cues,  and  pointing  gestures  to  trigger  attentional  shifts  across  cuts.”83  By  
depicting  content  that  we  most  frequently  attend  to  in  real  life,  filmmakers  carry  our  attention  from  
one  frame  to  the  next,  preventing  us  from  noticing  the  cut  in  between.  Continuity  editing  creates  
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79  Smith,  p.  1.  
80  Smith,  p.  2.  
81  Smith,  p.  3.  
82  Smith,  Tim.  “The  Attentional  Theory  of  Cinematic  Continuity.”  Projections  6.1  (May  2012):  1-­27.  
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narrative  continuity—our  following  a  narrative  coherently  rather  than  experiencing  a  discontinuous  
series  of  events—and  also  helps  create  apparent  motion.  It’s  precisely  by  overlooking  cuts  that  
we  perceive  a  film  screen  as  a  continuous,  moving  image.    
The  existence  of  depth  perception  and  motion  perception  pushes  against  the  claim  that  
we  perceive  a  film’s  images  as  images,  that  we  are  perceptually  aware  of  the  medium  in  this  
highly  robust  sense.  We  neither  perceive  the  images  as  flat  nor  as  static;;  and  so  we  don’t  really  
perceive  them  as  images.  Indeed,  even  more  strongly,  it’s  not  clear  that  we  can  perceive  them  as  
images—at  least  not  without  a  great  deal  of  effort.  And  motion  perception  is  the  chief  impediment  
here.  Even  where  a  telephoto  lens  is  used,  and  we  thus  don’t  perceive  depth  on  the  film  screen,  
it’s  nearly  impossible  to  see  the  images  as  a  series  of  static  frames  because  of  the  speed  at  
which  they’re  shown  in  succession.  Apparent  motion  takes  us  seamlessly  from  one  frame  to  the  
next.  For  this  reason,  the  medium  of  film  is  more  difficult  to  perceive  than  the  medium  of  a  static  
depiction.  Whereas  we  can  often  (albeit  perhaps  not  always)  attend  to  a  painting’s  canvas  by  
seeing  it  as  a  flat  surface  with  colors  and  shapes,  we  cannot  as  easily  attend  to  a  film’s  screen  as  
a  flat  surface  depicting  a  series  of  static  frames.  
We  can’t  take  Wilson’s  or  Hopkins’s  claims  literally,  then.  At  the  same  time,  endorsing  
this  conclusion  doesn’t  (and  shouldn’t)  commit  us  to  a  transparency  thesis.  In  fact,  I  think  the  
most  plausible  account  of  our  phenomenology  here  lies  in  between  Walton’s  and  
Wilson’s/Hopkin’s  and  maintains  that  the  perception  of  movie  depth  and  motion  is  compatible  with  
a  perceptual  medium  awareness.  Looking  at  this  compatibility  will  illuminate  (1)  why  the  
transparency  thesis  is  mistaken  and  (2)  the  proper  account  of  how  we  see  a  film’s  images.    
Let’s  start  with  the  compatibility  of  medium  awareness  with  depth  perception.  One  article  
which  is  particularly  pertinent  here  is  Boyd  Millar’s,  “The  Conflicted  Character  of  Picture  
Perception.”84  Millar  introduces  the  (common)  thesis  that  picture  perception  is  “conflicted”  
because  it  “involves  two  distinct  impressions  of  space—the  two-­dimensional  picture  surface  and  
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the  three-­dimensional  depicted  scene—that  are  somehow  in  conflict,  or  inconsistent,  with  one  
another.”85  As  opposed  to  other  theorists,  who  attempt  to  make  sense  of  this  conflict,  Millar  
maintains  that  there  is  no  such  conflict.    
Millar’s  central  point  is  that  “in  order  for  there  to  be  a  contradiction,  a  picture  would  have  
to  be  flat  and  non-­flat  in  the  same  respect,  or  in  the  same  sense.”86  This  isn’t  the  case.  For  Millar:  
“the  two-­dimensional  picture  surface  is  perceived  as  belonging  to  ‘environmental’  or  ‘real’  space,  
while  the  three-­dimensional  scene  is  perceived  in  terms  of  an  ‘imaginary’  or  ‘pictorial  space.’”87  In  
this  way,  there  are  two  perceptual  experiences  during  picture-­viewing:  (1)  perceiving  the  picture  
as  a  flat  surface  belonging  to  the  world  around  us  and  (2)  perceiving  what’s  represented  in  the  
picture  as  belonging  to  a  3-­D  pictorial  space.  The  aforementioned  ‘conflict’  disappears,  then,  
since  the  ‘depth’  we  perceive  in  picture-­perception  is  not  the  same  kind  of  depth  we  perceive  in  
the  real  world;;  the  latter  amounts  to  seeing  things  as  being  3-­D  in  our  world,  the  former  to  being  
3-­D  in  an  imaginary  world.  
In  defending  his  conclusion,  Millar  points  out  that,  in  pictures:  
Monocular  depth  cues  such  as  occlusion,  relative  size,  relative  density,  height  in  the  
visual  field,  and  aerial  perspective  tell  us  that  we  are  looking  at  a  3-­D  object  or  scene.  
However  at  the  same  time,  the  information  we  get  from  cues  such  such  as  
accommodation  and  convergency,  binocular  disparities,  and  motion  perspective  tell  us  
that  we  are  looking  at  a  2-­D  surface.88  
  
Theorists  typically  see  these  two  classes  of  cues  as  conflicting  because  they  interpret  
“monocular  depth  cues”  as  giving  us  the  same  sort  of  information  they  give  us  in  real  life,  causing  
the  perception  of  environmental  depth.  For  Millar,  on  the  other  hand,  monocular  cues  indicate  
merely  pictorial  depth  during  picture-­viewing;;  in  this  way,  such  cues  change  what  they  indicate  
depending  upon  the  context  in  which  they’re  perceived,  and  are  thus  (in  picture-­viewing)  
compatible  with  the  cues  indicating  flatness.  For  those  doubting  this  fact,  Millar  argues  that  only  
his  interpretation  can  make  sense  of  our  phenomenology.  As  he  puts  it:  
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If  we  assume  that  the  same  cues  are  always  understood  by  the  visual  system  as  
conveying  the  same  information,  we  will  not  be  able  to  account  for  the  perception  of  
pictorial  space  at  all.  To  say,  for  example,  that  when  we  look  at  a  picture  the  visual  
system  reaches  a  compromise  between  the  monocular  cues  suggesting  a  three-­
dimensional  space  and  the  stereo  information  suggesting  a  flat  surface,  does  not  explain  
why  we  perceive  the  three-­dimensional  scene  in  pictorial  as  opposed  to  environmental  
space.  A  strict  compromise  in  such  a  case  would  be  to  split  the  difference  between  the  
two  sets  of  cues  and  perceive  the  depicted  scene  as  occupying  a  highly  compressed  real  
space—a  space  in  which  a  sufficiently  small  person  could  move  around.89  
  
Of  course,  we  don’t  perceive  pictures  as  providing  any  sort  of  internal  movement.  
Engaging  in  picture-­depth  perception  doesn’t  bring  with  it  the  same  sorts  of  behavioral  
expectations  or  responses  as  engaging  in  environmental-­depth  perception.  This  is  part  of  why  
any  transparency  thesis  is  mistaken.  We  don’t  see  what’s  depicted  in  the  same  way  that  we  see  
objects,  people,  and  places  in  the  world  around  us.  Instead,  for  Millar,  we  perceive  pictorial  
space,  a  space  with  an  apparent  depth  that  is  distinct  (and  experienced  as  distinct)  from  
environmental  depth.  
Millar’s  thesis  can  clarify  precisely  the  co-­existence  we  need  to  clarify  with  regards  to  
film-­viewing,  and  it  can  elucidate  what’s  wrong  with  a  transparency  thesis.  In  just  the  way  Millar  
maintains,  if  we  endorse  a  transparency  thesis,  we  can’t  make  sense  of  the  responses  and  
reactions  we  have  during  film-­viewing,  responses  and  reactions  which  elucidate  that  we  are  
perceiving  a  space—and  a  depth—distinct  from  environmental  space  and  depth.  Just  as  we  don’t  
see  a  picture  as  affording  internal  movement,  we  don’t  perceive  a  film  screen  as  affording  
movement.  And  nor  we  do  perceive  the  movie-­action  as  though  it  extends  beyond  the  screen.    
   And  these  aren’t  merely  cognitive  reactions  or  expectations.  It’s  not  just  that  we  know  
there’s  no  opportunity  for  internal  movement  and  that  the  action  doesn’t  extend  beyond  the  
screen.  This  is  all  a  part  of  our  perceptual  experience.  Here  it  helps  to  take  note  of  two  things:  (1)  
that  we  perceive  the  objects  and  people  in  the  images  as  the  sizes  they  are  on  the  screen;;  and  
(2)  we  don’t  perceive  the  action  as  though  it’s  ‘popping  out’  at  us.  With  regards  to  (1):  we  don’t  
engage  in  any  sort  of  perceptual  illusion  that  the  images  of  the  actors  or  props  are  ordinary  
sizes—the  sizes  they’d  be  if  they  existed  in  our  environmental  space.  We  see  the  small  patches  
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they  occupy  on  the  screen,  in  the  film’s  frames,  and  we  see  those  patches  as  small  patches.  With  
regards  to  (2):  in  typical  instances  of  film-­viewing,  the  depth  we  perceive  is  within  the  screen  or  
within  the  action  depicted  in  the  screen;;  it’s  a  depth  that  exists  in  depicted  space,  not  a  depth  that  
reaches  out  to  us  in  environmental  space.  Perhaps  in  early  instances  of  film-­viewing,  this  wasn’t  
the  case  (e.g.,  the  supposed  incident  of  Paris  audiences  watching  Lumiere’s  1895  L’Arrivée  D’un  
Train  En  Gare  De  La  Ciotat  and  believing  that  the  train  on  screen  was  moving  towards  them);;  but  
it’s  rare  to  find  such  instances  now.  Indeed,  constructed  three-­dimensional  film-­viewing  
experiences  wouldn’t  exist  otherwise,  as  they  wouldn’t  differ  from  ordinary  ones.  
   Together  (1)  and  (2)  suggest  that  we  perceive  the  images,  and  the  content  of  the  images,  
as  being  on  a  screen.  What’s  depicted  (typically)  looks  to  be  whatever  size  it’s  shown  as;;  and  
there’s  an  important  respect  in  which  we  see  depth  in  the  screen  but  not  from  the  screen.  In  this  
way,  we  perceive  real-­world  flatness  alongside  of  depicted  depth  as  Millar  articulates.  I’m  not  sure  
just  which  perceptual  cues  cause  ‘flatness’  and  which  ones  cause  ‘apparent  depth.’  Since,  as  I  
mentioned,  medium  awareness  is  different  in  film-­viewing  than  it  is  in  our  interactions  with  static  
depictions—because  screens  are  more  transparent  than  surfaces  like  canvases  and  therefore  do  
not  afford  the  same  attention-­to-­depicting-­surface—the  cues  Millar  identifies  might  not  be  
precisely  the  ones  operating  in  film.  But  we  don’t  need  to  provide  these  specifications  here.  The  
point  is  just  that  we  perceive  the  screen  as  a  flat  depicting  surface  in  this  world  while  we  perceive  
depth  in  what  the  screen’s  images  depict.  
Perhaps  what  we  know  is  a  part  of  what  we  see  during  film-­viewing,  such  that  our  
knowledge  that  we’re  watching  a  movie  is  always  a  part  of  our  perceptual  experience.  Perhaps  
this  is  why  early  instances  of  film-­viewing  differed  from  contemporary  ones;;  because  we  know  
what  to  expect  now,  because  we’re  used  to  watching  movies  and  are  aware  of  the  conventions  at  
play.  Even  more  specifically,  we  might  turn  to  an  enactive  account  of  perception  like  Alva  Noë’s,  
according  to  which  perceptual  experience  involves  the  exercise  of  sensori-­motor  knowledge.  If  we  
endorse  a  Noë-­like  account  we  can  claim  something  like  this:  we  know  that,  if  we  move  around  
the  film  screen,  what’s  depicted  on  it  will  not  continue  to  be  a  part  of  what  we  see;;  this  knowledge  
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becomes  a  part  of  our  perceptual  experience  such  that  we  see  what’s  on  the  screen  as  though  
it’s  on  the  screen  and  not  as  though  it  continues  beyond  it.  We  might,  more  basically,  just  claim  
that—although  the  screen  itself  is  highly  transparent—we’re  perceptually  aware  of  the  outer  
surface  of  the  screen  and  that  our  perception  of  the  outer  surface  affects  the  transparency,  or  
limits  it,  so  that  we  see  it  as  a  screen  despite  perceiving  depth  and  motion  in  it.    
Regardless  of  which  account  we  endorse,  the  transparency  thesis  does  not  align  with  
what  it’s  like  to  watch  a  movie.  We  don’t  perceive  any  of  the  action  depicted  as  though  it’s  a  part  
of  the  space  we  occupy.  Instead,  we  perceive  it  as  occupying  a  depicted  space.  And  we  perceive  
the  depth  on  the  screen  as  depicted  depth.  We  perceive  trains  and  cars  as  moving  toward  or  
away  from  the  objects,  people,  and  places  around  those  cars  or  trains  on  the  film  screen.  We  
perceive  the  depth  (a  depth  filmmakers  work  hard  to  show)  in  the  rooms  and  on  the  streets  
shown  to  us  on  the  film  screen.  How  we  see  that  depth  is  different  from  how  we  see  the  
environmental  depth  in  the  people  and  objects  surrounding  the  screen—the  latter  is  a  depth  that  
affords  movement  and  a  type  of  action  that  the  former  does  not  allow.    
What  further  support  my  (and  Millar’s)  thesis  here,  and  extends  it  to  the  perception  of  
movie  motion,  is  the  fact  that  we  follow  a  film’s  narrative  unproblematically.  As  Trevor  Ponech  
states,  “seeing  a  movie  leads  to  comprehension  of,  and  emotional  responses  to  the  depicted  
individuals,  events,  and  actions  because  one  is  aware,  in  the  aforementioned  sense,  that  one  is  
watching  a  movie.”90  For  Ponech,  our  ability  to  comprehend  and  respond  to  the  narrative  
elucidates  the  extent  to  which  we  hold  background  beliefs  and  assumptions  about  the  fact  that  
“what  we  are  watching  is  a  selection  and  organization  of  images  resulting  from  somebody’s  
rational,  deliberate  actions  for  the  purpose  of  narrating  a  story.”91    
Ponech  uses  a  detailed  example  of  a  scene  from  the  movie  Twister,  in  which  we  are  
shown  a  series  of  images,  depicting  views  of  a  “shack  as  a  swirling  black  tempest  of  debris  
gradually  rips  its  planks  away”—some  of  which  are  nearby  shots  and  others  more  distant—as  
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well  as  various  views  of  the  characters  (including  point-­of-­view  shots,  close-­up  shots,  and  
medium  shots  depicting  their  facial  expressions)  as  they  watch.  Ponech  states:  
Despite  the  discontinuities  between  visual  perspectives,  we  interpret  this  ensemble  of  
pictures  as  a  chronologically  ordered  series  of  informative  views  on  a  single,  developing  
course  of  events,  namely,  the  tempest’s  gradual  engulfment  of  Jo  and  Bill,  its  impact  on  
them,  and  their  reactions  to  this  crises…were  they  truly  to  induce  loss  of  medium  
awareness,  these  images  would  be  experienced  as  a  bewildering  succession  of  visual  
sensations,  rather  than  as  a  coherent  cinematic  passage.  The  excitement  they  arouse  
would  be  due  to  the  observer’s  confusion  about  the  origins  of  his  perceptions,  the  
inexplicable  perspectival  discontinuities  to  which  his  visual  field  is  apparently  subject.92  
  
For  Ponech,  the  very  fact  that  we  interpret  the  shots  as  we  do—as  showing  us  a  
continuous  event  taking  place  over  a  short  period  of  time—and  the  very  fact  that  we  aren't  
bewildered  by  their  juxtaposition,  elucidates  that  we  are  aware  of  the  movie  as  a  recording.  If  we  
looked  through  the  movie  screen  and  dropped  medium  awareness,  “the  imagery’s  meaning  in  the  
context  of  the  narrative”  would  “be  lost.”93  We  wouldn’t  understand  why  the  shots  were  shown  in  
that  specific  order;;  we  wouldn’t  be  able  to  react  emotionally  to  what  those  shots  depicted  (in  part  
because  of  our  perceiving  them  as  constituting  “a  bewildering  succession  of  visual  sensations”).  
The  fact  that  we  do  react  emotionally,  the  fact  that  what  we’re  seeing  and  hearing  is  coherent  to  
us,  the  fact  that  we  find  the  film’s  editing  techniques  unproblematic  in  our  grasping  the  story  at  
hand:  these  phenomena  only  make  sense  if  we  take  the  film  screen  to  be  showing  us  a  series  of  
visual  sensations  that  make  up  a  recorded  story.  Importantly,  as  I’ll  argue  later,  I  don’t  think  this  
means  that  we  always  see  a  movie  as  a  movie  in  a  robust  sense.  I  think  that,  while  engaged  in  a  
fiction  film’s  pretense,  we  do  not  perceive  the  film  as  a  film,  where  that  amounts  to  perceiving  it  
‘as  images  of  the  nonfictional  depicting  the  fictional.’  The  perceptual  medium  awareness  here  
amounts  to  seeing  the  images  as  recordings  of  a  story.  Sometimes  we  see  those  images  as  
recordings  of  a  true  story  (when  we’re  pretending  that  the  fictional  is  real),  and  sometimes  we  see  
those  images  as  recordings  of  a  fictional  story  (when  we’re  not  imaginatively  engaged).  
Ponech  defends,  more  generally,  a  thesis  very  much  in  line  with  Wilson’s  and  Hopkins’s.  
He  argues  that,  while  imaginatively  engaged  in  a  film’s  fiction,  we  perceive  the  fiction  and  
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simultaneously  perceive  the  film  screen.  Much  like  Wilson  and  Hopkins,  though,  Ponech  doesn’t  
specify  just  what  (2)  amounts  to,  or  clarify  that  it  is  distinct  from,  strictly  speaking,  seeing  the  
images  as  images.  In  fact,  his  discussion  of  our  perception  of  the  film  screen  is  cashed  out  in  
terms  of  “sensory  seeing”—what  we  actually  see  at  a  bare  level—so  it  isn’t  clear  if  he  thinks  that  
we  have  a  genuine  perceptual  experience  of  the  film  screen  or  what  (for  him)  that  perceptual  
experience  would  consist  in.  Instead,  he  bases  his  account  on  the  distinction  between  “sensory  
seeing”  and  “cognitive  seeing”—the  latter  being  our  experience  of  the  fictional  (of  what’s  
depicted)  and  the  former  being  our  experience  of  the  screen  (of  the  depiction).94  As  rich  as  his  
discussion  is,  then,  Ponech  doesn’t  give  us  quite  what  we  need  to  make  sense  of  perceptual  
(rather  than  merely  sensory)  medium  awareness.    
Any  defense  of  the  transparency  thesis  requires  evidence  grounded  in  actions  and  
expectations  that  align  with  our  seeing  a  depth  and  space  that  is  (or  is  very  similar  to)  
environmental  depth  and  space.  Instead,  such  actions  and  expectations  align  with  my  (Millar’s  
and  Ponech’s)  thesis.  Indeed,  while  most  anti-­transparency  theorists  point  to  cognitive  or  
emotional  responses  inconsistent  with  the  transparency  thesis,  it’s  important  to  note  that  the  
phenomenon  of  seeing-­through  is  inconsistent  with  the  other  perceptual  experiences  we  have  
during  film-­viewing.    
It’s  not  clear  how  we  could  perceive  the  images  as  in  3-­D  while  also  perceiving  them  as  
being  the  sizes  they  are  on  the  film  screen:  what  does  it  mean  to  see  the  images  as  objects  and  
people  that  are  in  our  space  while  also  seeing  them  as  not  possessing  the  sizes  of  the  objects  
and  people  that  are  in  our  space?  Similarly,  it’s  not  clear  how  we  could  perceive  the  images  as  in  
3-­D  while  also  seeing  them  as  incomplete,  cut  off  by  the  screen;;  what  is  it  like  to  see  part  of  a  
face  as  though  it’s  before  us,  or  part  of  a  car  as  though  it’s  before  us?  We  experience  such  cut-­
offs  unproblematically,  and  the  best  (or  only)  explanation  of  why  we  do  so  is  because  we  see  the  
content  of  the  images  as  being  on  a  screen  in  front  of  us.  The  transparency  theorist  needs  to  
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explain  how  these  seemingly-­incompatible  perceptual  experiences  co-­exist.  As  it  is,  everything  
points  to  a  perceptual  medium  awareness.        
At  the  same  time,  any  account  according  to  which  we  perceive  the  images  as  images  is  
untenable  insofar  as  it  overlooks  the  perception  of  depth  and  motion  on  the  film  screen.  What  we  
need  is  a  theory  of  perceptual  medium  awareness  that  makes  way  for  a  combination  of  
perceiving  flatness  and  perceiving  depth  (and  motion).  This  is  what  my  theory  provides.  It  
maintains  that  we  don’t  perceive  the  images  as  a  series  of  flat,  static  frames  because  we  perceive  
depth  and  that  we  also  don’t  perceive  real-­world  depth  because  we  perceive  the  screen  as  a  
screen.    
Of  course,  saying  that  we  perceive  the  film  screen  as  a  screen  doesn’t  quite  articulate  
how  we  see  what’s  on  the  film  screen:  how  we  perceive  the  content  of  the  images.  Here,  we  can  
claim  that,  because  we  perceive  the  screen  as  a  screen,  we  perceive  its  images  as  cinematic  
recordings  of  events,  people,  places,  and  the  like.  Seeing  a  movie’s  static  frames  as  cinematic  
recordings  involves  (1)  perceptually  experiencing  depth  and  motion  on  the  screen;;  (2)  perceiving  
that  depth  and  motion  as  movie  depth  and  motion;;  and  thus  (3)  seeing  the  film  screen  as  a  
continuous,  moving  image  of  recorded  people,  places,  events,  and  things.    
Some  theorists  have  tried  to  maintain  something  like  my  account—in  endorsing  a  
perceptual  awareness  of  the  film  screen—but  haven’t  made  way  for  the  perception  of  movie  
depth  and  motion.  And  some  theorists  have  acknowledged  the  perception  of  movie  depth  and  
motion  but  haven’t  coupled  those  analyses  with  a  commitment  to  perceptual  medium  awareness.  
The  best  way  to  cash  out  what  goes  on,  perceptually,  when  we  watch  a  movie  is  a  combination  of  
these—typically  independent—theses.    
With  my  general  phenomenological  commitment—of  our  seeing  the  images  as  cinematic  
recordings—in  mind,  let’s  specify  further  just  what  we  see  the  images  as  cinematic  recordings  of.  
For  the  remainder  of  this  chapter,  I  will  outline  three  different  types  of  seeing-­as  experiences  we  
have  during  film-­viewing.  Throughout  all  three,  we  are  aware,  perceptually,  of  the  recording—so  
that  we  see  an  image  on  the  screen  as  a  cinematic  recording  of  something.  But  just  what  that  
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‘something’  is  changes  depending  upon  our  cognitive  engagement.  In  the  next  section,  I’ll  spell  
this  out  more  clearly  by  outlining  two  filmic  seeing-­as  experiences.  In  the  following  section,  I’ll  
spend  more  time  outlining  a  third,  which  will  require  returning  to  and  clarifying  the  notion  of  
‘imaginative  engagement’  that  I’ve  mentioned  throughout  this  section.  Importantly,  for  
convenience,  I’ll  sometimes  shorten  ‘as  cinematic  recordings  of’  to  ‘as  of.’  
              Two  Levels  of  Seeing-­As  
  
Level  (1)  seeing-­as  is  parasitic  on  the  seeing-­as  that  occurs  in  everyday  life.  It’s  simply:  
seeing  the  images  on  the  screen  as  cinematic  recordings  of  the  ordinary  objects  they  represent.  
Here,  we  see  images  of  actors  as  cinematic  recordings  of  people,  or  see  the  images  as  of  
buildings,  dogs,  cars,  etc.  The  descriptors  here  are  general—they’re  a  matter  of  categorizing  the  
images  into  ordinary-­object  types.    
It’s  commonly  held  (and  highly  intuitive)  that  we  employ  the  same  recognitional  capacities  
when  we  see  images  of  objects  as  we  do  when  we  see  objects  themselves.  As  Gregory  Currie,  
Noël  Carroll,  and  Richard  Wollheim  all  independently  argue:  if  we  can  recognize  objects  as  
objects,  then  we  can  also  recognize  (accurate,  non-­abstract)  images  (e.g.,  pictorial  
representations)  of  those  objects  as  images  of  those  objects,  and  this  includes  screen  (or  film)  
images.  Gregory  Currie  states,  for  instance:  
Cinematic  images,  like  other  realistic  representations,  have  an  important  feature  recently  
noted:  that  our  recognition  of  their  representational  content  is  in  a  certain  sense  
productive.  Roughly  speaking,  you  can  recognize  an  image  as  representing  a  man  if  you  
can  recognize  a  man,  and  in  general,  if  you  can  recognize  x,  you  can  recognize  a  x  as  
represented  in  such  an  image…in  interpreting  cinematic  and  other  realistic  images,  we  
apply  the  various  capacities  that  enable  us  to  recognize  objects  themselves;;  we  
recognize  that  the  image  represents  a  man  by  applying  it  to  our  visual  capacity  to  
recognize  a  man.95  
  
In  “The  Power  of  Movies,”  Noël  Carroll  echoes  Currie  in  arguing  that  being  presented  with  the  
same  sorts  of  visual  and  auditory  cues  in  film  that  we  encounter  in  daily  life  enables  us  to  
recognize  and  identify  those  cues  automatically  (where  “cues”  refers  to  objects  as  well  as  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95Currie,  Gregory.  “Impersonal  Imagining:  A  Reply  to  Jerrold  Levinson.”  The  Philosophical  
Quarterly  43.170  (Jan.,  1993):  79-­82.  p.  80.  
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features  of  objects),  prior  to  extensive  knowledge  of  film  production—indeed,  to  a  certain  extent,  
prior  to  any  film-­viewing  experience.96  
Neither  Carroll  nor  Currie  turns  theirs  into  a  claim  about  seeing-­as  (indeed,  doing  so  is  at  
odds  with  their  broader  theoretical  commitments,  as  we’ll  see  in  a  bit).  But  the  latter  follows  
from—in  fact  is  perhaps  equivalent  to—the  former.  If  we  deploy  ordinary  recognition  capacities  in  
film-­viewing,  then  this  is  just  a  matter  of:  seeing  screen  images  as  recordings  of  ordinary,  3-­D,  
objects  and  properties.  
Indeed,  this  phenomenon  is  similar  to  Wollheim’s  “seeing-­in.”97  For  Wollheim,  pictorial  
representations  call  on—and  sometimes  enable—recognitional  skills  of  the  objects  represented  in  
them.  This  recognition  coupled  with  visual  awareness  of  the  depicting  surface  constitutes  
“twofoldness.”  It’s  this  phenomenologically  complex  experience  that  (Wollheim  maintains)  is  
distinctive  of  our  perception  of  visual  representations.  The  level  of  seeing-­as  I’m  discussing  here  
is  similar  to  Wollheim’s  seeing-­in  it  insofar  as  (1)  it’s  distinctive  of  our  visual  experience  of  a  
depictive  representation;;  (2)  it  employs  and  enhances  ordinary  recognitional  abilities;;  and  (3)  it  
involves  a  type  of  twofoldness—which  I’ll  discuss  more  later.  Despite  these  similarities,  I  am  
outlining  forms  of  seeing-­as  rather  than  seeing-­in,  and  I’ll  explain  this  in  the  concluding  section.  
It’s  important  to  note  that  level  one  seeing-­as  holds  for  documentary  and  fiction  film  since  
it  doesn’t  depend  upon  anything  at  the  fictional  level.  What’s  more,  it  doesn’t  just  consist  in  
attending  to  the  nonfictional  elements—such  as  the  props  and  actors—on  the  screen;;  it  consists  
in  attending  to  the  ordinary  objects  those  things  represent.  Turning  to  nonphotographic  film  
clarifies  this  distinction.    
For  the  purposes  of  following  a  story,  we  often  treat  what  looks  like  an  image  of  a  person  
as  a  cinematic  recording  of  a  person,  or  what  looks  like  an  image  of  a  dog  as  a  cinematic  
recording  of  a  dog,  even  if  the  images  are  digitally  manipulated.  Think  of  Disney  or  CGI  movies  
here.  When  we  watch  Planet  of  the  Apes  we  see  the  images  as  of  apes,  just  as  we  see  the  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96Carroll,  Noël.  “The  Power  of  Movies.”  The  Moving  Image  114.4  (Fall,  1985):  79-­103.  P.  84.  
97  Wollheim,  Richard.  “Seeing-­as,  Seeing-­in,  and  Pictorial  Representation.”  Art  and  its  Objects,  
2nd  ed.  Cambridge:  Cambridge,  1980.  
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images  in  The  Lion  King  as  of  lions.  Doing  this  is  distinct  from  attending  to  what  the  images  are  in  
fact  of:  i.e.,  photographed  drawings  or  models.  It’s  a  matter  of  treating  them  as  recordings  of  
whatever  ordinary  objects  are  depicted  in  the  narratives  at  hand.  
We  can  delve  into  much  more  detail  with  respect  to  this  type  of  seeing-­as.  First  of  all,  I’ve  
presented  these  ordinary-­object  categories  as  quite  general,  and  they  need  not  be.  Perhaps  
instead  of  seeing  an  image  as  of  a  car,  we  can  see  it  as  of  a  2014  Honda  Accord;;  and  perhaps  
instead  of  seeing  an  image  as  of  a  man,  we  see  it  as  of  a  man  in  his  forty's  with  blond  hair,  brown  
eyes,  a  slim  figure,  etc.  What’s  more,  precisely  which  properties  we  see-­as  is  arguable;;  color,  
shape,  and  size  properties  might  seem  intuitive,  but  what  about  expressive  or  relational  
properties?    
This  question  is  related  to  a  more  general  debate  in  philosophy  of  perception—i.e,  which  
properties  are  represented  in  perception?  In  answering  these  question,  some  theorists  maintain  
that  only  low-­level  properties—like  color,  size,  and  shape  properties—are  represented  while  
higher-­order  ones  are  merely  cognized;;  others  maintain  that  we  can  perceptually  experience  
high-­level  properties  like  kind  properties,  agential  properties,  semantic  and  emotional  properties.  
While  defending  either  camp  in  full  is  outside  the  bounds  of  this  paper,  I’ve  already  committed  
myself  to  the  latter,  as  I’ve  maintained  that  we  see-­as  when  we  recognize  an  object  as  the  object  
it  is—a  ball  as  a  ball,  a  man  as  a  man—and  the  properties  at  work  there  are  highly  conceptual.  
This  puts  me  in  line  with  theorists  like  Susanna  Siegel,98  who  maintain  that  gaining  recognition  
capacities  produces  phenomenological,  visual,  shifts.  Indeed,  I  think  we  can  use  Siegel’s  account  
to  make  sense  of  the  aforementioned  fine-­grained  properties  like  “a  Honda  Accord”—it  seems  to  
me  there’s  nothing  fundamentally  different  from  recognizing  the  type  of  car  (or  the  type  house,  
ball,  man,  etc)  and  recognizing  the  type  of  tree  (which  is  the  example  Siegel  focuses  on,  as  she  
analyzes  recognizing  “a  pine  tree”).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98For  these  higher-­level  representationalist  accounts  of  perception:  (1)  Siegel,  Susanna.  “Which  
Properties  are  Represented  in  Perception?”  Perceptual  Experience,  Ed.  Tamar  S.  Gendler  and  
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What’s  more,  I  do  think  we  see  emotional  and  expressive  properties  in  objects,  people,  
and  places.  The  primary  way  in  which,  I  think,  we  do  so  is  by  recognizing  cues  of  natural  
meaning.  Natural  meaning  “exists  where  one  thing  or  property  is  a  reliable  indicator  or  sign  of  
something  else:  stable  correlations  between  information  states  allow  one  state  to  show  something  
about  another.”  H.P.  Grice99  and  Fred  Dretske  lay  out  the  concept,  and—while  their  accounts  
differ  in  slight  ways—they  both  point  to  this  idea  of  “stable  correlations  between  information  
states,”  the  idea  that  one  thing  or  property  can  just  show  something  about  another.    
Among  other  things,  we  see  natural  meaning  in  unintentional  facial  expressions  and  
gestures—smiles  that  mean  happiness,  tears  that  mean  sadness,  grimaces  that  mean  anger—
and  features  of  nature—rain  clouds  that  mean  rain,  a  sound  that  means  thunder,  smoke  that  
means  fire.  Because  these  cues  are  just  there  in  the  world,  they  allow  us  to  pick  up  on  their  
meaning  in  an  importantly  immediate  way.  This  immediacy  stems  partly  from  the  fact  that  we  
don’t  need  to  uncover  intention  in  grasping  what  is  meant  and  partly  from  the  fact  that  we’re  used  
to  seeing  these  signs  in  the  world.  
By  grasping  this  meaning,  we  can  see  (among  other  things)  expressive  and  emotional  
properties.  I  can  see  a  person’s  happiness  by  seeing  her  smile;;  I  can  see  her  anger  by  seeing  her  
grimace;;  I  can  hear  the  sadness  in  her  voice.  Grice  and  Dretske  don’t  push  their  theories  quite  as  
far  as  this,  but  I  think  the  phenomenon  of  natural  meaning—and  our  relation  to  it—supports  the  
idea  that  high-­level  properties,  including  emotional  and  expressive  properties,  can  be  perceived.  
Movies  trade  on  our  knowledge  of  natural  meaning;;  they  show  us  actors’  expressions  
and  gestures,  and  allow  us  to  hear  the  tones  in  their  voices;;  they  show  us  weather  and  scenery  
with  the  same  sorts  of  cues  (rain  clouds,  the  sound  of  thunder,  smoke,  dogs  barking)  that  we  pick  
up  on  in  real  weather  and  scenery.  Because  they  are  perceptual  presentations,  movies  call  on  us  
to  use  our  knowledge  of  natural  signs  to  grasp  what’s  going  on  in  their  narratives—to  understand  
how  a  character  thinks  or  feels,  or  to  understand  what  has  happened  or  what  will  happen  in  the  
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plot.  By  recognizing  people,  places,  and  things  that  can  deliver  the  same  sorts  of  cues  that  we  
encounter  in  people,  places,  and  things  in  everyday  life,  we  can  identify  (immediately)  expressive  
and  emotional  properties  when  we  watch  a  movie.  
Let’s  recap,  then.  Level  one  seeing-­as  includes  seeing  images  as  cinematic  recordings  of  
objects  and  properties;;  it  includes,  perhaps,  fine-­grained  properties  like  “a  2004  Honda  Accord”  or  
“a  man  in  his  forty’s  with  blond  hair;;”  it  also  includes  emotional  and  expressive  properties  like  
“sadness,”  “anger,”  or  “fear.”  In  short,  whatever  sort  of  seeing-­as  we  engage  in  when  we  utilize  
everyday  recognition  capacities  is  the  same  sort  of  seeing-­as  we  engage  in  during  film-­viewing  
because  the  latter  calls  on  those  recognition  capacities  through  its  perceptual  presentation.  
Now,  especially  once  we  turn  to  emotional  and  expressive  properties,  level  one  seeing-­as  
bleeds  into  (what  I  will  call)  level  three  seeing-­as.  We  see  actors’  expressive  cues  and—in  doing  
so—see  their  characters’  emotions  and  thoughts;;  we  see  the  expressiveness  of  a  movie’s  
landscape  and—in  doing  so—see  the  expressiveness  of  the  fictional  setting  or  world.  In  a  later  
section  I’ll  focus  on  how  the  three  levels  of  filmic  seeing-­as  intertwine,  and  this  is  one  such  
intertwinement:  when  films  call  on  our  everyday  perceptual  processes  to  show  us  expressive  and  
emotional  properties  they  (1)  allow  us  to  pick  up  on  those  properties  in  order  to  (2)  understand  
(and  see)  what’s  fictionally  depicted.  
With  all  of  this  in  mind,  let's  turn  to  the  second  type  of  filmic  seeing-­as.  Because  it  is  
purely  dependent  upon—and  stems  from—ordinary  recognitional  skills,  level  one  seeing-­as  isn’t  
specific  to  film  as  an  artform,  or  to  our  knowledge  of  it  as  an  artform.  Level  two  seeing-­as  centers  
precisely  on  this  further  specificity.    
Level  two  seeing-­as  is  a  matter  of  attending  to  the  nonfictional  in  the  way  that  level  one  
does  not.  Here,  we  see  the  film’s  images  as  production  shots  or  what  George  Wilson  calls  movie-­
picture  shots:  we  see  an  image  of  Elijah  Wood  as  a  cinematic  recording  of  Elijah  Wood  (rather  
than,  as  is  the  case  with  level  1,  as  a  recording  of  a  man),  an  image  of  Cate  Blanchett  as  a  
cinematic  recording  of  Cate  Blanchett,  an  image  of  the  landscape  as  a  cinematic  recording  of  
New  Zealand.  This  is  the  level  at  which  we  typically  (simultaneously  or  consequently)  evaluate  a  
	  45	  
	  
film’s  artistry—attend  to  the  makeup  and  costumes,  the  set  design,  the  score,  and  the  actors’  
portrayals.  By  seeing  the  shots  as  movie-­picture  shots,  we  enable  ourselves  to  judge  the  film  as  a  
film.  Unlike  level  one,  then,  this  involves  seeing  the  movie  as  a  movie.  But,  like  level  one,  it  
involves  overlooking  the  extent  of  nominal  portrayal  that  goes  on  in  fiction  film.100  
Just  as  level  one  needed  further  specification,  level  two  does  as  well.  We  might  wonder:  
are  we  just  seeing  the  images  as  of  “actors,”  “sets,”  “props”  and  the  like?  Or  are  we  seeing  them  
as  specific  tokens  of  those  things—i.e.,  seeing  an  image  as  of  “Daniel  Day-­Lewis,”  a  set  as  “the  
Lord  of  the  Rings  set”?  The  answer  to  this  will  vary,  depending  upon  how  much  knowledge  we  
bring  to  the  film  at  hand.  The  more  familiarity  we  have  with  particular  actors,  the  more  likely  we’ll  
be  to  see  the  images  of  them  as  recordings  of  them  specifically.  This  is  seemingly  no  different  
from—no  more  implausible  than—our  seeing  friends  and  acquaintances  as  of  themselves,  a  case  
Wittgenstein  discusses.101  The  less  familiarity  we  bring  to  a  movie,  the  less  likely  we’ll  be  to  have  
this  sort  of  recognition.  Instead,  we’ll  see  the  shots  as  movie-­picture  shots—by  seeing  the  attire  
as  costumes,  the  actors  as  actors,  and  the  sets  as  sets—without  any  further  recognition.  
Level  two  is  more  conceptual  than  level  one,  insofar  as  we  use  our  knowledge  and  
experience  of  film  rather  than  just  employing  ordinary  recognitional  capacities.  In  this  way,  it  
might  seem  to  be  the  most  obvious  of  the  three  levels,  since  it’s  a  matter  of  seeing  the  screen  
images  as  the  recordings  they  are.  On  the  other  hand,  the  extent  to  which  it  calls  on  our  
awareness  of  film  as  an  artform  might  make  it  less  obviously  a  case  of  seeing-­as.  Who’s  to  say  
that  we  aren’t  just  thinking  of  the  images  as  of  Cate  Blanchett  and  Elijah  Wood,  or  the  scenes  as  
sets  and  their  objects  as  props?  The  more  interpretation  we  bring  to  bear  on  our  film-­viewing  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100  The  difference  between  level  one  and  two  is:  whereas  the  former  consists  in  employing  
everyday  recognition  capacities  of  ordinary  objects,  the  latter  consists  in  employing  awareness  
and  knowledge  of  film  objects  and  shots,  so—for  instance—the  difference  between  seeing  an  
image  “as  a  man”  vs.  seeing  it  “as  Daniel  Day-­Lewis.”  Or  seeing  an  image  “as  a  lion”  (level  one)  
in  The  Lion  King,  vs.  “as  a  photographic  drawing  of  a  lion”  (level  two)  
101  “I  meet  someone  whom  I  have  not  seen  for  years;;  I  see  him  clearly  but  fail  to  know  him.  
Suddenly  I  know  him,  I  see  the  old  face  in  the  altered  one.  I  believe  that  I  should  do  a  different  
portrait  of  him  now  if  I  could  paint.  Now,  when  I  know  my  acquaintance  in  a  crowd,  perhaps  after  
looking  in  his  direction  for  quite  a  while,—is  this  a  special  sort  of  seeing?  Is  it  a  case  of  both  




experience—here,  the  interpretation  of  a  movie’s  production  elements—the  less  likely  it  might  
seem  that  we’re  really  seeing-­as  rather  than  just  thinking-­of-­as.  At  the  very  least,  whereas  level  
one  seems  perceptual  from  the  get-­go—insofar  as  it  calls  on  ordinary  perceptual  recognition  
capacities—we  need  to  spell  out  more  carefully  the  way  in  which  level  two  is.  
I’ll  delve  into  these  details  in  a  later  section,  when  I  argue  that  all  three  levels  of  filmic  
seeing-­as  are  genuinely  perceptual.  But  to  give  a  brief  defense  of  level  two  here:  level  two  is  
indeed  a  perceptual  experience  because  it  consists  in  attending  to  production-­centered  aspects  
of  the  film  screen  that  we  don’t  otherwise  attend  to.  Seeing  the  film  as  a  film  consists  in  listening  
to  the  score’s  expressivity,  looking  at  the  connections  between  shots,  the  use  of  montage,  the  
lighting;;  seeing  the  actors  as  actors  involves  picking  up  on  their  facial  expressions  and  gestures,  
their  subtle  mannerisms,  the  tone  in  their  voices.  The  reason  level  two  involves  (or  lends  itself  
to)102  film  evaluation  is  that  it’s  a  matter  of  noticing  distinctly  stylistic  and  performative  elements.  
Particular  things  stand  out  to  us,  visually,  on  the  film  screen  when  we’re  engaged  in  level  two,  
and  this  makes  it  at  once  a  cognitive  and  perceptual  experience.  
There  is  much  more  to  be  said  about  level  two,  and  level  one,  seeing-­as,  and  I’ll  discuss  
more  facts  about  them  later—in  particular  with  regards  to  how  they  interact  with  one  another  and  
with  level  three.  But,  for  now,  it’s  important  to  note  that  they  exist,  and  that  they  differ  from  one  
another  in  important  ways.  So  having  outlined  that  much,  let’s  turn  to  the  level  of  seeing-­as  that  
illuminates  my  chief  thesis  here:  that  we  engage  with  a  film’s  fiction  perceptually.  
         Imaginative  Engagement  Preliminaries  
Film  theorists  and  philosophers  of  film  often  ask:  how  do  we  engage  with  the  fiction  in  a  
fiction  film?  How  do  we  attend  to  what  is  depicted  on  the  screen?  Perhaps  the  most  popular  and  
plausible  response  here  is  the  claim  that  we  imagine  that  what’s  fictionally  depicted  is  real—that  
the  narrative  events  are  actually  happening,  that  the  characters  exist.  Theorists  spell  out  the  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102  I  won’t  argue  the  point  here,  but  I  think  a  level  two  analysis  involves—rather  than  just  
causes—film  evaluation.  Accepting  the  reverse,  though,  wouldn’t  problematize  my  arguments.    
	  47	  
	  
nature  of  this  imaginative  engagement  in  different  ways.  Let’s  briefly  look  at  some  of  the  most  
prominent  accounts.  
Gregory  Currie  and  Noël  Carroll  claim  that  we  partake  in  imagining-­that.103  Currie  
grounds  his  thesis  here  upon  the  claim  that  an  imagining  (or  making-­believe)  is  “an  attitude  we  
take  to  propositions”104—so  imagining  that  x  is  the  case  is  adopting  an  attitude  of  make-­belief  
toward  the  proposition  that  “x  is  the  case.”  For  Currie,  we  bring  this  attitude  to  our  interactions  
with  visual  depictions  (including  fiction  films),  imagining  that  the  depicted  events  are  happening—
that  George  Bailey  is  real,  that  he  is  about  to  attempt  to  commit  suicide,  that  his  guardian  angel  
saves  him,  and  so  forth.  And  this  is,  Currie  argues,  the  extent  of  our  imaginative  engagement:  we  
merely  take  an  attitude  of  make-­belief  toward  whatever  is  represented,  and  we  do  not  imagine  
anything  about  our  perceptual  experience  of  what  is  represented—we  don’t  imagine  seeing  
George  Bailey  or  seeing  his  guardian  angel.  
Other  theorists,  such  as  Kendall  Walton  and  George  Wilson,  substantiate  views  (albeit  
importantly  different  ones)  of  imaginative  engagement  that  make  this  further  claim.  For  Walton,  
imagining  seeing  consists  in  imaginatively  projecting  ourselves  into  the  fiction  and  imagining  
seeing  the  events  and  characters  from  the  inside.105  When  we  watch  a  fiction  film,  we  imagine  
occupying,  having  the  perceptual  experiences  of,  whatever  points  of  view  the  camera  shows.  
Berys  Gaut  sums  up  a  Walton-­esque  account  of  imagining  seeing  here:  “when  someone  watches  
a  film,  she  imagines  seeing  the  events  depicted,  and  so  is  fictionally  a  member  of  the  fictional  
world…she  is  to  imagine  herself  as  a  kind  of  invisible  observer  at  the  scenes  as  they  occur.”106    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103(1)  Carroll,  Noël.  “Narration.”  The  Routledge  Companion  to  Philosophy  and  Film.  New  York:  
Routledge,  2009.  196-­206.  (2)  Currie,  Gregory.  The  Nature  of  Fiction.  Cambridge:  Cambridge,  
1990.  
104Currie,  p.  20.  
105  Walton  doesn’t  focus  much  on  movies,  but  this  ‘imagination-­from-­the-­inside’  view  stems  from  
his  more  general  account  of  how  we  see  pictures  and  holds  for  all  cases  in  which  we  are  looking  
at  a  depictive  representation.  
106Gaut,  Berys.  “Imagination,  Interpretation,  and  Film.”  Philosophical  Studies:  An  International  
Journal  for  Philosophy  in  the  Analytic  Tradition  89.  2  (March,  1998):  331-­341.  
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   George  Wilson’s  account  of  imagining  seeing  removes  the  “projective”  aspect  Walton’s  
includes.107  His  theory—the  “Mediated  Version  of  the  Imagined  Seeing  Thesis”—holds  that:  
It  is  fictional  in  our  imaginative  engagement  with  [mainstream]  narrative  films  that  they  
consist  of  ‘motion  picture-­like  shots’  that  have  been  derived  in  a  fictionally  indeterminate  
manner  from  pertinent  segments  of  the  fictional  narrative  worlds.  Hence,  when  film  
viewers  imagine  seeing  constituents  of  the  narrative  world,  they  imagine  themselves  
seeing  those  fictional  constituents  through  the  mediation  of  the  on-­screen  moving  
images,  images  that  fictionally  have  been  transparently  derived  from  the  dramatized  
situations  of  the  story.108  
  
As  film-­viewers,  we  take  “motion-­picture  shots”  to  be  shots  of  props  and  actors.  And  we  consider  
those  shots  to  be  images  of  things  that  are  real  insofar  as  they  exist  as  a  part  of  the  constructed  
set.  When  we  watch  a  fiction  film,  Wilson  argues,  we  imagine  seeing  motion  picture-­like  shots  of  
the  fictional  entities,  and  so  imagine  seeing  images  of  whatever  it  is  that  the  props  and  actors  are  
depicting.  While  we  do  imagine  seeing,  then,  we  remain  aware  of  the  medium—of  the  film  
screen—throughout  our  viewing.  
   Accounts  of  imaginative  engagement  are  highly  varied.  Some  focus  on  the  concept  of  
‘imagining  seeing,’  some  on  ‘imagining-­that,’  and  others  on  more  emotion-­based  engagement—
such  as  empathizing  with  characters  or  simulating  characters’  mental  and  perceptual  states.109  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107  (1)  Currie,  Gregory.  “Visual  Fictions.”  The  Philosophical  Quarterly  41.163  (Apr.,  1991):129-­
143;;  (2)  Walton,  Kendall.  Mimesis  as  Make-­Believe:  On  the  Foundations  of  the  Representational  
Arts.  Harvard:  Cambridge,  1990;;  (3)  Wilson,  George.  Seeing  Fictions  in  Film.  Oxford:  Oxford,  
2011.  
108  Seeing  Fictions  in  Film,  p.  89  
109For  discussions  of  empathetic  engagement:  (1)  Neill,  Alex.  “Empathy  and  (Film)  Fiction.”  Post-­
Theory:  Reconstructing  Film  Studies,  Ed.  D.  Bordwell  and  N.  Carroll.  Madison:  University  of  
Wisconsin  Press,  1996.  175–194;;  (2)  Coplan,  Amy.  “Empathetic  Engagement  with  Narrative  
Fictions.”  The  Journal  of  Aesthetics  and  Art  Criticism,  62.2  (Spring  2004):  141-­152;;  (3)  Gaut,  
Berys.“Empathy  and  Identification  in  Cinema.”  Midwest  Studies  in  Philosophy  34.1  (2010);;  and  
(4)  Vaague,  Margrethe  Bruun.  “Fiction  Film  and  the  Varieties  of  Empahetic  Engagement,”  
Midwest  Studies  in  Philosophy,  34.1  (2010).  For  discussions  of  mental  simulation:  (1)  Currie,  
Gregory.  “The  Moral  Psychology  of  Fiction.”Australasian  Journal  of  Philosophy  73  (1995):  250–
259,  and  “Imagination  and  Simulation:  Aesthetics  Meets  Cognitive  Science.”  Mental  Simulation,  
Ed.  Martin  Davies  and  Tony  Stone.  Oxford:  Blackwell,  1995;;  (2)  Feagin,  Susan.  Reading  with  
Feeling:  The  Aesthetics  of  Appreciation  Ithaca:  Cornell  University  Press,  1996;;  (3)  Smith,  Murray.  
Engaging  Characters:  Fiction,  Emotion,  and  the  Cinema.  Oxford:  Clarendon,  1995;;  and  (4)  
Walton,  Kendall.  “Spelunking,  Simulation,  and  Slime:  On  Being  Moved  by  Fiction.”  Emotion  and  
the  Arts,  Ed.  Mette  Hjort  and  Sue  Laver.  Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press,  1997.  37–49.  For  
discussions  of  central  and  acentral  imagining:  Wollheim,  Richard.  On  Art  and  the  Mind  
Cambridge:  Harvard  University  Press,  1974  and  The  Thread  of  Life.  Cambridge:  Cambridge  
University  Press,  1984.  
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While  varied,  though,  they  tend  to  have  one  thing  in  common:  they  tend  to  be  cognitive.  Where  
perception-­of-­the-­fictional  is  concerned,  they  either  don’t  discuss  it,  or  they  make  it  merely  
imagined  rather  than  actual  (as  Wilson  does).  Some  theorists,  like  Richard  Allen,  hint  at  our  ability  
to  perceive  the  fictional  without  fully  spelling  out  the  phenomenon.  In  “Looking  at  Motion  
Pictures,”  Allen  states:  
My  approach  to  the  problem  of  perceiving  fictions  is  simply  this.  Assuming  that  fictions  
can  be  depicted,  then  the  arguments  that  I  make  about  looking  at  pictures  in  general  
apply  to  pictures  of  fictions  as  well.  That  is,  just  as  we  might  report  that  we  saw  Larry  
Hagman  acting  the  part  of  J.R.  being  shot,  we  might  also  report,  if  we  were  avid  Dallas  
watchers,  'J.R.  has  been  shot  .  .  .  I  just  saw  it.'  Similarly,  assuming  that  what  is  fictional  
can  be  depicted,  then  we  can  see  what  is  depicted  in  a  painting,  whether  the  painting  is  
of  a  horse  or  a  unicorn.  However,  I  shall  not  argue  the  case  here.110    
  
Walton  comes  closer  to  providing  an  account  of  fiction-­based  seeing-­as  but  falls  short  as  
well.  He  states:  
Imaginings  also,  like  thoughts  of  other  kinds,  enter  into  visual  experiences.  And  the  
imaginings  called  for  when  one  looks  at  a  picture  inform  the  experience  of  looking  at  it.  
The  seeing  and  the  imagining  are  inseparably  bound  together,  integrated  into  a  single  
complex  phenomenological  whole…It  is  this  complex  experience  that  is  distinctive  of  and  
appropriate  to  the  perception  of  pictures,  the  experience  sometimes  labeled  ‘seeing  the  
picture  as  a  mill’…111    
  
For  Walton,  there  is  an  important  way  in  which  our  imaginings  and  perceptual  
experiences  intertwine  when  we  look  at  a  depictive  representation,  so  that  we  see  the  
representation  as  the  object  it  depicts.  But,  here,  Walton  focuses  primarily  (if  not  exclusively)  on  
the  nonfictional—cases  in  which  we  see  a  representation  (e.g.,  a  painting  of  a  mill)  as  the  real  
object  it  represents  (e.g.,  as  a  mill),  rather  than  cases  in  which  we  see  a  representation  as  the  
fictional  object  it  represents.  Doing  the  latter  involves  an  additional  layer  of  depiction:  e.g.,  
showing  us  a  mill  so  that  we  see  it  as  a  mansion  in  a  fictional  world  or  as  the  house  of  a  fictional  
character.    
Rob  Hopkins  does  make  way  for  the  notion  of  perceiving  the  fictional,  and  he  does  so  
more  explicitly  than  Allen  or  Walton.  Because  he  also  retains  a  perceptual  medium  awareness,  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110  Allen,  Richard.  “Looking  at  Motion  Pictures.”  Film-­Philosophy  5.25  (August  2001).  
111  Mimesis  as  Make-­Believe,  p.  295.  
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his  theory  is  partly  in  line  with  the  one  I’ll  outline  here.  The  big  differences  between  Hopkins’s  
account  and  mine  are:  (1)  he  deems  ‘seeing  the  fictional’  a  form  of  ‘seeing-­in;;’  (2)  he  doesn't  use  
the  notion  of  imaginative  engagement  as  extensively  as  I  will;;  and  (3)  he  cashes  the  phenomenon  
out  as  a  type  of  illusion.  We’ll  see  that  (1)  is  important,  since  I’ll  defend  that  ‘perceiving  the  
fictional’  is  best  understood  as  a  form  of  seeing-­as  and  not  a  form  of  seeing-­in.  What’s  more,  I  
take  it  that  a  full  appeal  to  imaginative  engagement  should  make  us  wary  of  any  appeal  to  the  
notion  of  ‘illusion.’  It’s  not  clear  to  me  why  “the  representation  of  the  story”  in  a  film  is  illusionistic,  
especially  once  we  understand  the  representation  as  prescribing  us  to  imagine  that  the  
nonfictional  entities  are  fictional  entities.  Granted  Hopkins  is  talking  about  ‘perceptual  illusion’  and  
not  ‘cognitive  illusion’  which  makes  his  claim  more  plausible  than  other  illusionists’—for  him,  we  
see  the  fictional  in  the  images  on  the  screen  but  do  not  mistakenly  believe  that  they  are  images  of  
the  fictional.  Still,  I  don't  think  there’s  a  need  to  appeal  to  the  notion  at  all.  In  fact,  I  think  it  
misconstrues  what’s  going  on  during  film-­viewing  by  putting  the  focus  on  ‘illusion’  rather  than  
‘imagining.’  
So  there  isn’t  much  theoretical  support  for  the  idea  that  we  see-­as  when  we  imaginatively  
engage  with  a  film’s  fiction.  Allen  merely  hints  at  such  a  phenomenon;;  Walton  seems  primarily  (if  
not  solely)  focused  on  our  seeing  a  film’s  nonfictional  content  through  the  film  screen;;  and  
Hopkins  discussing  seeing-­in  rather  than  seeing-­as  (and  suggests,  mistakenly,  that  our  
experience  is  perceptually  illusionistic).  In  the  next  section,  I  will  provide  an  account  of  ‘seeing  the  
fictional’  that  I  think  works—one  that  extends  Wilson’s  account  of  imagining  seeing.        
         Seeing-­as  the  Fictional  
As  Walton,  Wilson,  and  Currie  argue,  the  strongest  explanation  for  how  we  cognize  a  
movie’s  fiction  is  that  we  imagine  it  to  be  real.  We  pretend  that  Frodo  is  real,  that  he  is  on  a  
mission  to  hide  the  Ring,  and  that  he  is  accompanied  by  his  friend  Samwise.  The  strength  of  
imaginative  engagement  theories  stems  partly  from  the  implausibility  of  competing  accounts  of  
cognitive  engagement  (e.g.,  illusionism),  partly  from  our  emotional  reactions  to  a  film’s  fiction  (for  
which  we  need  some  explanation),  and  partly  from  sheer  phenomenology.  It  certainly  seems  to  
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me  that  I  am  doing  something  very  much  like  believing  that  Middle-­Earth  exists  without  really  
believing  it.112  Once  we  turn  to  imaginative  engagement  theories,  George  Wilson’s  is  
comparatively  strongest.  To  see  why,  let’s  briefly  look  at  the  chief  issues  with  Walton’s  and  
Currie’s.  
I  think  Walton’s  view  is  open  to  an  expansion  of  ‘seeing  the  fictional’—indeed  it  perhaps  
implies  such  an  expansion—but  I  don’t  think  we  can  turn  to  him  here  for  the  simple  reason  that  he  
doesn’t  spell  out  the  right  kind  of  imagining  seeing.  His  is  a  theory  of  projective  imagining,  
according  to  which  we  imagine  seeing  the  events  and  characters  from  the  inside.  If  Walton  turned  
this  into  an  account  of  seeing-­as,  then  he’d  have  to  maintain  that  we  see  a  film’s  images  as  
whatever  they  depict:  as  the  narrative  events,  people,  and  objects.  He’d  have  to  maintain  that  we  
remain  unaware  of  the  medium  during  imaginative  engagement  and  see  the  movie  images  as  3-­D  
versions  of  whatever  they  fictionally  portray.  But,  just  as  his  account  of  seeing-­through  
photographs  is  mistaken  in  maintaining  that  we  look  through  a  photograph’s  surface  and  see,  
literally,  the  object  photographed,113  this  account  of  seeing-­through  a  movie  screen  is  unintuitive.    
As  I  mentioned  earlier,  perceiving  movie  depth  is  not  the  same  as  perceiving  real-­world  
depth;;  and  the  way  in  which  we  ‘see  through’  the  film  screen  (and  overlook  the  nature  of  the  
images  as  images)  depends  upon  our  being  aware  of  it  as  a  film  screen.  The  fact  that  we’re  
imaginatively  engaged  in  the  fiction  doesn’t  change,  or  remove,  this  medium  awareness.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112  Illusionists  claim,  in  various  ways,  that  we  take  a  film’s  images  to  constitute  reality  in  some  
strong  sense,  thereby  suspending  our  awareness  of  it  as  pretense  or  make-­believe.  For  defenses  
of  illusionism:  (1)  “The  predominant  myth  of  cinema,  fostered  by  cinema  itself,  is  that  its  images  
and  sounds  present  reality”  (Ellis,  John.  Visible  Fictions:  Cinema,  Television,  Video.  London:  
Routledge,  1982.  77.  (2)  “Conditions  of  screening  and  narrative  conventions  give  the  spectator  an  
illusion  of  looking  in  on  a  private  world”  (Mulvey,  Laura.  “Visual  Pleasure  and  Narrative  
Cinema.”  Film  Theory  and  Criticism  Ed.  Gerald  Mast,  Marshall  Cohen,  and  Leo  Baudry.  Oxford:  
Oxford  University  Press,  1992.  749).  (3)  Film  encourages  “a  perception  of  the  image  as  a  fully  
realized  world  through  ‘identification’  with  the  perceptual  point  of  view  of  the  camera”  (Allen,  
Richard.  Projecting  Illusion:  Film  Spectatorship  and  the  Impression  of  Reality.  Cambridge:  
Cambridge,  1995.  114)  
113  For  objections  to  Walton’s  seeing-­through:  (1)  Currie,  Gregory.  “Photography,  Painting  and  
Perception”.  The  Journal  of  Aesthetics  and  Art  Criticism  49.1  (1991):  23–29.  (2)  Martin,  Edwin.  
“On  Seeing  Walton's  Great-­grandfather”.  Critical  Inquiry  12.4  (1986):  796–800.  (3)  Friday,  
Jonathan.  “Transparency  and  the  Photographic  Image.”  The  British  Journal  of  Aesthetics  36:1  
(1996):  30.  (4)  Snyder,  Joel  and  Neil  Walsh  Allen.  “Photography,  Vision,  and  Representation.”  
Critical  Inquiry  (1975):  143-­69.  
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Although  one  perceptual  experience  alters  when  we’re  engaged  in  the  pretense—i.e.,  what  we  
see  the  content  of  the  images  as  (characters  and  fictional  events  rather  than  actors,  props,  and  
sets)—the  other  perceptual  experiences  we  discussed  don’t.  We  still  have  the  same  behavioral  
responses  and  expectations  (e.g.,  not  seeing  the  film  screen  as  affording  internal  movement);;  we  
still  follow  the  narrative  unproblematically  (in  the  ways  Ponech  points  out);;  things  still  don’t  look  
like  they’re  ‘popping  out’  at  us;;  and  the  images  still  look  to  be  the  sizes  they  are.      
Walton’s  theory  also  gets  things  wrong  emotionally.  His  thesis  implies,  and  perhaps  is  
committed  to  the  claim  that,  we  feel  self-­directed  affective  responses  during  fiction  film-­viewing.  
Indeed,  this  is  an  issue  Noël  Carroll114  raises  with  any  Walton-­esque  imagined  seeing  thesis.  If  
I’m  imaginatively  a  part  of  the  fictional  world—I’m  on  the  zombie-­occupied  streets  of  in  28  Days  
Later  or  at  the  battle  scenes  in  The  Thin  Red  Line—then  I  should  feel  fear  for  my  own  safety,  
panic  at  the  thought  of  my  destruction.115  After  all,  throughout  my  imagining,  I’m  actually  there.  
But  we  don’t  feel  these  sorts  of  emotions  when  we  watch  a  movie.  We  feel  sympathetic  (even  
empathetic)  emotions  for  characters  and  more  general  ones—like  curiosity  or  suspense.  But  we  
don’t  feel  for  ourselves.  Insofar  as  a  theory  of  projective  imagining  implies  that  we  do,  it  gets  
something  importantly  wrong  about  film-­viewing.  
On  the  other  hand,  turning  to  a  Currie-­style  view  doesn’t  quite  work  either  for  a  similar  
reason:  it  seems  phenomenologically  unintuitive.  Currie  doesn’t  discuss  how  we  can  imagine  that  
things  are  true  in  the  fictional  world  without  also  imagining  seeing  and  hearing  during  film-­viewing.  
And  we  have  immediate  reason  to  think  that  the  two  don’t  come  apart,  partly  because  of  the  
nature  of  other  seeing-­as  experiences  (in  the  Wittgenstein  and  Walton  cases,  imagining  that  
something  is  the  case  leads  to—helps  constitute—a  case  of  imagining  seeing)  and  partly  
because  of  the  difference  between  engaging  with  cinematic  narratives  and  engaging  with  literary  
narratives.  If  Currie  is  right,  then  there  is  merely  a  causal  difference  between  the  two—sights  and  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114Carroll,  Noël.  “Narration.”  The  Routledge  Companion  to  Philosophy  and  Film.  New  York:  
Routledge,  p.  196-­206  (2009).  
115  This  follows,  I  think,  from  the  fact  that  the  imagination  can  give  rise  to  emotions,  a  claim  
Walton  would  deny  insofar  as  he  argues  that  we  only  feel  quasi-­emotions  while  watching  movies.    
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sounds  cause  our  imaginings  in  one  case  while  words  on  a  page  cause  our  imaginings  in  the  
other—but  no  substantiate  difference  in  our  imaginative  engagement.  In  both  cases,  we  imagine  
that  certain  things  are  happening.  But  it  isn’t  clear  how  this  can  be  all  that’s  going  on  during  film-­
viewing.  
Do  perceptual  cues  (people,  scenes,  objects)  merely  prompt  our  imaginings  without  
serving  as  the  objects  for  those  imaginings—without  our,  in  other  words,  imagining  that  the  actors  
are  the  characters  we’re  imagining  exist  or  that  the  sets  are  the  fictional  worlds  we’re  imagining  
exist?  Surely  a  “yes”  answer  here  is  mistaken.  Part  of  what  makes  film-­viewing  so  distinct  from  
reading  is  precisely  that  only  in  the  former  do  we  imagine  that  what  we  see  and  hear  is  what  
we’re  imagining  exists.  We  imagine,  not  just  that  Frodo  is  real,  but  that  Elijah  wood  is  him;;  we  
imagine,  not  just  that  Middle-­Earth  is  real,  but  that  the  scenes  in  New  Zealand  that  we  see  are  
pieces  of  that  world.  And  if  this  is  the  case,  if  what  we  see  and  hear  become  the  objects  of  our  
imaginings  during  film-­viewing,  then  it’s  hard  to  see  how  ‘imagining  seeing’  isn’t  occurring.  How  
can  we  imagine  that  what  we  see  and  hear  is  a  certain  way,  while  we’re  seeing  and  hearing  it,  
without  also  imagining  seeing  and  hearing  it  as  such?  Currie  needs  to  provide  an  explanation  
here.  Without  one,  his  view  seems  untenable.  
In  light  of  the  issues  with  Currie’s  and  Walton’s  views,  we  seemingly  need  an  imaginative  
engagement  theory  that  maintains:  (1)  that  we  remain  continually  aware  (perceptually  and  
cognitively)  of  the  film  screen;;  and  (2)  that  we  do  imagine  seeing.  Wilson’s  “mediated  version  of  
the  imagined  seeing  thesis”  gives  us  this  combination.116    
Of  course,  here  we  need  to  bring  in  our  previous  discussion  about  medium  awareness.  
While  Wilson’s  thesis  is  on  the  right  track,  it  fails  to  specify  just  what  medium  awareness  is  like  
during  film-­viewing,  that  it  includes  perceiving  movie  depth  and  perceiving  movie  motion,  and  that  
these  phenomena  combine  to  make  us  perceptually  unaware  of  the  movie’s  images  as  images  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116  As  he  puts  it:  “when  film  viewers  imagine  seeing  constituents  of  the  narrative  world,  they  
imagine  themselves  seeing  those  fictional  constituents  through  the  mediation  of  the  on-­screen  
moving  images,  images  that  fictionally  have  been  transparently  derived  from  the  dramatized  
situations  of  the  story.”  Seeing  Fictions  in  Film,  p.  89  
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strictly  speaking.  Even  more  substantively,  Wilson  fails  to  take  into  account  how  we  perceive—
rather  than  merely  cognize—the  fiction  in  a  fiction  film.  In  fact,  he  seemingly  denies  such  a  
possibility  here:  
Perhaps,  one  is  inclined  to  protest  that  the  viewers  simply  see  Ethan  disrupt  the  
wedding—no  qualification  by  ‘imagined’  is  required.  However,  in  watching  the  very  same  
scene,  viewers  also  see  John  Wayne  stride  onto  a  Hollywood  set  and  act  out  the  
pertinent  prescriptions  of  the  script.  And  yet,  surely,  viewers  do  not  ‘see’  both  the  
behavior  of  the  actor  John  Wayne  and  the  actions  of  the  character  Ethan  in  the  same  
way…the  difference,  I  am  assuming,  should  be  explained  in  this  way:  viewers  actually  
see  John  Wayne  and  his  behavior,  and  it  is  make-­believe  for  the  viewers  that  they  see  
Ethan…the  viewers  imagine  seeing  those  constituents  in  the  fiction.117    
  
Despite  the  distinction  that  Wilson  draws  (between  how  we  actually  perceive  the  nonfictional  and  
imagine  perceiving  the  fictional)  his  account  immediately  lends  itself  to  an  account  of  seeing-­as,  
according  to  which—by  imagining  seeing  images  of  characters  and  fictional  worlds—we  see  the  
screen  images  as  cinematic  recordings  of  those  very  things.    
Extending  an  imaginative  engagement  theory  into  an  account  of  seeing-­as,  in  fact,  
immediately  makes  sense.  As  aforementioned,  the  imagination  is  typically  the  cognitive  faculty  
that  helps  constitute  artistic  seeing-­as;;  and  it  might  in  fact  be  responsible  for  even  non-­artistic  
instances,  as  Wittgenstein,  Strawson,  and  Scruton  all  suggest.  So,  of  all  the  cognitive  faculties  
that  could  potentially  fuse  with  perceptual  experience,  the  imagination  might  be  the  most  obvious  
one.  Indeed,  the  nature  of  film-­viewing  gives  us  ample  reason  to  extend  Wilson’s  account  in  this  
way,  and  for  two  related  reasons:  first  of  all,  our  imaginings  are  about  the  contents  of  our  
perception;;  secondly,  our  imaginings  and  perceptions  develop  together.  
A  movie  consists  in  a  richer  perceptual  apparatus  than  any  other  form  of  visual  depiction  
because  it  gives  us  precisely  the  perceptual  prompts  that  would  exist  if  the  fictional  world  were  
real.  As  Murray  Smith  puts  it:  
On  the  one  hand,  fiction  films  present  us  with  complex  narrative  scenarios  which  we  are  
required  to  engage  with  imaginatively  in  order  to  experience  fully;;  on  the  other  hand,  the  
cinema  is  built  upon  an  ‘apparatus’  which  can,  in  certain  limited  ways,  generate  the  
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perceptions  and  sensations  which  we  would  expect  to  experience  in  the  fictional  
scenarios  it  prompts  us  to  imagine.118    
  
Not  only  are  we  presented  with  these  perceptual  prompts,  as  Murray  claims;;  those  
prompts  serve  as  the  objects  of  our  imaginings.  And  this  makes  film-­watching  at  once  an  
imaginative  and  perceptual  experience,  differentiating  it  from  our  engagement  with  non-­visual  
depictions.  When  we  read  a  novel,  our  imaginings  aren’t  about  our  perceptual  experiences—we  
aren’t  imagining  that  the  words  we  read  are  characters  or  fictional  events.  When  we  watch  a  film,  
we  do  just  this.  We  imagine  that  the  images  that  we  see  are  of  certain  things.  We  can  see  this  as  
a  distinction  between  what  Walton  calls  a  prop  and  an  object  of  our  imagination;;  the  former  
merely  incites,  or  causes,  our  imaginings,  while  the  latter  is  what  are  imagining  is  of  or  about.  It’s  
precisely  in  cases  in  which  the  content  of  our  perception  serves  as  the  object  of  our  imagination  
that  we  tend  to  see-­as.  This  is  true  of  Wittgenstein’s  examples  as  well  as  the  artistic  seeing-­as  
examples.  We  imagine  that  the  duck-­rabbit  we’re  looking  at  is  a  duck;;  we  imagine  that  the  
painting  we’re  looking  at  is  a  mill  or  is  alive.  
Merely  defending  the  existence  of  level  three  seeing-­as,  however,  does  not  establish  
what  I  need  it  to.  My  chief  aim  here  is  to  show  how  our  engagement  with  a  film’s  depicted  content  
is  perceptual  as  well  as  cognitive,  thus  eliminating  the  stark  divide  often  drawn  between  the  
fictional  and  nonfictional.  But  some  cases  of  seeing-­as  aren’t  really  perceptual.  This  happens  
when  the  cognitive  element  is  free-­floating  and  not  anchored  in  any  part  of  the  visual  experience,  
or  in  purely  cognitive  instances  of  the  phenomenon.  To  show  that  level  three  is  perceptual—to  
establish  that,  by  imagining  seeing  characters  and  fictional  worlds,  we  perceive  them—we  need  
to  differentiate  filmic  seeing-­as  from  these  other  instances.    
In  the  next  section,  I  will  briefly  outline  what  some  nonperceptual  cases  of  seeing-­as  are  
like,  and  then  I  will  argue  that  level  three  is  distinct  from  them.  In  doing  so,  I  will  simultaneously  
defend  that  levels  one  and  two  are  genuinely  perceptual.  
            Perceiving  the  Fictional  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




To  borrow  an  example  of  Richard  Wollheim’s:  suppose  I’m  looking  at  tilted  columns  
outside  of  a  building.119  I  can  undergo  a  couple  different  seeing-­as  experiences  here.  On  the  one  
hand,  I  can  see  the  columns  as  falling  over.  But,  with  more  imaginative  work,  I  can  see  them  as  
having  been  pushed  by  barbarians.  In  the  latter  case,  there’s  a  distinct  aspect  in  my  experience  
that  informs  how  I  see  the  columns.  But  that  aspect  is  free-­floating—it  isn’t  anchored  in  the  
columns  physically.  I  can’t  point  to  the  way  in  which  they’re  being  pushed  over  or  specify  which  
parts  look  pushed  over  because  there’s  nothing  in  the  columns  that  grounds  their  having  been  
pushed  over.  The  aspect  I’m  aware  of  is,  in  a  sense,  too  far  away  from  the  columns,  physically.    
An  even  less  perceptual  case  of  seeing-­as  consists  in  “metaphorical  construal”120.  As  
Elisabeth  Camp  argues,  metaphors  use  one  thing  (a  “representing  frame”)  to  restructure  our  
understanding,  or  perspective,  of  another  (a  “focal  subject”).  This  perspective-­shifting  is,  
according  to  Camp,  a  case  of  “seeing  X  as  Y,”  despite  the  fact  that  we  don’t  actually  need  to  be  
seeing  subject,  object,  or—indeed—anything  at  all.  
Now,  if  level  three  seeing-­as  is  like  metaphorical  construal  or  the  Wollheim  case,  then  
there  isn’t  a  really  important  sense  in  which  the  representational  is  tied  to  the  perceptual.  Saying  
that  we  “see”  the  screen  images  “as”  characters  and  fictional  worlds  isn’t  really  saying  that  we  
perceive  them.  It’s  merely  saying  that  we  cognize  them  through  our  imagining  without  truly,  
genuinely,  seeing  them  in  the  screen  images.  
What’s  more,  independent  of  these  two  examples,  we  might  have  reason  to  consider  
level  three  nonperceptual.  Consider,  for  instance,  what  happens  when  we  shift  from  level  three  to  
level  two,  or  vice  versa.  There  is  a  cognitive  shift—from  imagining  seeing  characters  and  fictional  
worlds  to  thinking  of  the  images  as  of  actors  and  props.  But  it  might  seem  odd  to  say  that  there’s  
a  perceptual  change  since  nothing  changes  on  the  screen;;  we’re  still  looking  at  the  same  images,  
and  the  same  properties  of  those  images.  So  is  it  really  perceptual?  Or  is  it  merely  a  cognitive  act  
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to  move  from  seeing  Frodo  to  seeing  Elijah  Wood?  Looking  more  closely  at  some  attentional  
changes  that  take  place  when  we  move  from  level  three  to  level  two,  and  vice  versa,  shows  that  it  
is  indeed  a  perceptual  act.  
Level  three  involves  attending  to  the  content  of  the  images  without  attending  to  the  way  
they’re  constructed  or  presented.  Level  two  involves  noticing  distinctly  stylistic  and  performative  
elements:  because  we’re  seeing  the  film  as  a  film,  we  notice  the  types  of  shots  taken,  the  
transitions  between  them,  the  lighting,  the  actors’  mannerisms,  the  score’s  expressivity.  These  
are  features  of  the  film  that  aren’t  salient  when  we’re  imaginatively  engaged  in  the  fiction  (despite  
the  fact  that  they  affect  that  engagement).  Once  we  transition  to  level  two,  we  look  more  closely  
at  the  screen—to  evaluate  mood,  we  see  how  bright  a  scene  is  compared  to  others;;  to  evaluate  
acting,  we  see  subtle  expressions  and  gestures;;  to  evaluate  expressivity,  we  listen  closely  to  the  
score.  These  are  precisely  the  features  that,  I  think,  movie-­goers  don’t  attend  to  when  
imaginatively  engaged.  Instead,  the  majority  of  our  attention  is  spent  on,  more  basically,  grasping  
what’s  going  on  in  the  narrative  and  what  the  characters  are  doing.  
So,  when  we  change  from  one  type  of  seeing-­as  to  another,  we  visually  attend  to  
different  things  on  the  screen.  How  we’re  engaged  cognitively  becomes  a  part  of  how  we  engage  
perceptually,  causing  us  to  see  more  than  we  did  before  or  less  than  we  did  before.  These  two  
experiences,  thus,  do  constitute  different  perceptual  experiences.  
Turning  to  philosophers  of  perception  like  Susanna  Siegel  can  help  support  my  claim  
here.  For  Siegel,  a  perceptual  experience  can  contain  the  representation  of  natural  kind  
properties,  such  that,  in  seeing  something  (like  a  pine  tree)  we  represent  it  as  something  (“as  a  
pine  tree”).121  Thus,  for  Siegel,  a  change  in  recognitional  ability  brings  a  perceptual  shift;;  gaining  
the  capacity  to  identify  pine  trees  causes  us  to  see  the  pine  trees  differently.  For  Siegel,  this  
perceptual  alteration  doesn’t  happen  at  the  low  level;;  shape,  size,  and  color  properties  remain  
static.  The  transformation  consists  in  a  higher-­level  change  in  salience.  Learning  how  to  identify  
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pine  trees  in  a  forest  causes  us  to  notice  them.  And  because  they  stand  out  to  us  we  see  them  
differently.  This  is  precisely  what  happens  with  filmic  seeing-­as;;  depending  upon  which  type  we’re  
engaged  in,  different  things  on  the  movie  become  salient.  
Even  harkening  back  to  Wittgenstein,  we  see  this  support;;  for  him,  what  shows  that  
“noticing  an  aspect”  is  a  visual  phenomenon  is  the  behavioral  response  we  have  to  it—pointing  to  
relevant  comparisons  and  identifying  part(s)  of  the  diagram  or  object.  Of  course,  Wittgenstein’s  
account  centers  on  the  notion  of  Gestalt  switches  in  a  way  that  my  account  does  not.  The  duck-­
rabbit  diagram  changes,  organizationally,  for  us  when  we  alter  what  we  see  it  as—e.g.,  the  duck’s  
beak  becomes  the  rabbit’s  ears.  The  changes  that  occur  in  filmic  seeing-­as  aren’t  Gestalt-­based.  
The  actors’  faces  and  bodies  don’t  seem  to  take  on  a  different  organizational  pattern,  and  neither  
do  the  sets  or  environments.  Instead,  we  notice  things  in  those  sets  or  environments  or  faces  that  
we  didn’t  before.  So  filmic  seeing-­as  involves  visual  changes  that  are  importantly  different  from  
Gestalt  ones.  
More  importantly,  getting  clearer  on  just  how  much  we  see-­as  at  the  fictional  level  further  
solidifies  that  it  is  genuinely  perceptual  engagement.  As  I  mentioned  in  my  description  of  level  
one,  we  don’t  just  see  the  characters  and  fictional  worlds  depicted;;  we  see  many  properties  of  
those  things.  We  pick  up  on  natural  meaning  cues  (which  signify,  and  thereby  allow  us  to  grasp  
emotional  and  expressive  properties)  in  the  characters,  environments,  objects,  and  plot  events.  
Now,  sheer  volume  alone  doesn’t  establish  the  perceptual  nature  of  this  engagement.  But  what  
does  is  this:  we  grasp  these  signs  in  the  same  sort  of  way  that  we  grasp  them  in  everyday  life  
because  movies  call  on  our  everyday  perceptual  processes.  Movies  show  us  the  cues  that  we  
encounter  in  the  world;;  so  if  we  admit  that  picking  up  on  natural  meaning  is  a  perceptual  (as  well  
as  cognitive)  act  in  the  latter,  then  we  should  seemingly  admit  that  it’s  perceptual  in  the  former.  
Indeed,  when  we’re  watching  a  fiction  film,  and  when  we’re  properly  imaginatively  
engaged  with  it,  we  take  it  to  be  just  showing  us  the  people  and  events  in  the  narrative.  As  Robert  
Burgoyne  states,  we  experience  the  fictional  world  “directly  as  the  autonomous  facts  of  the  
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fictional  universe.”122  Similarly,  as  Jakob  Lothe  states:  “film’s  events  manifest  themselves  as  
definitive.  They  show  with  sovereign  conviction  certain  events.”123  What  these  quotes  suggest  is  
that  we  take  what  we’re  watching  on  the  screen  to  be  true,  to  be  depicting  a  world  that  unfolds  
before  our  eyes  (not  as  a  world  that  is  “the  discourse  of  a  narrator  situated  outside  the  story”).  
Another  way  to  put  this  is  that  we  assume  objectivity  in  the  narrative,  a  point  George  Wilson  
expands  upon  here:  
One  of  the  characteristic  marks  of  classical  narrative  films  is  that  their  audio/visual  
narration  is,  in  a  certain  sense,  transparent.  Very  roughly,  this  means  that  (1)  most  of  the  
shots  in  these  movies  are  understood  as  providing  the  audience  with  ‘objective’  or  
intersubjectively  accessible  views  of  the  fictional  characters,  actions,  and  situations  
depicted  in  the  film  and  that  (2)  where  the  shots  or  sequences  are  not  to  be  construed  as  
objective,  there  is  a  reasonably  clear  marking  of  the  fact  that  they  are,  in  one  of  several  
different  ways,  ‘subjective.’124  
  
So,  what  does  this  mean?  What  does  it  matter  that  we  treat  the  narrative  as  though  it’s  
showing  us  things  as  they  are,  objectively?  One  thing  it  means  is  that  we  watch  what’s  happening  
as  though  we  would  a  documentary.  While  imaginatively  engaged,  we  treat  the  characters  as  
people,  the  sets  as  real  landscapes  and  environments,  and  the  props  as  real  objects.  Given  that  
we’re  utilizing  basic  perceptual  processes  throughout,125  this  just  amounts  to  us  engaging  with  the  
fiction  in  fundamentally  the  same  way  that  we  engage  with  images  of  things  in  the  world.  And  so,  
just  as  we  take  ourselves  to  be  seeing  and  hearing  the  latter,  so  too—when  imaginatively  
engaged—we  take  ourselves  to  be  seeing  and  hearing  the  former.    
Given  what  goes  on  during  imaginative  engagement,  given  the  extent  to  which  we  see-­as  
the  fictional  and  the  way  in  which  we  do  so,  we  should  consider  level  three  to  be  a  genuinely  
perceptual  experience—one  according  to  which  we  see  the  fiction  in  a  film.  Theorists  are  thus  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122  Burgoyne,  Robert.  “The  Cinematic  Narrator:  The  Logic  and  Pragmatics  of  Impersonal  
Narration.”  Journal  of  Film  and  Video  42:1  (Spring,  1990):  3-­16,  9.  
123  Lothe,  Jakob.  Narrative  in  Fiction  and  Film:  An  Introduction.  Oxford:  Oxford,  2000.  
124  Wilson,  George.  “Transparency  and  Twist  in  Narrative  Fiction  Film.”  Journal  of  Aesthetics  and  
Art  Criticism  64:1  (Winter,  2006):  81-­95,  1.  
125  Of  course,  this  isn’t  to  downplay  the  role  of  interpretation  and  knowledge  of  film  convention.  
We  do  much  more  than  utilize  ordinary  perceptual  processes.  My  point  is  that  we  use  those  
processes  throughout,  even  as  we  interpret,  and  that  this  allows  us  to  pick  up  on  basic  facts  in  




wrong  in  drawing  a  separation  between  how  we  engage  with  the  nonfictional  and  how  we  engage  
with  the  fiction.  Even  more  broadly,  all  three  levels  of  filmic  seeing-­as  engage  both  our  cognitive  
and  perceptual  processes.  
         How  the  Levels  Intertwine     
   So  far,  I’ve  argued  for  three  types  of  filmic  seeing-­as,  and  I’ve  treated  them  as  distinct.  
But  part  of  what  makes  filmic  seeing-­as  so  interesting  and  complicated  is  that  the  three  levels  
intertwine,  interact  with  one  another.  Their  ability  to  do  so  differentiates  them  from  other,  more  
frequently  discussed,  forms  of  seeing-­as,  and  disproves  some  notions  we  might’ve  had  about  the  
phenomenon.    
   Although  I  introduced  level  one  first,  as  a  basic  recognition  ability,  in  fact  it  occurs  
throughout  all  of  film-­viewing—while  levels  two  or  three  occur.  It’s  difficult—if  not  impossible—to  
engage  in  level  three,  and  thus  see  an  image  as  of  a  particular  character  or  particular  setting,  
without  also  seeing  it  as  of  a  man  or  woman,  or  as  of  consisting  in  trees  or  clouds.  Similarly,  it’s  
confusing  to  consider  seeing  an  image  as  of  Daniel  Day-­Lewis  without  simultaneously  seeing  it  
as  of  a  man.  And  if  we’re  wary  of  making  a  necessity  claim  here,  we  can  at  least  admit  that  this  
simultaneity  is  possible.  There’s  nothing  about  seeing  an  image  as  of  Daniel  Day-­Lewis  that  
prevents,  or  rules  out,  our  also  seeing  it  as  of  a  man;;  there’s  nothing  about  seeing  the  Lord  of  the  
Rings  setting  as  of  Middle-­Earth  that  prevents,  or  rules  out,  our  seeing  it  as  containing  hills  and  
mountains.  
   This  simultaneity  distinguishes  filmic  seeing-­as  from  many  other  instances  of  the  
phenomenon.  With  regards  to  the  duck-­rabbit,  seeing  one  aspect  requires  our  not  seeing  another  
because  of  the  attentional  responses  it  necessitates.  Seeing  the  figure  as  a  duck  means  drawing  
comparisons  between  it  and  other  ducks;;  it  means  identifying  a  certain  collection  of  lines  as  its  
beak.  Doing  this  prevents  our  noticing  the  rabbit-­aspect,  as  the  latter  requires  different  
comparisons  and  identifications.  The  same  is  true  of  other  cases  of  seeing-­as.  Childlike  games  of  
make-­believe  require  our  not  seeing  particular  objects  or  people  as  themselves  because  noticing  
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them  as  themselves  spoils  our  attempts  to  engage  with  them  as  objects  in  our  imaginings.  During  
film-­viewing  we  don’t  face  this  exclusion  where  level  one  is  concerned.  
   Delving  more  deeply  into  level  one’s  intertwinements:  as  I  mentioned  earlier,  we  pick  up  
on  expressive  and  emotional  properties  during  film-­viewing  that  infect  what  we  perceive  at  the  
fictional  level.  Utilizing  basic  recognition  capacities  doesn’t  just  enable  us  to  see  ordinary  objects  
and  properties;;  it  also  enables  us  to  see  fictional  objects  and  properties.  And  the  reverse  is  true  
as  well:  engaging  with  the  fiction  affects  our  engagement  with  level  one.  As  I  mentioned  in  my  
initial  explication  of  the  latter,  just  how  we  identify  the  objects  and  people—just  which  basic  
categories  we  group  them  into—often  depends  upon  our  following  a  film’s  narrative;;  we  need  to  
understand  the  fictional  world  of  The  Simpsons  and  The  Lord  of  the  Rings  before  we  can  know  
whether  or  not  their  characters  are  humans,  for  instance.  So,  although  we  can  often  identify  the  
objects  and  properties  on  a  film  screen  without  any  familiarity  with  the  film  at  hand  (indeed,  
without  any  prior  experience  of  film),  it  sometimes  requires  engaging  with  a  film’s  fictional  content.  
And  this  elucidates  the  chief  difference  between  level  one  and  level  two:  whereas  the  latter  
consists  in  attending  to  what  is  in  fact  on  the  screen  (e.g.,  seeing  the  sets  depicting  houses,  
cottages,  and  castles  as  sets),  the  former  consists  in  attending  to  whatever  ordinary  objects  are  
represented  on  the  screen  (e.g.,  seeing  the  sets  as  houses,  cottages,  and  castles).       
   Despite  these  intertwinements,  I  think  we  can  experience  level  one  on  its  own.  Take,  for  
instance,  a  person  who  has  never  seen  Lord  of  the  Rings  and  happens  to  view  a  random  scene  
from  it.  This  viewer  doesn’t  see  an  image  of  Frodo  as  a  cinematic  recording  Frodo  or  an  image  of  
Middle-­Earth  as  a  cinematic  recording  of  Middle-­Earth.  She  sees  the  former  as  of  a  man,  and  the  
latter  as  of  a  place  with  trees,  clouds,  castles,  and  the  like.  Frodo’s  story,  his  quest,  and  his  
personality  is  completely  unknown  to  her,  as  is  Middle-­Earth’s  existence  as  a  continent  containing  
Elves  and  Ainur.  Without  an  awareness  of  the  narrative,  this  viewer  engages  in  level  1  and  not  
level  3.    The  latter  requires  her  learning  of  the  aforementioned  elements  in  the  fiction  so  that  she  
can  imaginatively  engage  with  that  content.  Doing  so  enables  her  to  see  and  hear  the  images  
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according  to  the  story—see  an  image  of  Frodo  as  a  recording  of  that  particular  character,  with  his  
particular  quest,  and  his  particular  characteristics.    
   It’s  worth  it  to  note  that,  while  it’s  possible  to  just  engage  in  level  one,  it’s  not  very  easy  
to.  If  we  become  even  slightly  imaginatively  engaged—pretending  that  the  characters  are  people,  
even  though  we  might  not  know  anything  about  their  specific  stories—we’re  likely  to  attribute  
emotions  and  thoughts  to  them  (and  ignore  the  fact  that  they  are  actors),  and  to  try  and  figure  out  
what  the  fictional  world  is  like  (and  ignore  the  fact  that  it  is  just  a  set).  We’re  likely,  in  other  words,  
to  have  some  bare  engagement  with  level  three.       
   Let’s  move  now  to  how  levels  two  and  three  intertwine.  During  typical  seeing-­as  
experiences,  two  (potential)  aspects  are  non-­simultaneous  and  antagonistic,  with  the  latter  
perhaps  causing  the  former;;  because  engaging  in  certain  attentional  processes  prevents  our  
engaging  in  others,  double-­aspect  seeing  is  impossible.  But  levels  two  and  three  enable  non-­
antagonism  even  while  they  necessitate  non-­simultaneity.  
If  I’m  attending  to  Daniel  Day-­Lewis  as  Daniel  Day-­Lewis  in  There  will  be  Blood,  then  
certain  features  of  the  character  of  Daniel  Plainview  become  more  prominent  to  me.  I  know  that  
Day-­Lewis  tends  to  portray  intense  characters,  and  I’m  aware  of  some  of  his  chief  approaches  in  
doing  so—e.g.,  conveying  emotion  through  looks,  his  eyes  showing  an  internal  anger  or  grief  that  
isn’t  released  vocally.  With  this  in  mind,  I  notice  Daniel  Plainview’s  eyes,  and  worry  that  his  
emotions  aren’t  being  healthily  exposed  to  those  around  him.  I  notice  this  feature  in  Daniel  
Plainview  more  because  of  the  knowledge  of  Daniel  Day-­Lewis  that  I’m  bringing  to  my  viewing.  In  
this  respect,  level  two  can  affect  level  three.  
The  reverse  is  true  as  well.  How  we  judge  a  film  (aesthetically)  results  from  our  engaging  
imaginatively  with  the  world  it  presents  to  us.  It’s  by  becoming  ensconced  in  the  action  and  
feeling  for  the  characters  that  we  can  discuss  how  the  plot  was  structured,  or  how  well  the  actors’  
portrayals  warranted  our  affective  responses.  Similarly,  picking  up  on  certain  stylistic,  production-­
level,  elements  enables  us  to  engage  imaginatively  with  the  story.  It’s  by  being  familiar  with  point-­
of-­view  editing,  for  instance,  that  we  can  thereby  imaginatively  take  on  a  character’s  perspective.  
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So,  when  we  watch  American  Beauty,  our  awareness  of  the  way  in  which  the  image  is  telescoped  
and  the  stylized  use  of  sound,  shows  us  that  we  are  entering  Lester’s  fantasy.126    
Levels  two  and  three  can  support  each  other  in  these  ways.  And  this  all  despite  their  non-­
simultaneity.  We  can’t  evaluate  the  film  while  we’re  imaginatively  engaged  in  it;;  we  can’t  feel  for  
the  characters  while  critiquing  the  actors’  performances.  And  this  differentiates  the  interaction  
between  two  and  three  from  what  occurs  between  them  and  level  one;;  whereas  level  one  is  
inherently  a  part  of  them,  the  latter  are  necessarily  separate.    
Now  we  might  doubt  this  last  claim.  Thinking  more  carefully  about  the  relation  between  
‘actor’  and  ‘character’  in  particular  might  make  us  deny  the  supposed  non-­simultaneity  of  levels  
two  and  three.  I  said  above  that  our  awareness  of  an  actor  can  affect  our  awareness  of  her  
character.  We  might  think  that  this  intertwinement  is  stronger  than  I’ve  presented  it:  if  we’re  
familiar  with  an  actor,  can  we  really  see  them  as  the  character  they  portray  in  a  given  film  without  
remaining  aware  of  them,  as  performer,  throughout?  Can  level  three  exist  without  level  two  in  this  
case?  And,  on  the  other  hand,  don’t  we  build  an  actor’s  persona  in  part  from  the  roles  she  has  
portrayed?  Is  there  really  such  a  thing  as  seeing  the  former  without  seeing  the  latter?  Stanley  
Cavell  in  fact  argues  for  an  association  between  character  and  actor  that  gives  us  some  reason  to  
think  that  there  isn’t  a  genuine  distinction  between  the  two.127  According  to  Cavell,  “for  the  stage,  
an  actor  works  himself  into  a  role;;  for  the  screen,  a  performer  takes  the  role  onto  himself.”128  This  
difference  amounts  to  an  ontological  distinction  which  Cavell  expands  upon  here:  
On  the  stage  there  are  two  beings,  and  the  being  of  the  character  assaults  the  being  
   of  the  actor;;  the  actor  survives  only  by  yielding…the  screen  performer  is  essen  
   tially  not  an  actor  at  all:  he  is  the  subject  of  study,  and  a  study  not  his  own.  
  
Cavell’s  meaning  here  is  a  bit  elusive,  but  I  think  he’s  getting  at  this  idea:  a  theater  role,  a  
stage  character,  is  an  entity  (somehow)  separate  from  the  actor  who  portrays  it.  The  latter  
becomes,  or  “yields”  to,  that  role.  A  screen  performance  differs  in  this  respect:  the  actor  doesn’t  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126  Sheri  Tuttle  Ross  mentioned  this  at  the  2015  Eastern  Division  meeting  of  the  American  
Society  for  Aesthetics  
127  Cavell,  Stanley.  The  World  Viewed:  Reflections  on  the  Ontology  of  Film.  Cambridge:  Harvard,  
1979.  
128  Cavell,  p.  27.  
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“yield”  to  a  character  because  the  character  doesn’t  exist  separate  from  the  actor  that  portrays  it.  
The  latter  becomes  the  former  by  creating  it,  by  bringing  it  to  life;;  in  this  sense,  what  exists  on  the  
stage  is  a  character  played  by  an  actor  while  what  exists  on  the  screen  is  both  actor  and  
character—the  two  constitute  one  being  or  create  each  other  simultaneously.  The  point  becomes  
a  bit  clearer  when  Cavell  states:  
‘Bogart’  means  ‘the  figure  created  in  a  given  set  of  films.’  His  presence  in  those    
   films  is  who  he  is,  not  merely  in  the  sense  in  which  a  photograph  of  an  event  is    
   that  event;;  but  in  the  sense  that  if  those  films  did  not  exist,  Bogart  would  not  exist,  
   the  name  ‘Bogart’  would  not  mean  what  it  does.129     
  
What  I  think  we  should  take  away  from  Cavell’s  analysis  is  that  movie  stars  are  
associated,  necessarily,  with  the  characters  they  portray—so  much  so  that  their  very  names  
conjure  an  awareness  of  the  latter  or  perhaps  even  mean  the  latter.  We  carry  Humphrey  Bogart’s  
or  Cary  Grant’s  roles  with  us  when  we  watch  their  films  (or  when  we  see  their  images  elsewhere).  
Cavell’s  ontological  claims  here  are  quite  strong,  and  I  don’t  think  we  should  necessarily  
endorse  them.  If  they’re  right,  then  there  is  seemingly  no  real  difference  between  levels  two  and  
three:  if  we  watch  an  actor’s  films,  we  can’t  just  see  her  as  the  character  she’s  portraying  
because  we’re  also  aware  of  her  as  a  performer;;  and,  on  the  other  hand,  being  aware  of  
someone  as  an  actor  just  consists  in  being  aware  of  her  characters.  Here  I  think  we  need  to  take  
a  step  back.  Indeed,  I  don’t  think  the  two  levels  are  fully  simultaneous,  let  alone  identical.  And  in  
order  to  make  sense  of  this  fact,  while  keeping  in  mind  the  association  I’ve  admitted  above,  we  
need  to  clarify  a  few  things.  
First  of  all,  it’s  important  to  keep  in  mind  that  the  association  only  happens  when  we’re  
familiar  with  an  actor’s  work;;  being  unfamiliar,  we’re  entirely  able  to  just  see-­as  character  when  
we  watch  a  film  and  entirely  able  to  just  see-­as  actor  when  we  wish  to  evaluate  the  movie  as  a  
movie.  Secondly,  even  with  this  aforementioned  familiarity,  we’re  not  fully  engaging  in  levels  two  
and  three  together  throughout  film-­viewing.      
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When  I  bring  an  awareness  of  an  actor’s  roles  with  me,  I  still  see-­as  character  throughout  
the  movie  I’m  watching.  I  still  engage  in  level  three.  Indeed,  the  sort  of  character-­awareness  
Cavell  speaks  of  consists  in  an  awareness  of  past  roles,  an  awareness  of  an  actor’s  history  of  
depiction;;  but  the  only  way  to  build  that  awareness  up,  and  the  only  way  to  continue  building  it,  is  
to  experience  level  three—to  imaginatively  engage  with  the  actor’s  characters.  What’s  more,  
perhaps  (with  the  aforementioned  familiarity)  we  frequently  see-­as  actor  to  a  certain  extent  as  we  
watch  a  film.  But  this  doesn’t  amount  to  experiencing  level  two  as  I’ve  described  it.    
Level  two  requires  active  attention  to  stylistic  elements  of  the  production  so  that  we  can  
evaluate  the  film  as  a  film.  The  sort  of  actor-­awareness  that,  I  think,  we  bring  to  a  movie  is  much  
more  bare  than  this.  It  consists  in  knowing  that  I’m  watching  an  actor—e.g.,  Daniel  Day-­Lewis—
and  attending  to  some  of  his  typical  techniques.  If  i’m  imaginatively  engaged,  if  I’m  really  
experiencing  level  three,  then  this  is  the  extent  of  my  engagement  with  level  two.  I  can’t  actively  
pay  attention  to  his  past  roles  or  to  his  expressions  and  gestures  as  an  actor  if  I’m  seeing  him  as  
the  character  he’s  portraying.  And  I  certainly  can’t  attend  to  stylistic  elements  beyond  him—the  
lighting,  the  other  actors’  mannerisms,  the  score’s  expressivity.  Level  three  engagement  is  fully  
imaginative;;  and  with  it,  the  most  we  can  bring  from  level  two  is  a  less  active,  bare  awareness  of  
the  actors  we’re  watching  (the  same  is  true  of  our  familiarity  with  directors,  writers,  
cinematographers,  etc).    
I  think,  then,  we  should  admit  that  (1)  we  can  attend  to  an  actor  as  her  character  
throughout  film-­viewing;;  (2)  even  with  an  awareness  of  the  actor  and  her  past  roles  we  do  not  
fully  experience  level  two  throughout  level  three;;  and  (3)  given  that  level  three  requires  
imaginative  engagement,  we  cannot  experience  it  when  we  experience  level  two.  With  regards  to  
(3):  seeing-­as  actor  throughout  film-­viewing  or  independent  of  film-­viewing  (e.g.,  just  thinking  of  
an  actor’s  persona  in  the  way  that  Cavell  discusses),  is  not  identical  to,  nor  is  it  simultaneous  
with,  imaginatively  engaging  with  the  actor’s  characters.  We  might  keep  in  mind  their  roles  when  
we  think  of  them,  and  we  might  build  our  perception  of  them  off  of  those  roles  (taking  them  to  
possess  some  of  the  characteristics  their  characters  possess);;  still,  this  is  not  level  three  insofar  
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as  it  (1)  is  not  imaginative  engagement,  and  (2)  consists  in  our  awareness  of  the  actor  as  
portraying  the  fictional  roles.  Level  three  involves  (1)  and  cannot  involve  (2):  because  of  our  game  
of  pretense,  we  aren’t  thinking  of  what  we’re  seeing  as  portrayal  or  depiction.  For  all  of  these  
reasons,  I  do  not  think  levels  two  and  three  are  simultaneous  despite  their  close  intertwinements.    
Let’s  get  back,  then,  to  the  focus  of  this  section.  I’ve  argued  here  that  there  are  various  
interactions—among  levels  one,  two  and  three—during  film-­viewing.  Taking  note  of  them  enables  
us  to  acknowledge  that  there  more  perceptual  experiences  during  film-­viewing  than  we  might’ve  
recognized,  more  than  theorists  usually  spell  out,  and  that  they  intertwine  in  important  ways.  
Indeed,  they  intertwine  in  ways  that  other,  if  not  all,  seeing-­as  experiences  cannot.  This  fact  
suggests  both  that  film-­viewing  is  a  highly  complex  experience,  one  that  combines  cognition  with  
perception  at  many  different  levels,  and  that  we  have  more  work  to  do  in  understanding  seeing-­as  
more  generally—in  grasping  the  characteristics  that  it  can  possess,  in  rethinking  whether  or  not  
(and  how)  different  types  can  co-­exist  or  support  each  other.  To  determine  whether  or  not  filmic  
seeing-­as  is  unique  in  the  ways  I’ve  laid  out,  we  need  to  get  clearer  on  the  phenomenon  of  
seeing-­as  itself.    
            Further  Thoughts  
The  analysis  I’ve  presented  here  is  only  a  starting-­point.  Among  other  things,  we  should  
examine  more  closely  the  types  of  filmic  seeing-­as  I’ve  outlined,  look  for  others,  and  continue  
analyses  of  (non-­filmic)  seeing-­as.  This  paper  is  a  step  towards  further  avenues  of  research  in  
philosophy  of  film  and  philosophy  of  perception.  Before  concluding,  I’ll  introduce  some  possible  
future  routes  and  answer  some  objections  we  might  raise  against  my  account.  
Although  I’ve  focused  on  narrative  films,  we  ought  to  examine  how  seeing-­as  works  in  
nonnarrative,  or  experimental,  movies.  For  films  that  lack  obvious  plot  and  character  
development,  what  does  seeing-­as  consist  in?  It’s  not  difficult  to  see  how  levels  1  and  2  can  
occur.  After  all,  even  films  that  lack  a  clear  storyline  or  characters  still  (indeed,  frequently)  present  
us  with  images  of  ordinary  objects  and  people  that  we  must  use  everyday  recognition  capacities  
to  identify.  And  we  can  evaluate  the  films  stylistically,  by  examining  their  clever  use  of  editing  
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techniques,  special  effects,  and  lighting.  Experimental  films  often  exploit  the  potentialities  of  the  
filmic  medium,  and  seem  to  be  ‘about’  nothing  more  than  that  exploitation.  So  engaging  in  level  2  
seeing-­as  might  even  be  the  most  appropriate  approach.    
It’s  more  confusing  to  consider  level  3.  Many  films  lie  somewhere  within  the  narrative—
nonnarrative  divide  by  possessing,  to  some  degree,  identifiable  plot  points  and  characters  (e.g.,  
David  Lynch’s  movies,  or  expressionist  films  like  Nosferatu  and  The  Cabinet  of  Dr.  Caligari);;  
when  viewing  those  films,  level  3  will  happen  whenever  we  are  imaginatively  engaged  and  not  
(actively)  attending  to  the  stylistic  and  performative  elements.  But  when  it  comes  to  what  we  think  
of  as  purely  nonnarrative  movies,  such  as  Stan  Brakhage’s  films,  level  3  is  questionable.  Often  
the  closest  we  get  to  a  type  of  depicted  content  is  “expressed  content”  where  this  refers  to  the  
emotions  expressed  in  the  work.  The  short  film  Orpheus,  for  instance,  concerns  a  man  who  
seems  stuck  in  a  vicious  cycle  of  pain  and  forgetfulness,  and  many  of  the  scenes  take  on  an  
expressive  quality;;  we  see  the  devastation  in  his  face  and  actions,  and  represented  by  the  filth  
and  grayness  of  his  surroundings.  
Are  we  experiencing  level  3,  though,  when  we  attend  to  such  expressed  content?  The  
answer  depends  on  whether  or  not  doing  so  involves  visual,  attentional,  habits  that  are  distinct  
from  level  2’s.  I  don't  think  it  does.  Recognizing  the  sadness  in  Orpheus  is  a  matter  of  looking  at  
the  scenes’  colors  and  lighting,  the  actor’s  mannerisms  and  facial  expressions.  It’s  a  matter  of  
considering  shot  transitions,  in  particular  how  certain  shots  tie  into  others—what  it  means  for  the  
flowers  in  one  scene  to  be  burning,  suddenly,  in  the  next;;  how  his  waking  up  in  a  garbage  dump,  
or  his  inability  to  throw  away  a  necklace,  represents  his  pain.  None  of  this  requires  imaginative  
engagement.  And  nor  does  it  seem  distinct  from  attending  to  the  film  as  an  experimental  film;;  
there,  too,  we  look  at  the  colors,  lighting,  shot  transitions,  and  the  actor’s  gestures.  Analyzing  a  
film  might  even  require  evaluating  its  expressive  abilities.    
Indeed,  most  accounts  of  artistic  expression  either  implicitly  or  explicitly  engage  in  
something  like  a  level  2  analysis;;  what  makes  something  valuable  as  a  work  of  art  or  (even  more  
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strong)  what  makes  it  a  work  of  art,  is,  at  least  partly,  the  fact  that  it  expresses  emotions.130  In  this  
way,  discussing  artistic  expression  is  attending  to  art  in  the  way  that  level  two  requires.  Of  course,  
few  if  any  theorists  make  theirs  a  claim  about  perception—a  claim  that  we  see-­as  when  we  notice  
expressed  content  in  a  film.  In  this  respect,  my  account  goes  further  than  theirs.  
It’s  worth  noting,  however,  that  there  is  some  theoretical  support  for  this  further  (seeing-­
as)  claim.  In  Musical  Meaning  and  Expression,  Stephen  Davies  argues,  among  other  things,  that  
music  (1)  literally  possesses  emotion  properties  (like  sadness,  happiness,  joy,  etc)  so  that  we  can  
hear  what  it  expresses  and  (2)  intentionally  and  systematically  uses  natural  meaning.131  I’ve  
argued  for  a  version  of  (2)  (with  regards  to  film),  and—as  I  mentioned—think  that  film’s  use  of  
natural  meaning  cues  allows  it  to  express  emotions  and  thoughts  in  the  same  sort  of  way  that  
everyday  people,  places,  and  objects  do.  In  substantiating  his  theory,  Davies  argues  that  we  
often  attribute  emotion  properties  to  appearances  of  things—to  human  faces,  to  aspects  of  
weather  and  the  environment,  to  animals,  etc—and  he  compares  this  to  the  way  in  which  we  
attribute  emotion  properties  to  songs.  Music  expresses,  for  Davies,  not  by  sharing  the  composer’s  
emotions  and  not  by  arousing  the  listeners’  emotions  but  by  being  emotional:  by  having  the  same  
sorts  of  emotion  properties  that  we  have  when  we  feel.    
I  think  Davies  would  perhaps  avoid  extending  his  theory  to  film,  partly  because  he  
differentiates  between  works  of  pictorial  depiction  and  musical  works:  the  former,  he  claims,  refer  
to  or  depict  emotions  while  the  latter  possess  emotion.  But  I  think  film’s  relation  to  natural  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130  For  prominent  theories  of  artistic  expression,  according  to  which  a  work  of  art  is  art  because  it  
expresses:  (1)  Collingwood,  R.G.  The  Principles  of  Art.  London:  Oxford,  1958.  (2)  Dewey,  John.  
Art  as  Experience.  New  York:  Penguin,  2005.  (3)  Mill,  John  Stuart.  “Thoughts  on  Poetry  and  its  
Varieties”  The  Crayon  7.4  (1860).  93-­97.  (4)  Langer,  Susanne  K.  Feeling  and  Form:  A  Theory  of  
Art.  New  York:  Charles  Scribner’s  Sons,  1953.  Other  accounts,  like  Mitchell  Green’s,  discuss  
artistic  expression  (by  implicitly  utilizing  a  level  two  analysis)  but  don’t  make  the  stronger  claim  
that  something  is  art  only  if  it  expresses.  (Green,  Mitchell.  Self-­Expression.  Oxford:  Oxford,  2007).  
131  Davies,  Stephen.  Musical  Meaning  and  Expression.  Ithaca:  Cornell,  1994.  In  “Hearing  and  
Seeing  Musical  Expression,”  Vincent  Bergeron  and  Dominic  McIver  Lopes—like  Davies-­-­argue  
that  music's  expressive  properties  are  perceived,  although  they  claim  that  its  expressive  
properties  are  visual  as  well  as  sonic  (where  theorists  typically  only  recognize  the  latter).  
Bergeron,  Vincent,  and  Dominic  McIver  Lopes.  “Hearing  and  Seeing  Musical  Expression.”  
Philosophy  and  Phenomenological  Research  LXXVIII.1  (January  2009):  1-­16.  
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meaning,  a  relation  that  distinguishes  it  from  other  forms  of  pictorial  depiction,132  supports  the  
idea  that  it  expresses  in  the  same  way  that  music  does—especially  once  we  center  our  
discussion  on  nonnarrative  films.  Experimental  films,  like  narrative  films,  show  us  emotion  
properties  by  showing  us  cues  of  natural  meaning;;  in  this  sense,  their  shots  possess  those  
emotions.  Indeed,  we  might  think  experimental  films  often  exploit  natural  meaning  cues  more  
purposefully  than  narrative  movies  do.  They  play  off  of  the  meaning  delivered  by  garbage  dumps  
(as  in  Orpheus),  bird  chirping  and  flowers  blooming  (as  in  Meshes  of  the  Afternoon),  and  bloody  
organs  (as  in  Dog  Star  Man).    When  these  natural  meaning  cues  aren’t  helping  to  constitute  a  
fictional—or  narrative—level,  they  are  used  precisely  to  express  at  level  2.133  And  we  see  and  
hear  what  they  express.  
My  focus  so  far  has  been  on  how  films  express  via  the  content  of  their  images:  what  
cues,  natural  meaning  or  otherwise,  they  show.  But  much  of  what  a  movie,  experimental  or  
narrative,  expresses  stems  from  its  production  and  post-­production  techniques—shot-­types,  shot-­
transitions,  montage,  and  post-­production  effects.  How  a  movie  shows  what  it  shows  is  just  as  
important,  for  expressive  purposes,  as  what  it  shows.  And,  what’s  particularly  interesting  with  
regards  to  this  expressivity  is  that  it  seems  to  constitute  a  type  of  nonnatural  and  natural  
meaning.  Insofar  as  it  is  expressed  content,  and  insofar  as  it  stems  from  conventional  techniques  
that  have  nonnatural  meaning  (indeed,  semioticians  often  point  to  film’s  editing  to  substantiate  
their  idea  of  film  possessing  a  grammar-­like  syntax  which  makes  it  language-­like),  it’s  nonnatural;;  
but  insofar  as  we’re  shown  or  feel  what’s  expressed,  that  content  is  direct  in  a  way  that  makes  it  
like  a  form  of  natural  meaning.  I’ll  discuss  this  more  in  the  appendix,  citing  relevant  examples.  
With  this  in  mind,  let’s  turn  to  some  other  issues  I  haven’t  yet  mentioned.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132  I  tackle  this  issue,  substantiating  just  how  film’s  relation  to  natural  meaning  is  unique  here:  
Fiorelli,  Lindsey.  “A  New  Defense  of  Cinematic  Realism.”  Film  and  Philosophy,  vol.  19  (2015).  
133  Some  experimental  films,  as  I  claimed  earlier,  do  have  something  like  a  fictional  level,  even  if  
a  bare  one.  I  think  Un  Chien  Andalou  falls  within  this  camp:  while  we  perhaps  can’t  pinpoint  a  




One  immediate  worry  we  might  have  with  my  account  of  filmic  seeing-­as  centers  on  how  
I’ve  presented  the  interaction  between  levels  2  and  3:  in  particular  with  regards  to  my  claim  that  
they  cannot  occur  simultaneously.  As  I  discussed  earlier,  this  claim  of  non-­simultaneity  might  
seem  false.  And,  rather  than  argue  along  the  lines  of  the  character-­actor  relationship,  we  might  
argue  more  generally:  it  just  might  seem  like  we’re  able  to  watch  a  film  as  a  film  while  
imaginatively  engaging  with  it.  I  don’t  think  we  can  provide  a  decisive  answer  here,  as  
phenomenology  will  necessarily  differ  for  different  moviegoers.  I  consider  such  simultaneity  to  be  
difficult,  if  not  impossible.  I  consider  level  three  to  be  an  experience  of  full  imaginative  
engagement  that  prevents  the  sort  of  production-­level  awareness  that  level  two  necessarily  
involves.    
Importantly,  as  I’ve  specified  throughout,  I  do  think  we  attend  (perceptually)  to  to  the  film  
screen—to  the  nature  of  the  recording—throughout  level  3.  So  there  is  a  type  of  what  Wollheim  
calls  “twofoldness”  here.  But  I  think  this  attention  is  different  from  level  2.  The  latter  requires  
actively  noticing  production  elements,  stylistic  and  performative  aspects  of  the  actors,  sets,  and  
props.  This  consists  in  much  more  than  merely  noticing  the  film  screen,  and  if  only  the  latter  co-­
exists  with  level  3,  then  there  isn’t  full  simultaneity  between  levels  2  and  3.  This  isn’t  to  say  that  
no  movie-­goer  can  fully  engage  in  the  levels  at  the  same  time;;  it’s  just  to  say  that,  based  on  how  
much  I  think  is  involved  with  each  level,  I  do  not  see  how  such  a  co-­existence  would  be  possible.  
Let’s  turn  now  to  a  more  general  worry  with  my  account,  on  that  centers  on  my  
terminology:  is  what  I’m  talking  about  seeing-­as  or  could  it  more  properly  called  seeing-­in?  I’ve  
mentioned  Wollheim  a  couple  of  times,  each  time  drawing  comparisons  between  his  thesis  and  
mine,  so  it’s  worth  it  to  clarify  whether  these  phenomena  are  experiences  of  seeing-­as  
specifically.  I  think  they  are.    
Like  Walton,  Wollheim  takes  there  to  be  an  experience  specific  to  “seeing  a  pictorial  
representation.”  The  phenomenon  he  spells  out  is  similar  to  the  phenomenon  Walton  elucidates,  
as  it  is  a  simultaneously  visual  and  cognitive  experience.  Still,  there  are  important  differences  
between  the  two,  most  prominently:  (1)  seeing-­as  requires  seeing  a  particular  object  as  an  object  
	  71	  
	  
of  a  certain  kind  while  seeing-­in  is  more  general;;  (2)  seeing-­as  is  localized  in  a  way  that  seeing-­in  
isn’t;;  and  (3)  seeing-­in  requires  a  twofoldness  that  seeing-­as  prevents.  
We  can  see  that  (1)  is  true  in  some  of  the  instances  I’ve  talked  about:  the  Wittgenstein  
and  Walton  examples  involve  seeing  something  as  an  object  of  a  certain  kind.  Wollheim  claims  
that  seeing-­in,  and  only  seeing-­in,  allows  us  to  see  more  general  features  of  a  work:  to  see  a  
certain  state  of  affairs,  to  see  that  something  is  the  case  (e.g.,  that  a  fire  is  starting,  that  a  storm  is  
gathering).  Relatedly,  with  regards  to  (2),  seeing-­as  requires  us  to  be  able  to  point  to  a  place  in  
the  representation  and  say  what  we’re  seeing  that  spot  as.  Seeing-­in,  for  Wollheim,  doesn’t  
require  such  localization;;  I  can  see  that  an  event  is  taking  place  without  being  able  to  point  to  
where,  in  the  picture,  I  see  it.    
I  think  Wollheim  is  right  to  say  that  (1)  and  (2)  are  typically  assumed  in  accounts  of  
seeing-­as.  And  much  of  what  I’ve  talked  about  goes  against  both  of  them:  I’ve  discussed  seeing  
expression  and  emotion  in  a  film  (at  both  the  narrative  and  nonnarrative  level),  and  I’ve  discussed  
seeing  narrative  events  taking  place.  I’ve  also  discussed  seeing  an  actor  as  a  character,  where  
that  doesn’t  amount  to  seeing  particular  things  on  the  screen  in  a  certain  way  (as  I  mentioned,  
nothing  really  changes  (at  the  low  level)  on  the  film  screen  when  I  switch  from  level  2  to  3  or  vice  
versa);;  in  this  sense,  there  isn’t  the  sort  of  localization  that  Wollheim  claims  seeing-­as  requires.  
Perhaps  in  making  my  theory  more  general  than  more  traditional  accounts  of  seeing-­as,  then,  I’ve  
put  myself  more  firmly  in  line  with  Wollheim.    
I  don’t  think  we  should  conclude  this  quite  so  quickly,  though.  For  some  theorists  don’t  
endorse  (1)  or  (2);;  they  provide  accounts  of  seeing-­as  that  can  accommodate  for  the  generality  
I’ve  articulated.  Berys  Gaut  and  Roger  Scruton  both  maintain  that  we  can  see  broader  features  of  
(or  qualities  in)  representations  by  seeing-­as—seeing  a  painting  “as  alive,”  seeing  “some  of  the  
bathers  in  Cézanne’s  picture  (National  Gallery)  as  either  moving  or  at  rest”—thus  going  against  
(1)  and  (2)  (I  take  it  that  there  isn’t  a  place  specifically  in  the  painting  that  makes  it  look  alive  or  a  
specific  location  in  Cézanne’s  that  makes  the  “bathers”  look  “at  rest;;”  rather  we  can,  at  most,  
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point  to  several  different  places  in  the  pictures  which  all  contribute  to  their  generally  looking  as  
such).134  
If  we  think  that  seeing-­as  can  make  sense  when  we’re  talking  about  states  of  affairs  or  
qualities,  then  we  can  deny  that  (1)  and  (2)  are  necessarily  the  case.  The  same  is  true  of  (3).  
While  Wollheim  claims  that  we  remain  aware  of  the  medium  only  in  the  case  of  seeing-­in,  I  don’t  
see  why  this  is  necessary.  If  we  use  George  Wilson’s  theory  of  imagining  seeing,  or  adopt  the  
sort  of  account  Hopkins  proposes,  then  there’s  nothing  implausible  about  our  seeing  the  film  
screen  while  engaging  in  level  three.  In  fact,  as  I  argued,  that  seems  the  most  accurate  
description  of  what’s  going  on.    
In  short,  if  we  think  that  the  conditions  Wollheim  has  articulated  are  necessary  for  seeing-­
as,  then  perhaps  we  should  conclude  that  I’ve  been  talking  more  about  seeing-­in.  But  if  we  doubt  
the  necessity  of  those  conditions,  then  we  needn’t  do  so.  Wollheim  has  Walton  specifically  in  
mind  when  laying  out  the  concept,  but  there  are  better—more  plausible—theories  of  seeing-­as  
that  we  can  turn  to.  With  this  in  mind,  then:  is  there  any  reason  to  distinguish  between  the  two?  Is  
there  any  reason  to  talk  of  seeing-­as  rather  than  seeing-­in  during  film-­viewing?  Once  we  admit  
that  the  former  can  possess  some  of  the  supposed  properties  of  the  latter,  we  might  think  that  
there’s  no  sense  in  which  they  are  fundamentally  different.  In  fact,  though,  I  think  there  are  two  
chief  differences,  and  they  put  me  more  in  the  seeing-­as  camp.  
First  of  all,  the  twfoldness  I’ve  articulated  is  not  the  same  as  the  twofoldness  Wollheim  
articulates.  As  I  argued  earlier,  we  can’t  really  see  the  images  as  images,  and  thus  don’t  see  the  
medium  in  the  same  way  that  we  see  the  medium  of  a  painting  or  picture.  In  a  movie,  the  medium  
is  more  transparent  than  in  static  forms  of  depiction  (primarily  because  of  the  perception  of  
motion).  So  it’s  not  clear  that  we’re  seeing  the  surface  as  robustly  as  Wollheim  suggests  we  do  
during  seeing-­in.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Secondly,  Wollheim  doesn’t  allow  enough  space  for  the  role  of  imagination  in  his  account  
of  seeing-­in.  For  Wollheim,  seeing-­in  is  a  psychological  ability  that,  as  Jerrold  Levinson  states,  “is  
generally  prior  to,  and  not  to  be  analyzed  in  terms  of,  imaged  seeing”  (227).  We  don’t  need  to  
imagine  seeing  a  certain  state  of  affairs  in  order  to  see  that  state  of  affairs  in  a  picture.  Wollheim  
and  I  part  ways  here.  With  regards  to  the  role  of  the  imagination,  we  might  be  ambivalent  about  or  
indifferent  towards  endorsing  seeing-­in  vs.  seeing-­as  in  the  sorts  of  instances  theorists  typically  
focus  on  (instances,  like  the  ones  Wollheim  and  Walton  discuss,  in  which  we  see  a  pictorial  
representation  as  the  nonfictional  object  it  depicts).  But  when  it  comes  to  seeing  the  fictional,  
when  it  comes  to  level  3  seeing-­as,  imaginative  engagement  is  key;;  and  because  it  is,  we  need  to  
appeal  to  a  phenomenon  that  can  make  sense  of  this  necessity.  Since  accounts  of  seeing-­as  
tend  to  center  on  imaginative  engagement  (e.g.,  Strawson’s,  Gaut’s,  Walton’s,  and  Scruton’s),  I  
think  that,  when  it  comes  to  fiction-­based  seeing-­as,  we  should  admit  that  this  is  the  experience  at  
work.  And  if  we  admit  this  with  level  3,  I  also  think  that  we  should  admit  it  with  the  other  two  
levels.  If  we  don’t  have  reason  to  think  that  the  latter  are  cases  of  seeing-­in  rather  than  seeing-­as,  
and  if  we  have  reason  to  choose  seeing-­as  in  level  3,  then  we  should  provide  the  more  nuanced  
characterization  of  seeing-­as  which  I  laid  out  above,  one  that  can  include  all  three  experiences  
I’ve  discussed.  
Seeing-­as  is  a  complicated  phenomenon.  In  this  chapter  I  have  tried  to  shed  light  on  just  
three  variants  of  the  experience,  specifically  three  that  happen  during  film-­viewing.  I’ve  argued  
that  they  are  highly  complex  in  ways  that  other  instances  of  seeing-­as  are  not,  and  that—through  
this  analysis—we  ought  to  recognize  just  how  nuanced  our  film-­viewing  experience  is.  When  we  
watch  a  movie,  our  cognition  and  perception  fuse  in  diverse,  intimate,  ways,  so  that  we  can  see  
ordinary  objects  and  their  properties,  actors  and  props,  and  (most  importantly)  fictional  entities,  
characters,  and  worlds.  Theorists  don’t  recognize  enough  that  we  can  see  the  fiction  in  a  film;;  
indeed,  they  don’t  recognize  just  how  many  perceptual  experiences  we  have  during  film-­viewing.  
This  paper  is  a  step  toward  doing  justice  to  these  experiences,  to  grasping  just  how  much  goes  





   Earlier  I  referenced  production  and  post-­production  techniques  that  seem  to  produce  a  
natural  and  nonnatural  form  of  meaning  insofar  as  they  directly  express  but  are  nonetheless  
conventional  and  importantly  constructed.  Now  it’s  worth  it  to  look  at  some  examples  of  this  
phenomenon.  Importantly  I  won’t  be  specifying  general  types  of  editing  techniques,  as  I  think  
nearly  every  editing  technique  can  be  used  for  such  expressive  purposes.  My  analysis  here  
comes  down  to  two  basic  points:  that  shot-­types,  shot-­transitions,  and  post-­production  effects  can  
(1)  enable  spectators  to  experience  expressed  emotions;;  and  (2)  show  characters’  subjectivity.    
   Let’s  start  with  (1),  the  more  common  of  the  two  phenomena.  One  immediate  editing  
technique  to  take  note  of  here  is  the  point-­of-­view  (or  POV)  shot.  Here,  we  see  through  a  
character’s  eyes  and—by  perceptually  experiencing  events  in  the  narrative  as  the  character  
experiences  them—emotionally  experience  events  as  she  does.  Horror  movies  exploit  this  
technique  regularly.  As  the  camera  takes  us  through  hallways,  around  corners,  into  bedrooms,  
we  move  with  the  character.  Lacking  any  more  (perceptual  or  epistemic)  access  to  the  narrative  
than  the  character  herself  possesses,  we  feel  her  fear.  Indeed,  one  horror  sub-­genre—the  found  
footage  film—bases  itself  entirely  off  of  this  effect:  utilizing  POV  shots  throughout  so  that  we’re  
continually  unaware  of  what  might  be  beside,  behind,  or  in  front  of  the  character.  By  granting  us  
access  to  characters’  perceptual  perspectives,  POV  shots  grant  us  access  to  their  subjectivity.    
Like  POV  shots,  other  production  and  post-­production  techniques  enable  spectators  to  
feel  the  emotion  expressed  in  a  film.  Jump  cuts,  for  instance,  produce  tension  and  drama,  as  in  
the  opening  sequences  to  City  of  God  and  Snatch.  Compare  our  experience  watching  these  
scenes  to  our  experience  reading  about  them.  We  pick  up  on  the  tension  expressed  in  the  latter  
by  interpreting  word  choice  and  sentence-­structure  and  feeling  the  tension  only  as  a  result  of  our  
interpretation.  In  the  former,  we  experience  the  tension  straight  away:  by  seeing  quick  cuts  from  
one  frame  to  the  next  as  burglars  try  to  access  a  diamond  company  in  Snatch,  and  by  seeing  
quick  shots  of  a  chicken  interspersed  with  shots  of  a  knife  being  sharpened,  vegetables  being  cut,  
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and  dancing  in  City  of  God.  This  sort  of  speed  mirrors  (perhaps  symbolizes)  the  plot’s  drama,  
expressing  narrative  tension  through  perceptual  means:  by  affecting  how  quickly  or  how  briefly  
what  we  see  and  hear  is  shown  to  us.  In  doing  so,  jump  cuts  allow  for  an  immediate  experience  
of  tension  that  cannot  be  produced  through  purely  linguistic  forms  of  communication.    
Tweaking  with  camera  speed  can  cause  the  same  sort  of  experiential  effect:  think  of  how  
slow-­motion  or  rapid  camera  movements  (as  well  as  quick  zooming)  make  a  scene  feel  (among  
other  things)  hallucinatory,  frightening,  confusing,  or  calm.  In  thriller  or  suspense  sequences,  for  
instance,  slow-­motion  heightens  dread  by  showing  us  every  moment  and  each  precise  action  as  
it  leads  up  to  a  potentially  unfortunate  conclusion  (e.g.,  the  infamous  prom  scene  in  Carrie).  
Long-­takes  achieve  a  similar  effect.  Take  the  Copacabana  sequence  in  The  Good  Fellas:  
here,  the  camera  follows  Henry  as  he  brings  Karen  into  the  club,  past  the  line  outside,  through  
the  service  door  and  kitchen,  and  to  their  seats.  Through  this  fluid  camera  movement,  we  get  a  
sense  of  Henry’s  smooth,  easy  lifestyle—people  and  places  are  available,  open  to  him.  Similarly,  
in  There  will  be  Blood’s  oil  disaster  sequence,  the  camera  fixates  on  Daniel  as  he  runs  with  an  
injured  H.W;;  without  any  cuts,  the  sequence  makes  us  feel  Daniel’s  urgency  and  impatience.  In  
these  ways,  long-­takes  express  tone,  mood,  and  perspective  by  letting  us  experience  tone,  mood,  
and  perspective.  
Camera  scale  can,  at  an  even  more  basic  level,  be  employed  for  expressive  purposes.  
This  is  something  experimental  and  narrative  films  both  frequently  exploit:  e.g.,  showing  us  an  
eyeball  up  close  (as  in  Hitchcock’s  Psycho),  a  fly  up  close  (as  in  Un  Chien  Andalou),  mothwings  
up  close  (as  in  Stan  Brekhage’s  Mothlight).  Just  by  seeing  these  objects  occupying  an  entire  
frame,  we  can  feel  unnerved—the  scale  isn’t  what  we  might  expect,  and  so  it’s  off-­putting.  More  
specifically,  close-­ups  have  various  aims  in  films—like  expressing  horror  via  close-­ups  like  
Psycho’s,  or  expressing  a  character’s  mental  state.  With  regards  to  the  latter,  a  close-­up  of  a  gun  
in  a  western  duel  expresses  the  character’s  nervousness,  illustrating  the  extent  to  which  their  
attention  is  fixated  on  the  weapon  that  could  potentially  kill  them  (importantly,  this  isn’t  a  POV  
shot  since  the  character  doesn’t  actually  see  the  gun  as  being  that  size).  
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   Let’s  sum  up  the  phenomenon  we’ve  been  discussing  so  far—and,  of  course,  these  
examples  don’t  exhaust  it.  Some  production  and  post-­production  techniques  express  emotion,  
tone,  and  mood  by  letting  spectators  experience  emotion,  tone,  and  mood.  The  way  we’re  shown  
what  we’re  shown  gives  us  an  immediate  sense  of  what  characters  are  feeling  or  how  tense  or  
dramatic  a  scene  has  become.  Seeing  the  rapidity  of  shot-­transitions,  following  a  fluid  camera  
through  a  narrative  sequence,  seeing  an  eye  up  close:  by  perceptually  experiencing  a  narrative  in  
these  ways,  we  feel  horror,  dread,  tension,  excitement,  and  the  like.    
Now,  these  production  and  post-­production  techniques  have  nonnatural  meaning—
they’re  conventional,  and  they  provide  movies  with  a  grammar-­like  syntax  (as  semioticians  
maintain).  But  they  also  do  something  that  other  forms  of  nonnatural  meaning  typically  don’t,  and  
can’t,  do:  they  express  emotion  directly  and  perceptually,  by  tweaking  how  we  see  and  hear  a  
scene.  There’s  an  important  respect,  then,  in  which  they  engage  in  showing.  Rather  than  call  on  
us  to  interpret  mood  and  tone,  they  call  on  us  to  sense  the  mood  and  tone  they  express  straight  
away.  They  thus  engage  in  a  direct,  immediate  form  of  communication.  
   We  can  see  this  even  more  clearly  by  turning  to  (2),  production  and  post-­production  
effects  that  show  us  a  character’s  subjectivity.  The  chief  technique  here  is  using  a  subjectively-­
inflected  shot.  As  George  Wilson  and  Sam  Shpall  define  them:  “These  are  non-­POV  shots  (more  
broadly,  impersonal  shots)  that  are  subjectively  inflected  but  do  not  share  their  vantage  point  with  
the  visual  perspective  of  any  character  in  the  film.”135  A  good  example  of  this,  which  Wilson  and  
Shpall  provide,  is  from  Murder  My  Sweet.  Wilson  and  Shpall  state:  
Phillip  Marlowe  (Dick  Powell)  has  been  knocked  out  and  drugged.  When  he  eventually  
comes  to,  we  ‘see’  him  stagger  around  the  room.  However,  these  shots  of  him  are,  in  a  
certain  respect,  clearly  subjective.  In  voice-­over,  Marlowe  describes  his  clouded  
perceptual  experience,  and  the  shots  with  which  we  are  presented  look  as  though  they  
had  been  filtered  through  smoke  and  spider  webs.  The  look  of  the  shots  in  this  respect  is  
obviously  meant  to  correspond  to  key  aspects  of  the  way  that  things  are  looking  to  
Marlowe  in  his  drugged  condition,  but  the  screen  image  here  does  not  purport  to  give  us  
his  actual  visual  perspective.”136  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135  Wilson,  George  M.  and  Sam  Shpall.  “Unraveling  the  Twists  of  Fight  Club.”  Fight  Club,  ed.  
Thomas  Wartenberg.  London  and  New  York:  Routledge,  2012.  78-­111.  P.  85.  
136  Wilson  and  Shpall,  p.  85.  
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We  see  this  sort  of  effect  in  many  films:  when  a  character  is  dizzy,  the  camera  might  wobble  back  
and  forth  as  we  watch  her  stumble;;  when  a  character  is  tired,  the  camera  might  show  us  her  
through  a  blurry  haze;;  when  a  character  is  anxious,  sounds  might  be  enhanced  and  faces  
skewed  in  the  character’s  environment.  The  subjectively-­inflected  shot  grants  us  access  to  a  
character’s  perceptual  perspective  but  in  a  different  way  than  the  POV  shot.  Rather  than  see  
things  through  her  eyes,  we  see  how  things  look  to  her  because  of  what  she’s  feeling  or  
otherwise  experiencing.  As  Wilson  and  Shpall  put  it,  we  are  “to  suppose  that  the  pertinent  
phenomenal  properties  included  in  the  onscreen  visual  perspective  reflect  specific  qualitative  
inflections  with  which  we  imagine”  the  character’s  “visual  perspective  to  be  suffused.”137    
   Let’s  compare  this  phenomenon  to  the  cues  of  natural  meaning  we’ve  discussed  
throughout  these  first  two  chapters.  Facial  expressions,  tones  of  voice,  and  gestures  express  a  
character’s  emotions  and  thoughts  by  showing  them  to  us:  via  smiles,  frowns,  grimaces,  and  the  
like.  Subjectively-­inflected  shots  don’t  engage  in  precisely  this  form  of  showing,  but  they  engage  
in  a  similar  (indeed  perhaps  more  substantive)  one.  A  subjectively-­inflected  shot  shows  us  a  
character’s  subjectivity  by  showing  us  the  qualitative,  phenomenal  properties  of  her  subjectivity:  
by  showing  us  how  things  look  to  her  because  of  her  internal  state.  Here,  we  don’t  see  fatigue  
and  anxiety  by  seeing  the  facial  expressions  and  gestures  that  express  them:  instead,  we  see  
fatigue  and  anxiety  by  seeing  what  they’re  like—by  seeing  and  hearing  what  the  character  sees  
and  hears,  but  (as  opposed  to  POV  shots)  more  specifically  how  she  sees  and  hears  because  of  
what  she  feels.    
The  subjectively-­inflected  shot  constitutes  another  form  of  nonnatural-­natural  meaning.  
Again,  the  technique  is  conventional  and  importantly  nonnatural.  But,  again,  it  seems  to  engage  
in  a  type  of  showing,  indeed  a  more  direct  type  of  showing  than  the  other  techniques  we  
discussed.  In  addition  to  allowing  experience  of  an  internal  state,  the  subjectively-­inflected  shot  
expresses  in  the  sort  of  way  that  natural  meaning  cues  do:  by  making  perceivable  an  internal  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  137	  Importantly,  though  I’ve  been  focusing  on  visual  examples  here,  filmmakers  subjectively-­
inflect  the  aural  content  of  the  scenes  as  well  (e.g.,  when  a  character  is  underwater).	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state.  Unlike  linguistic  forms  of  communication,  movies  that  employ  the  subjectively-­inflected  shot  
can  express  via  their  perceptual  content.  
Throughout  this  appendix,  I’ve  associated  ‘expression’  with  ‘the  communication  of  
emotion.’  I’ve  focused  on  how  movies  express  tone  and  mood  generally  as  well  as  how  they  
express  characters’  internal  states.  Of  course,  movies  express  in  a  multitude  of  other  ways:  they  
express  perspectives,  thoughts,  and  feelings  toward  characters,  narrative  events,  and  the  world  
outside  of  the  narrative  via  a  variety  of  means  we  haven’t  outlined.  And  they  perhaps  engage  in  
different  types  of  showing  via  those  means,  further  blurring  the  line  between  natural  and  
nonnatural  meaning.  But,  without  delving  into  that  fuller  analysis,  let’s  sum  up  my  chief  point  here.    
There’s  an  important  respect  in  which  natural  meaning  and  nonnatural  meaning  are  
opposed;;  theorists  (among  them,  Grice)  treat  them  as  such,  and  by  definition  they  seem  
incompatible.  One  entails  a  speaker  communicating  via  an  utterance  a  meaning  that  isn’t  just  
found  in  the  world:  it  entails  picking  up  on  intention  and  (sometimes,  but  not  always)  
understanding  convention.  When  we  think  of  how  movies  possess  nonnatural  meaning,  we  might  
think  of  production  techniques  that  choose  certain  shot  types  and  string  shots  together  into  a  
coherent  narrative;;  insofar  as  those  techniques  build  a  story  from  images  of  things  in  the  world  (or  
of  photographed  drawings,  models,  or  computer-­generated  images),  they  construct  a  meaning  
that  isn’t  just  there.  Indeed,  they  provide  films  with  a  grammar-­like  syntax,  one  that  often  requires  
our  knowledge  of  film  conventions  and  one  that  enables  films  to  communicate  and  express  
thoughts  about  the  world.  But  production  and  post-­production  techniques  can  often,  also,  engage  
in  an  immediate  form  of  communication—indeed,  sometimes  a  type  of  showing.  They  can  make  
emotion,  tone,  and  mood  perceivable;;  and  they  can  make  emotion,  tone,  and  mood  experiential.  
In  this  way,  they’re  like  forms  of  natural  meaning.  
By  analyzing  how  movies  express  via  their  production  and  post-­production  techniques,  
we  can  (1)  recognize  yet  another  way  in  which  seemingly  different  levels  of  meaning  intertwine  in  
film  and  (2)  question  just  what  the  distinction  between  natural  and  nonnatural  meaning  is.  With  
regards  to  (1):  we’ve  analyzed  how  the  perceptual  and  the  representational  interact  in  two  ways  
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(i.e.,  how  cues  of  natural  meaning  make  up  the  narrative  and  how  we  perceptually  experience  the  
fictional).  Here,  we  can  see  how  what  seems  a  highly  constructed,  convention-­based  aspect  of  
film—what  shots  are  chosen,  how  those  shots  are  edited,  and  how  they’re  strung  together—is  
intertwined  with  the  immediate  and  the  perceptual.  And  we  can  see  how  what  we  might  think  of  
as  a  merely  interpretable  level  of  meaning—what  a  film  expresses—is  intertwined  with  what  we  
see,  hear,  and  experience  during  film-­viewing.  
It’s  important  to  note  how  the  constructed  (narrative,  representational,  conventional,  etc.)  
and  perceptual  interact  with  one  another.  As  I  mentioned  in  the  preface,  these  interactions  just  
aren’t  acknowledged  by  theorists,  and  we  perhaps—pre-­theoretically—don’t  expect  such  
interactions.  We  need  to  be  more  accurate  in  our  analyses  of  filmic  meaning  and  in  our  analyses  
of  film-­viewing.  Much  is  involved  in  what  movies  mean,  how  they  mean,  and  how  we  see  and  
understand  them.  So  far  we’ve  focused  on  these  nuances  with  regards  to  the  perceptual  and  
representational,  as  well  as  the  perceptual  and  expressive—how  the  fictional  and  what’s  shown  
intertwine,  and  how  the  expressive  and  what’s  shown  intertwine.  Now,  let’s  move  to  another  
layer:  the  epistemic.  In  the  following  two  chapters,  I’ll  discuss  how  film’s  perceptual  immediacy  
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The  existence  (and  pervasiveness)  of  filmic  seeing-­as,  in  addition  to  film’s  relation  to  natural  
meaning,  amounts  to  a  phenomenological  immediacy.  We  perceptually  engage  with  a  movie’s  
fictional  world,  and—through  utilizing  ordinary,  natural-­meaning  recognition  capacities  —grasp  
much  about  that  world.  A  movie’s  fiction  is  just  there  for  us  to  see,  hear,  and  understand  in  a  way  
that  other  (primarily  literary)  fictions  are  not.    
   Indeed,  theorists  echo  this  point.  In  “Narrative  in  Fiction  and  Film,”  Jakob  Lothe  states:  
“film’s  events  manifest  themselves  as  definitive.  They  show  with  sovereign  conviction  certain  
events.”138  Similarly,  Robert  Burgoyne  states  that  a  film  world  is  a  “world  which  is  experienced  not  
as  the  discourse  of  a  narrator  situated  outside  the  story  but  rather  directly  as  the  autonomous  
facts  of  the  fictional  universe.”139    
   These  quotes  rephrase  what  I’ve  laid  out  so  far—that  we  experience,  directly,  a  film’s  
fictional  world—but  they  also  go  a  bit  further.  For  Lothe,  a  film  doesn’t  just  show  us  its  events;;  it  
shows  us  them  “with  sovereign  conviction.”  For  Burgoyne,  we  don’t  just  see  and  hear  a  film’s  
narrative;;  we  experience  “directly”  the  “facts  of  the  fictional  universe.”  These  points  get  at  what  I  
want  to  argue  in  these  final  two  chapters:  that  there  is  an  epistemic  directness  in  fiction  film—that  
we  are  shown  the  truths  in  a  fictional  world  when  we  watch  a  movie.  There  are  many  routes  we  
might  take  in  making  this  epistemic  move.  I’ll  take  one  in  particular:  comparing  fiction  film  to  
documentary  film.    
   In  this  chapter,  I’ll  outline  two  types  of  unreliability  documentary  films  possess.  In  the  
following  chapter,  I’ll  argue  that  fiction  films  lack  both  types  of  unreliability  and  that  this—
combined  with  their  phenomenological  immediacy—makes  their  fictional  truths  epistemically  
direct.                   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138  (1)  Lothe,  Jakob.  Narrative  in  Fiction  and  Film:  An  Introduction.  Oxford:  Oxford,  2000.    
139  Burgoyne,  Robert.  “The  Cinematic  Narrator:  The  Logic  and  Pragmatics  of  impersonal  
Narration.”  Journal  of  Film  and  Video  42:1  (Spring,  1990):  3-­16  
	  81	  
	  
            Documentary  Preliminaries    
   Moving  from  phenomenological  to  more  constructed  theses—that  center  on  how  movies  
communicate  truths—requires  some  initial  clarifications,  among  them:  (1)  who  is  this  “we,”  this  
audience,  that  I’ve  been  talking  about;;  and  (2)  what,  specifically,  settles  a  documentary’s  facts?  
   While  (2)  seems  the  more  robust  question,  it’s  particularly  simple  when  we  examine  
documentary  film,  and—as  we’ll  see—much  simpler  than  it  is  in  fiction  film.  Documentaries  have,  
as  their  subject  matter,  real-­world  events,  people,  and  places.  What  settles  the  “facts”  of  a  
documentary’s  subject  matter,  then,  is  whatever  exists  in  what  Dan  Shen  and  Dejin  Xu  call  “extra  
textual  reality.”140  What  determines  whether  or  not  Fahrenheit  9/11  is  communicating  facts  to  us  
is  a  matter  of  the  facts  of  9/11  itself.  What  makes  The  Cove  factual  is  a  matter  of  the  actual  
Seaworld  events  it’s  narrating  to  us.  
   Now,  documentaries  don’t  always  communicate  facts  about  their  subject  matters—they  
can  lie  or  mislead,  and  this  is  what  I’ll  talk  about  here.  The  point  for  now  is  that  what  makes  
something  an  actual  fact  in  the  subject  matter  of  a  documentary—what  makes  something  true  or  
false  about  the  events,  people,  or  places  depicted—exists  outside  of  the  documentary  itself  and  
coincides  with  (or  just  is)  a  matter  of  whatever  is  a  fact  in  the  world.  This  extra-­textual  settling  of  a  
documentary’s  facts  is  precisely  what  makes  them  capable  of  certain  sorts  of  unreliability,  and  it’s  
one  of  the  chief  distinctions  between  fiction  and  nonfiction  film.  So  we’ll  come  back  to  these  
points  later.  Keeping  this  in  mind,  let’s  move  to  (1).  
   As  I’ll  clarify  and  specify  throughout  this  chapter,  the  answer  to  (1)  is  importantly  
hypothetical.  The  audience  I’m  keeping  in  mind  is  not  an  actual  audience;;  and  the  sorts  of  
audience-­based  responses  I’ll  discuss  are  not  contingent,  a  matter  of  what  audience  members  
happen  (or  happened)  to  think  or  feel  or  believe  about  a  documentary’s  subject  matter.  Instead,  
my  claims  employ  the  idea  of  a  hypothetical,  ideal  audience.  This  audience  is  one  who  is  aware  
of  the  aims  of  the  filmmakers,  the  conventions  at  play,  and  who  is  perceptive  to  what’s  stated  or  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140  Shen,  Dan  and  Dejin  Xu.  “Intertextuality,  Extratextuality,  Intertextuality:  Unreliability  in  
Autobiography  versus  Fiction.”  Poetics  Today  28.1  (Spring  2007):  43-­87,  p.  45.  
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implied  by  the  text.  Only  such  an  appeal  enables  us  to  get  clear  on  what’s  in  a  documentary,  what  
cognitive  processes  it  actually  prescribes.  In  this  way,  I’m  against  strong  reader-­response  
theories  according  to  which  what  is  true  in  or  what  is  meant  by  a  work  of  art  is  (in  some  way)  
constructed  by  spectators  (readers,  interpreters,  etc.).141    
   I’m  also  against  typical  anti-­reader-­response  theories  according  to  which  a  work’s  
meaning  in  somehow  just  in  the  work  itself.  The  problem  with  these  sorts  of  accounts  is  precisely  
that  they  make  truth  (or  meaning)  too  separate  from  audience-­based  responses;;  here,  artistic  
meaning  doesn’t  depend  at  all  on  our  (hypothetical)  interpretive  additions  or  on  an  artist’s  
expectations  of  those  interpretive  additions.  Strong  intentionalist  theories  fail  along  the  same  
lines.  Insofar  as,  for  strong  intentionalists,  the  meaning  of  a  work  of  art  just  is  whatever  meaning  
the  artist  intended  the  work  to  have,  it  stems  entirely  from  the  author,  with  the  audience  playing  
no  constructive  role.142  
My  emphasis  throughout,  then,  is  somewhere  in  between  these  two  extremes.  I’ll  discuss  
how  ideal  audience  members  react,  or  what  they  come  to  believe,  based  on  the  film.  If  we  want,  
we  can  cash  this  out  as  how  audience  members  should  react,  given  the  features  the  film  
possesses:  what  perspectives  it’s  attempting  to  get  us  to  endorse,  what  implicit  and  explicit  
claims  it  makes  about  the  subject  at  hand,  what  perceptual  information  it  shows.  Both  analyses—
based  on  how  we  should  react  and  how  ideal,  hypothetical  audiences  react—amount  to  the  same  
thing  insofar  as  ideal  audiences  interpret  the  film  (and  respond  to  it)  in  the  way  that  they  should  
(i.e.,  they  are  attentive  to  the  film’s  relevant  features,  the  conventions  it’s  employing,  and  the  like).  
   More  generally:  I  adopt  a  roughly  Gricean  model  of  communication  according  to  which  (1)  
some  facts  are  communicated  explicitly  in  a  text,  either  by  being  stated  or  shown  by  it;;  and  (2)  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141  Such  as  those  endorsed  by  (1)  Stanley  Fish  in  Is  There  a  Text  in  This  Class?  The  Authority  of  
Interpretive  Communities.  Cambridge:  Harvard  University  Press.  1980;;  and  (2)  Roland  Barthes  in  
“The  Death  of  the  Author.”  Image/Music/Text.  Trans.  Stephen  Heath.  New  York:  Hill  and  Wang,  
1977.  142-­7.  
142  Steven  Knapp  and  Walter  Benn  Michaels  support  a  strong  intentionalist  theory  in  “Against  
Theory”  in  Critical  Inquiry  8.4  (1982):  723-­742.  E.D  Hirsch  does  as  well  in  “In  Defense  of  the  
Author”  in  Intention  and  Interpretation,  ed.  Gary  Iseminger.  Philadelphia:  Temple  University  
Press,  1992.    11-­23.    
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some  communication  depends  very  much  upon  the  (hypothetical)  audience’s  responses  and  
interpretations  and  the  speaker’s  (i.e.,  filmmaker’s)  expectations  of  those  responses  and  
interpretations.  With  regards  to  (2):  the  filmmaker  employs  certain  conventions  in  order  to  
communicate  more  than  is  directly  shown  in  the  film;;  similarly,  she  implies  (or  implicates)  more  
than  is  directly  shown  in  the  film.  Here,  audience  members  are  called  upon  to  employ  their  
awareness  of  the  intentions  or  aims  of  the  film,  familiarity  with  and  knowledge  of  genres,  
conventions,  and  styles,  and  real-­world  knowledge;;  this  enables  appropriate  extrapolation  from  
the  explicit  content  of  the  film.    
   I  will  argue  that  facts  are  communicated  via  four  central  things:  (1)  explicit  stating;;  (2)  
implication;;  (3)  our  expectations  of  genre,  style,  or  documentary  conventions;;  and  (4)  showing.  
Some  of  the  content  of  what’s  communicated  is  “in”  the  film  itself  in  an  important  sense—explicitly  
a  part  of  it  through  showing  or  stating—while  some  depends  more  heavily  upon  our  awareness  of  
intention:  picking  up  on  the  filmmaker’s  aims  in  order  to  grasp  what’s  implied  by  the  shots  we’re  
shown,  and  utilizing  our  knowledge  of  convention  to  recognize  what  the  film  is  trying  to  do.  While  
all  of  this  is  very  general  right  now,  I’ll  delve  into  specifics  throughout  the  remaining  sections  of  
this  chapter.  
   When  talking  about  the  filmmaker  here,  I  have  the  same  sort  of  model  as  for  the  
audience:  a  roughly  hypothetical  intentionalist  one.  There  is  an  important  space  for  the  notion  of  
intention—what  aims  the  film  has,  what  it’s  trying  to  get  us  to  believe,  what  perspectives  it’s  
taking  toward  the  events  portrayed;;  indeed,  we’ll  see  that  this  space  is  necessary  for  my  concepts  
of  unreliability,  as  is  a  space  for  our  attention  to  intention.  But  the  idea  isn’t  that  we  construct  the  
actual  filmmaker’s  aims  or  beliefs  from  the  evidence  in  the  film.  Rather,  we  take  the  film  as  
evidence  for  how  the  filmmaker  seems  to  believe,  what  the  filmmaker  seems  to  be  up  to,  how  she  
presents  herself,  regardless  of  what  motivations  or  opinions  she  in  fact  holds  (or  held).143    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
143  For  defenses  of  hypothetical  intentionalism  see:  (1)  Levinson,  Jerrold.  “Intention  and  
Interpretation:  A  Last  Look.”  Intention  and  Interpretation,  ed.,  Gary  Iseminger.  Philadelphia:  
Temple  University  Press,  1992.  221-­256.  (2)  Nelles,  William.  “A  Hypothetical  Implied  Author.”  
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   With  these  things  in  mind,  we  can  see  how  this  chapter  and  the  following  one  move  
beyond  phenomenological  questions.  When  it  comes  to  epistemic  questions,  we  need  to  analyze  
movies  in  the  same  sort  of  way  we  analyze  any  communicative  situation  (linguistic,  artistic  or  
otherwise):  by  specifying  how  we  take  away  more  from  a  text  (or  from  an  utterance)  than  is  
directly,  perceptually  there—e.g.,  by  utilizing  awareness  of  convention  and  context  to  pick  up  on  
Gricean  implicature.  A  large  part  of  what  I’ll  do  in  these  final  two  chapters  is  outline  how  this  
extrapolation  happens  in  nonfiction  and  fiction  film.  
   So  far,  none  of  these  preliminaries  is  specific  to  film.  I  consider  any  work  of  art  to  be  
within  a  (roughly)  Gricean  model.  One  thing  that  does  differentiate  movies  is  its  collaborative  
nature:  the  fact  that  multiple  filmmakers  work  together  on  a  production.  The  notion  of  multiple  
authorship  complicates  the  sort  of  communicative  situation  we’re  in—since  it’s  not  within  the  
individual  speaker  and  individual  listener  model—but  I  don’t  think  it  makes  it  non-­Gricean  or  
prevents  an  appeal  to  intention.  I  endorse  some  appeal  to  collective  intentionality,  whereby  we  
construct  one  overarching  intention  from  among  the  many  individual  ones  in  the  production  and  
thus  have  an  authorial  intention  despite  multiple  authors;;  in  this  way,  this  distinction  between  
movies  and  art  forms  like  paintings  and  novels  doesn’t  problematize  my  general  Gricean  
commitment.144  
   More  important  for  our  purposes  here,  in  distinguishing  movies  from  other  artworks,  is  the  
role  of  ‘showing’  at  play  in  the  former.  What  I  said  about  fiction  film  in  the  previous  two  chapters  
holds  for  documentaries—they  show  us  situations  so  that  we  can  utilize  our  knowledge  of  natural  
meaning  and  our  ordinary  perceptual  capacities  to  pick  up  on  narrative  information.  While  there’s  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Style  45.1  (Spring  2011):  109-­118.  (3)  Booth,  Wayne  C.  The  Rhetoric  of  Fiction,  2nd.  Ed.  Chicago:  
University  of  Chicago,  1983.  
144  For  some  prominent  theories  of  collective  intentionality  see:  (1)  Bratman,  Michael  E.  Shared  
Intention.  Ethics  104.1  (1993):  97-­113;;  and  (2)  Searle,  John  R.  “Collective  Intentions  and  
Actions.”  Consciousness  and  Language.  Cambridge:  2002.  90-­105.  Their  accounts  differ  in  
important  ways,  but  either  can  be  applied  to  film  in  order  to  make  multiple  authorship  compatible  




an  important  sense  in  which  documentaries  are  Gricean  communicative  utterances,  then,  it’s  
necessary  to  keep  in  mind  that  they  also  have  a  type  of  meaning  that  is  not  Gricean:  one  that  
doesn’t  amount  to  being  told  and  that  enables  a  direct  delivering  of  information.  We’ll  talk  about  
this,  as  well  as  points  (1)-­(4)  above,  in  depth  in  the  following  sections.  So,  with  these  initial  
commitments  spelled  out,  let’s  turn  to  that  discussion  now.  
               Documentary  Truth  
   How  can  documentaries  lie?  How  can  they  withhold  facts?  Before  we  provide  analyses  of  
these  types  of  unreliability,  it’s  necessary  to  outline  a  conception  of  documentary  truth;;  the  
former,  it  seems,  will  amount  to  some  lack  of  the  latter,  or  some  untrustworthiness  with  regards  to  
a  documentary  showing  us  the  latter.    
   The  topic  of  documentary  truth  is  a  highly  complicated  one,  but—from  the  get-­go—we  
can  reject  a  simplistic  account  according  to  which  documentaries  just  show  us  reality.  As  Errol  
Morris  argues,  in  documentary  filmmaking  (and,  relatedly,  photography)  choice  and  intention  are  
at  play  immediately,  preventing  full  objectivity.  Filmmakers  choose  what  to  show  us  (and  thereby  
what  to  crop  out),  how  to  show  it,  and  how  to  connect  the  different  things  they  show  us.  These  
decisions  already  carry  evaluation—i.e.,  this  subject  should  be  shown  and  is  therefore  more  
important  than  alternatives.  Morris  states:    
   The  minute  you  take  one  picture  as  opposed  to  another,  or  the  minute  you  select    
   one  photograph  from  a  group  of  photographs,  you  are  doing  something  very,  very    
   similar  to  manipulating  reality.  It  may  not  be  the  same  as  picking  up  an  object  in  a  
   home  and  removing  it  or  taking  something  out  of  your  pocket  and  putting  it  on  a    
   table.  But  you  are  selecting  images—as  in  the  case  of  Walker  Evans  and  the    
   Gudgers.  You  are  selecting  certain  photographs  for  Let  Us  Now  Praise  Famous    
   Men,  and  you  are  editing  out  other  photographs  that  may  not  support  the  ideas    
   that  you  want  to  present.  Why  is  that  so  different  in  kind  from  taking  something    
   out  of  your  pocket  or  moving  something  that  you  see  in  a  bedroom  or  in  a  living    
   room  from  one  place  to  another  and  then  photographing  it?.145  
  
By  “cropping  reality,”  by  “tearing  an  image  from  the  fabric  of  reality”—something  all  
photographers  and  all  filmmakers  must  do—the  artist  prevents  herself  from  just  showing,  
objectively,  how  things  are  in  the  world.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




   Other  theorists  echo  Morris  in  discussing  photographs  and  documentaries  alike  and  
extending  the  idea  of  manipulation  to  further  processes  of  filmmaking  (e.g.,  post-­production,  
editing  processes).  Patricia  Aufderheide  deems  “documentary”  a  genre  “defined  by  the  tension  
between  the  claim  to  truthfulness  and  the  need  to  select  and  represent  the  reality  one  wants  to  
share;;”  John  Grierson  famously  deemed  documentary  “the  creative  treatment  of  actuality;;”146  and  
Bill  Nichols  has  perhaps  provided  the  most  extensive  account  of  the  ways  in  which  
documentaries  are  tied  to  reality  despite  being  fundamentally  texts  and  therefore  artistic  
interpretations  of  the  world.147  As  he  puts  it:  “documentaries  direct  us  toward  the  world  but  they  
also  remain  texts.  Hence  they  share  all  of  the  attendant  implications  of  fiction’s  constructed,  
formal,  ideologically  infected  status.”148  While  there  is  some  sense  in  which  documentaries  are  
tied  to  truth,  we  should  discard  any  appeal  to  their  “just  showing”  us  objectively  accessible  facts  
about  the  world.  Documentaries  treat  reality  “creatively”  by  “representing”  or  “arguing  about”  it.    
   Within  this  space  of  intentional  and  subjective  presentation,  the  documentarian  has—and  
employs—a  plethora  of  formal  techniques  that  decrease  objectivity  further.  A  few  of  the  more  
common  ones  are:  
(1)  The  use  of  reenactments.  In  moves  like  The  Thin  Blue  Line,  Nanook  of  the  North,  and  
Stories  we  Tell,  documentarians  use  actors  to  represent  real-­life  subjects.  In  this  way,  
they  make  performance  an  explicit  part  of  their  films,  blurring  the  line  between  
documentary  and  fiction.    
(2)  The  use  of  the  essay  film.  Some  documentaries  eschew  any  pretense  of  objectivity  by  
making  subjectivity  a  part  of  what’s  depicted.  In  these  cases  (e.g.,  The  Gleaners  and  I,  
and  Man  with  a  Movie  Camera)  the  documentarian  becomes  one  of  the  represented  
subjects,  making  the  film’s  nature  as  a  film—and  the  filmmaker’s  nature  as  a  filmmaker—
explicit.  Films  like  this  acknowledge  openly  and  reflexively  that  representation  is  
subjective.    
(3)  The  use  of  a  political  agenda.  Political,  commitment,  and  propaganda  films  all—in  
various,  and  sometimes  highly  divergent,  ways—present  historical  or  social  events  from  a  
particular  perspective.  In  doing  so,  they  often  leave  out  conflicting  viewpoints  and  
represent  facts  in  a  purposefully  biased  way.  Michael  Moore’s  movies  all  fall  within  this  
camp.  
(4)  The  use  of  techniques  that  place  doubt  on  documentary  objectivity  itself.  Some  
movies,  like  Exit  Through  the  Gift  Shop  and  Night  and  Fog,  make  their  narratives  about  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146  (1)  Aufderheide,  Patricia.  Documentary  Film:  A  Very  Short  Introduction.  Oxford:  Oxford,  2007,  
p.  127.  (2)  Grierson,  John.  “The  First  Principles  of  Documentary.”  Grierson  on  Documentary.  Ed.  
Forsythe  Hardy  (London:  Faber  &  Faber,  1966).  
147  Nichols,  Bill.  Representing  Reality.  Bloomington:  Indiana  University  Press,  1991.  
148  Nichols,  p.  110.  
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the  inaccessibility  of  objective  truth.  The  former  does  this  by  presenting  us  with  
untrustworthy  narrators  and  shots  whose  origins  are  unclear;;  the  latter  contains  voice-­
over  narration  which  explicitly  questions  the  possibility  of  accurate  memory  or  
representation.  Other  films  make  their  subject  matter  unclear  and  thereby  remove  
whatever  expectation  of  objective  presentation  we  might’ve  had.  Sherman’s  March,  for  
instance,  is  ostensibly  about  the  lingering  consequences  of  General  Sherman’s  march  
through  the  South  during  the  Civil  War,  but  it  ends  up  being  as  much—if  not  more—about  
documentarian  Ross  McElwee’s  quest  for  romantic  love.  Throughout  our  viewing  of  it,  it’s  
difficult  to  figure  out  just  what  we’re  watching  or  why  we’re  watching  it.  
  
So  this  is  the  space  documentarians  work  within:  a  non-­objective  space  in  which  artistic  
representation  of  reality  is  key.  In  light  of  this  non-­objectivity,149  some  theorists  reject  that  
documentaries  are  tied  to  reality—or  truth—claiming  that  there  is  no  real  distinction  between  
documentaries  and  fictions.150  Others  try  to  accommodate  for  subjectivity  and  artistic  
representation  whilst  still  preserving  the  intuition  that  documentaries  have  some  tie  to  the  world  
that  fictions  lack.  
   André  Bazin,  commonly  considered  a  cinematic  realist  who  takes  the  photographic  image  
(in  fiction  and  documentary  film)  to  provide  unmediated  access  to  things  in  the  world,  
acknowledges  the  lack  of  objectivity  in  documentary  filmmaking.  According  to  Philip  Rosen151,  
Bazin  maintains  that  
      If  formal  and  stylistic  procedures  cannot  provide  an  actual,  unmediated  access  to  the  
objective,  then  the  basis  for  evaluating  those  procedures  is  located  elsewhere  than  in  the  
relation  of  text  to  its  referent:  in  the  processes  of  the  subject,  its  modes  of  postulating  and  
approaching  ‘objectivity.’152  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
149  Indeed,  some  theorists  rest  this  upon  the  more  general  fact  of  reality  being  inaccessible  
outside  of  our  mental  representations  full-­stop.  As  Dirk  Eitzen  puts  it  “even  our  ‘brute’  perceptions  
of  the  world  are  inescapably  tainted  by  our  beliefs,  assumptions,  goals,  and  desires.  So,  even  if  
there  is  a  concrete,  material  reality  upon  which  our  existence  depends…we  can  only  apprehend  it  
through  mental  representations  that  at  best  resemble  reality  and  that  are  in  large  part  socially  
created.”  Eitzen,  Dirk.  “When  is  a  Documentary?:  Documentary  as  a  Mode  of  Reception.”  Cinema  
Journal  35:1  (Autumn,  1995):  81-­102.  
150William  Gunn  makes  this  claim  in  his  book  A  Cinema  of  Nonfiction  (London  and  Toronto:  
Associated  University  Presses,  1990),  17ff.  Related  arguments  against  this  distinction  are  laid  out  
in  Barbara  Foley,  Telling  the  Truth:  The  Theory  and  Practice  of  Documentary  Fiction  (Ithaca  and  
London:  Cornell  University  Press,  1986),  29-­41.  
151  Rosen,  Philip.  “History  of  Image,  Image  of  History:  Subject  and  Ontology  in  Bazin.”  Rites  of  
Realism:  Essays  on  Corporeal  Cinema.  Ed.  Ivone  Margulies.  Durham  and  London:  Duke  
University  Press,  2003.  42-­79.  
152  Rosen,  p.  46.  
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If  “the  objective  is  always  inflected  by  the  subjective,”  never  approachable  outside  of  our  modes  
of  representation,  then—for  Bazin—we  can  only  evaluate  documentaries  by  appeal  to  how  
closely  they  “approach,”  how  they  strive  towards,  objectivity.  Here,  Bazin  offers  an  account  that  
can  (correctly)  discard  the  possibility  of  objective  presentation  but  still  make  sense  of  
documentary's  truthful  or  realistic  nature:  the  latter  amounts  to  coming  as  close  as  possible  to  the  
former.    
   Appealing  to  Bazin  doesn’t  quite  work,  though,  and  for  one  chief  reason:  many  movies  
that  we  categorize  as  documentaries  don’t  try  to  approach  objectivity.  Some  focus  primarily  on  
the  presentation  of  subjectivity  and  expressivity,  as  essay  films  such  as  Agnes  Varda’s  do;;  some  
focus  on  fully  biased  perspectives  of  events  in  the  world,  as  political  and  propaganda  
documentaries  do;;  and  some  take  their  subject  matter  to  be  the  impossibility  of  objectivity,  as  Exit  
Through  the  Gift  Shop  and  Night  and  Fog  do.  In  light  of  these  examples,  we  seemingly  have  to  
get  rid  of  the  notion  of  objectivity—admitting  that  an  appeal  to  it  isn’t  even  necessary  in  our  
evaluations  of  works  within  the  genre.  
   Here  we  might  turn  to  Bill  Nichols  again.  For  Nichols,  documentaries  make  “arguments”  
about  historical  reality—historical  reality  being  “brute  reality”  in  which  “objects  collide,  actions  
occur,  forces  take  their  toll.”153  As  I  mentioned  earlier,  Nichols  acknowledges  subjectivity  by  
emphasizing  how  documentaries  comment  on—rather  than  merely  show—the  world.  Insofar  as  
they  are  texts,  they  are  necessarily  inflected  with  our  interpretations  (and  with  culturally-­specific  
ideological  constructs).  Still,  they  are  tied  to  reality  by  commenting  on  reality:    they  “refer  to,  
represent,  or  make  claims  about  historical  reality.”154  Nichols’  approach  is  more  promising  than  
Bazin’s  insofar  as  it  discards  an  appeal  to  objectivity  altogether.  Still,  it  faces  a  different  sort  of  
problem:  it  doesn’t  distinguish  documentaries  from  fiction  films  accurately,  a  point  that  Dirk  Eitzen  
makes.  He  states:    
There  are  many  fiction  films  that  refer  to,  represent,  or  make  claims  about  historical  
reality.  Spike  Lee’s  School  Daze,  for  example,  portrays  tensions  in  the  student  body  of  a  
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154  Eitzen,  p.  84.  
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fictional  all-­black  college—tensions  that  include  strong  differences  of  opinion  on  the  issue  
of  whether  the  college  should  divest  its  holdings  in  companies  that  do  business  in  South  
Africa.  In  1987,  when  the  film  was  made,  this  issue  was  certainly  a  historical  reality  on  
many  college  campuses.155  
  
Nichols  tries  to  accommodate  for  the  fact  that  fictions  refer  to  the  real  world  by  claiming  that  they  
do  so  “metaphorically,”  but—as  Eitzen  argues—this  doesn’t  adequately  capture  what  movies  like  
School  Daze  do.  School  Daze  “points  to  historical  reality  without  resembling  it  in  the  least  and  
without  explicitly  comparing  it  to  anything  else.”156  
   Nichols  is  right  in  taking  there  to  be  an  important  difference  between  the  way  in  which  
fiction  films  refer  to  the  world  and  the  way  in  which  documentaries  do  so.  But  the  distinction  isn’t  a  
matter  of  being  metaphorical  or  literal.  It’s  a  matter  of  what  Carl  Plantinga  calls  “stances.”157  
Fiction  film  refers  to  the  real  world  through  a  fictive  stance—presenting  us  with  an  imaginative  
reality  in  order  to  comment  on  historical  reality.  Documentary  takes  a  merely  assertive  stance—
straightforwardly,  non-­imaginatively,  commenting  on  historical  reality.  The  difference  is,  more  
precisely,  between  “presenting  the  state  of  affairs  for  our  delectation,  edification,  education,  
amusement,  or  what  have  you,  but  not  to  have  us  believe  that  the  state  of  affairs  that  constitute  
the  world  of  the  work  holds  in  the  actual  world”  on  the  one  hand,  and  asserting  “that  the  state  of  
affairs  making  up  that  projected  world  holds  or  occurs  in  the  actual  world”  on  the  other.158  Indeed,  
there  is  more  to  the  idea  of  documentaries  “as  assertions,”  and  spelling  it  out  (particularly  by  
appeal  to  Plantinga)  can  give  us  precisely  what  we  need  to  make  sense  of  the  difference  between  
fiction  films  and  documentaries  and  how  the  latter  are  tied  to  reality  (or  truth).  
   Plantinga  states:  
   Central  to  our  idea  of  the  typical  or  usual  documentary…is  the  implicit  directorial  
   assertion  of  veridical  representation,  representation  that  is,  in  the  case  of  implicit  
   ly  or  directly  asserted  propositions,  truthful;;  and  in  the  case  of  images,  sounds,  or    
   combinations  thereof,  a  reliable  guide  to  relevant  elements  of  the  pro-­filmic  scene  
   or  scenes.  When  a  filmmaker  presents  a  film  as  a  documentary,  he  or  she  not  only    
   intends  that  the  audience  come  to  form  certain  beliefs,  but  also  implicitly  asserts    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
155  Eitzen,  p.  84.  
156  Eitzen,  p.  85.  
157  Plantinga,  Carl.  “What  a  Documentary  Is,  After  All.”  The  Journal  of  Aesthetics  and  Art  Criticism  
63.2  (2005):  105-­117.  
158  Plantinga,  p.  107.  
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   something  about  the  use  of  the  medium  itself—that  the  use  of  motion  pictures  and  
   recorded  sounds  offer     an  audiovisual  array  that  communicates  some  phenomeno  
   logical  aspect  of  the  subject,  from  which  the  spectator  might  reasonably  be  ex  
   pected  to  form  a  sense  of  that  phenomenological  aspect  and/or  form  true  beliefs    
   about  the  subject.159  
  
This  passage  illuminates  the  chief  difference  between  Plantinga  and  Nichols.  Nichols  focuses  on  
how  documentary  films  comment  on  the  world,  while  Plantinga  takes  them  to  (additionally)  
comment  on  themselves.  The  documentarian  makes  implicit  and  explicit  propositions  about  a  
state  of  affairs  and  implicitly  “asserts  something  about  the  medium  itself”—that  the  film  is  a  
truthful  representation.  
   Let’s  unpack  this  further.  There  are  seemingly  four  things  going  on,  for  Plantinga,  in  
documentary  films:  (1)  explicit  propositions  about  a  state  of  affairs;;  (2)  implicit  propositions  about  
that  state  of  affairs;;  (3)  direct  showing,  via  images  and  sounds,  of  “relevant  elements  of  the  
profilmic  scene  or  scenes;;”  and  (4)  the  implicit  assertion  of  truthfulness  by  the  movie  (or  by  the  
filmmaker).160  (1)  is  quite  easy  to  grasp,  as  it  seemingly  consists  in  direct  statements—made  via  
voice-­over  narration,  interviews,  text,  and  the  like—about  the  film’s  subject  matter.  So,  we  have  
Michael  Moore  telling  us  in  Roger  and  Me  that,  in  Flint,  Michigan,  “the  Hyatt  went  bankrupt  and  
was  put  up  for  sale,  Waterstreet  Pavillion  saw  most  of  its  stores  go  out  of  business;;”  Blackfish  
telling  us,  via  interviews,  that  “all  whales  in  captivity  have  a  bad  life”  and  “this  is  a  multi-­billion  
dollar  corporation  that  makes  its  money  through  the  exploitation  of  Orcas;;”  and  Joshua  Zeman  
telling  us,  in  Cropsey,  that  “Cropsey  was  an  escaped  mental  patient  who  lived  in  the  tunnels  
beneath  the  old  Willowbrook  mental  institution,  who  would  come  out  late  at  night,  snatch  children  
off  the  streets.”    
   While  (1)  is  easy  enough  to  grasp,  (2)  is  a  bit  less  clear.  With  regards  to  this,  Plantinga  
states:  
   Consider  an  observational  film  such  as  Frederick  Wiseman’s  Hospital  (1970)…  
   Wiseman  clearly  implies  much  about  the  hospital  through  the  selection  of  footage    
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160  Plantinga  initially  talks  of  the  “director”  asserting,  but  switches  back  and  forth  between  that  a  
talk  of  the  film  asserting.  I  think  the  latter  is,  for  him,  entailed  by  the  former.  
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   and  through  editing,  so  one  might  find  in  the  film  propositional  content  that  is  im  
   plied  or  asserted.161  
  
Plantinga  doesn’t  expand  upon  the  idea  of  implicit  propositions,  as  he  talks  at  once  of  “implied  or  
asserted”  content,  but  I  think  this  category  captures  most  of  the  “arguments”  or  “comments”  we  
typically  take  documentaries  to  make.  Making  a  Murderer  implies  that  Steven  Avery  was  
convicted  of  a  murder  through  incompetent  investigative  work;;  Fahrenheit  9/11  implies  that  
George  Bush  was  an  incompetent  president;;  The  Thin  Blue  Line  implies  that  Randall  Dale  Adams  
was  innocent  of  his  conviction.  These  films  make  such  implied  propositions  through  a  
combination  of  their  imagistic/aural  content  and  directly  asserted  propositions.  Making  a  Murderer  
uses  direct  statements  from  Avery’s  family  and  defense  attorneys  detailing  the  unjust  actions  of  
Manitowoc  county  officials  and  shows  shocking  recordings  of  investigators’  manipulative  
interviews  with  Avery  and  his  nephew,  Brendan  Dassey;;  The  Thin  Blue  Line  uses  reenactments  
to  show  us  the  implausibility  and  inconsistency  of  various  witnesses’  testimonies  (testifying  to  
Adams’  guilt)  and  statements  made  by  Adams  asserting  his  own  innocence;;  Fahrenheit  9/11  tells  
us  that  George  Bush  “when  informed  of  the  first  plane  hitting  the  World  Trade  Center,  where  
terrorists  had  struck  just  8  years  prior…  decided  to  go  ahead  with  his  photo  opportunity,”  and  
shows  us  footage  of  him  reading  “My  Pet  Goat”  for  “nearly  seven  minutes”  after  hearing  of  the  
second  tower’s  destruction.  Documentaries  make  claims  about,  comment  on,  their  subject  matter;;  
and  the  arguments  they  make  outstrip  their  explicit  propositions.  Indeed,  here  we  see  the  
importance  of  the  films’  imagistic  and  aural  content  ((3)  above),  as  it  gives  documentaries  this  
broader  communicative  ability.  
   Outlining  (3)  more  solidly,  Plantinga  states  that    
   It  may  be  that  certain  images  and  sounds,  or  sequences  thereof,  are  meant  to  ap  
   proximate  some  element  of  the  phenomenological  experience  of  the  event,  such  as  
   how  it  looked  or  sounded  from  a  particular  vantage  point,  or  how  it  was  full  of    
   energetic  good  cheer  or  a  strong  sense  of  foreboding.  Thus  the  film  may  be  taken    
   to  assert  that  the  relevant  scenes  give  a  sense  of  how  the  filmmakers  were  ‘ap  
   peared  to’  aurally  and/or  visually.162  
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Plantinga  differentiates  himself  from  other  documentary-­as-­assertion  theorists  by  acknowledging  
that  documentaries  communicate  certain  phenomenological  facts  about  a  state  of  affairs—how  it  
looked,  sounded,  appeared  to  the  filmmaker—that  aren’t  propositional.  This  takes  us  back  to  the  
point  about  phenomenological  immediacy  and  elucidates  how  it  applies  just  as  much  to  
documentaries  as  fiction  films:  both  engage  in  showing  by  directly  presenting  us  with  looks,  feels  
and  sounds  in  a  way  that  literary  art  forms  cannot.  As  Plantinga  states:  “the  moving  photograph  
and  the  sound  recording  are  to  some  degree  belief-­independent.  Their  communicative  richness  
extends  beyond  the  intentions  of  the  filmmakers  and  leaves  something  for  interpretation  and  
discovery  by  audiences.”163  
   What  we  discover  through  the  perceptual  content  can  include  the  sort  of  “sense”  that  
Plantinga  focuses  on,  but  it’s  important  to  specify  here  that  it  can  also  include  facts.  We  can  know  
what  happened  when  George  Bush  found  out  about  the  second  tower  just  by  seeing  him  read  My  
Pet  Goat  and  watching  the  time  tick  away  in  the  left  corner  of  the  screen.  We  can  know  that  
Mantiwok  county  officials  were  manipulative  by  seeing  and  hearing  their  interactions  with  Avery.  
Direct  propositions,  made  by  the  documentarians  and  interviewees,  contribute  to  our  knowing  
such  facts,  but  propositional  content  is  also  communicated  perceptually  (something  that  is  true  in  
the  aforementioned  cases  of  natural  meaning;;  by  seeing  cues  of  natural  information,  we  pick  up  
on  propositional  content—we  grasp  facts  about  a  person’s  emotions  and  thoughts  and  facts  
about  weather  and  scenery).  
   Importantly,  even  though  (3)  constitutes  “showing,”  it  still  includes  the  notion  of  assertion,  
for  Plantinga,  insofar  as  “the  filmmakers  might  be  taken  to  be  asserting  that  a  scene  shows  what  
the  pro-­filmic  event  looked  like,  or  approximates  how  the  filmmakers  ‘were  appeared  to.’”164  
Getting  clearer  on  this  implicit  assertion  is  key  to  Plantinga’s  account,  so  let’s  delve  into  it  more  
fully.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
163  Plantiga,  p.  110-­11.  
164  Plantiga,  p.  111.  
	  93	  
	  
   For  Plantinga,  the  documentarian  (and  her  film,  as  a  result)  makes  this  implicit  assertion  
of  veridicality  “when”  she  “presents  a  film  as  a  documentary.”  I  think  we  should  take  this  to  mean  
that  the  very  categorization  of  the  film  carries  the  implicit  assertion:  given  the  genre—its  history  
as  well  as  viewers’  accompanying  expectation  of  its  tie  to  reality—a  documentarian  claims  that  
her  film  abides  by  the  convention  and  expectation  of  truth.  She  does  this  not  through  any  
particular  formal  techniques  but  through  the  very  presentation  of  the  film:  through  naming  or  
categorizing  it  as  a  work  within  the  genre.  
   I  think  we  can  take  this  idea  of  implicit  assertion  to  be  synonymous  with  (or,  at  least,  very  
similar  to)  Grice’s  “conversational  implicature.”165  For  Plantinga,  filmmakers  don’t  commit  to  their  
veridical  representation  by  stating  it  explicitly,  just  as  speakers  don’t  linguistically  (based  on  the  
conventional  meaning  of  the  words  they  utter—or  what  they  say)  commit  to  their  implicatures.  
But,  by  engaging  in  the  convention  of  documentary  film  the  filmmaker  commits  implicitly  to  
providing  a  truthful  depiction  of  reality—just  as  speakers  of  a  language,  in  presenting  themselves  
as  being  cooperative,  commit  implicitly  to  certain  propositions  their  statements  suggest.  
Importantly,  other  cases  of  implicit  assertions  that  I’ve  discussed  and  will  continue  to  discuss  
(e.g.,  The  Thin  Blue  Line  implying  that  Adams  was  innocent,    and  Making  a  Murderer  implying  
that  Avery  was  innocent)  are,  I  think,  stronger  than  cases  of  Gricean  implicature—insofar  as  the  
content  of  the  film  itself,  and  not  the  mere  assumption  of  cooperation,  suggests  those  
propositions—and  I’ll  talk  about  this  in  the  following  section.  
   Plantinga’s  account  ties  documentaries  to  truth  in  two  ways:  through  the  assertions  they  
make  about  states  of  affairs  and  through  the  implicit  assertion  that  they  are  truthfully  representing  
the  states  of  affairs.  Of  course,  just  how  documentaries  represent  the  world—and  just  what  they  
take  their  subject  matter  to  be—  varies.  Here  we  need  to  keep  in  mind  the  subjectivity  and  
intentionality  mentioned  earlier.  Indeed,  this  is  something  Plantinga  discusses  here:  
   What  counts  as  assertedly  veridical  representation,  however,  differs  in  various    
   contexts.  For  example,  what  is  accepted  as  a  veridical  representation  depends  in    
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   part  on  the  mode  of  documentary  in  question.  In  expositional  documentaries,  the    
   assertion  of  propositions  or  truth  claims  becomes  central.166       
  
Plantinga  expands  upon  this  by  stating  that  veridical  representation  can  include,  among  other  
things,  “animated  maps,  occasional  reenactments,  the  relatively  loose  use  of  archival  footage,  
and  so  forth,  as  long  as  such  images  and  sounds  are  not  fundamentally  misleading.”167  Part  of  
this  variation  stems  from  subgenre  differences.    
   If  we  watch  The  Gleaners  and  I,  we  are—or,  at  least  throughout  the  viewing,  become—
aware  of  its  nature  as  an  essay  film.  We,  correspondingly,  expect  representations  of  Agnes  
Varda’s  subjectivity  and  techniques  that  enhance  the  film’s  expressiveness,  such  as  her  filming  
her  hand  up  close  at  various  points  throughout  the  movie  in  order  to  acknowledge  her  own  
mortality.  We  don’t  expect  what  we  expect  from  an  expositional  documentary:  i.e.,  truthful  
propositions  about  a  reality  external  to  the  filmmaker.  If  we  watch  an  observational  documentary  
like  Frederick  Wiseman’s  Hospital,  which  is  done  in  the  cinema  verité  tradition,  we  expect  (or  
come  to  expect)  “no  voice-­over  narration”  and  the  use  of  “images  and  sounds  recorded  on  
location  to  present  a  portrait  of  New  York’s  Metropolitan  Hospital.”168  If  we  watch  Fahrenheit  9/11,  
we  expect,  among  other  things:  an  everyday-­man  depiction  of  Michael  Moore  and  footage  of  
interviews  with  politicians  and  governmental  actions  that  support  a  socially  liberal  perspective.  
We  don’t  expect  an  unbiased  look  at  the  political  landscape;;  we  don't  expect  an  expositional  
documentary;;  and  we  don’t  expect  the  “verité”  style  of  movies  like  Hospital.  
   In  these  ways,  we  tweak  our  notion  of  ‘truthful  representation’  so  that  it  applies  to  the  
particular  subgenre  in  which  a  film  belongs.  Because  we  expect  essay  films  to  accurately  
represent  the  filmmakers’  expressivity  and  subjectivity,  we  don’t  consider  Varda’s  movies  
untruthful  when  they  focus  less  on  objective  truths.  Because  we  expect  politically-­motivated  films  
to  provide  real  footage  that  supports  and  motivates  one  political  perspective,  we  don’t  consider  
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Moore’s  movies  non-­veridical  because  they  fail  to  show  all  sides  of  the  story.  What  makes  the  
movies  accurate,  what  makes  them  trustworthy,  depends  upon  their  purposes.  
   Even  more  broadly:  our  knowledge  of  the  plethora  of  genre-­neutral  techniques  available  
to  the  documentarian  further  affect  our  expectations  and  conception  of  documentary  veridicality.  
Realizing  that  The  Thin  Blue  Line  utilizes  reenactments,  we  don’t  expect  the  film  to  show  us  the  
actual  people  involved  in  the  crime—and  so  its  failure  to  do  so  doesn’t  constitute  a  veridical  
failure.  Watching  Exit  Through  the  Gift  Shop  and  noticing  that  there  doesn’t  seem  to  be  any  
objective  presentation  of  facts  (because  there  is  no  reliable  narrator),  we  realize  that  the  film  is  
about  the  lack  of  objective  presentation—and  so  its  failure  to  provide  one  doesn’t  constitute  a  
veridical  failure.  As  we  learn  what  to  expect  from  subgenres  and  what  to  expect  from  particular  
filmmakers  (what  their  favored  techniques  and  subject  matters  are),  we  apply  a  notion  of  
“veridicality”  that  takes  into  account  their  aims  and  styles:  one  that  doesn’t  necessitate  full-­blown  
objectivity,  one  that  preserves  a  broad  conception  of  the  category  of  “documentary,”  one  that—
generally—acknowledges  how  intention  and  subjectivity  are  at  play  in  complex  and  highly  varied  
ways  throughout  filmmaking.  We  admit  that  different  filmmakers  and  different  films  are  focused  on  
different  “truths”  and  consequently  employ  different  techniques  in  communicating  them.  
   Acknowledging  this  variation  needn’t  (and  shouldn’t)  mean  overlooking  what  all  
documentaries  have  in  common:  that  they  say  something  about  the  world  and  that  they  say  
something  about  their  medium.  Documentaries  carry  a  norm  of  assertion  that  fiction  films  do  not  
carry.  Even  though  both  represent  their  subjects  artistically,  only  the  former  has  events  or  people  
or  places  in  the  world  as  their  direct  subject,  and  only  the  former  shed  honest  light  on  that  subject  
(“honest  light”  being  the  very  thing  that  alters).  
   Indeed,  we  can  see  documentaries  more  specifically  as  communicative  utterances  that  
carry  Gricean  nonnatural  meaning.  The  director  uses  her  film—which,  importantly,  partly  engages  
in  showing  and  therefore  carries  some  natural  meaning—in  order  to  communicate  (via  explicit  
and  implicit  propositions)  certain  truths  about  a  real-­world  subject  matter;;  she  implies,  and  
thereby  communicates,  that  her  intention  is  to  tell  us  such  truths;;  we,  aware  of  her  intention  to  
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communicate  and  the  specific  techniques  she’s  using  in  order  to  do  so,  take  hers  to  be  an  
utterance  that  can  communicate  (directly  and  indirectly)  facts  about  (some  aspect  of)  the  world.  
Plantinga’s  implicit  assertion,  because  reflexive,  in  addition  to  an  emphasis  on  our  awareness  of  
the  variation  in  ‘shedding  honest  light’  can  allow  us  to  see  documentaries  as  bearers  of  Gricean  
nonnatural  meaning.169    
   Closely  tied  to  this  idea  of  communication  is  the  idea  of  reliability.  If  documentaries  aim  to  
show  us  true  facts  about  the  world,  in  their  nuanced  and  diverse  ways,  they  are  reliable  when  
they  actually  do  so—when,  by  watching  them,  we  can  come  to  true  beliefs  about  the  subject  
matter  at  hand.  Documentaries  are  reliable  when  they  serve  as  reliable  guides  to  true  beliefs.  
This  amounts,  more  specifically,  to  (1)  making  true  propositions  (both  explicit  and  implicit)  and  (2)  
providing  an  audiovisual  array  from  which  the  spectator  might  reasonably  be  expected  to  form  
true  beliefs  about  the  subject.  
   Plantinga,  in  fact,  includes  the  notion  of  reliability  in  his  account,  stating  that,  
“documentary  representation  commits  the  filmmaker  to  assert  the  reliability  or  functionality  of  
whatever  materials  are  used  to  show  the  spectator  how  something  is,  was,  or  might  be  in  the  
actual  world.”170  What  makes  a  documentary  reliable  is  that  it  presents  us  with  (and,  importantly,  
it  asserts  that  it  is  presenting  us  with)  images  and  sounds  that  directly  show  us  phenomenological  
aspects  of  the  subject  matter  and  (implicit  and  explicit)  propositions  which  assert  true  facts  about  
the  subject  matter—whether  that  subject  matter  be  subjective,  biased,  or  political  in  nature.  On  
the  other  hand,  documentary  unreliability  consists  in  leading  us  to  false  beliefs  about  people,  
events,  or  places  in  the  world.  
   Using  Alvin  Goldman’s  definition  of  reliability  we  can  bolster  this  discussion.171  For  
Goldman,  reliability—or  reliabilism—grounds  the  notion  of  belief-­justification  and  applies  primarily  
to  cognitive  belief-­forming  processes.  While  there  are  many  complexities  to  his  account  and  many  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
169  Grice,  H.P.  “Meaning.”  The  Philosophical  Review  66.3  (1957):  377-­388.  
170  Plantinga,  p.  111.  
171  For  the  most  prominent  and  discussed  account  of  process-­reliability  (or  reliabilism)  look  to:  
Goldman,  Alvin  I.  “What  is  Justified  Belief?”  Justification  and  Knowledge.  Ed.  G.S  Pappas.  
Dordrecht:  Reidel,  1979.  1-­25.  
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contemporary  versions  of  it,  we  only  need  to  work  with  his  original,  basic  definition  here.  Goldman  
maintains  that  a  belief  is  justified  if  and  only  if  it  was  caused  by  a  reliable  process;;  and  what  
makes  a  process  (here  a  cognitive  process,  like  perceptual  processes,  good  reasoning,  
remembering,  and  introspection)  reliable  is  its  tendency  to  produce  true  beliefs.  
   Accounts  of  process  reliabilism  generally  apply  to  cognitive  processes,  and  I’m  
attempting  to  spell  out  ways  in  which  movies  can  be  reliable  (or  unreliable),  but  my  discussion  of  
the  latter  is  really  shorthand  for  a  more  complicated  account.  A  movie’s  reliability  (or  unreliability)  
is  determined  by  the  cognitive  processes  it  engages.  When  a  movie  engages  viewers  in  cognitive  
processes  that  tend  to  produce  true  beliefs,  the  movie  is  reliable  to  that  extent;;  when  a  movie  
engages  viewers  in  cognitive  processes  that  don’t  tend  to  produce  true  beliefs,  the  movie  is  
unreliable.  It’s  important  here  to  note  that,  in  line  with  epistemological  accounts  of  reliability  like  
Goldman’s,  the  focus  here  is  on  process  types—movies  engage  tokens  of  process-­types  that  are  
or  aren’t  reliable.    
   Process  reliabilism  can  center  on  what  a  cognitive  process  actually  does  in  the  world—its  
history  of  producing  true  beliefs—or  it  can  center  on  counterfactual,  possible-­world  outcomes.  In  
various  ways,  my  account  of  film-­viewing  does  the  latter.  I’m  not  interested  in  whether  or  not  
movies  do  in  fact  cause  certain  cognitive  processes  in  viewers;;  I’m  interested  in  whether  or  not,  
given  the  convention  of  documentary  and  viewers’  general  expectations  of  veridicality,  a  movie  
would—across  various  viewing  situations—engage  reliable  cognitive  processes.  Assuming  that  
we  trust  that  what  we’re  watching  is  a  truthful  depiction—and  assuming  that  the  movie  presents  
itself  as  such  a  depiction—we  treat  the  documentary  as  a  Gricean  utterance  with  nonnatural  
meaning.  We  take  it  as  some  sort  of  testimony  to  the  facts  (of  a  case  or  event  or  subject  matter).  
When  a  documentary  is  honest  in  its  testimony,  it  engages  reliable  cognitive  processes.  When  it  
is  deceptive  in  its  testimony  it  engages  unreliable  cognitive  processes.  
   There  are  more  nuances  we  could  specify  here,  but  this  basic  account  is  enough  for  now.  
With  this  in  mind,  “the  documentary  is  unreliable”  really  amounts  to  “the  documentary  calls  on  
unreliable  cognitive  processes;;”  and  “the  documentary  tends  to  produce  false  beliefs”  or  “the  
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documentary  leads  viewers  to  false  beliefs”  is  shorthand  for  “the  documentary  engages  a  token  of  
a  cognitive  process  type  that  tends  to  produce  false  beliefs.”  What’s  more,  given  the  
counterfactual  nature  of  my  account,  reference  to  what  ‘we,’  as  viewers,  expect  from  a  
documentary  or  the  cognitive  processes  ‘we’  engage  in  is  reference  to  ‘attentive,’  or  ‘ideal’  
viewers’—viewers  who  are  taking  the  documentary  at  hand  as  a  communicative  utterance  and  
who  are  aware  of  its  epistemically-­relevant  features,  perspectives,  and  aims  (the  features,  
perspectives,  and  aims  that  either  make  it  an  honest  or  a  dishonest  depiction).  
   With  all  of  this  in  mind,  let’s  turn  to  an  examination  of  documentary  unreliability  centered  
on  how  documentaries  can  lie  and  mislead.  We’ll  then  be  equipped  to  make  the  positive  claims  
about  fiction  films’  epistemic  directness.  
            Two  Kinds  of  Documentary  Unreliability  
   Theorists  discuss  documentary  unreliability  just  as  they  do  fiction  unreliability.  Sometimes  
they  do  so  in  order  to  distinguish  between  the  two  in  the  sort  of  way  I  will.172  Too  often  the  focus  
is  on  unreliability  via  unreliable  narrators:  voice-­over  or  character-­narrators  who  say  or  imply  false  
things  about  the  subject  matter  presented,  and  whose  unreliability  we  discover  by  noticing  how  
their  claims  are  inconsistent  with  the  image  track,  what  we  know  about  the  subject  matter,  or  what  
other  characters  in  the  film  say  or  imply  about  the  subject  matter.173  Theorists  typically  point  to  
Land  without  Bread,  The  Oath,  and  Exit  Through  the  Gift  Shop  as  prime  examples  of  this  form  of  
deception.    
   My  focus  in  this  section  will  be  on  something  quite  different:  how  documentaries  can  
deceive  without  such  narrators.  Indeed,  I  think  it’s  important  to  point  out  that  cases  of  unreliable  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
172  (1)  Otway,  Fiona.  “The  Unreliable  Narrator  in  Documentary”.  Journal  of  Film  and  Video  67.3-­4  
(2015):  3–23.  (2)  Ferenz,  Volker.  “Fight  Clubs,  American  Psychos  and  Mementos.”  New  Review  
of  Film  and  Television  Studies  3.2  (2005):  133-­169.  
173  (1)  Otway,  Fiona.  “The  Unreliable  Narrator  in  Documentary”.  Journal  of  Film  and  Video  67.3-­4  
(2015):  3–23.  (2)  Donovan,  John.  “Practical  Considerations  of  the  ‘Unreliable’  Narrator  in  
Documentary  Films.”  Personal  Website  of  John  Donovan.  (3)  Wiener,  Jon.  “The  Omniscient  
Narrator  and  the  Unreliable  Narrator:  The  Case  of  Atomic  Café.”  Film  &  History:  An  
Interdisciplinary  Journal  of  Film  and  Television  Studies  37.1  (Spring  2007):  73-­76.  (4)  Ruoff,  
Jeffry.  “An  Ethnographic  Surrealist  Film:  Luis  Bunuel’s  Land  Without  Bread.”  Visual  Anthropology  
Review  (March  1998).    
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narration  via  narrators  in  documentary  are  not  really  cases  of  unreliability:  if  the  film  itself  exposes  
the  speaker  as  unreliable,  then  the  film  itself  is  reliable.  What  we  need  is  a  conception  of  
documentary  unreliability  according  to  which  the  movie  deceives  us.  This  is  what  I  will  map  out  
here.  I’ll  argue  that  there  are  two  chief  ways  in  which  documentaries  can  be  unreliable:  they  can  
lie  to  us  about  their  subject  matters  or  they  can  mislead  us  about  the  perspectives  they  place  
upon  their  subject  matters.  Let’s  start  with  the  concept  of  lying.  
   Dirk  Eitzen  argues  that  the  genre  of  documentary  should  be  defined  by  its  ability  to  lie.174  
He  states  that,  whether  something  is  or  is  not  a  documentary  depends  on:  
   whether  it  is  perceived  in  such  a  way  that  it  makes  sense  to  ask  ‘might  it  be    
   lying?’  I  propose  that  the  applicability  of  this  question,  ‘Might  it  be  lying?’  is    
   what  distinguishes  documentaries,  and  nonfiction  in  general,  from  fiction.175    
  
I  think  Plantinga  gives  a  slightly  more  attractive—if  only  because  more  complete—account,  but  I  
don’t  think  Eitzen’s  is  as  different  from  Plantinga’s  as  he  takes  it  to  be.  Depending  upon  our  
notion  of  “lying,”  Eitzen’s  might  require  Plantinga’s—indeed,  it  might  be  no  different  from  it.  If  we  
can  only  lie  by  making  an  assertion—implicit  or  explicit—then  documentaries  can  only  do  the  
former  because  they  do  the  latter.  We’ll  return  to  these  concepts  in  a  bit.  For  now,  regardless  of  
whether  or  not  Eitzen’s  is  distinct  from  Plantinga’s,  it’s  not  hard  to  find  documentaries  that  lie  via  
explicit  propositions:  Waiting  for  Superman  provides  incorrect  statistics  in  its  attempt  to  convince  
audiences  of  the  superiority  of  a  charter  school  education;;  Religulous  falsely  claims  that  the  
model  of  Jesus  was  copied  from  earlier  religions;;  Blackfish  says  that  it’s  interviewing  SeaWorld  
employees  when  it’s  frequently  interviewing  animal  rights  activists;;  and  Searching  for  Sugar  Man  
tells  us  that  singer  Rodriguez  was  unsuccessful  (when  he  was,  in  fact,  highly  popular).  
   In  addition  to  making  false  explicit  propositions,  documentaries  can  lie  via  false  implicit  
propositions.  One  subgenre  regularly  partakes  in  this  sort  of  deception:  nature  documentaries.  
They  often,  among  other  things:  (1)  imply  or  state  that  the  animals  they’re  showing  are  in  the  wild  
when  they’re  really  in  zoos;;  (2)  imply  or  state  that  they’re  showing  us  a  space  without  humans,  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
174  Eitzen,  Dirk.  “When  is  a  Documentary?:  Documentary  as  a  Mode  of  Reception.”  Cinema  
Journal  35:1  (Autumn,  1995):  81-­102.  
175  Eitzen,  p.  89.  
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when  in  fact  they’re  just  cropping  people  outside  of  the  frame;;  (3)  imply  or  state  that  they  are  
showing  us  genuine  animalistic  behavior—such  as  predator-­prey  interactions,  killings,  feedings,  
or  suicides—when  those  events  have  been  staged.176  
   Michael  Moore  does  a  similar  thing  in  Bowling  for  Columbine.  He  shows  footage  of  
Charlton  Heston  saying  “I  have  five  words  for  you:  from  my  cold  head  hands”  alongside  footage  
from  the  Columbine  massacre,  implying  that  Heston  was  (coldly)  referring  to  the  massacre  in  his  
statement.  In  reality,  Heston  made  that  comment  a  year  after  Columbine  in  response  to  someone  
giving  him  a  musket  as  a  gift.  What’s  more,  Moore  states  that  there  are  11,127  gun  murders  per  
year  in  America,  a  statistic  that—it  was  later  discovered—is  actually  a  combination  of  the  figures  
for  murders,  uses  of  guns  for  self-­defense,  and  use  of  guns  by  the  police.  Similarly,  the  nature  
documentary  Blackfish  makes  false  suggestions  in  order  to  advance  its  claims  against  
SeaWorld’s  treatment  of  killer  whales,  including  its  suggestion  that  one  killer  whale—Tilikum—
had  become  psychotic  and  that  SeaWorld  never  informed  Tilikum’s  trainers  of  this  fact.  
   These  cases  involve  documentaries  lying  through  their  implicit  propositions  (or  
assertions).  Nature  documentaries  imply—without  directly  stating—that  the  events  and  subjects  
they’re  filming  are  one  thing  (in  the  wild,  genuine,  etc)  when  they  are  another  (in  zoos,  staged,  
etc);;  and  Bowling  for  Columbine—through  its  tricky  editing—implicitly  asserts  (falsely)  that  
Charleton  Heston  responded  coldly  to  Columbine.    
   How  do  these  movies  make  such  implicit  propositions?  They  do  it  partly  through  their  
perceptual  content—showing  us  Heston’s  quotes  interspersed  with  Columbine  footage  and  
showing  us  activities  of  animals  “in  the  wild.”  They  do  it  partly  through  the  facts  they  leave  out—
e.g.,  the  fact  that  Charleton  Heston  said  what  he  said  in  an  entirely  different  context,  and  the  fact  
that  there  are  humans  just  outside  of  the  movie  shots.  And  they  do  it  partly  through  the  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
176One  shocking  example  of  staged  interactions  is  found  in  the  documentary  White  Wilderness.  In  
one  scene,  we're  shown  a  group  of  dead  lemmings  and  are  told  that  they  committed  suicide  (and  
that  they  do  this  regularly),  when  in  fact  the  lemmings  were  pushed  off  of  a  cliff  using  a  rotating  
platform.  This  is  an  instance  of  explicit  lying,  but  other  cases  of  implication  are:  in  BBC’s  Frozen  
Planet  (which  shows  a  captive  polar  bear  at  a  Holland  zoo)  and  in  Wild  America,  which  staged  
many  of  its  predator-­prey  interactions.  
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propositions  they  explicitly  make—in  the  context  of  Michael  Moore’s  various  statements  regarding  
gun  violence  in  America  and  similar  statements  his  interviewees  provide,  we’re  likely  to  interpret  
Heston  as  one  among  many  citizens  who  hold  fierce,  irrational  beliefs  about  guns.  Implicit  
propositions  are  made  through  a  combination  of  information-­withholding,  visual  and  aural  content,  
and  explicit  propositions.  When  movies  use  those  three  avenues  in  order  to  imply  false  
conclusions,  they  lie.  
   Any  case  of  lying—whether  it’s  done  via  explicit  propositions  or  implicit  propositions—
involves  two  forms  of  deception.  First  of  all,  the  films  lie  about  their  subject  matter:  they  make  
false  claims  about  what  is  true  in  the  real-­world  people,  places,  events,  or  things  they  examine.  
Secondly,  they  lie  via  their  implicit  assertion.  The  documentarian  presents  her  film  as  a  
documentary,  thereby  implying  that  hers  is  a  veridical  representation  of  its  subject  matter.  Insofar  
as  she  does  not  provide  such  a  veridical  representation,  she  lies  to  viewers  about  what  she’s  
showing  them.    
   This  is  where  we  need  to  be  quite  careful,  however.  For  talk  of  implicit  propositions  or  
implicit  assertions  might  seem  incompatible  with  talk  of  lying.  For  many  philosophers  of  language,  
“lying”  requires,  as  Andreas  Stokke  puts  it:  “saying  something  one  believes  to  be  false  with  the  
intent  to  deceive  one’s  listener.”177  More  specifically,  it  includes  there  being  “a  proposition  p  such  
that  A  says  that  p  to  B…”178  If  we  agree  with  these  accounts,  then  “saying”  or  “asserting”  is  at  the  
root  of  lying,  where  “asserting”  consists  in  explicitly  stating  a  proposition  (it  consists,  in  other  
words,  in  sentential  or  linguistic  meaning—the  conventional  meaning  of  the  words  actually  
uttered).  We  must,  consequently,  admit  that  (1)  there  is  no  such  thing  as  lying  via  reflexive  implicit  
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assertion  and  that  (2)  cases  like  Bowling  for  Columbine  and  deceptive  nature  documentaries  
aren’t  cases  of  lying.  
   It  wouldn’t  threaten  my  discussion  here  if  I  were  to  accept  (1)  and  (2).  Despite  (1),  we  still  
have  cases  like  Religulous,  Blackfish,  and  Searching  for  Sugar  Man  that  make  false  explicit  
propositions.  And  if  we  admit  (2),  we  need  to  tweak  our  account  of  what’s  going  on  in  these  
instances,  specifically  by  talking  of  misleading  rather  than  lying:  many  theorists  differentiate  
between  the  two  by  specifying  that  the  latter  involves  what  is  said  being  false  and  the  former  can  
involve  what  is  suggested  but  not  said  being  false.  Endorsing  both  of  these  conclusions  would  
enable  us  to  understand  two  types  of  unreliability  in  documentary  film  and  to  recognize—as  is  my  
chief  aim  in  this  paper—how  fiction  films  are  incapable  of  both  insofar  as  they  cannot  lie  (i.e.,  they  
cannot  provide  false  information  about  their  fictional  worlds)  or  mislead  (i.e.,  they  cannot  withhold  
facts  about  their  fictional  worlds).  
   I  don’t  think  we  need  to  be  so  quick  to  accept  (1)  and  (2),  however.  First  of  all,  we  needn’t  
equate  what  is  said  or  asserted  with  what  is  explicitly  stated—we  can  have  a  more  pragmatic  
account  according  to  which  we,  by  making  an  utterance,  sometimes  say  or  assert  more  than  what  
our  sentences  (conventionally)  mean.  Contextualists  about  language  make  precisely  this  move,  
maintaining  that  “contextual  factors  can  pervasively  ‘intrude’  into  the  semantics,  to  affect  what  a  
speaker  says”—so  that  “what  is  said”  can  amount  to  more  than  the  conventionally  encoded  
meaning  of  the  words  uttered  (and  include,  among  other  things,  loose  talk  and  metaphor).179  If  we  
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adopt  a  contextualist  view  about  implicit  assertions,  then  what  is  said  can  include  what  is  implied,  
in  which  case  the  implicit  assertion  Plantinga  discusses  and  the  implicit  propositions  
documentaries  make  about  their  subject  matter  are  all  actual  assertions—instances  of  saying.  We  
can  thereby  adopt  the  ‘lying  requires  saying’  view  and  still  make  sense  of  the  cases  discussed  so  
far  as  cases  of  two-­fold  (subject-­matter-­level  and  reflexive-­level)  lying.  
   Another  route  we  can  take  is  to  equate  what  is  said  or  asserted  with  sentential  (or  
linguistic)  meaning,  in  which  case  implicit  assertions  are  not  a  part  of  what  is  said  (even  though  
they  are  a  part  of  what  is  meant),180  but  claim  that  we  can  lie  via  implicit  propositions.  Theorists  
have  defended  this  move  as  well,  maintaining  that  we  can  lie  about  what  we  merely  implicate  
and,  more  generally,  that  we  can  lie  while  saying  the  truth.181  Again,  I  don’t  think  it  threatens  my  
aims  here  to  endorse  this  or  the  previous  saying-­includes-­implicating  view.  I  am  most  convinced  
by  this  final  take  on  the  matter,  though:  according  to  which  we  (1)  say  what  we  merely  assert,  
where  that  is  cashed  out  in  sentential  meaning,  (2)  often  imply  more  than  we  say,  and  (3)  can  lie  
via  (1)  or  (2).    
   Here  it’s  important  to  clarify  just  what  I  mean  by  ‘implicit  assertion’  or  ‘implicit  proposition.’  
First  of  all,  the  sort  of  implicit  propositions  I’m  talking  about  aren’t  what  we  might  think  of  as  
logical  entailments:  i.e.,  saying  something  that  logically  implies  another  statement,  and  thereby  
committing  ourselves  to  the  content  of  the  latter.  I  don't  think  that  we  can  make  sense  of  images  
logically  entailing  some  proposition,  and—as  I  stated—a  documentary’s  implicit  propositions  are  
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supported  in  part  by  the  image-­track  and  sound-­track;;  at  the  very  least,  I’m  not  prepared  to  
defend  how  that  would  be  the  case.  At  the  same  time,  the  implicit  assertions  I’m  discussing  aren’t  
mere  cases  of  Gricean  implicature.  For  Grice,  implicatures  are  communicated  via  what  is  said  
and  the  conversational  context.  By  itself,  what  is  stated—the  utterance—does  not  communicate  
the  contents  implicated;;  this  is  precisely  why  saying  one  statement  in  one  context  can  implicate  x  
when  it  doesn’t  implicate  x  in  another  conversational  context.  What  the  hearer  appeals  to  is  the  
cooperative  principle  and  its  various  maxims;;  assuming  that  the  speaker  is  being  cooperative,  the  
listener  concludes  that  the  speaker  means  more  than,  or  something  distinct  from  what,  she  says.    
   I  think  Plantinga’s  implicit  assertion  is  a  case  of  implicature  as  I  argued  earlier.  And  
perhaps  some  other  cases  of  implicit  assertions  are  as  well:  perhaps  ‘nature  documentaries’  
engage  in  implicature  when  they  show  us  shots  without  people  and  thereby  implicate  that  there  
are  no  people—maybe  all  we  appeal  to  here  is  our  idea  of  the  movie  as  a  nature  documentary.  
But  the  cases  of  implicature  I’ve  been  focusing  most  on  are  broader  than  this:  they  have  to  do  
with  implying  things  via  the  shots  and  via  the  explicit  propositions  in  the  film.  And  in  this  sense  
they  stem  from  the  content  of  the  utterance  (if  we  think  of  the  film  as  an  utterance  here)  more  
than  Grice’s  implicatures  do.  Rather  than  being  as  context-­sensitive  as  conversational  
implicatures,  these  implicit  assertions  are  communicated—or  should  be  communicated—
regardless  of  the  particular  viewer  or  the  particular  (viewing)  situation.  I  think  that,  for  this  reason,  
they  carry  more  commitment  than  conversational  implicatures  (and  that  it’s  perhaps  more  
plausible  to  think  of  them  as  capable  of  lying).  
   With  this  in  mind,  let’s  cash  out  just  how  this  is  a  form  of  unreliability.  We  can  grasp  it  by  
returning  to  the  idea  of  documentaries  as  (Gricean)  communicative  utterances.  When  we  watch  a  
documentary,  we  treat  it  as  a  veridical  representation.  While  the  notion  of  veridicality  varies,  and  
while  we  keep  a  flexible  conception  of  it  in  mind,  at  the  very  least  we  expect  that  what  we’re  
watching  isn’t  a  lie:  that  the  explicit  and  implicit  claims  are  not  false.  More  specifically:  we  expect  
that,  if  the  film  is  meeting  its  implicit  assertion  of  veridicality—if  it’s  maintaining  the  normative  
standard  of  documentary  film—its  claims  are  not  false.  So  viewers  treat  the  documentary’s  claims  
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as  testimony  to  the  facts  of  the  subject  matter  at  hand.  More  specifically:  they  take  the  
documentary’s  claims  as  input  and  form  further  conclusions  or  beliefs  based  on  that  input.  Now,  
when  a  documentary  lies,  viewers  are  taking  a  deceptive  testifier’s  claims  as  input,  and  herein  
lies  the  link  to  a  more  general  unreliable  process-­type:  generally,  any  cognitive  process  that  
involves  trusting  a  deceiver,  any  process  that  takes  a  deceptive  testifier’s  claim  as  input  to  further  
beliefs,  will  tend  to  produce  false—not  true—beliefs.  A  documentary  that  lies  is,  thus,  engaging  a  
token  of  an  unreliable  cognitive  process-­type.  Of  course,  there  are  a  few  other  ways  we  might  try  
to  cash  this  out.  Perhaps,  for  instance,  rather  than  see  this  as  ‘taking  a  testifier’s  claims  as  input,’  
we  should  see  it  as  ‘taking  the  belief  that  the  testifier  is  truthful  as  input.’  Either  way,  the  cognitive  
process  will  not  be  a  reliable  one.  
   I  think  this  is  the  primary  type  of  unreliability  that  documentaries  can  possess.  And,  
although  I  haven’t  made  this  explicit  yet,  the  notion  of  ‘lying’  here  is  centered  on  the  idea  of  
intentional  deception—i.e.,  the  documentarian  is  purposefully  presenting  or  suggesting  false  
information  with  her  film.  It  might  be  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  to  find  evidence  for  this  intent  to  
deceive,  but  I  think  we  can  assume  in  some  instances  that—based  on  the  type  of  documentary  at  
hand,  and  the  aims  the  documentarian  has  in  showing  her  film—it  is  at  play.  There  may  be  other  
cases  of  accidental  deception,  cases  in  which  a  documentarian  makes  certain  explicit  or  implicit  
propositions  in  her  film  which  she  doesn’t  realize  are  false.  We  might  be  wary  of  calling  this  lying,  
since—as  Stoke  puts  it—lying  is  typically  assumed  to  consist  in  “saying  something  one  believes  
to  be  false  with  the  intent  to  deceive  one’s  listener.”  So  perhaps  cases  of  accidental  deception  
constitute  their  own  category  of  unreliability.  
   It’s  hard  to  find  instances  of  this,  primarily  because  (1)  it  often  seems  like  the  deception  at  
play  is  intentional  and  (2)  the  documentarian  should  have  evidence  and  facts  at  her  disposal  
(given  the  responsibility  of  veridical  representation  she’s  taken  upon  herself)  that  enable  her  to  
communicate  truthful  propositions.  Still,  there  are  cases  that  we  can  appeal  to  here,  such  as  
ethnographic  documentaries.  These  films  take  themselves  to  be  informing  us  about  a  particular  
group  of  people  and  unintentionally  present  that  group  as  ‘savage’  or  ‘other.’  In  this  sort  of  case,  
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the  filmmakers  are  dishonest  with  themselves  or—to  be  more  precise—don’t  realize  the  
implications  of  what  they’re  representing.  This  should,  it  seems,  constitute  a  type  of  unreliability  
insofar  as  (1)  trusting  the  film’s  representation  will  cause  us  to  form  mistaken  assumptions  about  
the  subjects  and  (2)  any  film  that  doesn’t  recognize  its  own  implications  can’t  be  trusted  as  a  
guide  to  truth.  Still,  it’s  distinct  from  the  case  of  lying  since  the  intent  to  deceive  is  absent.  
   There  is  more  to  be  said  about  this  potential  second  category  of  unreliability,  but  let’s  
turn,  now  to  a  second  (I’m  not  treating  ‘accidental  deception’  as  its  own  category  for  now)  
category.  My  discussion  of  it  will  be  more  complicated  than  the  first,  partly  because  I  only  have  
one  film  to  appeal  to  here  and  partly  because  I  think  it  might  seem  conceptually  problematic.  Let’s  
start  with  an  example.    
   Making  a  Murderer  is  a  Netflix  documentary  special  that  has  caused  quite  an  outrage  
recently.  The  film  presents  a  particular  perspective  on  an  issue:  a  perspective  of  a  convicted  
murderer’s  innocence.  In  order  to  construct  its  perspective,  it  is  careful  in  its  selection  and  
arrangement  of  content.  We  view  scenes  in  which  police  investigators  are  behaving  
incompetently  and  manipulatively  (interviewing  convinced  murderer  Steven  Avery  and  his  
nephew,  Brendan  Dassey,  individually  without  their  respective  lawyers  present  and  manipulating  
them  into  admitting  to  the  murder  of  Teresa  Halbach)  and  are  producing  ‘evidence’  that  seems  
planted—for  instance,  a  key  at  Halbach’s  apartment  which  was  found  in  plain  sight  seven  days  
into  a  nine-­day  long  investigation  of  Avery’s  property.  Throughout  the  film,  the  Manitowoc  Country  
sheriff’s  department  appears  to  be  framing  Avery  for  the  murder  or  (at  least)  appears  too  eager  to  
convict  him  of  it.  Making  a  Murderer  constructs  its  perspective  by  withholding  facts,  including  
relatively  unquestionable  evidence  that  links  Avery  to  the  crime  as  well  as  facts  about  Avery’s  
past  that  show  his  history  with  violence  (which  I’ll  detail  soon).  Withholding  facts  in  and  of  itself  
isn’t  problematic:  all  documentaries  do  it  to  a  certain  degree,  and  openly  opinionated  or  one-­sided  




   Laura  Ricciardi  and  Moira  Demos,  Making  a  Murderer’s  directors,  are  nearly  nonexistent  
in  the  film.  No  voice-­over  narration  hints  at  Avery’s  innocence,  and  we  do  not  see  the  filmmakers  
on  the  screen  (in  fact,  it’s  hard  to  tell  when  they—and  not  reporters—are  performing  the  on-­
screen  interviews).  This  absence  combined  with  further  techniques  trick  us  into  thinking  we  are  
watching  a  more  objective  presentation  of  the  case  than  we  are.  For  instance,  the  first  episode  
presents  a  visual  timeline  of  the  events  and  then  seemingly  shows  those  events  in  order.  This  
chronology  suggests  that  we  are  merely  seeing  the  events  unfold  as  they  occurred,  watching  the  
timeline  take  shape  rather  than  watching  a  biased  interpretation  of  those  events.  What’s  more,  
throughout  the  series,  the  shots  largely  consist  of  people  (including  Avery’s  defense  attorney  and  
family  members)  who  attest  to  Avery’s  innocence  and  a  plethora  of  non-­subjective  evidence  
suggesting  the  same:  e.g.,  recordings  of  Manitowoc  County  officials,  recordings  of  investigators’  
manipulative  interviews  with  Avery  and  Dassey,  trial  proceedings,  footage  from  news  outlets,  etc.  
Because  of  this  plethora  of  seemingly-­objective  content,  it  really  seems  like  the  evidence  (for  
Avery’s  innocence)  is  speaking  for  itself.  
   While  the  aforementioned  evidence  for  Avery’s  innocence  is  prioritized  in  the  film,  
evidence  for  his  guilt  is  omitted.  Handcuffs  and  leg  irons  were  found  in  Avery’s  trailer;;  DNA  from  
his  epithelial  cells  was  found  on  the  hood  latch  of  Halbach’s  car;;  a  bullet  in  Avery’s  garage,  which  
contained  Halbach’s  DNA  on  it,  was  fired  from  the  same  model  rifle  above  Avery’s  bed;;  and  
Halbach’s  camera  and  cellphone  were  found  in  the  burn  pit  behind  Avery’s  trailer.  In  addition  to  
leaving  these  facts  out,  Ricciardi  and  Demos  fail  to  share  information  about  Avery’s  past—for  
instance  that  at  the  time  of  Halbach’s  disappearance,  he  was  being  investigated  for  the  alleged  
sexual  assault  of  a  teenage  female  relative.    
   Making  a  Murderer  implicitly  asserts  that  Steven  Avery  is  innocent.  It  does  this  via  visual  
and  aural  content  (of  the  investigations,  manipulative  interviews,  footage  of  trial  proceedings,  etc)  
and  directly  asserted  propositions  (claims  made  by  Avery’s  defense  attorneys  and  family  
members).  Because  the  film  is—on  the  surface—an  objective  investigation  into  the  case  (one  that  
reaches  the  conclusion  that  Avery  is  innocent),  we  believe  that  Avery  is  innocent  as  a  result  of  
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watching  the  film.  Indeed,  viewers  believed  this  so  strongly  that  almost  130,000  people  signed  a  
petition  asking  the  president  to  pardon  Avery  and  his  nephew  “for  their  wrongful  conviction  in  the  
connection  to  the  murder  of  Teresa  Halbach.”  They  reached  this  conclusion  by  assuming  
objectivity  in  the  film  and  not  knowing  about  further  facts  regarding  the  case’s  evidence  and  
Avery’s  background.  Had  they  (1)  been  aware  of  those  withheld  facts,  or  (2)  known  that  the  film  
was  setting  out  to  show  Avery’s  innocence  by  providing  a  subjective  presentation  of  the  case,  
they  likely  would’ve  formed  more  qualified  beliefs—taking  the  film  to  show  just  one  side  of  the  
story,  expecting  evidence  to  the  contrary,  and  hesitating  from  making  the  quick  judgment  of  
innocence.  Now,  not  all  one-­sided  documentaries  engage  in  this  deception.  As  problematic  as  
Michael  Moore  is  as  documentarian,  for  instance—because  of  the  lying  his  movies  often  engage  
in—one  strength  he  has  consists  in  his  openness.  To  see  this,  let’s  return  to  Bowling  for  
Columbine.  
   Michael  Moore’s  movies  are  typically,  among  other  things,  critical  commentaries  on  the  
American  government.  Bowling  for  Columbine  is  no  exception.  In  the  film,  Moore  ostensibly  
examines  why  the  Columbine  massacres  occurred,  strongly  suggesting  that  America’s  history  of  
and  preoccupation  with  gun  violence  bears  responsibility.  This  film  is  by  no  means  objective;;  it  
presents  its  story  from  one  socially  liberal  perspective.  Indeed,  as  is  the  case  with  all  of  Moore’s  
films,  it  is  particularly  blunt  in  its  support  for  its  perspective.  This  brazenness  gives  the  film  a  form  
of  reliability.  
   While  Ricciardi  and  Demos  and  absent  in  their  film,  Moore’s  voice-­over  and  on-­screen  
narration  make  his  opinions  and  evaluations  as  much  a  part  of  the  film  as  the  footage  he  shows.  
And  he  combines  this  openness  with  other  transparent  filmic  techniques—interviewing  highly  
conservative  individuals  whose  answers  will  likely  seem  extreme  and  ridiculous  (at  one  point,  
Moore  speaks  with  a  teenager  in  a  local  bar  who  bemoans  the  fact  that  he  wasn’t  placed  at  the  
top  of  his  high  school’s  “bomb  threat”  list)  and  playing  sarcastic  music—“What  a  Wonderful  
World”  and  “Happiness  is  a  Warm  Gun”—alongside  montages  of  gun  violence  and  military  
destruction.  Through  these  techniques,  Bowling  for  Columbine  is  open  about  its  subjectivity—it’s  
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open  about  the  perspective  it’s  presenting  its  story  from  and  its  aims  in  doing  so.  This  openness  
makes  us,  as  attentive  viewers,  able  to  form  appropriately  qualified  beliefs  about  the  subject  
matter  at  hand.  Since  we  know  we’re  seeing  one  liberal  side  of  the  story,  we  don’t  (if  we’re  
attentive  viewers)  draw  general  conclusions  about  the  American  government’s  history  of  gun  
violence;;  at  most,  we  take  the  film  as  some  evidence  or  support  for  one  possible  conclusion.    
   Making  a  Murderer  fails  in  just  the  way  that  Bowling  for  Columbine  succeeds:  it  doesn’t  
make  its  perspective  apparent.  It  isn’t  honest  with  viewers  about  the  fact  that  it  is  withholding  
facts.  I  think  this  lack  of  openness  constitutes  a  form  of  unreliability:  the  film  cannot  be  trusted  as  
a  reliable  guide  to  truth  because  it  uses  viewers’  mistaken  assumptions  about  its  perspective  in  
order  to  guide  viewers  to  ill-­informed—albeit  perhaps  not  false—beliefs  about  its  subject  matter.  
   More  carefully,  returning  to  the  idea  of  documentaries  as  communicative  utterances,  we  
can  make  sense  of  what’s  going  on  in  Making  a  Murderer  as  just  another  token  of  the  process-­
type  at  work  in  instances  of  lying.  Here,  as  in  the  previous  cases,  we’re  taking  a  deceptive  
testifier’s  claims  as  input,  or  we’re  taking  ‘the  belief  that  the  testifier  is  trustworthy’  as  input  for  the  
formation  of  further  beliefs.  
   At  this  general  level  I  think  we  can  see  Making  a  Murderer  as  the  same  sort  of  
unreliability  as  instances  of  lying.  We  can  also,  though,  specify  the  processes  at  work  here  more  
specifically;;  and  at  a  lower  level,  they’re  slightly  different.  Lying  involves  making  false  
propositions—either  explicitly  or  implicitly—about  the  subject  matter.  It  involves  saying  or  
suggesting  untrue  things  about  the  people,  places,  things,  or  events  it’s  showing  us.  If  we  trust  a  
liar,  we  take  false  claims  as  true,  and  we  form  further  conclusions  based  on  our  mistaken  
assumption  of  their  truth.  When  documentaries  mislead,  the  footage  they  present  may  be  true,  as  
is  the  footage  in  Making  a  Murderer.  They  might  be  leading  us  to  true  beliefs  about  the  subject  
(Making  a  Murderer  does  this  to  a  certain  extent,  as  Manitowoc  County  officials  did  behave  
incompetently  during  the  investigation,  and  the  film  may  even  be  correctly  implying  that  Avery  is  
innocent  or  was  framed).  There  need  be  nothing  false  about  what  they  are  showing,  saying,  or  
suggesting.  Their  deceptiveness  amounts  to  being  dishonest  about  their  aims;;  in  Making  a  
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Murderer’s  case,  this  is  done  via  formal  techniques  that  suggest  an  objective  perspective  (albeit,  
of  course,  not  a  fully  objective  perspective)  from  which  the  filmmakers  are  not  operating.  If  we  
trust  this  sort  of  deceiver,  we  aren’t  necessarily  taking  as  true  claims  about  a  subject  that  are  
false.  Instead,  something  more  nuanced  in  going  on.  
   In  cases  like  Making  a  Murderer,  we  (1)  take  the  testifier’s  claims  as  true;;  (2)  assume  that  
the  information  in  those  claims  is  sufficient  for  us  to  draw  further  conclusions  about  the  subject;;  
and  (3)  thereby  draw  further  conclusions  about  the  subject.  (2)  is  where  the  unreliability  really  
lies.  This  type  of  unreliability  amounts  to  using  information  as  sufficient  evidence  when,  in  fact,  it  
isn’t  sufficient  evidence.  We  engage  in  a  cognitive  process  that  involves  placing  too  much  stake  
in  the  information  we’re  given—it  involves  drawing  conclusions  based  on  insufficient  evidence  
(evidence  that  is  insufficient  either  because  there  is  competing  evidence  that  we’re  unaware  of  or  
because  there  just  isn't  enough  evidence  to  support  any  fixed  conclusion).  And  this  type  of  
cognitive  process  will,  I  think,  tend  to  produce  true  beliefs  less  frequently  than  it  tends  to  produce  
false  beliefs.  So,  although  in  this  specific  case,  we  could  very  well  be  forming  true  conclusions  
about  the  subject  matter,  we’re  (1)  using  a  false  belief  about  the  film  in  order  to  draw  our  further  
conclusions  and  (2)  thereby  engaging  in  a  token  of  a  cognitive  process  that  generally  tends  to  
produce  false  beliefs.    
   As  I  mentioned  at  the  outset,  this  type  of  unreliability  is  less  plausible,  conceptually,  than  
the  first.  First  of  all,  there  aren’t  many  films  that  engage  in  it  (Making  a  Murderer  is  the  only  one  
I’ve  found),  and  so  it  doesn’t  really  seem  like  a  general  form  of  unreliability  that  documentaries  
engage  in.  What’s  more,  my  description  of  Bowling  for  Columbine’s  reliability  is  perhaps  
questionable,  partly  because  the  very  same  film  lies,  and  partly  because  my  account  of  it  almost  
sounds  like  “it’s  reliable  because  it’s  open  about  the  fact  that  it  might  be  unreliable.”  I  stated  that  
viewers  who  pick  up  on  the  techniques  (that  signal  bias)  are  able  to  form  appropriately  qualified  
beliefs.  But  doesn’t  this  just  mean  that  we,  as  viewers,  don’t  really  trust  that  what  we’re  watching  
is  giving  us  an  honest  portrayal  of  the  American  government?  Doesn’t  our  awareness  of  the  fact  
that  we’re  watching  a  subjective  presentation  prevent  us  from  drawing  solid  conclusions  about  the  
	  111	  
	  
subject  matter?  If  this  is  the  case,  then  ‘reliability’  here  has  become  something  strange:  it  consists  
in  a  movie  being  open  about  the  deception  it  might  partake  in  so  that  we  refrain  from  forming  
beliefs  on  the  basis  of  what  we’re  watching.  I  can’t  discard  these  worries  in  full  here,  but  I  think  
there  are  some  defenses  available.  
   The  chief  thing  to  keep  in  mind  is  the  difference  between  ‘forming  false  beliefs  about  the  
subject  matter’  and  ‘refraining  from  forming  beliefs  about  the  subject  matter.’  I’ve  been  treating  
‘unreliability’  as  the  former;;  a  movie  is  unreliable  when  it  makes  us  think  that  something  false  is  
true  about  a  state  of  affairs  in  the  world  or  when  it  misleads  us  into  forming  ill-­informed  beliefs  
(i.e.,  beliefs  that  may  be  true  but  are  formed  with  the  use  of  false  information)  about  a  state  of  
affairs,  thereby  (in  both  cases)  engaging  unreliable  cognitive  processes.  What  Michael  Moore’s  
movies  do  is  something  quite  different:  they  make  us  hesitate  from  forming  beliefs  full-­stop.    
When  we’re  aware  that  a  film  is  one-­sided  (because  of  its  open  subjectivity),  we  typically  remain  
hesitant,  not  knowing  what  to  believe  about  9/11  or  global  warming  (as  in  An  Inconvenient  Truth)  
or  the  treatment  of  dolphins  (as  in  The  Cove).  
   Now,  this  is  precisely  where  the  worry  above  arises:  how  can  a  film  be  reliable  if  it  makes  
us  question  its  presentation  of  facts?  But  this  is  also,  I  think,  where  the  worry  should  dissipate:  
what  we  have  here  is  a  high-­level  honesty  (about  a  film’s  aims)  preventing  us  from  being  taken  in  
by  whatever  low-­level  dishonesty  (the  explicit  or  implicit  claims  it  makes  regarding  its  subject  
matter)  it  might  partake  in.  If  an  openly-­opinionated  movie  lies  to  us,  as  nearly  every  such  film  is  
accused  of  doing,  we  aren’t  deceived  by  its  lies.182  And  if  it  doesn’t  lie,  if  the  information  it  
presents—while  biased—is  accurate,  then  it  leads  us  to  true  beliefs  about  the  subject  matter.  
   Things  do  get  more  complicated  here  though  because,  keeping  in  mind  type  one  
unreliability—which  many  opinionated  documentaries  engage  in—we’ve  already  maintained  that  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
182  Just  a  few  examples  of  other  politically  or  socially  motivated  documentaries  that  are  one-­sided  
and  have  been  accused  of  lying  (through  presenting  false  information,  making  false  implications,  
or  staging  scenes):  An  Inconvenient  Truth,  Sicko,  2016  Obama’s  America,  The  Prosecution  of  an  
American  President,  and  The  Cove.  The  list  goes  on,  as  nearly  every  such  motivated  
documentary—even  when  thoroughly  open  about  its  subjectivity,  as  all  of  the  aforementioned  




Bowling  for  Columbine  is  deceptive.  What  do  we  do  with  this  co-­existence?  Does  the  fact  that  a  
documentary’s  openness  prevents  attentive  viewers  from  believing  its  false  statements  or  
implications  eliminate  that  initial  form  of  deception?  We  seemingly  have  two  options:  (1)  claiming  
that  these  sorts  of  films  (e.g.,  Michael  Moore’s)  are  reliable  full-­stop  because  their  higher-­level  
reliability  eliminates  their  apparent  low-­level  unreliability,  or  (2)  claiming  that  they  are  unreliable  
full-­stop  because  their  openness  just  makes  us  aware  of  their  potential  unreliability  and  shouldn’t  
be,  in  and  of  itself,  considered  a  form  of  reliability.  
   If  we  take  option  (2),  and  if  we  still  want  to  make  sense  of  how  Making  a  Murderer  is  
unreliable,  then  we  need  a  different  comparison  class,  a  different  sort  of  documentary  that  is  
reliable  in  the  way  that  Making  a  Murderer  is  not.  One  option  here,  and  perhaps  the  best  one,  is  
to  say  that  the  only  openly-­opinionated  documentaries  that  are  reliable  in  this  respect  are  those  
that  don’t  lie.  I  think  we’d  be  hard-­pressed  to  find  movies  that  fall  within  this  camp,  as  nearly  every  
openly-­opinionated  documentary  is  accused  of  lying  either  implicitly  or  explicitly.  One  odd  but  
potentially  helpful  category  here  is  ‘reality  tv  shows.’  While  they  aren’t  really  documentaries,  let  
alone  aesthetically  valuable  ones,  they  do  possess  a  high-­level  reliability  without  engaging  in  low-­
level  unreliability.  Viewers  are  aware  that,  for  the  purposes  of  maintaining  viewership,  the  
producers  of  reality  shows  edit  footage  and  conduct  interviews  which  make  events  and  
interactions  between  people  (contestants  on  a  cooking  show,  or  contestants  on  The  Bachelor,  for  
instance)  appear  more  dramatic  than  they  actually  are.  Still,  we  know  that  we  aren’t  really  
watching  lies  either.  We’re  seeing  real  people  with  real  stories  engaging  in  real  activities.  We’re  
seeing  genuine  interactions  between  people,  and  events  and  interviews  that  did  take  place.  
Perhaps  in  this  respect,  as  odd  as  it  may  sound,  reality  tv  shows  constitute  the  chief  
documentaries  that  engage  in  high-­level  reliability  (i.e.,  being  open  about  bias  or  potential  
manipulation)  without  lying.  
   Let’s  look  now  at  option  (1).  As  Plantinga  discusses,  with  regards  to  the  implicit  assertion  
of  veridical  representation,  the  documentarian  presents  her  film  as  an  honest  depiction.  As  I  
mentioned  earlier,  this  is  a  case  of  Gricean  implicature:  just  as  we  grasp  conversational  
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implicatures  by  appeal  to  the  cooperative  principle  and  its  maxims,  so  too  we  grasp  a  
documentary’s  implicature  (of  veridical  representation)  by  appeal  to  an  analogous  cooperative  
principle.  Now,  when  a  documentary  is  open  about  its  one-­sidedness,  or  open  about  its  bias,  this  
is  seemingly  a  case  in  which  we  are  no  longer  expecting  Grice's  cooperative  communicative  
context:  because  it’s  clear  to  the  viewer  that  there  may  be  manipulation  of  some  sort  at  play,  
given  the  film’s  purposes,  she  takes  herself  to  be  in  a  less  honest  situation,  one  in  which  the  film  
may  suggest  or  imply  false  conclusions  about  the  subject  in  order  to  convince  viewers  of  its  
particular  perspective  on  the  subject.  We  might  think  that,  by  being  open  with  viewers  about  this  
potential  deception  via  film  techniques  that  make  its  purposes  and  subjectivity  clear,  a  
documentary  can  eliminate  the  deceptiveness  of  its  false  implications  altogether.    
   Let’s  think  about  this  more  carefully.  The  idea  here  is  that,  because  of  the  film’s  
openness,  viewers  are  no  longer  in  a  position  to  take  the  film  as  testimony  to  the  facts  of  the  
subject  matter;;  they  aren’t  in  a  position  to  believe  the  claims  made  by  the  documentarian  (via  her  
film).  Hence,  when  the  film  lies,  no  cognitive  process  like  ‘taking  a  deceptive  testifier’s  claims  as  
true’  occurs.  In  fact,  we  might  think  that  a  particularly  reliable  cognitive  process  occurs.  Since  
we’re  careful  to  form  judgments  about  the  subject  throughout  film-­viewing,  we’re  likely  to  (1)  take  
the  film’s  claims  as  constituting  just  one  account  of  the  story  at  hand;;  (2)  look  outside  of  the  film  
for  validation  of  those  claims;;  and  (3)  form  further  conclusions  about  the  subject  that  are  either  in  
line  with  the  film’s  (if  a  sufficient  number  of  external  claims  supports  the  film’s)  or  that  diverge  
from  the  film’s  (if  we  find  external  evidence  to  the  contrary).  This  amounts  to  a  combination  of  
gathering  evidence  and  remaining  hesitant  to  form  beliefs  until  a  sufficient  amount  of  evidence  
points  to  further  conclusions.  And  the  cognitive  processes  involved  here  are  highly  reliable.  We  
might  even  think  they  simply  combine  two  of  the  processes  Goldman  himself  deems  reliable:  
good  reasoning  and  introspection.    
   So,  I  think  we  should  take  option  (2).  Movies  like  Bowling  for  Columbine  are  reliable  full-­
stop  insofar  as  their  higher-­level  honesty  prevents  viewers  from  engaging  unreliable  cognitive  
processes  (even  when  they  lie).  We  can  take  option  (1),  and  it  wouldn’t  threaten  the  discussion  of  
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unreliability  I’m  focusing  on  here:  we  can  (and  should)  agree  that  Making  a  Murderer  is  deceptive  
(and  that  it’s  deceptive  because  it  falsely  presents  itself  as  an  objective  presentation  of  
information)  even  if  we  disagree  over  just  how  a  movie  can  be  reliable  in  the  way  that  this  film  
fails  to  be.  Still,  insofar  as  most  openly-­opinionated  documentaries  are  accused  of  lying,  and  
insofar  as  I  think  we  need  to  do  justice  to  the  high-­level  honesty  such  films  possess,  option  (2)  
seems  preferable.    
   As  I  mentioned  at  the  outset,  type  two  unreliability  is  complicated.  Before  concluding  this  
section,  it’s  worth  it  to  tackle  just  one  more  question  about  this  phenomenon.  I’ve  presented  
Making  a  Murderer’s  dishonesty  as  a  form  of  misleadingness,  and  I’ve  argued  that  it  does  not  
constitute  a  case  of  lying.  We  might  question  this  distinction.  
   Keeping  in  mind  Plantinga’s  account,  all  documentaries  implicitly  assert  that  they  are  
veridical  representations—where  the  definition  of  “veridical”  varies  from  genre  to  genre  and  
filmmaker  to  filmmaker.  Given  this,  we  can  reframe  what  I’ve  said  about  Making  a  Murderer  in  this  
way:  the  movie  implicitly  asserts  that  it  is  one  kind  of  representation  when  it  is  a  different  kind.  It  
implicitly  asserts,  via  its  formal  techniques  and  the  content  of  the  images  it  shows  us,  that  it  is  
merely  representing  the  case  of  Avery’s  trial.  In  fact,  it  is  representing  the  case  of  Avery’s  
innocence.  Is  this,  then,  just  another  case  of  lying  via  false  implicit  assertion?  
   If  this  does  constitute  a  case  of  lying,  it’s  importantly  different  from  the  ones  previously  
discussed:  those  involved  making  false  claims  about  the  subject  matter  and  therefore  making  a  
false  claim  of  veridical  representation,  while  this  kind  only  involves  the  latter.  Where  we  land  on  
this  is  more  a  matter  of  terminology.  There  is  one  complication  with  making  this  move,  though,  
and  I’m  therefore  hesitant  to  do  it.  
   If  we  claim  that  Making  a  Murderer  is  lying  in  this  way,  then  it  seems  to  me  that  we  are  
re-­defining  (or  expanding  upon)  what  Plantinga’s  implicit  assertion  consists  in.  On  the  one  hand,  
and  this  is  the  sense  in  which  I’ve  used  it  (and  the  sense  in  which  he  seems  to  use  it)  it  means  
“implicitly  asserting  that  the  representation  is  a  veridical  representation  of  the  subject  matter”  
where  that  includes  (1)  not  lying  about  that  subject  matter  and  (2)  presenting  visual  and  aural  
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content  that  gives  viewers  an  accurate  sense  of  its  phenomenology.  Documentaries  lie  via  this  
implicit  assertion  when  they  do  not  represent  their  subject  matter  veridically.    
   The  sort  of  unreliability  I’ve  outlined  for  Making  a  Murderer’s  does  not  involve  false  
explicit  or  implicit  propositions  about  the  subject  matter.  In  this  sense,  it  doesn’t—at  least  not  
straightforwardly—consist  in  lying  about  being  a  veridical  representation.  Instead,  it  involves  
dishonesty  about  what  kind  of  veridical  representation  it  is;;  it  involves  pretending  to  be  an  
objective  presentation  when  it  is  subjective  one.  This  means  that,  if  we  claim  that  Making  a  
Murderer  lies  here,  we  need  to  admit  one  of  two  things:  (1)  that  Plantinga’s  implicit  assertion  
contains  within  it  an  implicit  assertion  about  what  perspective  the  film  is  taking  or  (2)  that  there  is  
another  implicit  assertion,  alongside  Plantinga’s,  that  makes  this  further  claim.  Both  alternatives  
complicate  matters.  Specifically,  they  require  something  that  Plantinga’s  implicit  assertion  does  
not  require:  reflexivity  about  the  formal  techniques  and  perceptual  content  used  in  the  film.    
   The  only  way  in  which  a  documentary  makes  its  perspective  clear,  the  only  way  it  can  
claim  to  be  one  sort  of  ‘look’  at  a  subject,  is  through  the  formal  techniques  it  uses  and  the  sights  
and  sounds  it  shows  us—techniques  and  content  that  either  suggest  subjectivity  as  Michael  
Moore’s  films  do  or  techniques  and  content  that  suggest  objectivity  as  Making  a  Murderer  does.  
Here,  then,  the  filmmaker  doesn’t  just  make  her  implicit  assertion  by  presenting  and  categorizing  
the  film  as  a  documentary:  she  makes  an  implicit  assertion  by  employing  particular  stylistic  and  
formal  methods.  Now,  there’s  nothing  inherently  wrong  with  this  conclusion.  But  if  we  endorse  it,  
we  end  up  turning  the  documentary  film  into  an  almost  entirely  linguistic  tool  of  communication:  
one  that  asserts  through  its  artistic  techniques  and  perceptual  (visual  and  aural)  content.  I  think  
we  then  run  the  risk  of  overlooking  the  extent  to  which  documentaries  show  information.  
   It’s  one  thing  to  say  that  the  documentary  filmmaker  asserts  her  film’s  veridicality  by  
presenting  it  as  a  documentary;;  it’s  another  to  say  that  she  does  this  and  asserts  what  kind  of  
representation  it  is  through  her  stylistic  choices.  The  former  enables  us  to  look  at  the  film  more  
closely,  examine  just  what  is  shown  and  said  about  the  subject  matter,  and  admit  that  the  
“showing”  outstrips  and  remains  importantly  independent  of  the  “saying.”  The  latter  requires  us  to  
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take  a  notion  of  assertion  with  us  when  we  engage  in  that  examination—interpreting  what  is  
shown  and  said  as  constituting  one  of  the  propositions  that  is  asserted.  Perhaps  this  isn’t  
problematic.  But,  at  the  very  least,  we’d  need  to  clarify  this  account  more  clearly  before  we  can  
see  what  it  requires  of  our  interpretations  of  documentaries.  Until  we  provide  such  an  account,  it  
seems  wisest  to  stick  with  Plantinga  and  to—as  a  result—deem  this  example  of  Making  a  
Murderer  a  case  of  misleading  but  not  lying.  
               Conclusion  
   In  this  chapter,  I’ve  defined  two  types  of  documentary  unreliability.  One  central  thing  
grounds,  or  enables,  both  of  them:  the  relation  documentaries  bear  to  the  world.  As  Shen  puts  it:  
“the  discovery  of  various  kinds  or  degrees  of  fictionalization  [in  autobiography]  is  based  on  the  
very  fact  that  there  exists  an  extra  textual  reality  for  distinguishing  the  fictional  from  the  factual.”183  
The  phrase  “extra-­textual  reality”  is  key  here:  it’s  only  because  such  a  reality  exists  that  
documentaries  can  lie  about  their  subjects.  Indeed,  we  typically  search  that  extra-­textual  reality  
(finding  information  online,  in  interviews,  and  the  like)  to  check  for  a  documentary’s  accuracy.    
   What  enables  a  documentary  to  lie  is  precisely  the  fact  that  it  doesn't  construct  its  own  
truths;;  it  isn’t  responsible  for  settling  whether  or  not  what  it  communicates  about  9/11  or  Steven  
Avery  or  Randall  Dale  Adams  is  true—the  world  is.  What  enables  a  documentary  to  mislead  is  
precisely  the  fact  that  it  doesn’t  create  the  truths,  or  information,  in  its  subject  matter;;  it  isn't  
responsible  for  settling  whether  or  not  there’s  additional  information  (information  it  may  not  be  
showing  us)  about  a  real-­world  event  or  person—the  world  is.  In  other  words:  the  divide  between  
what  is  shown  or  said  as  true  about  a  subject  matter  in  a  documentary  and  the  actual  truth  about  
that  subject  matter  enables  (1).  This  divide  doesn't  exist  in  fiction  film;;  and  because  it  doesn’t,  
fiction  films  cannot  possess  either  type  of  unreliability  we’ve  discussed  in  this  chapter.  In  the  next  
chapter,  I  will  argue  for  precisely  this  point.    
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
183  Shen,  Dan  and  Dejin  Xu.  “Intertextuality,  Extratextuality,  Intertextuality:  Unreliability  in  
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In  the  previous  chapter,  I  discussed  the  ways  in  which  documentaries  can  be  unreliable.  In  this  
chapter,  I’ll  turn  to  fiction  film.  My  chief  thesis  will  be  that  fiction  films  cannot  be  unreliable  in  the  
ways  that  documentaries  can  and  that  this—combined  with  their  phenomenological  immediacy—
makes  them  epistemically  direct.  As  we  did  in  beginning  our  discussion  of  documentaries,  let’s  
lay  out  some  important  preliminaries,  the  primary  two  being:  (1)  who  is  the  ‘audience,’  and  (2)  
what  settles  a  fiction  film’s  facts?  
   (1)  is  the  same  as  it  was  in  the  previous  chapter.  Here  I’ll  be  discussing  an  ideal  
audience,  one  that  imaginatively  engages  with  the  fiction  film  and  reacts  (emotionally  and  
cognitively)  in  the  way  prescribed  by  the  work.  The  notion  of  ‘prescribed  responses’  is  a  
complicated  one,  but  it’s  one  that  many  theorists  depend  (and  expand)  upon.  The  general  idea  is  
that  an  appeal  to  prescribed  responses  (or  ideal  audiences)  is  necessary  for  us  to  uncover  the  
features  a  work  actually  possesses—what  (moral,  emotional,  and  cognitive)  perspectives  it  takes  
toward  the  narrated  events,  people,  and  places;;  what  characteristics  those  events,  people,  and  
places  have  (which  we  deduce  partly  from  the  perspectives  placed  upon  them).    Insofar  as  this  is  
the  sort  of  analysis  I’m  interested  in,  the  ‘audience’  is  one  who  picks  up  on  precisely  these  
features  by  engaging  in  a  game  of  make-­believe.  For  similar  reasons,  in  addition  to  the  ones  
mentioned  in  the  previous  chapter,  I’m  implicitly  adopting  a  hypothetical  or  constructed  concept  of  
the  ‘author.’  
   More  broadly,  facts  are  communicated  in  fiction  film  via  four  central  things:  (1)  explicit  
stating;;  (2)  implication;;  (3)  our  expectations  of  genre,  style,  or  storytelling  conventions;;  and  (4)  
showing.  In  this  way,  some  content  is  communicated  explicitly,  and  some  requires  the  sort  of  
extrapolation  and  appeal  to  intention  that  we  discussed  with  nonfiction  film.  We’ll  get  clearer  on  
this  throughout  the  chapter,  as  I  specify  just  what  content  is  ‘shown’  in  a  film,  and  what  a  fiction  
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film  implies  (as  well  as  how  it  implies),  especially  when  I  discuss  principles  of  generation  that  
depend  upon  our  real-­world  knowledge  for  the  construction  of  fictional  truths.  For  now,  it’s  
important  to  note  that  this  is  a  roughly  Gricean  model,  albeit  one  that  allows  for  a  non-­Gricean  
‘showing’  (which  partly  involves  the  cues  of  natural  meaning  that  we  discussed  in  chapter  one).  
   Turning  to  the  question  of  what  settles  a  fiction  film’s  facts  or  truths,  there  are  two  related  
questions:  (1)  what  are  the  facts  about  in  a  fiction?  And  (2)  what  settles  those  facts?  Because  of  
the  nature  of  fiction  film,  (2)  will  be  much  more  nuanced  than  it  was  in  our  analysis  of  
documentary  film.  Let’s  look  at  each  one  in  turn.  
   (1)  is  a  question  of  ontology.  It  asks:  what  are  fictional  entities,  characters,  and  worlds?  
Theorists  fall  into  two  broad  camps  here:  realist  theories  and  anti-­realist  ones.  The  latter  come  in  
several  varieties,  but  the  most  prominent  and  plausible  is  a  pretense  theory  endorsed  by  (among  
other  theorists)  Kendall  Walton.  For  pretense  theorists,  we  pretend  that  fictional  entities  exist  for  
the  sake  of  engaging  in  a  work  of  fiction  when,  in  reality,  they  do  not  exist  (and  therefore  
statements  about  them  are  always  literally  false).  There  are  several  merits  with  this  sort  of  anti-­
realist  view,  but  I  won’t  be  adopting  it  here.  
   Within  the  realist  camp,  there  are  three  chief  routes  theorists  take:  a  Meinongian  one,  a  
kind-­theory  one,  and  an  artifactualist  one.  I  won’t  be  discussing  the  first,  partly  because  it  
encounters  several  difficulties  not  worth  discussing.    The  second—the  kind-­theory—defines  
fictional  characters  as  “‘person-­kinds’  which  do  exist.”184  For  such  theorists,  characters  are  
abstract  entities  which  exist  prior  to  their  creation—authors  and  storytellers  select  them  “from  
among  all  the  available  possibilia”—and  are  metaphysical  ‘kinds’  made  up  of  all  and  only  “those  
properties  the  work  attributes”  to  them.”185  
   Artifactualist  theorists,  like  kind-­theorists,  consider  fictional  entities  abstract  in  nature;;  the  
chief  difference  between  them  is  that  artifactualists  define  such  entities  not  by  appeal  to  the  
properties  they’re  fictionally  ascribed  but  by  appeal  to  their  creation.  So,  for  instance,  Sherlock  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
184  Thomasson,  Amie  L.  “Fictional  Entities.”  A  Companion  to  Metaphysics,  2nd  ed.  Ed.  Jaegwon  
Kim,  Ernest  Sosa  and  Gary  Rosenkrantz.  Malden:  Blackwell,  2009.  P.  8.  
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Holmes  is  defined  as  “a  character  created  by  Arthur  Conan  Doyle,  who  modeled  Holmes  on  a  
medical  doctor”  rather  than  a  person-­kind  that  has  properties  of  “being  a  man,  smoking  a  pipe,  
etc.”186  For  artificatualists,  like  Amie  Thomasson,  fictional  characters  are  abstract  individuals  that  
have  a  purely  contingent  existence  dependent  upon  the  storyteller’s  “activities  in  writing  or  telling  
stories;;”  they  do  not  possess  the  sort  of  Platonic  existence  kind-­theorists  attribute  to  them.187    
   I  favor  an  artifactualist  view  for  a  few  reasons,  most  primarily:  (1)  it  aligns  more  strongly  
with  our  intuition  that  storytellers  create,  rather  than  merely  define,  the  entities  in  their  works;;  and  
(2)  it  avoids  one  implausible  commitment  of  kind-­theorists,  namely  that  “no  fictional  character  
could  have  had  any  properties  other  than  those  they  are  ascribed.”188  So  I’ll  be  adopting  the  
artifactualist  model.     
   The  general  model  of  artifactualism  is:  a  storyteller  brings  characters  into  existence  by  
creating  works  in  which  they  inhere;;  within  those  works,  the  storyteller  engages  us  in  a  game  of  
pretense  according  to  which  she  pretends  to  assert  things  (and  we  pretend  to  believe  things)  
about  those  characters;;  the  storyteller  ascribes  certain  properties  to  the  characters  via  those  
pretend  assertions.  This  last  claim  is,  I  think,  one  of  the  toughest  to  clarify,  and  Thomasson  isn’t  
as  helpful  as  she  might  be  with  regards  to  it.  On  the  one  hand,  she  seems  to  maintain  that  the  
propositions  in  a  work  (propositions  that  tell  the  story  of  the  fiction,  e.g.,  “Sherlock  Holmes  has  a  
partner  named  Watson;;  Sherlock  Holmes  smokes  a  pipe”)  ascribe  actual  properties  to  a  
character,  stating:  
   The  artifactualist  typically  treats  historical  continuity—not  properties  ascribed—  
   as  the  primary  factor  for  the  identity  of  a  fictional  character.  This  leaves  open  the    
   idea  that  an  author  might  have  described  a  character  somewhat  differently  than    
   she  did,  and  allows  that  a  later  author  may  prescribe  new  properties  to  a      
   preexisting  fictional  character,  provided  she  is  familiar  with  that  character  and    
   intends  to  refer  back  to  it  and  ascribe  it  new  properties.189    
  
If  we  take  Thomasson  literally  here,  it  seems  that  a  work’s  pretend-­assertions  function  to  actually  
give  abstract  entities  characteristics.  But  it’s  not  clear  how  an  author  “can  refer  back  to  a  
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187  Thomasson,  p.  10.  
188  Thomasson,  p.  12.  
189  Thomasson,  p.  13.  
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character  and  ascribe  it  certain  properties  (by  pretending  to  assert  more  things  about  it)”  211.  If  
the  statements  of  a  novel,  or  other  fictional  work,  do  just  “pretend  to  assert  various  things,  i.e.,  of  
Sherlock  Holmes,  they  pretend  to  assert  that  he  smokes  a  pipe,”  and  if—in  this  way—the  
properties  ascribed  to  the  characters  aren’t  literally  properties  the  characters  can  possess,  then  it  
seems  that  no  properties  are  genuinely  ascribed  to  the  character  via  the  work’s  propositions.  
Thomasson  seems  in  line  with  this  and  thus  goes  against  what  the  above  passage  implies  when  
she  states:    
   According  to  the  pretense  invoked  by  the  story,  Frankenstein’s  monster  was  a    
   creation  of  Dr.  Frankenstein,  but  really  it  is  a  fictional  character  created  by  Mary    
   Shelley;;  and  according  to  the  pretense  invoked  by  the  story,  Sherlock  Holmes  is  a    
   detective,  but  really  Holmes  is  a  fictional  character  who  thus  cannot  be  called    
   upon  to  solve  crimes.190  
  
   So  Thomasson  seems  slightly  contradictory  when  it  comes  to  the  idea  of  prescribed  
properties.  My  own  view  is  that  no  genuine  properties  are  ascribed  to  characters  via  pretend  
assertions;;  they  are  ‘pretend  properties’  that  the  character  does  not  genuinely  possess.  Within  
the  game  of  make-­believe,  we  imagine  things  like  “Sherlock  Holmes  is  a  man,”  and  “he  has  a  
partner  named  Watson.”  These  statements  are  literally  false;;  insofar  as  characters  are  abstract  
entities,  they  cannot  literally  be  men,  and  they  cannot  literally  smoke  pipes.  Outside  of  our  game  
of  make-­believe,  the  true  assertions  we  make  about  characters  are  the  sort  that  Thomasson  
identifies,  ones  that  center  on  their  creation—e.g.,  “that  Sherlock  Holmes  is  a  character  created  
by  Sir  Arthur  Conan  Doyle”—and  that  correctly  ascribe  to  them  an  abstract,  contingent,  existence.    
   Artifactualism  is  a  view  about  fictional  characters  and  entities  in  general.  When  
discussing  movies,  we  need  to  clarify  or  expand  upon  a  few  of  the  theory’s  commitments.  Initially,  
artifactualism  might  seemingly  help  us  makes  sense  of  perceptual  engagement.  Since  it  
considers  fictional  characters  individual  entities,  it  makes  intuitively  unproblematic  the  notion  that  
we  can  perceptually  experience  them  in  the  same  way  we  experience  other  individual  entities  in  




the  world  (whereas  it  would  be  much  more  difficult  to  substantiate  the  claim  that  we  can  
perceptually  experience  characters  as  ‘kinds’  composed  of  a  bundle  of  properties).    
   On  the  other  hand,  insofar  as  artifactualism  is  committed  to  the  abstract  existence  of  
fictional  characters,  the  idea  of  perceptual  engagement  runs  into  a  bit  of  a  problem.  For  
Thomasson,  fictional  characters  are  “clearly  abstract  in  some  sense”  and  “lack  a  spatio-­temporal  
location  (and  are  not  material).”191  Given  what  I’ve  said  about  ‘perceiving  the  fictional’  during  film-­
viewing,  we  might  think  that  I  either  have  to  discard  this  aspect  of  Thomasson’s  view—at  least  
with  regard  to  movies,  plays,  television  shows,  and  the  like—or  discard  my  commitment  to  
genuine  perceptual  engagement.  
   In  fact,  though,  I  don’t  need  to  discard  either  commitment.  It  is  the  case  the  characters  
are  abstract.  It’s  also  the  case  that  we  experience  them  perceptually  and  thus  as  physically  
instantiated.  Here’s  why:  whether  or  not  a  character  is  merely  abstract  or  physically  instantiated  
(and  therefore  perceivable)  depends  upon  what  sort  of  seeing-­as  we’re  engaging  in.  In  chapter  
two,  I  spelled  out  three  different  seeing-­as  experiences,  each  of  which  consists  in  a  combination  
of  the  cognitive  and  perceptual.  What  we  need  to  keep  in  mind  here,  with  regards  to  my  account  
of  seeing  the  fictional,  is  that  that  experience  only  takes  place  if  we’re  imaginatively  engaged  in  
the  pretense.  Much  like  our  ability  to  see  and  hear  fictional  worlds  depends  upon  whether  we’re  
attending  to  the  fictional  or  the  nonfictional,  so  too  a  character’s  existence  (as  merely  abstract  or  
embodied)  depends  upon  whether  we’re  attending  to  the  fictional  or  the  nonfictional.    
   With  this  in  mind,  there  are  two  answers  to  the  question  ‘are  characters  spatio-­temporally  
located  in  film?’  At  the  nonfictional,  real-­world,  level:  no.  In  fact,  characters  are  abstract  entities  
created  by  storytellers,  and  actors  portray  (but  do  not  physically  become)  them.  At  the  fictional,  
pretense,  level:  yes.  Through  imaginative  engagement,  the  actors  become  the  characters  and  the  
sets  become  the  fictional  worlds.  By  pretending  that  Daniel  Day-­Lewis  is  Daniel  Plainview,  and  by  
imagining  seeing  the  former  as  the  latter,  I  do  see  the  former  as  the  latter.  I  have  a  genuinely  
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perceptual  experience  of  the  character  because  my  cognition—my  imagining—is  bound  up,  
intimately  and  inseparably,  with  what’s  (perceptually)  on  the  film  screen.    
   Much  of  what  I’ve  been  talking  about,  in  answering  the  ontological  question,  centers  on  
the  idea  of  pretense—of  pretending  to  assert  or  pretending  to  believe  things  about  the  fictional  
world.  This  concept  of  pretense  bleeds  into  the  second  aforementioned  question—i.e.,  what  
makes  something  fictionally  true  (or  what  settles  the  facts  of  a  fiction)?  If  we  consider  characters  
abstract  entities  brought  to  life  by  their  creators,  and  if  we—with  Thomasson—maintain  that  
imaginative  engagement  consists  in  pretending  that  characters  have  certain  properties  and  that  
they  engage  in  certain  actions,  the  question  here  is:  which  pretend  assertions,  which  pretend  
beliefs,  are  true  in  that  imaginative  world?  What  makes  it  the  case  that  a  character  does  fictionally  
possess  certain  properties  or  that  a  certain  plot  event  does  fictionally  happen?    
   One  intuitive  place  to  start  here  is  with  the  account  of  fictional  truth  Gregory  Currie  
provides.192  Currie  grounds  his  thesis  upon  the  notion  of  ‘taking  a  text  as  evidence,’  stating:  “the  
proposal  is  not  that  fictional  truth  coincides  with  what  the  author  believes…but  that  it  coincides  
with  what  the  text  provides  evidence  for  him  believing”  (hence  supporting  a  hypothetical  rather  
than  actual  intentionalist  model).193  What  the  text  provides  evidence  for  coincides  with  (or  is  just  a  
matter  of)  what  a  reasonable,  informed  viewer  would  think  the  author  believed  (here  Currie  
maintains  the  model  of  a  hypothetical,  ideal  reader  I’ve  been  endorsing).  This  ‘reader’  can  be  
understood  either  as  someone  who  mistakenly  thinks  that  work  is  nonfiction  (i.e.,  that  the  work  is  
“a  serious,  assertive  utterance”194)  and  thus  takes  the  statements  as  evidence  for  what  the  author  
believes  or  as  someone  who  make-­believes  that  the  work  is  nonfiction  and  thus  “‘make  believes’  
that  the  text  is  evidence  for  what  the  author  believes.”195  Both  accounts  amount  to  the  same  sort  
of  analysis,  since  “the  inferences  that  it  is  reasonable  to  make  in  the  case  of  mistaken  belief  are  
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194  Currie,  p.  209.  
195  Currie,  p.  205.  
	  123	  
	  
exactly  the  inferences  that  it  is  reasonable  to  make  in  the  case  of  make-­belief—since  make-­belief  
is  a  conscious  mimicking  of  belief.”196     
   For  Currie,  what  is  fictionally  true  in  a  work  is  whatever  an  ideal  reader  would  (either  
make-­believedly  or  genuinely)  reasonably  infer  about  the  author’s  beliefs,  using  the  text  as  
evidence  for  those  beliefs.  But  it’s  worth  it  to  delve  just  a  bit  more  deeply  here,  since  I  think  that—
when  we  do  so—we  can  see  just  how  in  line  Currie’s  thesis  is  with  other  accounts  of  fictional  
truth.    
   What  is  it  reasonable  for  a  reader  to  infer  about  the  author’s  beliefs?  Well,  if  we’re  talking  
about  an  internal  perspective—i.e.,  a  reader  making-­believe  that  the  text  is  a  work  of  nonfiction  
and  making-­believe  that  the  author  genuinely  asserts  things  about  a  fictional  world—then  what  it’s  
reasonable  to  infer  the  author  believes  is  just  a  matter  of  what  it’s  reasonable  to  imagine  the  
author  believes.  And  what  it’s  reasonable  to  imagine  the  author  believes  will  just  be  whatever  it’s  
reasonable  to  imagine  is  true  about  the  fictional  world;;  after  all,  we’re  figuring  out  what  the  author  
believes  about  that  fictional  world.  What  is  it  reasonable  to  imagine  is  true?  Well,  given  that  we’re  
cashing  out  the  notion  of  ‘reader’  by  appeal  to  an  ideal  reader  attentive  to  the  properties  the  work  
genuinely  possesses,  then  what  it’s  reasonable  to  imagine  will  amount  to  whatever  the  work  is  
prescribing  us  to  imagine.197  
   The  notion  of  prescribed  imaginings  is  what  theorists  typically  use  to  ground  their  
accounts  of  fictional  truth.  For  fictional-­truth  theorists,  a  proposition  is  fictionally  true  if  we  are  
prescribed  to  imagine  that  it’s  true  about  the  fictional  world,  and  a  proposition  is  fictionally  false  if  
we  are  not  prescribed  to  imagine  that  it’s  true  about  the  fictional  world.  In  other  words:  what  
makes  something  fictionally  true  is  just  a  matter  of  whether  or  not  the  (constructed,  hypothetical)  
author  is  calling  on  us  to  imagine  it.    
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197  This  is  importantly  different  from  what  the  author  is  actually  trying  or  intending  to  prescribe.  
The  idea  here  is  that  the  work  is  doing  the  prescribing  because  of  the  features  it  actually  




   What  does  this  prescribing  is  the  work  (the  novel,  painting,  movie,  etc.)  combined  with  
principles  of  generation.  Kendall  Walton  provides  the  most  in-­depth  discussion  of  the  principles,  
and  most  theorists’  discussions  take  his  as  a  starting  point.198  I’ll  rely  upon  Walton’s  account  to  
some  extent,  although  I’ll  focus  mostly  on  the  account  Anthony  Everett  gives  primarily  because  
it’s  more  directly  applicable  to  movies  and  the  concept  of  ‘showing’  I’ve  been  emphasizing.199  
   Everett  sums  up  his  position  here:  “games  or  pretenses  are  governed  by  principles  of  
generation  which  determine  what  counts  as  true  within  that  game  or  pretense  and  hence  what  we  
are  to  imagine  being  the  case  when  we  engage  in  that  game.”200  In  spelling  out  the  idea  of  
prescribed  imaginings,  Everett  focuses  on  the  analogy  between  the  prescription  of  imaginings  in  
pretense  and  the  formation  of  beliefs  in  the  real-­world.  Discussing  works  of  visual  art,  including  
movies,  he  states  that  there  are  “very  close  similarities  between  the  way  in  which  our  ordinary  
beliefs  may  be  generated  and  the  ways  in  which  our  imaginings  are  often  generated  in  response  
to  a  fiction.”201  
   What  are  the  similarities  Everett  points  to?  He  makes  two  basic  points:  (1)  we  form  
imaginings  based  on  what  we  see  and  hear  in  a  fiction  analogous  to  the  beliefs  we  form  based  on  
what  we  see  and  hear  in  the  world;;  and  (2)  we  form  imaginings  that  extend  beyond  what  we  see  
and  hear  analogous  to  the  beliefs  we  form  that  extend  beyond  what  we  see  and  hear  in  the  real  
world.  We  can  see  (1)  as,  roughly,  what  Walton  calls  directly-­generated  fictional  truths  and  (2)  as  
analogous  to  what  Walton  calls  implied  fictional  truths.  Let’s  start  with  (1).    
   Everett  states:    
   Fictions  which  have  a  visual  component,  such  as  plays  and  puppet  shows  and    
   films  and  television  shows,  will  typically  generate  imaginings  either  in  something    
   like  the  sort  of  direct  manner  that  our  observations  of  real  events  so  or  in  the    
   manner  that  our  consumption  of  factual  documentaries  does.202    
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Cambridge,  1990.    199	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With  regards  to  these  direct  imaginings,  “in  the  simplest  instances  we  will  imagine  that  we  are  
directly  perceiving  real  people  and  real  events;;  we  will  treat  our  perceptions  as-­if  they  were  simply  
perceptions  of  reality.”203  Where,  had  we  seen  and  heard  the  pretense-­content  in  the  real  world  
we  would’ve  formed  certain  “demonstrative  beliefs,”  we  form  analogous  “demonstrative  
imaginings”  toward  the  work  of  fiction.204  Works  of  fiction  generally  prescribe  us  to  form  these  
imaginings,  and—in  doing  so—construct  basic  fictional  truths.  
   Film-­makers  prescribe  us  to  treat  the  actors  and  props  and  sets  as  the  characters  and  
fictional  places  they  depict.  In  doing  so,  they  make  it  fictionally  true  that  they  are  those  things:  
that,  when  we  see  John  Travolta’s  actions  and  hear  his  words,  we  are  seeing  and  hearing  
Vincent  Vega’s;;  that  when  we  see  and  hear  aspects  of  New  Zealand,  we  are  seeing  and  hearing  
aspects  of  Middle-­Earth.  At  the  barest  level,  fiction  films  prescribe  us  to  take  what  we  see  and  
hear  to  be  a  part  of  the  fictional  world  at  hand  and  thus  make  what  we  see  and  hear  a  part  of  that  
world.    
   Returning  to  the  idea  of  natural  meaning  that  we’ve  been  emphasizing:  by  perceiving  
cues  of  natural  meaning,  we  form  imaginings  about  characters’  emotions  and  thoughts;;  and  we  
form  imaginings  about  what  has  happened  or  what  will  happen  in  the  plot.  We  do  this  in  the  same  
way  we  form  beliefs  based  on  cues  of  natural  information  in  the  real  world.  In  the  first  chapter,  we  
discussed  these  cues  by  focusing  on  how  they  give  movies  a  unique  tie  to  reality.  Here  we’re  
moving  from  the  pure  phenomenological  claim  to  a  constructed,  epistemic  one,  namely:  films  
utilize  these  perceptual  cues  in  order  to  make  things  the  case  in  their  narratives.  
   Moving  beyond  natural  meaning  cues,  many  movies  show  their  plot  events  in  a  more  
general  sense:  by  showing  Uma  Thurman  overdosing  in  Pulp  Fiction;;  by  showing  Verbal  Kint’s  
gestures  change  in  order  to  communicate  that  he  is  Keyser  Söse  in  The  Usual  Suspects;;  by  
showing  Malcolm’s  bloody  back  so  we  realize  that  he  has  been  dead  all  along  in  The  Sixth  
Sense.  By  using  perceptual  prompts,  movies  prescribe  us  to  imagine  that  certain  plot  events  are  
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happening  in  their  fictional  worlds  and  thereby  make  true  those  events.  The  Sixth  Sense  makes  it  
the  case  that  Malcolm  discovers  that  he  has  been  dead  all  along  while  standing  up  against  a  wall  
in  his  house;;  Pulp  Fiction  makes  it  the  case  that  Mia  overdoses  while  at  Vincent’s  house.  
   Engaging  in  this  pretense  enables  us  to  pretend-­prescribe  properties  to  the  characters  
and  fictional  worlds  in  the  way  that  Thomasson  states.  For  Everett:  
   A  perceptually  formed  demonstrative  belief  is  about  the  object  perceived.  In  a    
   similar  way,  when  we  watch  a  play  and  make-­believe  that  the  actor  we  see  is  a    
   character  in  the  play,  within  our  make-­believe  our  demonstrative  imagining  will    
   count  as  being  about  that  character—it  will  function  as-­if  it  was  a  demonstrative    
   belief  about  the  character.205  
  
So,  for  instance,  we  can  pretend-­assert  that  Vincent  Vega  has  black  hair  and  that  he  wears  a  suit  
in  the  same  sort  of  way  that  we  genuinely  assert  such  things  about  an  actual  person.    
   The  sort  of  “showing”  I’ve  been  discussing  isn’t  the  same  as  Gricean  showing.  It  extends  
beyond  the  presentation  of  natural  meaning  cues  and  centers  on  the  idea  of  seeing  the  fictional—
being  able  to  just  perceive  many  of  the  events  taking  place.  And  we  might  worry  here  about  just  
how  broadly  I’m  using  the  term  ‘show.’  I’ve  claimed  that  we  “can  be  shown”  complex  narrative  
events  in  a  movie—e.g.,  that  a  character  “has  overdosed”  and  that  a  character  “is  dead.”  These  
phrases  employ  quite  loaded  concepts.  Given  the  amount  of  interpretation  that  viewers  must  
bring  to  their  “seeing”  and  “hearing”  these  events,  it  might  seem  worrisome  to  deem  these  
instances  of  “showing.”  We  might  even  think  that  talk  of  “what  is  directly  shown”  in  a  movie  only  
makes  sense  when  we’re  referring  to  basic  perceptual  content—like  sense-­data.    
   Fully  answering  this  worry  is  beyond  the  scope  of  this  paper,  as  it  depends  upon  more  
general  views  in  philosophy  of  perception.  But,  to  at  least  slightly  allay  it  for  now:  I  think  there’s  a  
stronger  sense  of  “showing”  that  we  can  and  do  employ  in  everyday  life.  I  think  we  can  
immediately  and  directly—perceptually—pick  up  on  concept-­laden  information.  Because  we’re  
used  to  employing  certain  concepts,  we  can  grasp  much  about  what  we  see  and  hear—when  we  
walk  outside,  look  around  the  house,  go  to  a  coffee  shop—straight  away.  My  point  with  regards  to  
movies  is  no  different  from  this:  because  movies  call  upon  ordinary  recognition  capacities  and  
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depict  sights  and  sounds  that  help  constitute  their  narratives,  we  see  and  hear  their  actions  and  
events  in  just  the  same  way  that  we  see  and  hear  actions  and  events  in  everyday  life.  If  we  agree  
that,  in  the  latter  we  can  be  “shown”  or  “directly  (immediately)  perceive”  content  despite  our  
interpretive  additions,  then  we  should  admit  the  same  about  the  former.206    
   There  is  an  even  more  basic  point  I’ve  been  attempting  to  make  here,  though.  We  might  
disagree  over  the  content  that  is  shown  in  a  fiction  film.  Perhaps  I  take  it  to  be  quite  rich—e.g.,  
“being  shown  Uma  Thurman  overdosing”  in  Pulp  Fiction—while  a  friend  takes  it  to  be  bare—i.e.,  
“being  shown  patches  of  colors  and  shapes  on  the  film  screen.”  The  two  of  us  needn’t  settle  our  
disagreement  in  order  to  come  to  one  shared  conclusion:  that  the  film  is  showing  us  something.  
It’s  showing  us  some  content,  content  that  narrative  art  forms  like  novels  cannot  show  us.  And,  in  
providing  that  perceptual  content,  it  enables  us  to  grasp  narrative  information  in  a  different  sort  of  
way  than  we  can  with  books  or  short  stories—by  employing  ordinary  recognition  capacities  so  
that  we  can  pick  up  on  facts  as  directly  as  we  do  in  everyday  life.  
   Although  I’ve  been  discussing  a  broader  non-­Gricean  type  of  showing,  we  can  turn  to  
Grice  for  support  here.  In  his  aforementioned  photograph  example,  his  aim  isn’t  to  specify  what  is  
shown:  it’s  to  claim  that  something  is  shown—that,  as  opposed  to  a  drawing,  there  is  content  that  
is  accessible  independent  of  any  appeal  to  the  shower’s  intentions.  Grice  wouldn’t  deny  that  Mr.  
X  interprets  the  photograph  in  order  to  glean  its  full  content—and  indeed,  given  that  his  example  
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although  interpretation  or  the  use  of  concepts  is  at  work  in  visual  experience—our  experience  is  
still  importantly  perceptual,  phenomenological.  The  fact  that  we  can  make  sense  of  interpretation  
being  a  part  of  perception  itself  elucidates  that  we  can  substantiate  a  form  of  “showing”—by  
which  we  do  see  and  hear  certain  contents  even  as  we  represent  or  think  about  them.  Of  course  
here  I’m  making  sense  of  a  more  “direct”  account  of  perception—I’m  arguing  that  we  can  directly,  
immediately,  perceive  certain  contents  even  if  we  employ  concepts  in  doing  so.  But  nearly  every  
representationalist  about  perception  would  admit  that  much  of  our  experience  is  
phenomenologically  direct—we  feel  as  though  we  perceive  certain  contents  straight  away.  There  
is  a  difference  between  maintaining  that  perceptual  experience  is  (metaphysically  or  ontologically)  
indirect  because  mediated  by  the  mind  (in  maintaining  this  ontological  claim,  representationalists  
separate  themselves  from  non-­representationalists  or  non-­conceptualists)  and  maintaining  that  
perceptual  experience  seems  phenomenologically  indirect.  We  can  admit  the  former  and  deny  
the  latter,  which  is  precisely  what  I  am  doing  here.  
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is  one  that  requires  picking  up  on  infidelity,  Grice  would  (and  should)  admit  that  much  interpretive  
work  is  done.    
   Despite  the  role  of  interpretation,  the  photograph  has  a  basis  of  perceptual  content  that  
enables  it  to  communicate  meaning  naturally.  The  fact  that  Mr.  X  has  to  utilize  his  concepts  in  
interpreting  it  just  means  that  (1)  what  is  shown  is  more  basic  than  what  he  ends  up  inferring  
about  his  wife  (perhaps  what  is  shown  is  simply  that  a  woman  is  standing  near  a  man,  or  perhaps  
it’s  even  more  basic  than  that)  or  (2)  what  is  shown  is  more  robust  and  can  include  what  Mr.  X  
cognizes  (perhaps  what  is  shown  is  that  his  wife  is  having  an  affair).  Regardless  of  which  
alternative  we  accept,  the  photograph  still  has  a  perceptual  content  that  communicates  meaning  
in  a  way  that  intention-­dependent  art  forms,  like  paintings  and  drawings,  do  not.  Whereas  the  
latter  cannot  even  show  that  a  woman  is  standing  near  a  man—because  Mr.  X  has  to  appeal  to  
why  the  drawer  drew  them  as  such  in  order  to  know  that  fact—the  photograph  (at  the  very  least)  
shows  Mr.  X  content  that  (1)  has  a  natural  meaning  he  can  grasp  immediately  and  (2)  Mr.  X  can  
draw  further  inferences  from.  
   Similarly,  because  of  its  perceptual  presentation,  a  film  is  depicting—via  sights  and  
sounds—some  content.  We  might  take  this  content  to  consist  merely  in  sense-­data;;  we  might  
choose  to  talk  about  Gricean  content  and  maintain  that  movies  only  show  the  natural  meaning  
cues  they  present  to  us;;  and  we  might  have  a  more  extensive  account  according  to  which  more  
conceptually-­laden  content  can  be  shown.  In  the  end,  a  disagreement  over  what  is  shown  
amounts  to  a  disagreement  over  the  number  of  truths  which  a  film  directly  generates—it  doesn’t  
change  the  principle  of  generation  itself,  or  threaten  the  relevant  distinctions  between  movies  and  
other  art  forms.    
   None  of  this  is  to  say  that  we  should  endorse  a  general  principle  like  “whatever  is  part  of  
the  explicit  content  of  a  film  is  (gives  rise  to  propositions  which  are)  fictionally  true.”  This  is  a  point  
Walton  emphasizes  when  he  maintains  that  what  he  calls  directly-­generated  fictional  truths  
should  not  be  confused  with  the  explicit  content  of  the  work:  what  is  said  or  shown  in  it.  As  Walton  
states,  and  this  is  primarily  the  case  where  unreliable  narrators  are  concerned,  sometimes  what  is  
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shown  or  said  is  not  fictionally  true  (we’ll  discuss  examples  of  this  in  a  later  section).  Still,  we  can  
say  this  much:  if  we  think  of  truths  that  are  directly  generated—fictional  truths  that  are  not  implied  
by  others—they  are  the  truths  that  are  shown.  The  film’s  perceptual  content  itself  gives  rise  to  
them,  without  any  further  inferential  work  (other  than  the  ordinary  inferential  work  required  to  
grasp  ‘what  is  shown’).  Every  movie  prescribes  us  to  imagine  that  fictional  propositions  are  the  
case;;  and  every  movie  engages  in  this  prescription  in  part  through  its  explicit  ‘showing.’  While  we  
may  not  be  able  to  trust  that  everything  we  see  and  hear  in  a  movie  makes  up  the  fictional  world  
at  hand,  it’s  generally  (indeed,  I  would  argue,  always)  the  case  that  some  of  what  we  see  and  
hear  does.  And  that  content  is  responsible  for  some  of  the  film’s  fictional  truths.  
   Of  course,  not  all  imaginings  are  prescribed  directly  from  what  we’re  shown  in  a  film.  And  
this  takes  us  to  how  movies  generate  implied  fictional  truths—how  they  prescribe  imaginings  that  
stem  from,  but  extend  beyond,  what  we  see  and  hear.  Roman  Frigg  introduces  the  concept  of  
implied  fictional  truths  here:  “the  leading  idea  is  that  primary  truths  follow  immediately  from  the  
prop,  while  implied  ones  result  from  the  application  of  some  rules  of  inference.”207  Everett  doesn’t  
use  the  language  of  ‘primary’  vs.  ‘implied’  in  quite  the  same  way  as  Frigg  (or  Walton).  But  I  take  it  
that  ‘primary  truths,’  insofar  as  they  “follow  immediately  from  the  prop,”  consist  in  the  sorts  of  
‘shown’  truths  we’ve  discussed  so  far.208  Implied  fictional  truths  require  “rules  of  inference”  that  
enable  us  to  build  fictional  truths  from  what’s  shown.  
   Cases  of  implication  often  depend  heavily  upon  narrative  context—a  context  that  
amounts  to  a  combination  of  what  has  been  shown  and  what  has  been  said.  An  example  of  
Walton’s  helps  here.  He  states:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
207  Frigg,  Roman.  “Models  and  Fiction.”  Synthese  172  (2010):  251-­268  p.  260.  
208Of  course,  not  everything  we’re  directly  shown  in  a  film  does  give  rise  to  (or  consist  in)  fictional  
truths.  This  is  a  point  that  Walton  makes,  and  is  the  chief  reason  he  doesn’t  associate  “explicit  
content”—e.g.,  what  is  said  or  shown—in  a  work  with  the  concept  of  “primary  truth.”  We’ll  get  to  
this  idea  later,  when  I  discuss  fiction  films  that  deceive  or  trick  us  by  showing  us  content  that  is  
not  actually  a  part  of  the  fictional  world.  For  now,  we  can  keep  this  much  in  mind:  when  it  comes  
to  works  of  visual  art—including  movies—a  truth  is  only  ever  directly  generated  when  it’s  shown.  
So,  although  we  cannot  endorse  the  relationship  of  showing—>  direct  generation,  we  can  
endorse  direct  generation—>  showing;;  if  there  is  direct  generation  in  movies  and  paintings  and  
pictures,  it  amounts  to  content  that  is  shown.    
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   Goya’s  No  Se  Puede  Mirar  from  The  Disasters  of  War  shows  the  bound  victims  of  
   an  execution  by  firing  squad  and  the  muzzles  of  guns  pointing  at  them.  It  does  not  
   show  the  soldiers  wielding  the  guns;;  they  are  outside  the  picture  frame.  Yet  there    
   can  be  no  doubt  that  there  are  soldiers  (or  anyway  people)  holding  the  guns.  We    
   know  that  there  are  because  of  the  position  of  the  guns…it  is  fictional  that  there    
   are  soldiers  because  it  is  fictional  that  there  are  guns  positioned  as  they  are.209  
  
Similarly,  discussing  the  aforementioned  example  of  the  newspaper  headline  in  Conrad’s  The  
Secret  Agent,  Walton  states  that  “the  fact  that  fictionally  this  headline  appeared  in  a  newspaper  
shortly  after  Mrs.  Verloc  had  embarked  for  the  Continent…makes  it  fictional  that  Mrs.  Verloc  
committed  suicide.”210  
   We  can  think  of  these  processes  of  inference  as  analogous  to  everyday  processes  of  
inference,  as  relying  “upon  the  sort  of  processing  which  underlies  our  visual  responses  to  the  real  
world.”211  Walton’s  examples  above  support  this  point:  the  imaginings  at  hand  are  based  on  what  
we  would  believe  if  we  saw  or  read  the  content  outside  of  the  pretense,  and  this  analogy  just  
stems  from  the  fact  that  we’re  treating  “the  fictional  text  or  narrated  story  essentially  as-­if  it  were  a  
purported  factual  report.”212  We  make  these  sorts  of  inferences  constantly  during  film-­viewing:  
when  we  infer  what  a  character  feels  about  another  character  by  appeal  to  the  same  sorts  of  
behavioral  cues  we  use  in  real  life;;  when  we  make  inferences  about  a  character’s  past  by  appeal  
to  cues  in  the  current  plot  (e.g.,  in  their  interactions  with  family  members  and  their  living  situation);;  
when  we  make  inferences  about  a  fictional  town’s  financial  and  social  situation  by  appeal  to  
perceptual  and  structural  cues  we  encounter  in  the  world.  
   While  these  inferential  processes  are  real-­world  inferential  processes,  much  more  is  at  
play  in  our  engagement  with  fiction.  For  one  thing,  implied  fictional  truths—or,  rather,  the  
principles  of  implication  responsible  for  them—often  require  knowledge  of  “genre  or  symbolic  
conventions.”213  An  example  Everett  uses  here  is:  “when  reading  a  vampire  novel,  a  principle  like  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
209  Walton,  p.  140.  
210  Walton,  p.  141.  
211  Everett,  p.  32.  
212  Everett,  p.  32.  
213  Everett,  p.  33.  
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‘if  someone  hisses  at  a  cross  they  are  a  vampire”  is  operative.214  Similarly,  when  a  romantic-­
comedy  film  ends  with  the  two  protagonists  finally  uniting,  it  implies  that  they  will  be  in  a  
relationship,  and  when  a  horror  movie  ends  with  the  protagonist  screaming,  it  implies  that  she  has  
been  harmed.  More  generally,  implied  truths  depend  upon  a  combination  of  narrative  context  and  
genre  conventions.  When  we  deduce  that  George  Bailey  will  remain  as  happy  as  he  is  in  the  
ending  of  It’s  a  Wonderful  Life,  that  Randle  Patrick  McMurphy  would  have  remained  mentally  ill  in  
One  Flew  Over  the  Cuckoo’s  Nest,  or  that  Travis  Bickle  will  perform  more  psychotic  actions  in  
Taxi  Driver,  we  attend  to  what  the  depiction  shows  us  about  the  characters  (George’s  satisfaction  
at  the  film’s  finale,  McMurphy’s  psychosis  before  his  death)  as  well  as  the  type  of  film  at  hand  
(e.g.,  because  of  the  tone  and  aim  of  It’s  a  Wonderful  Life,  we  can  safely  assume  that  its  
protagonist  will  not  end  up  unhappy,  while  the  same  cannot  be  said  of  One  Flew  Over  the  
Cuckoo’s  Nest).  
   Of  course,  it’s  not  always  easy  to  figure  out  what  a  movie  implies  about  its  fictional  world,  
and  different  viewers  often  walk  away  from  a  film  with  different  conclusions.  Sometimes  both  
conclusions  are  compatible  with  what  is  shown  and  said  in  the  narrative,  in  which  case  the  film  is  
indeterminate.  Sometimes  there’s  more  evidence  for  one  assumption,  in  which  case  we  typically  
take  that  to  be  the  more  likely  one.  Even  more  basically:  it’s  difficult  to  say  what  the  difference  is  
between  ‘implying’  and  ‘showing’  in  fiction  film  (a  point  Walton  also  makes).  While  I  contend  that  
The  Babadook  implies  that  Amelia  experiences  a  period  of  frightening  depression  each  year  
around  her  son’s  birthday,  someone  might  contend  that  that  fact  is  shown  in  the  film;;  while  I  
contend  that  Bringing  up  Baby  implies  that  David  wouldn’t  be  truly  happy  if  he  married  his  fiancé,  
Alice,  we  might  wonder  if  that  fact  is  actually  shown  via  loveless  conversations  between  David  
and  Alice;;  while  I  contend  that  Birdman  implies  that  Riggan  Thomson’s  daughter,  Sam,  ends  up  
with  a  mental  disease  analogous  to  his,  who’s  to  say  that  the  film  doesn’t  show  us  that  Sam  is  
mentally  ill  by  showing  her  smile  when  she  sees  (what  we  know  to  be)  her  father’s  dead  body?  
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   We  can  think  of  this  discussion  as  analogous  to  the  debate  in  philosophy  of  language  
about  the  distinction  between  what  is  said  and  what  is  suggested  or  implied;;  where  we  land  on  
that  is  a  matter  of  our  theoretical  commitments,  and  the  same  is  true  here.  I  take  these  
aforementioned  facts  to  be  implied  by  the  film’s  narrative  context—a  combination  of  what  we  see  
and  hear  between  David  and  Alice’s  conversations  and  what  we  see  and  hear,  comparably,  
between  him  and  Susan;;  a  combination  of  seeing  Riggan  contemplate  jumping  to  his  death,  
watching  Sam  search  for  him  in  his  hospital  room,  and  knowing  (from  what  we’ve  seen  and  
heard)  that  Sam  struggles  with  drug  problems  and  that  her  father  imagines  himself  to  be  a  
superhero.  I  also  think  we  need  to  make  room  for  the  idea  of  film  implication.  Claiming  that  these  
instances  are  all  instances  of  ‘being  shown’  simplifies  the  films  unnecessarily  (and  inaccurately).  
There’s  a  reason  The  Babadook  only  suggests  that  Amelia  struggles  with  depression  each  year  
around  her  son’s  birthday  (because  it  aims  to  treat  the  matter  of  mental  illness  in  a  more  
aesthetic—less  heavy-­handed—way).  There’s  a  reason  Birdman  ends  as  it  ends,  on  what  some  
viewers  feel  is  an  ambivalent  note  regarding  whether  Riggan  committed  suicide  or  whether  he  
flew  away;;  saying  that  we’re  shown  one  or  the  other  downplays  the  nuance  in  the  film’s  narrative  
and  cinematography.    
   In  addition  to  context  and  film  convention,  implication  can  depend  upon  what  Walton  calls  
“the  reality  principle”  and  the  “mutual  belief  principle.”  Walton  defines  the  reality  principle  here:  
“the  basic  strategy  which  the  Reality  Principle  attempts  to  codify  is  that  of  making  fictional  worlds  
as  much  like  the  real  one  as  the  core  of  primary  fictional  truths  permits.”215  Everett  sums  up  the  
reality  principle  similarly,  stating  that  it  prescribes  us  to  “fill  in  the  background  of  our  imaginative  
scenario  on  the  basis  of  what  the  real  world  is  actually  like  or  what  it  would  be  like  were  the  
content  of  our  pretense  to  really  obtain.”216  Employing  this  principle,  we  expand  the  number  of  
fictional  truths  by  appeal  to  what  further  facts  would  be  true  if  certain,  basic  fictional  truths  held  in  
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the  real  world.  We  ask  “what  else  would  be  true  if  they  [the  directly-­generated  fictional  truths]  
were?”217    
   Does  a  novel  say  that  it’s  raining  in  the  fictional  setting?  Then  the  characters  are  getting  
wet  when  outside,  just  as  they’d  get  wet  if  they  existed  in  the  real  world.  Are  the  characters  
interacting  in  a  social  setting?  Then  they’re  dressed  in  some  form  of  attire,  just  as  they  would  be  if  
they  were  interacting  in  the  real  world.  Most  of  these  expanded  fictional  truths  consist  in  rather  
basic,  ordinary  facts.  Many  novels  don’t  even  state  that  the  characters  are  human,  or  that  their  
worlds  have  grass  and  houses.  As  Walton  puts  it:  “it  is  because  people  in  the  real  world  have  
blood  in  their  veins,  births,  and  backsides  that  fictional  characters  are  presumed  to  possess  these  
attributes.”218  We  use  our  knowledge  of  reality  to  fill  in  these  gaps,  and  insofar  as  works  call  on  us  
to  do  so,  they  possess  a  plethora  of  fictional  truths  that  aren’t  explicitly  stated  (or  shown)  or  
strongly  implied  by  what’s  explicitly  stated  (or  shown).  
   The  mutual  belief  principle,  like  the  reality  principle,  expands  fictional  truths  by  appeal  to  
real-­world  knowledge.  But  it,  more  narrowly,  maintains  that  we  take  into  consideration  “what  is  or  
was  commonly  believed  in  the  author’s  community.”219  So,  for  instance,  although  Sherlock  
Holmes  doesn’t  say  that  Baker  Street  is  closer  to  Paddington  station  than  to  Waterloo,  that  fact  
counts  as  a  truth  in  that  fictional  work  because  “it  would  be  reasonable  for  our  reader  of  Sherlock  
Holmes  to  suppose  that  Conan  Doyle  believed  that  Baker  Street  is  closer  to  Paddington  than  to  
Waterloo.”220  Despite  gaps  in  the  explicit  or  strongly  implied  content  of  a  work,  the  mutual  belief  
principle  constructs  fictional  truths  that  depend  upon  what  the  storyteller  likely  believed  in  addition  
to  what  she  stated  and  implied.  
   Let’s  apply  these  two  principles  to  film.  Among  other  things,  we  bring  our  knowledge  of  
natural  meaning  and  human  psychology  in  order  to  understand  characters’  emotions  and  
thoughts—what  their  gestures  and  facial  expressions  indicate,  what  their  reactions  to  certain  
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situations  will  be  (how  they  will  be  heartbroken,  upset,  or  angry  because  of  other  narrative  
events).  We  bring  our  knowledge  of  history  to  grasp  what  sorts  of  conventions  were  operating  
during  a  particular  time  period  in  the  narrative  (what  social  conventions  were  at  play,  what  
respective  roles  women  and  men  held,  etc.).  More  generally,  we  imagine  that  the  fictional  world  
extends  beyond  the  shots  we  see,  so  that  other  people  exist  in  other  parts  of  the  fictional  world  
and  engage  in  similar  sorts  of  behaviors.  We  assume  these  things  insofar  as  they  are  consistent  
with  the  fictional  truths  we  are  shown  and  the  fictional  truths  that  are  strongly  implied.    
   Although  it’s  important  to  notice  how  the  reality  principle  and  mutual  belief  principle  are  at  
work  in  cinematic  depiction,  it’s  equally  important  to  note  that  they  play  a  more  minor  role  than  
they  do  in  nonperceptual  art  forms  like  literature.  In  virtue  of  its  perceptual  presentation,  as  I  
argued  in  chapter  one,  more  content  is  ‘just  there’  in  a  film  than  it  is  in  novels.  Where  we  might  
have  to  assume  that  characters  are  human  when  we  read,  we  see  that  they  are  when  we  watch  a  
movie;;  where  we  might  have  to  assume  that  cars  or  houses  or  animals  exist  in  a  novel’s  fictional  
world,  we  see  and  hear  those  things  during  film-­viewing.  Many  basic  facts  are  perceptually,  and  
thus  directly,  available  to  us  in  a  film’s  scene:  facial  expressions,  gestures,  movements,  tones  of  
voice,  objects,  etc.  And  this  means  that  some  of  what  only  exist  as  implied  fictional  truths  in  
literary  works  exist  as  directly  generated  fictional  truths  in  film.  
   Everett’s  account  coupled  with  Walton’s  clarifies  how  facts,  or  truths,  are  settled  in  a  
fiction  film.  The  general,  commonly-­endorsed,  answer  is:  they're  settled  by  whatever  we’re  
prescribed  to  imagine.  And  prescriptions  to  imagine  happen  via  the  prop  (the  work  of  fiction)  in  
addition  to  principles  of  generation.  We’ve  outlined  a  bit  just  what  those  principles  are,  how  they  
work  in  fiction  film,  and  how  they  work  differently  in  fiction  film  than  in  other  artforms.  But  it’s  
difficult  to  delve  more  deeply—to  specify  the  principles  further,  or  differentiate  among  them.  As  
Everett  states:    
   Thus,  for  example,  we  must  also  determine  whether  we  are  to  employ  the    
   Reality  Principle  to  fill  in  the  background  details,  or  some  version  of  the       
   Mutual  Belief  Principle,  or  whether  we  are  to  employ  different  principles  in    
   different  contexts.  We  must  determine  what  genre  and  symbolic  conventions    
   are  in  force  and  which  further  principles  of  generation  we  should  adopt       
   because  of  these,  and  so  on.  Beyond  this,  of  course,  we  will  also  have  to       
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   determine  exactly  what  the  consequences  are  of  the  principles  we  do  adopt.    
   In  short  we  must  determine  how  we  are  to  interpret  the  fictional  text.221  
  
Walton  echoes  this  uncertainty,  or  lack  of  systematization.  For  Walton,  “common  sense  is  our  
guide.”  172.  He  states:  
   When…we  look  to  see  how  direct  generation  does  work,  we  are  treated  to  a    
   veritable  variety  show.  Artists  use  every  trick  in  the  book  and  more.  Some       
   techniques  are  more  or  less  traditional;;  others  are  strikingly  ad  hoc…some,  even    
   some  ad  hoc  ones,  leave  no  doubt  about  what  is  fictional;;  others  keep  us  guessing    
   forever.  Some  require  familiarity  with  the  genre  to  be  understood,  or  familiarity    
   with  one  or  another  aspect  of  the  outside  world.  171  
  
Indeed,  the  specification  of  principles  of  generation—the  rough  specification  it’s  possible  to  
provide—doesn’t  settle  interpretive  debates.  We’ll  still  continue  to  disagree  over—among  other  
things—what  is  true  in  a  work  of  fiction,  what’s  shown  vs.  what’s  implied,  and  whether  or  not  we  
ought  to  use  the  reality  principle  and  the  mutual  belief  principle.  We  can,  with  Everett,  “regard  the  
debate  concerning  how  a  fictional  text  should  be  interpreted  as,  in  essence,  a  debate  concerning  
which  principles  of  generation  should  be  taken  to  govern  our  imaginative  engagement  with  that  
text  and  what  factors  determine  whether  a  particular  principle  can  play  this  role.”222  In  this  way,  
interpretive  debate  doesn’t  threaten  an  appeal  to  principles  of  generation.    
   Everett  forms  a  notion  of  fictional  truth  that  includes  the  notion  of  interpretive  debate,  and  
it’s  useful  to  adopt  his  approach.  He  claims:  
   We  can  define  what  counts  as  true  in  a  given  interpretation  of  the  fiction  in  a    
   straightforward  manner.  In  an  interpretation  of  a  fiction  p  will  be  true  just  in  case    
   it  is  true  within  the  scope  of  the  pretense  associated  with  that  interpretation.  In  an    
   interpretation  p  will  be  false  just  in  case  not  p  is  true  in  that  interpretation.       
   Otherwise  it  will  be  indeterminate  whether  or  not  p  is  true  in  that  interpretation.223         
  
A  proposition,  thus,  counts  as  fictionally  true  in  a  given  interpretation  of  a  work  of  fiction  just  in  
case,  according  to  that  interpretation,  it’s  prescribed  to  be  imagined.  What’s  more,  we  can  use  the  
notion  of  multiple  interpretations  in  our  more  general  definition  of  fictional  truth.  As  Everett  puts  it:  
“in  the  fiction  p  will  be  absolutely  true  just  in  case  it  is  true  in  all  acceptable  interpretations.  In  the  
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fiction  p  will  be  absolutely  false  in  case  not  p  is  true  in  all  acceptable  interpretations.”224  We  
needn’t  adopt  these  further  specifications  of  Everett’s  account.  But  the  chief  merit  in  doing  so  is  
that  Everett’s  account  is  explicitly  sympathetic  to  the  notion  that  there  are  multiple  interpretations  
of  a  text—sometimes  all  (or  many)  of  which  are  compatible  with  the  text—and  to  the  notion  that  
interpretive  work  doesn’t  always  lead  up  to  one  correct  interpretation.  
   Let’s  sum  up  the  points  I’ve  made  about  the  facts  of  a  fiction  film.  Whatever  is  fictionally  
true  is  whatever  we’re  prescribed  to  imagine.  Some  principles  of  generation—the  principles  
responsible  for  prescriptions  to  imagine—are  frequently  used  and  thus  nearly  generally  
applicable:  e.g.,  the  reality  principle  and  mutual  belief  principle.  Beyond  that,  we  perform  
interpretative  work—taking  into  account  genre,  style,  conventions,  ordinary  processes  of  
inference,  and  real-­world  knowledge—when  interacting  with  a  work  of  fiction  in  order  to  grasp  
what  principles  are  operating  and  thus  what  we’re  prescribed  to  imagine  about  the  fictional  world.    
   The  notion  of  prescribed  imaginings  grounds  the  notion  of  epistemic  directness  I  want  to  
substantiate  in  this  chapter,  so  let’s  turn  to  that  now.  I  will  argue  that,  because  a  film’s  facts  are  
established  by  prescriptions  to  imagine,  fiction  films  cannot  be  unreliable—they  cannot  lie  or  
mislead  in  the  ways  that  documentaries  can—and  they  are  necessarily  (epistemically)  
trustworthy.  
            Lying,  Misleading,  and  Fiction  Film  
   To  review  from  the  previous  chapter:  unreliability  consists  in  a  film  engaging  unreliable  
cognitive  processes.  When  we  bring  this  concept  to  fiction  film,  the  ‘beliefs’  we’re  talking  about  
are  ‘fictional  beliefs’  and  the  ‘truth’  or  ‘falsity’  at  hand  is  ‘fictional  truth’  or  ‘fictional  falsity.’  
‘Reliability’  here,  then,  is  defined  in  a  way  analogous  to  how  we  defined  it  with  documentary  film:  
it’s  a  matter  of  whether  or  not  a  fiction  film  can  lie  about  its  fictional  world,  whether  it  can  engage  
unreliable  cognitive  processes  by  deceiving  us  into  thinking  that  something  ‘fictionally  false’  is  
‘fictionally  true.’  We  might  find  such  talk  problematic  or  implausible,  requiring  a  discussion  of  
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genuine  truth  or  genuine  belief  in  any  discussion  of  reliability.  In  this  case,  we  can  focus  on  a  type  
of  discourse  about  fiction  called  external  discourse.    
   Sometimes  we  make  statements  about  fictional  worlds  and  characters  while  not  
imaginatively  engaged,  uttering  statements  like  “Sherlock  Holmes  is  a  detective”  or  “Norman  
Bates  killed  Marion  Crane.”  We  make  precisely  the  claims  I’ve  been  calling  pretend-­assertions,  
but  we  do  so  from  a  perspective  external  to  the  pretense  and  in  a  (seemingly)  genuinely  
assertorial  way.  Now  if  we  take  these  statements  literally,  they  are—as  we  mentioned  earlier—
false.  Insofar  as  Norman  Bates  is  an  abstract  entity  created  by  Robert  Bloch,  he  isn’t  capable  of  
engaging  in  any  physical  action,  let  alone  those  actions  necessary  to  kill  someone  (albeit  
‘someone’  who  is  also  abstract).  But  some  theorists  consider  these  statements  shorthand  for  
assertions  that  are  genuinely  true  or  false.  As  Frigg  puts  it:    
   When  we  metafiction  ally  assert  p,  what  we  really  assert  is  ‘in  work  w,  p.’      
   Asserting  that  something  is  the  case  in  a  work  of  fiction  is  tantamount  to  asserting  
   that  it  is  fictional  in  that  work.  Hence  asserting  ‘in  work  w,  p’  amounts  to       
   asserting  ‘p  is  fictional  in  work  w,’  which  in  turn  is  equivalent  to  ‘it  is  fictional  in    
   work  w  that  p.’225    
  
Alex  Neill  echoes  Frigg,  stating  that  there  is  an  “apparent  paradox”  that  arises  from  statements  
about  fictional  entities,  events,  and  worlds.226  Such  statements  seem,  intuitively,  true  despite  the  
fact  that  they  express  propositions  about  fictional  characters  (and  the  like)  which  aren’t  literally  
true.  For  Neill,    
   One  way  of  dispelling  the  apparent  paradox  here,  as  a  number  of  philosophers  of    
   noted,  is  by  construing  statements  such  as  ‘Winnie  Verloc  had  a  pretty  miserable    
   time  of  things’  as  elliptical  for  statementts  of  something  like  the  form  of  ‘It  is  The    
   Secret  Agent-­fictional  that  Winnie  Verloc  had  a  miserable  time  of  things.227  
  
If  we  take  the  Neill-­Frigg  approach  (an  approach  endorsed  by  many  theorists),  then  we  seemingly  
have  no  problem  discussing  reliability.  The  statements  we  make  are  assertions  that  are  genuinely  
true  or  false,  and  the  beliefs  we  express  via  those  statements  are  genuine  beliefs.  As  Neill  puts  it:    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
225  Frigg,  p.  263.  
226  Neill,  Alex.  “Fiction  and  the  Emotions.”  American  Philosophical  Quarterly  30.1  (January  1993):  
1-­13.  P.2.    
227  Neill,  p.  2.  
	  138	  
	  
   There  is  nothing  fictional  about  beliefs  of  this  sort;;  it  is  their  content  that  concerns    
   the  fictional.  Beliefs  about  what  is  fictionally  the  case,  that  is,  are  just  that:    
   beliefs…in  believing  that  it  is  fictionally  the  case  that  p  my  attitude  is  one  of    
   judgment,  the  expression  of  which  is  assertion.228  
  
As  opposed  to  the  sort  of  internal  discourse  I’ve  been  focusing  on,  which  expresses  fictional  
beliefs—beliefs  we  only  maintain  from  within  our  imaginative  engagement  and  which  are  thus  not  
genuine  beliefs—this  external  discourse  concerns  the  beliefs  we  have  about  “what  is  fictionally  
the  case”  in  a  story.  Its  being  fictional  is  a  part  of  our  thought-­content,  then,  while  its  being  
fictional  is  not  a  part  of  our  thought  content  in  internal  discourse.  If  we  take  this  external  route,  our  
analysis  here  centers  on  whether  or  not  fiction  films  can  lead  viewers  to  false  beliefs  expressed  
via  statements  about  ‘what  is  true  within  the  world  of  the  fiction.’    
   In  between  the  internal-­discourse  and  external-­discourse  approaches  is  an  approach  that  
Eddy  Zemach  takes.229  Zemach  analyzes  internal  discourse  and  claims  that  such  discourse  
possesses  genuine  truth-­value.  His  argument  centers  on  how  a  token-­sentence  is  intended  for  
evaluation.  As  he  puts  it:  
   I  attribute  truth-­value  to  token-­sentences,  maintaining  that  a  token-­sentence  is  true  
   if  and  only  if  the  statement  it  expresses  is  true  in  the  world(s)  in  which  it  is    
   intended  to  be  evaluated.  Thus  most  tokens  of  ‘Anna  Karenina  loved  Vronski,’    
   being  intended  for  evaluation  in  the  target-­worlds  of  Anna  Karenina,  are  true,    
   while  for  that  reason  most  tokens  of  ‘Anna  Karenina  married  Vronski’  are  false.’230       
  
For  Zemach,  we  can  count  such  claims,  which  are  a  part  of  internal  discourse,  as  genuinely  true  
or  false;;  they  express  propositions  that  are  intended  to  be  evaluated  in  the  fictional  worlds,  and  
insofar  as  that’s  the  case,  they  have  not-­merely-­fictional  truth-­value.  
   With  all  this  being  said,  we  have  several  options  regarding  how  to  understand  the  
discussion  of  fiction  film  reliability  (and  unreliability).  If  we’re  wary  of  discussing  a  type  of  reliability  
that  centers  on  fictional  beliefs  and  fictional  truths,  we  can  discuss  merely  external  discourse  or  
internal  discourse  cashed  out  in  the  way  Zemach  maintains.  I  prefer  the  internal-­discourse  route,  
according  to  which  we  analyze  whether  or  not  fiction  films  can  lead  us  to  false  fictional  beliefs  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
228  Neill,  p.  9.  
229  Zemach,  Eddy  M.  “Emotion  and  Fictional  Beings.”  The  Journal  of  Aesthetics  and  Art  Criticism  
54.1  (Winter,  1996):  41-­48.  
230  Zemach,  p.  43.  
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which  we  express  via  claims  that  aren’t  literally  true.  I  prefer  this  route  because  my  focus  is  on,  in  
many  ways,  our  imaginative  engagement—how  we  interact  with  a  fiction  film  while  make-­
believing  that  the  fiction  is  real.  Since  my  other  analyses  in  these  chapters  center  on  this  internal  
interaction  with  a  fictional  world,  and  since  our  perspectives  as  engaged  film-­viewers  is  of  utmost  
interest  to  me,  I  prefer  to  be  consistent  with  my  central  motivations  here.    
   It’s  important  to  note,  though,  that  we  can  reframe  the  conversation  entirely  in  terms  of  
external  discourse,  and  my  theses  will  be  unchanged.  The  core  idea  is,  given  the  beliefs  we’re  
discussing,  can  fiction  films  engage  unreliable  cognitive  processes  that  produce  those  beliefs?  If  
the  beliefs  at  issue  are  genuine,  external-­to-­the-­fiction,  beliefs,  and  if  fiction  films  engage  reliable  
cognitive  processes  in  producing  those  beliefs,  then  the  films  are  reliable  to  that  extent.  If  the  
beliefs  at  issue  are  fictional  beliefs,  and  if  fiction  films  engage  reliable  cognitive  processes  in  
producing  those  beliefs,  then  the  films  are  reliable.  I’ll  argue  for  this  second  claim  (regarding  
fictional  beliefs);;  but  its  truth  establishes  the  truth  of  the  first  claim  (regarding  genuine  beliefs).  If  
we,  as  viewers,  form  true  fictional  beliefs  about  the  fiction  while  imaginatively  engaged,  then  we  
also  form  true  beliefs  about  the  fiction  when  not  imaginatively  engaged.  After  all,  we  cash  out  
‘what  is  fictionally  true’  by  stating  the  very  things  about  the  characters,  events,  and  worlds  that  we  
pretend  are  true  from  the  internal  perspective.  Reliability  in  the  latter  guarantees  reliability  in  the  
former.  
   Bringing  back  my  commitment  to  artifactualism,  we  can  see  how—whether  we  take  the  
external  or  internal  discourse  route—we  have  no  problem  making  sense  of  how  our  statements  
(fictional  or  genuine)  can  be  true  or  false  (fictionally  or  genuinely)  in  film-­viewing.  With  regards  to  
external  discourse,  the  claims  we  make  about  what’s  fictionally  true  in  the  story  are  claims  about  
the  abstract,  individual  entities  created  by  the  storyteller  and  the  actions  and  behaviors  they  
fictionally  partake  in;;  and  they  are  true  or  false  in  just  the  way  that  statements  about  other  
(abstract  or  non-­abstract)  individual  entities  are.  With  regards  to  internal  discourse,  the  claims  we  
make  about  the  characters  and  fictional  worlds  are  about  the  fictional  entities  that  we  perceptually  
experience,  and—because  we  perceptually  experience  them  as  individuals—those  claims  are  
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(fictionally)  true  or  false  in  an  analogous  way  to  the  claims  we  make  about  entities  we  
perceptually  experience  in  the  real  world.  Endorsing  an  ontology  according  to  which  fictional  
entities  are  real  and  individuals  (rather  than  ‘kinds’)  enables  us  to  make  sense  of  our  perceptual  
experience  of  them  as  well  as  the  (fictional  or  genuine)  truth  or  falsity  of  the  claims  we  make  
about  them  (where  a  ‘kind  theory’  would  make  the  former  less  plausible).    
   So,  with  internal  discourse  in  mind,  the  question  is  this:  can  fiction  films  be  trusted  as  
reliable  guides  to  true  fictional  beliefs  about  the  fictional  characters,  events,  etc.,  that  we  pretend  
possess  certain  properties  while  imaginatively  engaged?  Or  can  fiction  films  deceive  us  about  
these  fictional  facts  in  the  same  sort  of  way  that  documentaries  can  deceive  us  about  real-­world  
facts?  
   From  the  get-­go,  fiction  films  seem  incapable  of  unreliability  precisely  because  they  use  
principles  of  generation.  Insofar  as  a  work  uses  principles  that  depictive  representations  generally  
use,  we  can  typically  trust  that  (1)  what  is  explicitly  stated  or  shown  in  the  work  is  true  in  the  work;;  
and  that  (2)  we  can  infer  what  is  true  based  on  principles  of  implication  we’ve  already  learned.  
The  fact  that  we  interact  with  works  of  art  so  frequently  makes  us  equipped  to,  through  
interpretive  work,  recognize  the  principles  employed  to  generate  fictional  truths.  Indeed,  we  are  
especially  equipped  to  recognize  them  since  many  of  them  involve  real-­world  processes  of  
inference.  
   Delving  a  bit  more  deeply,  when  we  think  about  the  perceptual  cues  shown  to  us  in  a  
film—including  cues  of  natural  meaning—those  cues  typically  indicate  certain  fictional  facts.  More  
often  than  not,  certain  facial  expressions,  gestures,  and  tones  of  voice  indicate  particular  
emotions  and  thoughts—just  as  they  typically  indicate  those  emotions  and  thoughts  in  real  life.  
More  often  than  not,  rain  clouds  in  a  fiction  film  indicate  rain  in  the  fictional  world—just  as  they  
typically  indicate  rain  in  real  life.  As  Grice  and  Dretske  maintain,  cues  of  natural  information  have  
a  meaning  in  virtue  of  the  fact  that  they  tend  to  indicate  (but  do  not  always  indicate)  the  presence  
of  something  in  the  world;;  they  are,  in  this  way,  reliable.  The  same  is  true  about  as-­if  natural  
meaning  in  fiction  film.  Though  movies  can  deceive  us  by  providing  us  with  perceptual  cues  that  
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do  not  indicate  the  fictional  facts  they  tend  to  indicate  (which  we’ll  come  back  to  in  a  bit),  on  a  
very  general  level  we  can  trust  that  much  of  what  we  see  and  hear  on  the  screen  is  there  for  us  to  
imagine  (and  thus  to  take  as  true)  about  the  fictional  world.  
   There’s  an  even  stronger  argument  available  to  us  here,  though,  once  we  take  into  
consideration  the  two  particular  types  of  documentary  unreliability.  Let’s  start  with  the  first  type  of  
unreliability:  lying.  My  argument  here  runs  as  follows:  (1)  what  a  fiction  film  prescribes  us  to  
imagine  is  what  it  presents  as  true  in  its  fictional  world;;  (2)  what  a  fiction  film  prescribes  us  to  
imagine  is  fictionally  true  in  its  fictional  world;;  (3)  given  (1)  and  (2),  a  fiction  film  cannot  present  as  
fictionally  true  something  fictionally  false;;  (4)  lying  requires  a  film  to  present  as  true  (or  as  
fictionally  true)  something  false  (or  fictionally  false);;  (5)  therefore,  fiction  films  cannot  lie  to  us  
about  their  fictional  worlds.    
   As  Robert  Burgoyne  states:  
   In  producing  the  facts  of  the  fictional  world,  the  impersonal  narrator  creates  a    
   universe  that,  once  established,  cannot  be  revoked,  for  this  discourse  provides  the    
   very  basis  of  the  fictional  world…Any  kind  of  false  report  or  lie  on  the  part  of  the  
   impersonal  narrator—   which  in  film  might  take  the  form  of  images  which  are    
   directly  presented  as  facts,  without  the  intermediate  agency  of  a  personal  narrator,  
   and  which  are  then  contradicted  by  other  images—would  simply  be  taken  as    
   incoherence  in  the  fictional  world  itself,  leading  the  spectator  to  question  the  very    
   existence  of  a  diegetic  universe.231  
  
Being  prescribed  to  imagine,  in  fiction  film-­viewing,  is  analogous  to  being  prescribed  to  believe,  in  
documentary  film-­viewing.  Documentaries  lie  when  they  prescribe  us  to  believe  something  
untrue.  This  divide  isn’t  possible  in  fiction  film  because  whatever  we’re  prescribed  to  imagine  is  
fictionally  true.  That’s  just  the  definition  of  prescription  we’ve  been  discussing.  Hence,  fiction  films  
cannot  lie  to  us  about  their  fictional  worlds.  There  is  no  such  thing  as  a  narrative  presenting  as  
true  propositions  about  a  fictional  world  which  are  false  because  whatever  it  presents  as  true  just  
is  true  in  the  fictional  world.    
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   The  same  reasoning  that  grounds  this  conclusion,  in  fact,  grounds  why  fiction  films  are  
incapable  of  what  I  called  ‘accidental  deception’—e.g.,  what  ethnographic  films  engage  in.  If  
whatever  is  presented  as  true  is  true  in  a  fiction  film,  then  there’s  no  sense  in  which  a  film  can  
‘accidentally’  present  something  as  true.  We  might  think  of  cases  in  which  filmmakers  accidentally  
imply  certain  propositions  with  their  films—e.g.,  unintentionally  racist  movies  like  The  Toy  or  
Driving  Miss  Daisy,  or  unintentionally  sexist  movies  like  many  superhero  or  sci-­fi  films.  But  these  
aren’t  cases  of  accidental  deception.  These  are  cases  in  which  the  films  just  means  something  
different  from  what  was  intended.  They’re  cases  in  which  some  propositions  about  the  fictional  
world  are  presented—explicitly  or  implicitly—as  true  and  thus  are  true.  In  other  words:  once  we  
talk  about  a  film  as  a  narrative,  we  analyze  the  propositions  that  are  in  fact  made  within  it;;  
whatever  was  intended  to  be  expressed,  or  whatever  the  filmmaker  accidentally  asserted,  is  
irrelevant  because  the  concepts  of  ‘intention’  or  ‘accident’  (where  we  don’t  mean  those  terms  
hypothetically)  aren’t  at  play  in  this  analysis.  
   So  fiction  films  are  incapable  of  type  (1)  unreliability,  where  this  refers  to  both  intentional  
lying  and  unintentional  deception.  Let’s  turn  now  to  type  (2)  unreliability.  This  requires  a  
combination  of  two  things:  (1)  withholding  facts  in  order  to  present  one  perspective  on  the  story  at  
hand  and  (2)  dishonesty  about  this  aim.  Fiction  films  cannot  have  this  combination  for  two  
reasons:  first  of  all,  they  cannot  engage  in  (2):  if  they  do  present  their  narratives  from  particular  
perspectives,  then  they  cannot  be  dishonest  about  doing  so.  Secondly,  they  cannot  engage  in  (1).  
Let’s  start  with  (1).    
   Narratives  can  and  do  withhold  information.  Sometimes  they  do  so  in  order  to  present  
particular  perspectives  within  their  fictional  worlds.  Showing  the  subjective  experiences  of  
characters—presented  via  voice-­over  narration,  first-­person  point  of  view,  or  both—is  one  of  the  
most  common  approaches  here,  as  is  having  subjectively-­inflected  shots.  Indeed,  simply  focusing  
on  a  protagonist  throughout  the  film  (which  can  be  done  with  a  voice-­over  narrator,  as  in  The  
Shawshank  Redemption)  makes  a  narrative  skewed;;  we’re  tempted  to  sympathize  with  her  and  to  
interpret  things  as  she  interprets  them.  These  sorts  of  perspective-­showing  require  information-­
	  143	  
	  
withholding—so  that  we  don’t  see  other  characters’  subjectivities  or  other  viewpoints  of  narrative  
events.  In  this  respect,  fiction  films  can  be  one-­sided.  
   Even  more  generally,  every  narrative  places  a  certain  perspective  upon  its  events:  by  
showing  a  particular  character  as  a  protagonist  (and  causing  the  bias  mentioned  above),  by  
connecting  the  events  in  purposefully  manipulative  ways  (e.g.,  Pulp  Fiction—which  presents  its  
story  non-­chronologically—or  The  Usual  Suspects,  which  presents  Verbal  Kint  as  pathetic  in  
order  to  shock  us  by  his  guilt),  indeed  by  connecting  the  shots  at  all  (narratives  just  are  
constructions  which  impose  some  sort  of  order  upon  people  and  events).  
   But  this  perspective-­taking  is  importantly  different  from  documentary  one-­sided-­ness.  
Bowling  for  Combine  is  a  perspective  on  America’s  gun  violence.  Making  a  Murderer  is  a  
perspective  on  the  Steven  Avery  case.  What  it  means  for  these  movies  to  be  one-­sided  is  that  
they  take  (and  show)  stances  on  an  event  (or  set  of  events)  that  exists  external  to  them.  In  a  
fiction  film,  one-­sided-­ness  is  internal  to  the  narrative.  We  see  (or  otherwise  experience,  
sympathize  with,  etc)  the  perspective  of  a  character  who  exists  in  the  fictional  world.  Because  
there  is  no  “extra-­textual  reality,”  there  is  no  possibility  of  a  narrative  presenting  a  perspective  on  
events  that  exist  outside  of  itself—at  least  not  at  the  fictional  level.  Indeed,  even  narrators  who  
are  supposedly  telling  us  the  stories  of  their  fictional  worlds,  as  in  The  Princess  Bride  or  Stand  By  
Me,  are  still  within  the  narrative;;  their  narratives  are  just  multi-­leveled.  
   Of  course,  this  isn’t  to  say  that  fiction  films  don’t  also  present  perspectives  on  the  world.  
Many,  if  not  most,  fiction  films  do  just  this:  implying  something  about  their  extra-­textual  reality  by  
commenting  on  (among  other  things)  social  or  cultural  issues,  human  identity,  relationships,  
emotions  and  psychology.  And  these  perspectives  can  be  evaluated  as  reliable  or  unreliable  in  
the  same  sort  of  way  that  documentaries’  perspectives  can—we  can  ask  whether  or  not  they  can  
lead  viewers  to  true  beliefs  about  people,  places,  or  phenomena  in  the  world.  These  aren’t  the  
viewpoints  I’m  interested  in  here,  as  I’m  analyzing  whether  or  not  fiction  films  can  lie  about  their  
fictional  worlds.  Still,  it’s  important  to  take  note  of  this  fact,  as  it  illuminates  how  fiction  films  often  
make  assertions  about  the  same  extra-­textual  reality  that  documentaries  comment  on.  
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   Moving  back  to  the  idea  of  fiction-­based  perspectives,  another  point  is  important  to  note  
here,  namely:  the  information  that  a  fiction  film  withholds  (in  order  to  present  its  one-­sided-­ness)  
is  not  the  same  sort  of  information  that  a  documentary  withholds.  Whereas  the  latter  withholds  
facts  about  their  subject  matter,  the  former  merely  withholds  information;;  it  just  doesn’t  tell  us  
what  is  true  or  false  about  other  events  or  characters.  Whatever  information  is  left  out  makes  the  
narrative  incomplete  in  the  way  I  mentioned  earlier.232  
   Relatedly,  it’s  hard  to  see  how  a  fiction  film  can  be  dishonest  about  its  one-­sided-­ness  
(which  is  what  type  (2)  unreliability  amounts  to  in  full).  As  in  Making  a  Murderer,  this  would  
amount  to  presenting  the  story  from  a  perspective  without  letting  us  know  that  it  is  doing  so.  More  
specifically,  it  would  amount  to  our  finding  no  evidence  in  the  movie  itself  for  that  perspective.  
This  just  takes  us  back  to  our  fundamental  point  about  extra-­textual  reality;;  if  there  is  no  evidence  
for  a  perspective  in  the  narrative,  then  no  such  perspective  exists.  In  the  same  way  that  
narratives  cannot  leave  out  information  about  the  content  of—the  facts  of—their  fictional  worlds,  
so  too  they  cannot  leave  out  facts  about  how  that  content  is  structured.  Fiction  films,  then,  are  
incapable  of  type  (2)  unreliability.  They  cannot  be  misleading  about  their  one-­sided-­ness.    
   So,  fiction  films  are  incapable  of  the  types  of  unreliability  that  documentaries  can  engage  
in.  They  cannot  lie  to  us  about  their  fictional  worlds,  and  they  cannot  accidentally  deceive  us  
about  them,  because  they  construct  whatever  truths  there  are  in  their  narratives  and.  They  also  
cannot  mislead  us  in  the  way  that  documentaries  like  Making  a  Murderer  can  because  they  
cannot  hide  the  perspective  they  place  upon  their  narrative  events.  
            A  Type  of  Fiction  Film  Unreliability  
   I’ve  argued  that  fiction  films  are  reliable  insofar  as  they  cannot  lie  or  mislead,  and  my  
defense  for  this  has  rested  upon  the  claims  that  a  fiction  film’s  narrative  (1)  cannot  present  as  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
232We’re  just  left  not  knowing  about  other  characters  or  aspects  of  the  fictional  world.  This  isn’t  to  
say,  of  course,  that  nothing  external  to  the  character’s  perspective  can  count  as  fact.  Indeed,  
unreliable  narrators  exist  precisely  because  they  don’t  know  all  there  is  to  know  about  he  story  or  
they  present  the  story  incorrectly,  and  we  can  identify  their  doing  so.  The  point  here  is  that,  
whatever  information  actually  is  left  out,  throughout  the  entire  film,  doesn’t  really  count  as  
information  in  the  documentary  sense.  
	  145	  
	  
fictionally  true  propositions  which  are  fictionally  false  and  (2)  cannot  withhold  facts  about  its  
fictional  world.  These  claims  seem  defeated  by  the  existence  of  films  which  do  seem  to  withhold  
facts  and  which  do  seem  to  lead  us  to  false  fictional  beliefs.  In  this  section  I’ll  discuss  these  films  
and  then  argue  that  their  existence  does  not  complicate  the  concept  of  fiction-­film  reliability  I’ve  
been  outlining.  To  get  started,  let’s  look  at  some  examples.    
   The  Sixth  Sense  is  a  horror  film  about  the  relationship  between  a  psychiatrist—
Malcolm—and  a  boy—Cole—who  possesses  the  capacity  to  see  ghosts.  We  watch  as  Malcolm  
helps  Cole  attain  a  peaceful,  bearable  way  in  which  to  deal  with  his  predicament.  In  the  film’s  
shocking  finale,  it’s  revealed  that  Malcolm  was  a  ghost  all  along.  Fight  Club  is  ostensibly  about  an  
unnamed  narrator  who  befriends  a  man  named  Tyler  Durden,  starts  a  “fight  club”  with  him,  and  
co-­leads  the  formation  of  fight  clubs  across  the  country.  In  the  film’s  finale,  we  learn  that  Tyler  
Durden  is  a  dissociated  personality  of  the  unnamed  narrator’s.  Memento  centers  on  a  
protagonist,  Leonard,  who  struggles  with  retrograde  amnesia—tattooing  his  body  to  remind  
himself  daily  of  important  facts.  The  film  starts  at  the  end  chronologically,  with  a  photograph  of  a  
dead  man,  and  moves  in  reverse  order  as  we  follow  Leonard  in  his  search  for  his  wife’s  second  
killer.  Throughout  our  viewing,  we  believe  that  Leonard  is  partaking  in  a  worthwhile  search  and  
that  one  man  (Teddy)  is  to  blame  for  his  wife’s  death.  In  the  film’s  finale,  we  discover  that  the  
dead  man  from  the  beginning  is  Teddy,  that  Leonard  has  killed  him,  that  Teddy  is  in  fact  innocent,  
and  that  Leonard’s  wife  wasn’t  murdered  at  all;;  she  actually  died  from  an  insulin  overdose.  
   Each  of  these  films  constructs  its  narrative  by  playing  off  of  our  basic  assumptions  and  
expectations—e.g.,  that  the  characters  we  see  are  real  and  non-­hallucinatory,  that  what  seems  to  
be  the  movie’s  plot  is  the  plot  (as  in  Memento)—and  withholding  information  that  would  enable  us  
to  reject  those  basic  assumptions  and  expectations.  Returning  to  the  idea  of  principles  of  
generation,  they  seemingly  (1)  fail  to  employ  the  principles  of  implication  we’re  used  to  and  (2)  
reject  the  first  principle  regarding  directly-­generated  fictional  truths  that  stem  from  the  content  we  
see  and  hear.  In  these  instances,  what  we  see  and  hear  is  not  actually  a  part  of  the  fictional  world  
(and  thus  does  not  help  constitute  fictional  truths  despite  our  assuming  they  do  so)  and  we’re  
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tricked  into  thinking  that  what  we  see  and  hear  is  as  similar  to  the  world  as  it  appears  to  be  (that  
the  characters  who  are  speaking  exist,  and  that  they  do  not  exist  as  ghosts  or  hallucinations).    
The  Sixth  Sense,  Fight  Club,  and  Memento  thus  seem  to  present  as  true  propositions  about  their  
fictional  worlds  that  are  false,  and  they  do  not  seem  to  employ  common  principles  of  generation.  
Indeed,  these  are  the  types  of  films  theorists  tend  to  point  to  in  their  discussions  of  fiction  
unreliability,  arguing  that  fiction  films  are  unreliable  either  because  of  character  or  voice-­over  
narrators  that  mislead  us  about  their  fictional  worlds  or  because  of  implied,  cinematic  narrators  
that  mislead  us  about  their  fictional  worlds.233    
   So  don’t  these  films  threaten  my  earlier  discussion?  Isn’t  their  unreliability  precisely  a  
matter  of  withholding  facts—actual  facts—about  their  fictional  worlds?  And  don’t  they  present  as  
fictionally  true  propositions  which  are  fictionally  false?  For  much  of  the  movie:  yes.  For  all  of  the  
movie:  no.  Eventually  the  truths  about  the  characters  are  revealed.  In  the  end,  they  do  present  as  
true  what  is,  in  fact,  fictionally  true:  that  Malcolm  is  dead,  that  Tyler  Durden  is  a  hallucination,  that  
Leonard  killed  his  own  wife.  In  the  end,  they  do  present  the  facts—the  actual  facts—about  their  
fictional  worlds.  This  means  that  these  films  don’t  engage  in  the  sort  of  deception  that  
documentaries  do.  Whereas  we  discover  the  truth  about  an  unreliable  documentary’s  subject  
matter  by  appeal  to  extra-­textual  reality,  we  discover  the  truth  about  a  movie  like  The  Sixth  Sense  
by  appeal  to  the  movie:  the  movie  itself  reveals  its  truths  to  us.  And  because  it  does,  taken  as  a  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
233  Gregory  Currie,  for  instance,  defines  cinematic  unreliability  in  much  the  same  way  I  have  here,  
maintaining,  when  talking  about  a  film’s  implied  author:  “an  agent  can  do  something  with  
an  intention  of  the  following  complex  kind:  she  creates  or  presents  something  which  she  intends  
will  be  taken  as  evidence  of  her  intentions  ,and  she  intends  that  superficial  evidence  will  suggest  
that  her  intention  was  X,  whereas  a  better,  more  reflective  grasp  of  the  evidence  will  suggest  that  
her  intention  was  Y.”,  Currie,  Gregory.  “Unreliability  Refigured:  Narrative  in  Literature  and  Film”.  
The  Journal  of  Aesthetics  and  Art  Criticism  53.1  (1995):  19–29.  Dan  Shen  and  Dejin  Xu  discuss  
fiction  film  unreliability  as  well,  although  they  focus  largely  on  character  narrators  in  the  narratives  
and  maintain  a  separation  between  what  the  “narrator”  says  is  true  about  the  fictional  world  and  
what  the  “implied  author”  maintains  about  the  narrator’s  reliability,  distinctions  that  I  can’t  delve  
into  in  full  here.  Shen,  Dan  and  Dejin  Xu.  “Intratextuality,  Extratextuality,  Intertextuality:  
Unreliability  in  Autobiography  versus  Fiction.”  Poetics  Today  28.1  (Spring  2007):  43-­87.  Jakob  
Lothe,  like  Shen  and  Xu,  discusses  primarily  character  narrators  but  outlines  the  same  idea  of  




whole,  it  does  not  deceive—it  does  not  withhold  facts,  and  it  does  not  present  fictional  falsehoods  
as  fictional  truths.    
   This  is  something  I  think  theorists  too  often  miss:  the  distinction  between  being  unreliable  
for  some  or  even  most  of  the  film  and  being  unreliable  overall  (‘overall’  being  ‘even  after  the  film  
ends,  the  unreliability  remains’).  The  latter  is  what  I’ve  been  talking  about,  and  this  is  what  I’ve  
claimed  fiction  films  are  incapable  of.  Indeed,  if  a  documentary  engages  in  partial  unreliability  by  
lying  to  us  for  most  of  the  film  and  then  revealing  the  truths  it  had  hidden,  then  we  should  say  
precisely  the  same  thing  that  I’ve  said  about  these  aforementioned  fiction  films.    
   Not  only  is  the  truth  eventually  revealed  to  us  in  supposedly  tricky  fiction  films  cases:  
there’s  a  sense  in  which  the  facts  weren’t  really  withheld  to  begin  with.  One  chief  reason  we  re-­
watch  The  Sixth  Sense  is  so  that  we  can  notice  the  clues  we’d  missed  all  along.  The  film  even  
provides  a  flashback  montage  at  the  end,so  that  we  can  do  just  this  (an  approach  many  similarly  
tricky  films  employ).  We  discover  that,  while  we’d  assumed  that  Malcolm  was  interacting  with  
other  characters,  in  fact  there  isn’t  a  single  clip  in  which  he  is;;  while  we’d  assumed  his  wife  was  
unhappy  for  no  definable  reason,  in  fact  she  was  depressed  because  of  his  death;;  and  when  Cole  
told  Malcolm  that  ghosts  didn’t  know  they  were  dead,  he  was  referring  in  part  to  Malcolm.  The  
movie  constructed  its  narrative  so  that  we  would  misinterpret  these  clues  or  overlook  them,  but  
the  clues  were  there.  
   The  Usual  Suspects  is  a  prime  example  of  how  clues  are  hidden  but  still  very  much  
present.  Once  we  realize  who  Keyser  Söze  is,  we  see  (via  the  film’s  flashback  sequence  and  re-­
viewings)  Verbal  Kint  in  a  completely  new  light;;  we  notice  that,  in  his  first  trip  to  the  police  station  
he  was  perusing  the  bulletin  board  for  the  information  he’d  present  as  ‘facts’  in  his  story  to  the  
detective  (the  first  time  we  w2atch  it,  he  just  looks  bored);;  we  notice  that  he’d  held  his  cigarette  in  
a  ‘European’  way;;  we  even  notice  that  the  voice  from  the  beginning  of  the  movie  (the  voice  of  
Keyser)  is  Verbal’s.  Everything  clicks  in  this  film—and  in  films  like  it—because  we  see  the  very  
clues  we’d  been  manipulated  to  overlook.  In  this  sense,  it’s  hard  to  say  just  how  much  information  
was  withheld  at  all.    
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   In  fact,  and  this  brings  us  back  at  the  distinction  between  film  and  other  narrative  art  
forms:  the  information  is  often,  in  these  cases,  shown.  The  clues  we  find  via  the  flashback  
montage  in  The  Usual  Suspects  are  (and  were)  perceptually  available:  we  are  shown  Verbal  Kint  
holding  his  cigarette  in  the  aforementioned  way,  shown  a  voice  in  the  beginning  (the  voice  of  
Söse’s)  that  matches  Verbal’s,  shown  him  scanning  the  bulletin  board  in  the  beginning.  Because  
the  film  constructs  its  story  in  a  way  that  leads  our  interpretations  elsewhere,  we  don’t  pick  up  on  
their  relevance  (or  even  notice  that  we’re  seeing  and  hearing  them).  But  this  doesn’t  change  the  
fact  that  they  were  presented  to  us  in  a  way  that  they  couldn’t  have  been  presented  in  a  novel.    
   So  theorists  aren’t  fully  correct  in  deeming  these  sorts  of  films  ‘unreliable.’  In  fact,  some  
theorists  (Volker  Ferenz  in  “Fight  Clubs,  American  Psychos  and  Mementos,”  and  Fiona  Otway  in  
“Unreliable  Narrators  in  Documentary”234)  claim  that  the  idea  of  ‘reliability’  doesn’t  apply  to  fiction  
film.  My  argument  doesn’t  hinge  on  our  accepting  or  not  accepting  the  term  ‘unreliable’  here;;  
what’s  important  is  that,  if  we  do  use  the  term  to  talk  about  films  like  The  Sixth  Sense,  we  keep  in  
mind  that  this  unreliability  doesn’t  amount  to  the  deception,  lying,  or  misleading  I’ve  laid  out.  
               Epistemic  Directness  
   The  argument  in  this  chapter  has  been  largely  negative:  I’ve  argued  against  the  thesis  
that  fiction  films  can  be  unreliable  by  claiming  that  they  cannot  deceive  us  as  documentaries  can.  
It’s  worth  it  now  to  articulate  the  positive  claims  we  can  glean  from  this  analysis.     
   If  fiction  films  cannot  deceive  us  by  lying  to  us  or  misleading  us  about  their  fictional  
worlds,  then  they  are  necessarily  epistemically  reliable.  As  I’ve  argued,  the  truths  of—the  facts  
in—their  fictional  worlds  are  there  for  us,  as  viewers,  to  find.  Sometimes  they’re  there  even  when  
they  seem  to  be  absent  (as  in  tricky  films  like  The  Usual  Suspects  or  Fight  Club).  We  can’t  always  
agree  upon  what  those  truths  are,  and  it’s  not  always  easy  to  find  them.  But,  regardless,  we  can  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
234    The  two  ground  their  claims  upon  slightly  different  reasons.  Ferenz  maintains  that  we  can  use  
different  “recuperations  strategies”  when  we  encounter  inconsistencies,  instances  of  information-­
withholding,  or  instances  of  misrepresentation  in  fiction  film,  and  that  the  construct  of  the  
“unreliable  narrator”  is  unnecessary.  Otway  differentiates  fiction  film  from  documentary  by  stating  
(albeit  briefly)  that  the  fictional  storyteller  creates  the  very  world  she  tells  and  thus  cannot  truly  
deceive  us  about  it  (hence  harkening  back  to  Burgoyne’s  aforementioned  point).  
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trust  that  whatever  facts  there  are  to  grasp  about  narrative  events,  places,  and  people,  are—in  an  
important  sense—in  the  film  itself.  Fiction  films  are  honest  with  us  about  their  fictional  worlds;;  
they  show  us  them,  necessarily.    
   Of  course,  the  phrase  “in  the  film  itself”  is  a  bit  deceptive  here  and  needs  qualification  by  
appeal  to  the  notion  of  implication—and  more  particularly  by  appeal  to  principles  like  the  reality  
principle  and  the  mutual  belief  principle.  Some  fictional  truths  are  not  ‘in’  the  work  in  any  genuine  
sense  and  instead  depend  upon  viewers  using  real-­world  knowledge  to  construct  more  than  is  
shown  to  us  on  the  film  screen.    
   Admitting  this  much,  though,  doesn’t  threaten  my  chief  claim  here.  The  idea  of  epistemic  
directness  I’m  employing  isn’t  a  matter  of  ‘making  fully  apparent’  fictional  truths;;  it’s  a  matter  of  
our  ability,  as  (ideal)  viewers,  to  form  true  fictional  beliefs  about  the  fictional  world,  a  film’s  
engaging  reliable  cognitive  processes  in  our  forming  those  beliefs.  This  consists  in  fiction  film’s  
inability  to  lie  or  mislead—in  our  ability  to  trust  that  what  is  shown  or  said  in  the  film  as  true  is  true  
in  the  fictional  world,  that  what  is  implied  strongly  by  what  is  shown  and  said  in  the  film  is  true,  
and  that  we  can  trust  any  other  inferences  (those,  for  instance,  based  on  the  reality  principle  and  
mutual  belief  principle)  the  film  as  a  whole  calls  upon  us  to  make.  By  using  principles  of  
generation,  and  by  constructing  the  (explicit  and  implied)  truths  they  prescribe  us  to  fictionally  
believe,  fiction  films  necessarily  lead  us  to  true  beliefs  about  their  fictional  worlds.  
   This  is  what  differentiates  fiction  films  from  nonfiction—or  documentary—films.  What  
differentiates  them  from  literary  art  forms  is  their  phenomenological  immediacy:  the  sense  in  
which  many  of  their  truths  are  there  directly,  because  perceptually.  We  see  and  hear  a  great  deal  
of  information  about  characters  and  fictional  places—and,  as  I  argued,  we  really  see  that  
information—and  we  do  so  immediately  by  calling  us  our  knowledge  of  natural  meaning  and  our  
ordinary,  everyday  perceptual  processes.  Thus,  while  literary  art  forms  also  have  an  important  
epistemic  status  because  they—like  all  narrative  art  forms—construct  the  truths  in  their  fictional  
worlds,  they  do  not  have  the  epistemic  directness  that  movies  have.  When  we  read,  we  co-­
construct  the  narrative  by  mentally  imagining  how  characters  and  places  look  and  sound,  and  
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how  full  scenes  appear.  The  narrators  of  a  book  tell  us  the  facts,  while  the  narration  in  a  movie  
shows  us  the  facts;;  the  latter  enables  the  immediacy  and  direct  engagement  that  the  former  
prevents.  
   Similarly,  while  other  perceptual  art  forms—like  paintings,  pictures,  and  photographs—
construct  their  fictional  truths  (and  thus  have  epistemic  reliability)  they  don’t  engage  in  the  same  
form  of  showing  that  movies  engage  in.  Paintings,  photographs  and  pictures,  like  films,  call  on  
ordinary  recognition  capacities235  and  present  cues  of  natural  meaning  that  we  can  grasp  
immediately  (because  perceptually).  So  they  are  more  phenomenologically  immediate  than  
literary  art  forms.  But  I  don’t  think  they  do  show  us  their  fictions  (or  their  nonfictional  
representations)  in  quite  the  same  way  that  movies  do  because  they’re  static.  
   Static  forms  of  visual  depiction  present  one  viewpoint  (of  an  object,  person,  place,  etc.).  
That  viewpoint  illuminates  features  of  the  represented  subject  and  gives  us  a  way  of  seeing  it  so  
that  we  pick  up  on  particular  features—expressive,  physical,  emotional,  and  the  like—that  allow  
the  representation  to  communicate  its  meaning.  Now,  it’s  important  to  note  the  extent  to  which  we  
are  given  a  viewpoint,  the  extent  to  which  emotional  and  expressive  facts  are  shown  to  us  so  that  
we  interpret  the  representation  in  a  certain  way.  It’s  also  important  to  note  the  extent  to  which  
artistic  techniques  can  draw  our  attention  to  specific  features  within  the  represented  scene.  The  
way  the  depiction  uses  lighting,  color,  focus,  and  the  like  make  certain  aspects  of  the  scene  stand  
out  to  us.  Still,  beyond  this,  static  depictions  don’t  take  us  through  their  representations—whether  
fictional  or  nonfictional.  Instead,  we  search  them.  Herein  lies  the  chief  difference  between  static  
depictions  and  fiction  films.  
   When  we  watch  a  fiction  film,  we  see  moving  images  of  the  people,  places,  and  thinks  
depicted,  and—via  the  use  of  editing  techniques  that  connect  those  moving  images—we’re  led  
through  the  story.  Rather  than  look  at  one  static  image  and  examine  the  features  within  it,  we  see  
(1)  many  images  in  quick  succession,  so  that  their  connections  (rather  than  their  minute  features)  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
235  Indeed,  theorists  like  Wollheim,  Currie,  and  Carroll  all  independently  make  this  point  about  
paintings  and  pictures—if  we  can  recognize  3-­D  objects  and  properties,  we  can  recognize  images  
of  those  objects  and  properties  when  looking  at  paintings  and  pictures  of  them.  
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are  prioritized  and  (2)  whatever  features  within  a  shot  that  are  prioritized  by  having  our  attention  
drawn  to  them  via  editing  techniques.  In  a  film,  the  camera  (to  a  certain  extent)  becomes  our  
eyes—it  scans  an  environment,  scene,  event,  or  person,  and  shows  us  the  aspects  that  matter  
for  the  narrative.  It  does,  in  other  words,  what  we  have  to  do  when  we  look  at  a  picture.  
   None  of  this  is  to  downplay  the  role  that  our  own  interpretive  and  perceptual  additions  
play  in  fiction  film  viewing,  and  nor  is  it  to  downplay  the  role  that  artistic  techniques  play  in  
drawing  our  attention  to  features  in  static  depictions.  I  don’t  think  we  should  see  what  I’ve  argued  
as  necessary  or  firm.  Still,  we  should  admit  that  the  role  of  motion  in  film,  and  the  role  of  its  
various  editing  techniques  (which  often  mirror  ordinary  perceptual  processes)  make  it  more  able  
to  take  us  through  its  world  than  paintings,  pictures,  and  photographs.  
   Another,  related,  difference  between  movies  and  static  depictions  is:  while  both  engage  
ordinary  perceptual  and  recognition  capacities,  only  the  former  really  engages  everyday  
perceptual  processes.  Static  depictions  call  on  the  same  recognition  capacities  that  we  use  in  
everyday  life  so  that  we  can  identify  objects  and  their  properties  (including  their  natural  meaning  
properties);;  film-­viewing  involves  seeing  in  the  same  sort  of  way  that  we  see  in  everyday  life.  
Here,  we  can  return  to  the  idea  of  our  ‘examination’  of  a  static  depiction.  This  examination  
involves  close  attention  to  detail—looking  at  different  aspects  of  the  work  over  time,  staring  at  the  
canvas  or  photograph  to  analyze  the  one  viewpoint  of  the  subject  it’s  showing  us.    
   This  sort  of  attention  is  vastly  different  from  the  perceptual  processes  we  use  in  daily  life:  
where  we  scan  objects  and  environments  as  we  move  through  them,  see  them  at  various  
distances  (as  we  approach  them  or  walk  away  from  them),  move  quickly  from  perceiving  one  
thing  to  perceiving  another,  pay  attention  to  the  spatial  relations  between  the  things  around  us,  
and  place  ourselves  within  our  space  (picking  up  on  egocentric  spatial  information).  In  short,  the  
typical  perceptual  processes  we  use  as  we  interact  with  the  world  are  a  matter  of  seeing  and  
hearing  various  objects  in  our  environments  at  various  moments  at  various  distances  as  we  grasp  
our  changing  relations  to  them.  They  typically  don’t  include  staring  at  one  object  or  scene  from  
one  point  of  view  over  time.  In  this  respect,  although  what  we  see  in  pictures  and  paintings—
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objects  and  their  properties—is  similar  to  what  we  see  in  the  world,  how  we  see  the  former  differs  
vastly  from  how  we  see  the  latter.  
   Movies  prioritize  the  sort  of  scanning  we  ordinarily  engage  in  over  the  static  examination  
of  paintings  and  pictures.  Among  other  things,  movies  (by  taking  us  through  their  narratives)  
show  us  distances  and  relations  between  objects  in  their  fictional  worlds,  allow  us  to  move  
perceptually  through  their  fictional  worlds  (as  the  camera  does  so)  in  much  the  same  way  that  we  
move  through  our  actual  environments,  and  offer  us  point-­of-­view  and  deep  focus  shots  that  
mirror  our  basic  perceptual  processes.  Rarely  are  we  presented  with  a  motionless  shot  during  
film-­viewing;;  rarely  are  we  called  upon  to  look  closely  at  the  details  of  a  particular  object  from  a  
particular  point-­of-­view.  Instead,  we’re  called  upon  to  move  along  with  the  camera  to  see  and  
hear  the  fictional  world  from  alternating  points  of  view.  
   Of  course,  it’s  dangerous  to  draw  an  exclusive  divide  here:  through  many  editing  
techniques,  movies  call  on  perceptual  processes  that  differ  widely  from  everyday  ones.  They  
often  present  us  with  perspectives  we  couldn’t  actually  attain  when  engaging  with  the  world,  and  
(by  changing  focal  length  and  focus  distance)  make  us  more  attuned  to  features  that  we  overlook  
in  daily  life  (or  less  attuned  to  features  that  we  notice  in  daily  life).  I’m  not  claiming  here  that  film-­
viewing  is  identical  to  world-­viewing.  What  I  am  claiming,  though,  is  that  it  is  more  like  world-­
viewing  than  our  perception  of  paintings  or  pictures.  In  this  respect,  fiction  films  engage  in  a  form  
of  showing  that  frequently  calls  on  ordinary,  everyday  perceptual  processes,  while  static  
depictions  engage  in  a  form  of  showing  that  frequently  does  not.    
   For  these  reasons,  the  sort  of  ‘showing’  that  I’ve  discussed  in  this  paper  really  is  specific  
to  motion  pictures.  It  consists  in  taking  us  through  a  (typically  objectively-­presented)  fictional  
world  as  we  employ  everyday  perceptual  capacities  and  processes  so  that  we  pick  up  on  
narrative  information  directly.  Without  being  perceptual,  literary  art  forms  lack  the  
phenomenological  immediacy  (and  thus  the  capacity  for  showing)  that  makes  their  narrative  facts  
directly  accessible.  Without  depicting  motion,  static  forms  of  visual  depiction  don’t  allow  us  to  pick  
up  on  information  in  the  same  sort  of  way  that  we  pick  up  on  information  in  daily  life.  
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   With  this  in  mind,  let’s  turn  to  another  clarification:  why  I’ve  talked  of  film  narratives  
showing  us  rather  than  film  narrators  showing  us.  My  answer  here  is  twofold:  first  of  all  the  sort  of  
unreliability  in  fiction  that  I  initially  mapped  out  and  the  sort  of  epistemic  directness  that  I’ve  been  
attempting  to  elucidate  cover  cases  that  include  film  narrators  as  well  as  cases  that  don’t.  Fiction  
films  can  be  unreliable  by  withholding  information  when  they  have  unreliable  character-­narrators,  
as  in  Fight  Club  and  The  Usual  Suspects.  They  can  also  withhold  information  when  they  don’t  
have  narrators,  as  in  The  Sixth  Sense  (any  M.  Night  Shyamalan  film  in  fact),  and  many  horror  
films  generally.  Additionally,  both  types  of  movies  are  importantly  epistemically  direct:  they  
necessarily  present  us  with  the  truths  in  their  fictional  worlds  and  they  necessarily  make  apparent  
the  perspectives  from  which  they  present  their  narratives.  Indeed,  I  discussed  cases  of  unreliable  
narrators—like  The  Usual  Suspects—in  which  ‘clues’  are  there  all  along.  The  second  reason  for  
talking  more  broadly  of  ‘narratives’  rather  than  ‘narrators’  is  this:  when  it  comes  to  films  without  
character  or  voice-­over  narrators,  I  don’t  think  we  should  appeal  to  the  idea  of  a  cinematic  
narrator.  
   In  defending  this  move,  it’s  worth  it  to  look  at  the  film-­narrator  debate  more  generally.  
David  Bordwell  is  perhaps  the  most  well-­known  defender  of  the  narrator-­less  view.  Bordwell’s  
defense  rests  on  two  essential  claims:  (1)  as  I  mentioned  earlier  (in  virtue  of  phenomenological  
immediacy)  we  are  seldom  aware  consciously  of  a  film  narrator  when  we  watch  a  movie;;  and  (2)  
there  is  no  necessity  for  the  concept.  With  regards  to  (2),  Bordwell  argues  that  any  trait  we  might  
assign  to  the  implied  author  (a  concept  I’ll  outline  soon)  or  to  the  narrator    can  simply  “be  ascribed  
to  the  narration  itself:  it  sometimes  surpasses  information,  it  often  restricts  our  knowledge,  it  
generates  curiosity,  it  creates  a  tone,  and  so  on.”  The  construct  of  the  film  narrator,  or  any  sort  of  
fictional  shower,  doesn’t  help  us—in  other  words—make  sense  of  film-­viewing.  Anything  we  might  
want  to  say  about  the  film  narrator  could  just  as  easily  be  said  about  the  narration  itself.  When  we  
want  to  say  that  the  film  narrator  is  hiding  information,  we  could—for  Bordwell—simply  say  that  
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the  narration  is  hiding  information.  When  we  want  to  say  that  the  narrator  is  creating  a  certain  sort  
of  mood,  we  can  say  that  the  narration  is  doing  so.236  
   Several  theorists  reject  the  Bordwell  view;;  in  fact,  the  no-­narrator  concept  seems  to  be  in  
the  minority  opinion.  Jakob  Lothe,  Dan  Shen,  Robert  Burgoyne,  and  Seymour  Chatman  all  point  
to  the  necessity  of  the  cinematic  narrator.  Burgoyne’s  defense  is  twofold:  (1)  the  concept  of  
unreliability  and  the  hierarchy  of  different  voices  structuring  the  movie  narrative  only  make  sense  
if  we  posit  the  existence  of  an  impersonal,  cinematic  narrator;;  and  (2)    the  idea  of  truth  in  fiction  
film  only  makes  sense  if  we  posit  the  concept.  With  regards  to  (2),  Burgoyne  seems  to  think  that  
we  can  only  say  that  there  is  such  a  thing  as  truth  in  a  film  if  there  is  someone,  some  agent,  
communicating  those  truths  to  us.  With  regards  to  (1),  Burgoyne  takes  the  idea  of  unreliability  to  
necessitate  the  existence  of  a  film  narrator:  if  there  is  a  perspective  placed  upon  the  fictional  
events,  and  if  we  are  being  shown  those  events  in  a  way  that  could  potentially  mislead  us,  we’re  
seemingly  interacting  with  a  narrator  who  is  doing  the  showing.  
   I  side  with  Bordwell  and  for  two  related  reasons.  First  of  all,  I  think  Bordwell  is  right  in  that  
we  don’t  typically  experience—aren’t  aware  of—a  film  narrator  when  we  watch  a  movie.  This  
partly  stems  from  the  phenomenological  immediacy  and  assumption  of  objectivity  I  mentioned  
earlier.  Things  seem  to  just  be  there,  audibly  and  visually,  when  we  watch  a  fiction  film;;  they  don’t  
seem  to  be  presented  by  someone  or  something  (excluding  cases  of  character-­narrators,  of  
course).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
236Gregory  Currie  agrees  with  Bordwell  in  this  fundamental  point:  that  there  isn’t  necessarily  a  film  
“narrator”  or  “cinematic  narrator”  in  fiction  film.  Unlike  Bordwell,  though,  Currie  does  posit  the  
existence  of  an  “implied  author.”The  implied  author  is,  for  Currie,  separate  from  a  narrator  and  
actual  filmmaker.  Instead  it  is  the  set  of  (or  the  hypothetical  agent  we  take  to  hold)  the  
perspectives,  ideas,  and  viewpoints  the  film  endorses  toward  the  fictional  events  it  depicts,  more  
specifically:  moral  and  emotional  perspectives.  For  Currie,  when  we  figure  out  what  these  
perspectives  are—and  this  is,  for  Currie,  one  of  our  aims  as  film-­viewers—we  figure  out  what  the  
implied  author’s  viewpoints  are.  Because  we  have  this  construct  of  the  implied  author,  coupled  
with  our  awareness  of  film  narration,  Currie  argues  that  there  just  isn’t  the  need  for  the  idea  of  a  
“film  narrator.”  
Currie,  Gregory.  “Unreliability  Refigured:  Narrative  in  Literature  and  Film”.  The  Journal  of  
Aesthetics  and  Art  Criticism  53.1  (1995):  19–29.  
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   This  claim  is,  of  course,  a  purely  phenomenological  one,  and  we  might  argue  that  I’ve  
gotten  our  phenomenology  wrong.  In  order  to  argue  this  point,  though,  we  need  some  positive  
reason  to  think  there  is  a  cinematic  narrator.  As  Bordwell  states,  it’s  unnecessary  to  claim  that  
some  construct  exists  when  we  can  seemingly  explain  everything  about  a  movie  without  it.  Here  it  
also  helps  here  to  look  at  Burgoyne,  who  gives  one  of  the  most  spelled  out  defenses  of  the  
cinematic  narrator:  while  he  points  to  the  supposed  necessity  of  the  construct,  he  fails  to  prove  its  
necessity.  
   One  of  Burgoyne’s  chief  claims  is  that  we  can  only  make  sense  of  fictional  truth  if  we  
posit  the  existence  of  a  film  narrator.  This  claim  just  doesn’t  seem  true.  Surely  we  can  say  some  
things  about  a  fictional  world  without  appeal  to  a  narrator.  We  can  say  that  Frodo  exists,  the  
Middle-­Earth  is  a  place  full  of  elves,  that  Gandalf  is  a  wizard,  that  Frodo’s  best  friend  is  Sam-­wise,  
etc.  We  know  these  things  just  by  watching  the  film—not  by  acknowledging  a  narrator  in  Lord  of  
the  Rings.  Burgoyne  needs  to  give  some  positive  reason  for  our  thinking  otherwise.  Here,  he  
might  appeal  to  the  ‘messenger’  model  of  film  that  he  espouses.  But  this  model  is  both  
unconvincing  and  unilluminating—saying  that  films  are  like  messages  communicated  from  one  
agent  (a  narrator)  to  another  (an  audience  member)  is  really  just  another  way  of  saying,  rather  
than  defending  or  describing,  that  we  need  to  make  way  for  the  existence  of  a  film  narrator.  
   Delving  further  into  the  ‘film  narrator’  debate  is  beyond  the  scope  of  this  paper.  But,  for  
now,  I  don’t  think  we  have  any  reason  to  appeal  to  the  construct;;  I  thus  think  that  talking  about  
what  narratives  show  us  and  how  they  can  deceive  us  is  best.  Now,  on  the  one  hand,  I  don’t  think  
my  chief  arguments—about  everything  that’s  presented  as  true  being  true  in  a  fiction  film  and  
about  the  necessary  presence  of  narrative  facts  and  narrative  perspectives—remain  any  less  
plausible  if  I  shift  to  talking  of  a  cinematic  narrator.  So  I  do  think  much  of  my  analysis  regarding  
the  distinction  between  documentary  unreliability  and  fiction  film  reliability  remains  in  tact.  Still,  
the  idea  of  a  narrator  might  immediately  imply  the  idea  of  ‘telling’  rather  than  ‘showing’—
problematizing  my  distinction  between  literary  and  cinematic  narratives—and  my  earlier  claims  
about  the  lack  of  intentionality  and  the  lack  of  ‘accidental  deception’  in  fiction  film  might  seem  less  
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plausible  if  we  make  sense  of  an  actual  agent  presenting  the  fictional  world.  So,  while  I  do  think  
that  ultimately  the  idea  of  fiction  film  epistemic  directness  could  be  defended  regardless  of  where  
we  land  on  this  issue  (indeed,  theorists  like  Burgoyne  substantiate  a  notion  of  fiction  film  reliability  
while  using  the  ‘narrator’  construct),  it  would  require  more  work  to  lay  out.      
   Let’s  look,  now,  at  some  broader  consequences  of  this  chapter’s  analysis.  In  chapters  
one  and  two,  we  saw  how  the  perceptual  and  the  representational  (more  specifically,  fictional)  
intertwine  during  film-­viewing  insofar  as  what  we  see  and  hear  at  the  natural-­meaning  level  
makes  up  what’s  represented  in  the  narrative,  and  insofar  as  we  have  a  seeing-­as  experience  of  
fictional  characters  and  worlds.  Now,  we  can  note  how  the  epistemic  and  perceptual  intertwine.  
During  fiction  film-­viewing,  we  pick  up  on  narrative  facts  by  imaginatively  engaging  with  the  story:  
by  cognizing,  forming  fictional  beliefs  about,  characters’  emotional  states,  actions,  and  narrative  
events.  Insofar  as  truth  (genuine  and  fictional)  can  only  really  be  interpreted,  whatever  we  know  
about  a  film’s  fiction  is  seemingly  constructed  from—and  not  a  part  of—what  we  see  and  hear.  In  
this  way,  an  analysis  of  fictional  truth  and  an  analysis  of  the  perceptual  seem  independent.  But  
this  isn’t  the  whole  story.    
   Fiction  films  have  an  epistemic  value—an  epistemic  directness—partly  in  virtue  of  their  
phenomenological  immediacy.  They  don’t  just  show  us  actors  and  sets  that  represent  characters  
and  fictional  worlds;;  they  show  us  fictional  truths.  They  make  the  fictional  perceivable  and  
construct  some  fictional  truths  via  that  perceptual  content.  They  show  us  characters  and  the  
actions  they  partake  in;;  they  show  us  dogs  barking  and  cars  moving  and  rain  falling.  Insofar  as  
they  prescribe  us  to  imagine  that  what  we  see  and  hear  is  a  part  of  the  fictional  world,  movies  
allow  us  to  directly  see  and  hear  facts  about  their  fictional  worlds  in  the  same  sort  of  way  that  we  
see  and  hear  facts  in  the  real  world.  Just  as  we  pick  up  on  what  color  hair  a  person  has,  what  sort  
of  emotion  they’re  feeling,  or  how  the  weather  is  outside,  so  too  we  pick  up  on  what  color  hair  a  
character  has,  what  sort  of  emotion  they’re  feeling,  and  how  the  weather  is  in  the  fictional  world.  If  
we  think  (as  I  do)  that  the  former  constitutes  an  immediate  perceiving  of  facts  in  the  world,  the  
latter  constitutes  an  immediate  perceiving  of  facts  in  the  fictional  world.  Because  movies  engage  
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in  this  fictional-­truth  showing  (keeping  in  mind,  of  course,  that  not  all  of  their  truths  are  shown),  
they  are  uniquely  epistemically  direct  because  of  their  phenomenological  immediacy.  
               Medium  Specificity  
   Throughout  these  chapters,  I’ve  argued  for  some  descriptive  medium  specificity  claims:  
claims  that  establish  the  ways  in  which  movies  are  unique—how  they  possess  capacities  other  
art  forms  lack  or  how  they  can  exercise  some  common  artistic  capacities  more  than,  or  in  
different  ways  than,  other  art  forms.  Despite  these  descriptive  claims,  I  stated  in  chapter  one  that  
I’m  against  normative  claims  of  medium  specificity  of  the  kind  Noël  Carroll  takes  issue  with.  In  this  
concluding  section,  I’ll  delve  more  carefully  into  the  nature  of  the  medium  specificity  thesis  by  
laying  out  some  typical  defenses  of  it.  I’ll  then  defend  my  rejection  of  the  normativity  commonly  
endorsed.  
   Briefly,  we  can  think  of  medium  specificity  as  the  idea  that,  as  Henry  John  Pratt,  puts  it:    
   The  media  associated  with  a  given  art  form  (both  its  material  components  and  the    
   processes  by  which  they  are  exploited)  (1)  entail  specific  possibilities  for  and    
   constraints  on  representation  and  expression,  and  (2)  this  provides  a  normative    
   framework  for  what  artists  working  in  that  art  form  ought  to  attempt.237    
  
   For  medium  specificity  theorists,  a  medium—where  we  think  of  medium  as  the  “ensemble  
of  possibly  diverse  materials,  instruments,  and  procedures  effectively  involved  in  the  fabrication  
or  use  of  a  particular…display  or  category  of  displays”—determines  the  properties  or  capacities  
essential  to  an  art  form,  and  an  art  form  ought  to  exploit  those  properties  or  capacities.238  
Defenses  of  medium  specificity  have  been  common  in  film  theory,  particularly  stemming  from  an  
interest  in  combatting  charges  against  film’s  nature  as  a  new  art  form.  
   Following  Clement  Greenberg,  some  avant-­garde  or  modernist  filmmakers  maintain  that  
essential,  physical  properties—like  “the  film  strip,  projector,  camera,  and  screen”—serve  as  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
237  Pratt,  Henry  John.  “Medium  Specificity  and  the  Ethics  of  Narrative  in  Comics.”  StoryWorlds:  A  
Journal  of  Narrative  Studies  1  (2009):  97-­113.  P.  98.  
238  Ponech,  Trevor.  “Cinema:  Display,  Medium,  Work.”  Revista  Portuguesa  de  Filosofia,  T.  69,  
Fasc  ¾  (2013):  543-­564.  P.  551.  
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limitations  on  the  cinematic  medium.239  The  central  claim  made  by  Greenberg-­ian  avant-­gardists  
is  that  movies  ought  to  exploit  and  draw  attention  to  these  limitations,  and  that  they  ought  to  do  so  
at  the  expense  of  narrative;;  rather  than  tell  a  story,  films  ought  to  show  us  the  medium  itself,  
reflexively.  Some  examples  of  movies  made  within  this  movement  are:  “The  flicker  films  of  
Sharits…and  Conrad  (The  Flicker)”  which  “foreground  the  structure  of  the  filmstrip  and  the  
mechanism  of  both  camera  and  projector  that  make  the  illusion  of  movement  possible  in  cinema,”  
and  Andy  Warhol’s  “long,  static,  silent”  films  Empire  and  Sleep  which  lack  content  and  “focus  the  
spectator’s  attention  on  the  unique  physical  characteristics  of  the  medium  itself:  the  grain  of  the  
image,  the  shape  and  two-­dimensionality  of  the  support,  and  so  on.”240  
   At  the  other  end  of  the  spectrum  are  the  cinematic  realists  we  discussed  in  chapter  one:  
extreme  realists  like  Bazin  and  Kracauer  who  maintain  that  film’s  essential  capacity,  which  stems  
from  its  photographic  nature,  is  to  show  us  reality.  Despite  the  strong  divergence  in  their  claims,  
realists  “posit  as  its  basis  the  photographic/illusionistic/representational  properties”  of  film,  
emphasizing  the  content  of  a  film’s  images  (content  which,  in  one  way  or  another,  shows  us  the  
world)  over  the  visual  reflexivity  of  avant-­gardists.241  Similarly,  supporters  of  the  Dogme  95  
filmmaking  movement  eschew  post-­production  editing  in  favor  of  simple  narrative.  Dogme  95  
movies  depict  basic  events  without  props,  produced  sound,  or  genre;;  their  films  are  shot  with  
hand-­held  cameras  and  on  location  so  that  theme  and  story  are  prioritized  above  special  effects.  
   Somewhere  in  between  these  two  extremes  is  Rudolf  Arnheim,  who  emphasized  film’s  
unique  recording  capacities  which  enabled  film  to  show  images  different  from  “the  images  we  
obtain  when  we  look  at  the  physical  world.”242  Unlike  cinematic  realists,  Arnheim  maintained  that  
movies  could  show  us  objects,  people,  and  places  differently  than  reality  could;;  unlike  avant-­
gardists,  Arnheim  didn’t  argue  for  a  strict  reflexivity  and  instead  prioritized  film’s  unique  recording  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
239  Walley,  Jonathan.  “The  Material  of  Film  and  the  Idea  of  Cinema:  Contrasting  Practices  in  
Sixties  and  Seventies  Avant-­Garde  Film.”  October  103  (Winter,  2003):  15-­30.  P.  15.  
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capacities:  its  ability  to,  for  instance,  show  a  close-­up  which  “can  make  an  object  appear  
enormous  in  a  way  that  would  not  occur  in  natural  perception.”243  Similarly,  in  between  the  avant-­
garde  extreme  and  the  cinematic  realistic  extreme,  Soviet  montage  theorists  maintained  that  
film’s  unique  capacity  was  editing:  specifically  stringing  together  images  via  montage  to  enable  
expressivity  and  narrative  understanding.    
   Medium  specificity  theses  span  a  wide  range.  Despite  their  divergences,  they  begin  with  
the  same  two  initial  assumptions:  that  movies  do  have  unique  capacities  or  properties  and  that  
movies  ought  to  exploit  those  unique  capacities  or  properties.  My  defense  of  medium  specificity  
rejects  both  initial  assumptions.  In  doing  so,  it  remains  more  plausible  than  these  aforementioned  
ones.  Having  outlined  some  typical  defenses,  then,  let’s  turn  to  mine:  how  it  diverges  and  why  it  
remains  particularly  strong.  
   Avant-­garde  filmmakers  focus  on  the  physical  properties  of  movies;;  cinematic  realists  
focus  on  film’s  photographic  capacities;;  Arnheim  focuses  on  film’s  unique  recording  abilities;;  and  
montage  theorists  focus  on  film’s  ability  to  communicate  through  shot-­transitions.  Each  defense  
focuses  on  just  one  filmic  capacity  or  a  subset  of  filmic  capacities.  And  they  do  so  because  they  
search,  straight  away,  for  film’s  uniqueness:  what  separates  the  filmic  medium  from  other  artistic  
media.  Because  other  art  forms  can  tell  stories,  avant-­gardists  deem  that  capacity  unimportant  for  
film;;  because  other  art  forms  can  use  expressive  techniques,  cinematic  realists  focus  on  film’s  
distinctly  photographic  nature;;  and,  for  montage  theorists,  only  film  has  the  capacity  to  express  
through  connections  between  frames.  
   The  starting-­point  of  my  medium  specificity  claim  is  very  different.  Rather  than  look  for  
what  makes  movies  unique,  I  attend  generally  to  what  movies  are  capable  of:  what  capacities  
they  have,  including  what  capacities  they  share  with  other  art  forms.  And  I  draw  out  a  uniqueness  
claim  from  the  combination  of  those  capacities.  Thus,  where  other  medium  specificity  theorists  
start  with  a  uniqueness  claim,  I  end  with  one.  We  can,  perhaps,  articulate  my  uniqueness  claim  
as,  roughly:  movies  can  show  us  their  stories  in  ways  that  other  art  forms  cannot.  This  amounts  to  
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making  their  stories  perceivable  through  the  employment  of  everyday  perceptual  processes  and  
recognition  capacities  (including  our  recognition  of  natural  meaning  cues).    
   What  enables  this  unique  ‘showing’  is  a  combination  of:  (1)  film’s  photographic  ability  
(i.e.,  how  photographic  movies  possess  natural  meaning);;  (2)  film’s  perceptual  nature  (which  
makes  its  story,  fiction  or  nonfiction,  perceivable);;  (3)  film’s  motion  and  sound  (which  makes  film-­
viewing  more  like  everyday  perception  than  our  perception  of  static  depictions);;  (4)  filmic  editing  
techniques  which  enable  expressivity  and  everyday  ‘scanning;;’  and  (4)  film’s  narrative  ability  (the  
way  in  which,  like  books,  movies  can  show  us  stories).  Some  of  these  capacities—(1),  (2)  and  
(5)—  are  shared  with  other  art  forms;;  and  some—(3)  and  (4)—aren’t.  What’s  more,  some—(1)—
while  shared,  can  be  uniquely  exploited  by  film.  But  the  central  point  for  my  claim  of  medium  
specificity  doesn’t  hinge  on  which  individual  capacity  (or  capacities)  distinguish  movies  from  other  
art  forms.  Rather,  my  claim  is  that,  taken  together,  these  capacities  make  movies  unique.  Their  
combination  enables  movies  to  engage  in  a  form  of  showing  that  other  art  forms  cannot  engage  
in.        
   This  distinction  between  my  theory  and  other  medium  specificity  theories  can  allow  us  to  
see  one  of  the  central  shortcomings  of  the  latter:  by  focusing  on  what  distinguishes  film  from  
other  art  forms  straight  away,  they  overlook  a  plethora  of  filmic  capacities.  This  is  problematic  for  
the  reason  Carroll  states:  if  we  really  care  about  art,  and  we  really  care  about  the  expressive  and  
emotional  and  narrational  abilities  of  artforms,  then  we  ought  to  care  about  all  of  those  abilities.  
We  shouldn’t  eschew  or  overlook  something  movies  can  do  merely  because  books  or  paintings  
can  exercise  the  same  capacity.  Movies  can  tell  stories;;  they  have  editing  techniques  at  their  
disposal;;  they  can  photograph  reality;;  they  can  engage  everyday  perceptual  processes;;  and  they  
can  engage  perceptual  processes  that  we  can’t  exercise  in  everyday  life.  At  the  core  of  my  
medium  specificity  thesis  is  that  all  of  this  matters.  And  medium  specificity  theorists  haven’t  made  
it  clear  why  it  shouldn’t.  
   Additionally,  and  perhaps  more  fundamentally,  there’s  something  right  (and  therefore  
wrong)  about  each  of  the  medium  specificity  theses  above.  Film’s  photographic  ability  does  
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differentiate  it  from  other  art  forms  (albeit  not  precisely  in  the  way  cinematic  realists  maintain);;  a  
movie’s  editing  techniques  do  give  it  expressive  and  communicative  abilities  other  art  forms  lack;;  
and  film  can  draw  attention  to  its  unique  physical  properties.  The  medium  of  film  makes  way  for  
each  of  the  artistic  capacities  medium  specificity  theorists  typically  defend.  And  this  means  that  
such  theses  arbitrarily  choose  one  among  many  traits  supported  by  the  medium—more  than  one  
of  which  is  unique  to  film  (and  all  of  which  can  be  uniquely  exploited  by  film).    
   As  Carroll  argues,  and  as  we  discussed  in  chapter  one,  medium  specificity  theorists  use  
their  own  aims  or  values  to  determine  which  capacities  or  properties  are  ‘essential’  to  the  
medium;;  in  doing  so,  they  don’t  actually  pinpoint  capacities  or  properties  that  are  any  more  
objectively  ‘essential’  than  the  ones  other  theorists  identify.  As  Carroll  puts  it:  
   The  medium  specificity  theorist,  it  would  seem,  has  no  non-­arbitrary  way  to    
   choose  between  conflicting  aesthetic  programs  that  may  be  equally  grounded  in    
   the  complex  of  possibilities  afforded  by  the  medium.  Nor  is  this  problem  a  merely  
   academic  one.  For  very  often  contesting  artistic  programs  attempt  to  vindicate    
   themselves  by  means  of  invocating  the  nature  of  the  medium.  But  this  is  of  little    
   moment,  because  the  media  we  are  considering  can  each  support  contradictory    
   programs.  A  medium  does  not  ordain  a  single  style  or  even  a  single  family  of    
   styles,  but  generally  affords  the  opportunities  for  a  plethora  of  incompatible    
   styles.244    
        
Oddly  enough,  the  central  problem  with  medium  specificity  theses  is  that  they  attempt  to  identify  
what  makes  film  unique—or  what  is  essential  to  it—and  end  up  identifying  an  arbitrary  capacity  
that  isn’t  any  more  ‘unique’  or  ‘essential’  than  others.  In  the  process,  they  misunderstand  the  
medium  or  miss  what’s  most  interesting  about  it:  that  it  does  afford  multiple  (sometimes  
conflicting)  opportunities,  that  it  possesses  more  than  one  unique  trait,  and  that  it  can  exploit  
some  common  artistic  capacities  differently  than  other  art  forms  can.    
My  medium  specificity  thesis  doesn’t  start  with  a  claim  of  uniqueness.  Instead,  it  
acknowledges  filmic  capacities  and  properties  generally—regardless  of  whether  or  not  they’re  
unique.  By  grounding  itself  upon  this  more  nuanced  understanding  of  what  the  medium  of  film  is  
like,  my  thesis  attends  to  (1)  the  multiple,  individual  properties  unique  to  film;;  (2)  the  properties  it  
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shares  with  other  art  forms;;  (3)  the  properties  it  exploits  differently  than  other  art  forms;;  and  (4)  
the  unique  form  of  showing  that  (1),  (2),  and  (3),  give  rise  to.  In  this  way,  it  doesn’t  limit  our  
discussion  of  the  filmic  medium  as  other  theses  have,  and  it  reaches  a  more  accurate,  complete  
picture  of  what  movies  can  do.  
   Let’s  turn,  now,  from  the  descriptive  to  the  normative  claim,  since  the  latter  is  perhaps  the  
biggest  shortcoming  with  typical  defenses  of  medium  specificity  and  since  we  might  wonder  just  
how  I  can  plausibly  reject  it.  As  Steven  Maras  and  David  Sutton  put  it:    
The  discussion  of  the  essence  or  specificity  of  an  art  form  is  very  quickly  liable  to    become  
normative:  critics  establish  the  ‘essence’  of  a  particular  art  form  from  their  own  historical,  
cultural,  and  personal  perspective,  but  they  then  all  too  easily  begin  to  use  that  definition  
in  order  to  exclude  all  manifestations  which  run  counter  to  it.245    
  
   In  excluding  “all  manifestations  which  run  counter”  to  their  “historical,  cultural,  and  
personal  perspective,”  medium  specificity  theorists  endorse  a  general,  exclusive  claim:  that  
movies  are  aesthetically  better  when  they  do  x.  If  movies  ought  to  do  what  makes  them  unique,  
then  any  movie  that  doesn’t  is  less  good  as  a  movie.  Each  of  the  theses  I’ve  discussed  is  guilty  of  
this  normativity.  On  the  one  hand  this  normative  commitment  is  intuitive.  If  movies  are  unique  in  
certain  ways,  does  it  really  make  sense  to  say  that  they  needn’t  show  their  uniqueness?  But,  as  
intuitive  as  it  may  seem,  the  normative  claim  is  mistaken.  To  see  why,  and  to  make  sense  of  how  
I  can  reject  it  (despite  endorsing  the  descriptive  medium  specificity  claim),  it  helps  to  look  at  
movies  that  don’t  exercise  all  of  the  capacities  I  mentioned.  
   Many  experimental  films  eschew  narrative  in  favor  of  post-­production  effects  and  
modifications,  and  in  this  way  tie  movies  more  strongly  to  paintings  than  narrative  artforms  like  
literature;;  they  thus  do  not  elucidate  film’s  storytelling  capacities.  At  the  other  end  of  the  
spectrum,  Dogme  95  or  extreme  cinematic  realist  films  eschew  technical  gimmicks  and  post-­
production  effects  in  favor  of  narrative  (or  in  favor  of  capturing  the  transient  everyday  encounters  
Kracauer  emphasizes);;  they  thus  do  not  take  advantage  of  the  expressivity  which  cinematic  
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editing  techniques  enable,  and  they  do  not  utilize  the  full  range  of  techniques  which  separate  
filmic  ‘showing’  from  the  ‘showing’  of  static  forms  of  visual  depiction.    
   These  movies  don’t  exploit  all  of  film’s  capacities,  and  they  thus  do  not  engage  in  film’s  
full  ‘showing.’  To  endorse  the  normative  claim,  I’d  seemingly  have  to  maintain  that  these  films  are  
less  good  aesthetically  than  movies  that  do  exercise  filmic  ‘showing’—this  second  category  
perhaps  including  standard  Hollywood  movies  which  tell  stories  through  the  use  of  montage  and  
post-­production  effects.  But  this  comparative  claim  isn’t  true:  it’s  not  the  case  that  Stan  
Breakage’s  films  are  less  good  (as  a  general  rule)  than  they  would  be  if  they  told  stories.  It’s  not  
the  case  that  Dogme  95  movies  are  less  good  (as  a  general  rule)  than  they  would  be  if  they  
utilized  more  editing.  These  movies  have  different  aims,  and  they  elucidate  different  filmic  
capacities:  as  a  result,  they  have  different  kinds  of  aesthetic  value.  It’s  this  distinction  among  
kinds  of  aesthetic  value  that  typical  medium  specificity  theses  ignore.  
   When  we  watch  Stan  Brekhage’s  films,  we  notice  how  editing  techniques  can  be  used  to  
create  movies  that  are  like  moving  paintings:  we  recognize  the  expressivity  in  what  we’re  shown  
at  a  bare  perceptual,  natural-­meaning,  level  (and  the  expressivity  it  enables  at  a  higher,  
emotional,  level).  And  we  recognize  how  movies  differ  from  static  forms  of  visual  depiction  
because  of  the  editing  techniques  at  their  disposal  as  well  as  their  nature  as  moving  images.  
When  we  watch  a  Dogme  95  movie,  we  see  how  movies  can  be  used  to  tell  stories—indeed  to  
tell  very  basic  stories—through  a  form  of  showing  that  novels  are  incapable  of.  By  highlighting  
one,  or  a  few,  of  film’s  capacities  these  movies  do  two  things:  (1)  they  draw  our  attention  to  that  
capacity  and  (2)  they  highlight  something  that  differentiates  movies  from  another  art  form.  Who’s  
to  say  that  doing  (1)  and  (2)  isn’t  as  good  as  drawing  our  attention  to  all  of  film’s  capacities  in  the  
way  that  a  Paul  Thomas  Anderson  film  or  a  Robert  Zemeckis  film  does?  
   We  might  even  think  there’s  a  special  sort  of  aesthetic  value  that  comes  with  appreciating  
one  particular  filmic  capacity.  By  showing  us  expressive  visuals  and  sounds,  without  an  
accompanying  narrative,  experimental  movies  enable  us  to  appreciate  filmic  editing  techniques  
(and  the  expressivity  they’re  capable  of)  more  than  we  do  when  we’re  simultaneously  paying  
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attention  to  a  story.  By  showing  us  a  basic  story  without  enhanced  post-­production  effects,  
Dogme  95  movies  enable  us  to  appreciate  the  ways  in  which  movies  can  take  us  through  a  
narrative  more  than  we  do  when  we’re  simultaneously  attending  to  editing  techniques.  It’s  not  
clear  that  either  of  these  is  a  lesser  sort  of  value  than  appreciating  all  of  film’s  capacities  to  a  
moderate  degree.  
   Similarly,  sometimes  purposefully  eschewing  certain  filmic  capacities  draws  our  attention  
to  those  capacities  in  a  way  that  provides  yet  another  sort  of  aesthetic  value.  The  Artist  is  a  good  
example  of  this.  Made  in  2011,  the  film  mimics  the  style  of  1920’s  silent  black-­and-­white  films.  
Partly  because  it’s  silent  and  (colorless)  in  2011  and  partly  because  of  the  plot,  the  film  draws  our  
attention  to  sound  in  film.  How  is  watching  The  Artist  different  from  watching  sound  films?  What  
does  it  do  for  us,  as  spectators,  to  see  a  film  purposefully  eschew  one  of  the  central  aspects  of  
contemporary  cinema?  If  we’re  attentive  viewers,  these  are  the  questions  The  Artist  raises,  and—
insofar  as  it  does—it  has  a  particular  type  of  aesthetic  value:  one  that  amounts  to  thinking  more  
about  the  filmic  medium,  what  its  properties  are,  and  what  value  those  properties  bring.  More  
basically,  The  Artist  is  a  visually  stunning  film,  and  our  experience  of  it  entails  attending  to  its  
visual  cues  more  carefully  than  (I  think)  we  do  when  we  watch  sound-­films.  The  beauty  in  its  
images,  the  cinematic  questions  it  raises,  and  its  providing  viewers  with  the  opportunity  for  
enhanced  attention  to  what  they  see,  makes  The  Artist  valuable  precisely  because  it  isn’t  aural.  
   Movies  can  be  aesthetically  valuable,  then,  by  eschewing  filmic  capacities.  They  can  also  
be  aesthetically  valuable  when  they  exercise  all  of  the  capacities  we’ve  discussed.  The  central  
point  here  is  that  different  types  of  movies  (experimental  films,  Dogme  95  films,  standard  fiction  
films,  etc.)  can  allow  for  different  kinds  of  cinematic  value.  Importantly,  this  isn’t  to  say  that  every  
film  has  value.246  Nor  is  it  to  say  that  aesthetic  value  only  consists  in  exploiting  filmic  capacities  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
246  Does  every  film  have  some  aesthetic  value?  I’m  tempted  to  say  ‘yes,’  if  only  because  I  think  
there’s  aesthetic  value  in  appreciating  filmic  capacities—and  this  goes  for  movies  that  aren’t  
particularly  well-­written,  well-­acted,  well-­shot,  or  well-­directed.  But  we  might  worry  that  this  claim  
is  too  strong.  After  all,  it  would  seemingly  entail  that  any  work  of  art  has  value  simply  by  exploiting  
its  medium;;  surely  we  don’t  want  to  say  that  every  painting  is  aesthetically  valuable  because  it’s  
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(we  care  about  acting,  directing,  cinematography,  score,  etc.).  It’s  to  say  that  we  cannot  look  to  
‘uniqueness’—i.e.,  whether  or  not  a  movie  exploits  all  of  film’s  capacities  (or  at  least  the  ones  I’ve  
identified)—to  determine  how  aesthetically  valuable  a  film  is.  And  this  is  why  the  normative  claim  
is  mistaken.    
So  far,  I’ve  been  operating  under  the  assumption  that,  to  endorse  the  normative  claim,  I’d  
have  to  maintain  that  films  ought  to  exploit  all  of  their  capacities—since  the  ‘uniqueness’  I’ve  
argued  for  results  from  their  combination.  And  we’ve  seen  why  this  claim  can’t  be  convincingly  
maintained.  But  let’s  consider  a  slightly  weaker  normative  claim,  one  that  states:  a  movie  ought  to  
exercise  at  least  one  capacity  unique  to  film.  Should  I  make  this  claim,  or—more  importantly—
have  I  implicitly  maintained  it?    
   I  do  think  I’ve  maintained  it,  but  I  don’t  think  it’s  normative.  Most  any  film  will  exercise  a  
capacity  it  has  which  other  art  forms  lack  or  it  will  exercise  a  common  artistic  capacity  differently  
than  other  art  forms.  Any  fiction  film  will  necessarily  engage  in  showing,  distinguishing  itself  from  
novels  and  static  forms  of  visual  depiction  (the  former  because  of  its  perceptual  nature  and  
natural  meaning  cues,  the  latter  because  of  its  motion  and  sound);;  most  any  film  that  utilizes  
editing  techniques—in  fact,  any  film  that  moves—will  ‘show’  differently  from  static  forms  of  visual  
depiction  and  will  engage  ordinary  perceptual  processes  and  recognition  capacities  that  
nonperceptual  art  forms  (like  novels)  cannot  engage.  This  is  true  even  of  basic,  Dogme  95  films.  
In  this  way,  I  think  the  claim  above  is  true  necessarily,  descriptively—and  thus  not  as  an  ‘ought.’  
If  we’re  wary  of  endorsing  this  general  claim,  we  can  endorse  a  more  moderate  one,  
namely:  every  film  will  exploit  a  capacity  it  has  which  at  least  one  other  art  form  lacks,  and  will  in  
this  way  show  film’s  comparable  uniqueness.  Each  of  the  examples  above  achieves  this,  as  do  
more  extreme  examples.  For  instance,  a  film  that  doesn’t  move—one  composed,  say,  of  a  series  
of  freeze  frames—will  differentiate  itself  from  literature  via  its  natural  meaning  cues  and  ‘showing’  
even  though  it  doesn’t  differentiate  itself  from  photography.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
painted,  that  every  novel  is  aesthetically  valuable  because  it’s  written,  and  so  forth.  So  I’m  not  
sure  just  what  my  commitment  is  here.  
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   Now,  I  don’t  want  to  commit  myself  to  the  necessity  of  these  claims.  Perhaps  there  are  
(actual  or  potential)  films  that  eschew  filmic  capacities  in  ways  I  haven’t  realized  and  that  
therefore  don’t  even  show  film’s  comparable  uniqueness.  Merely  because  of  this  potential,  I  don’t  
want  to  maintain  the  ‘ought’  above.  If  it’s  not  true  descriptively  that  movies  exercise  at  least  one  
unique  capacity  (either  a  capacity  which  other  art  forms  lack  generally  or  a  capacity  which  at  least  
one  other  art  form  lacks),  then  I  don’t  think  movies  ‘should’  do  so.  While  I  can’t  cash  this  out,  
since  I  can’t  think  of  relevant  examples,  my  guess  is  that  we’ll  find  an  interesting,  distinct,  
aesthetic  value  in  such  films—and,  once  again,  we  need  to  leave  open  this  space  for  various  
kinds  of  aesthetic  value.    
My  thesis  of  medium  specificity,  then,  isn’t  even  normative  in  this  weaker  sense.  And  not  
only  is  this  not  a  shortcoming—it’s  a  merit;;  it  makes  my  thesis  open-­minded  and  (perhaps  more  
importantly)  accurate  about  the  fact  that  different  movie-­types  have  different  kinds  of  aesthetic  
value.  Normative  medium  specificity  theses  aren’t  just  problematic  because  they’re  exclusive;;  
they’re  problematic  because  they’re  incorrect  about  what  can  make  a  movie  good  as  a  movie.  
   All  of  this  points  to  perhaps  the  fundamental  distinction  between  my  medium  specificity  
thesis  and  others:  I’m  not  interested  in  uniqueness  for  uniqueness’s  sake.  I  care  about  the  filmic  
medium  and  what  sorts  of  capacities  it  has.  And  I  care  about  artistic  media  more  generally:  how  
they  diverge  from  one  another,  what  a  canvas  or  photograph  affords  that  a  film  doesn’t,  what  a  
movie  provides  that  a  book  can’t.  I  care  about  these  things  just  because  it’s  worthwhile  to  
understand  artistic  media.    
   None  of  this  gets  us  to  a  normative  claim  about  what  art  forms  should  do.  And  none  of  it  
amounts  to  claims  of  excellence.  We  shouldn’t  compare  one  general  type  of  movie  to  another  
general  type  of  movie—e.g.,  an  experimental  to  a  narrative  film—and  deem  one  more  
aesthetically  valuable  than  another.  And  we  shouldn’t  compare  one  art  form  to  another  art  form.  
With  regards  to  this  latter  claim,  I  haven’t  been  arguing  for  ways  in  which  movies  are  superior  to  
books  or  paintings  or  pictures.  While  movies  can  show  in  ways  that  other  art  forms  can’t,  this  
‘showing’  doesn’t  make  movies  comparably  better.  In  many  ways,  we  might  think  a  novel’s  telling  
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is  superior  to  a  film’s  showing  (because  it  leaves  more  room  for  our  imaginative  co-­construction  of  
the  fictional  world)  or  that  static  forms  of  visual  depiction  are  superior  because  static  (precisely  
because  they  often  draw  enhanced  attention  to  one  or  more  aspects  of  a  scene  rather  than  
engage  in  ‘everyday  scanning,’  and  thereby  exercise  perceptual  processes  that  we  don’t  
otherwise  get  the  chance  to  exercise).  
   So  this  is  what  my  medium  specificity  thesis  amounts  to.  It  amounts  to  understanding  
‘filmic  capacities’  as  ‘filmic  opportunities’  in  the  way  Carroll  articulates.  Movies  can  tell  stories.  
They  can  connect  their  images  via  a  multitude  of  editing  techniques.  They  can  be  aural.  They  can  
be  expressive.  When  they  take  advantage  of  all  of  these  opportunities  to  some  degree,  they  
distinguish  themselves  from  other  perceptual  and  nonperceptual  art  forms.  But  filmmakers  have  
various  purposes  and  therefore  exploit  the  medium  in  various  ways:  sometimes  by  not  taking  all  
available  opportunities.  Indeed,  some  “aesthetic  programs”  are  conflicting  despite  being  “equally  
grounded  in  the  complex  of  possibilities  afforded  by  the  medium.”247  Some  filmmakers  aim  to  
elucidate  the  physical  capacities  of  film  and  produce  the  reflexive  movies  of  the  sort  Warhol  
produced;;  some  aim  to  take  advantage  of  film’s  storytelling  capacities  and  produce  movies  along  
the  lines  of  Dogma  95  films;;  some  utilize  montage  above  all  else  in  order  to  express  and  
communicate  through  shot-­transitions.  None  of  these  projects  is  any  ‘better’  than  any  other  
because  (1)  each  stems  from  the  medium  itself;;  and  (2)  each  brings  a  specific  kind  of  aesthetic  
value  which  can’t  adequately  be  compared  to  the  others.    
   Other,  traditionally  defended,  medium  specificity  theses  are  mistaken  in  two  central  ways:  
in  searching  for  one  unique,  essential  filmic  capacity  or  property,  and  in  maintaining  that  that  
property  or  capacity  ought  to  be  exploited.  Despite  these  shortcomings,  each  does  point  to  a  
capacity  of  film,  one  that  it’s  important  to  take  note  of  insofar  as  it’s  important  to  understand  the  
medium  of  film  and  to  grasp  how  that  capacity  distinguishes  movies  from  (some)  other  art  forms.  
I’ve  argued  that  we  ought  to  endorse  a  descriptive  claim  of  medium  specificity  that  acknowledges  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
247  Carroll,  p.  13.  
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each  aforementioned  capacity  (and  others)  and  that  leaves  open  the  space  for  different,  equally  
valuable,  kinds  of  aesthetic  merit.    
            Conclusion  
One  of  my  central  aims  throughout  these  four  chapters  has  been  to  clarify  how  movies  
are  distinct  from  other  perceptual  and  nonperceptual  art  forms.  In  concluding,  it’s  worth  it  to  keep  
in  mind  broader  aims  as  theorists,  film-­goers,  and  appreciators  of  art:  to  understand  what  artistic  
media  can  do,  to  clarify  what’s  involved  in  our  interactions  with  various  forms  of  (fictional,  
experimental,  and  nonfictional)  depictions,  and  to  think  more  about  how  we  see  and  cognize  and  
know  the  fictional  worlds  we  experience.  I’ve  provided  many  of  these  specifications  with  regards  
to  film.  And  we  need  to  continue  with  these  sorts  of  analyses—analyses  that  get  at  our  cognitive,  
perceptual,  and  epistemic  engagement  with  film,  and  analyses  that  don’t  treat  the  ‘perceptual’  
and  the  ‘cognized’  (or  ‘constructed’)  separately.    
Movies  have  an  epistemic  value—an  epistemic  directness—that  stems  partly  from  their  
perceptual  immediacy.  They  engage  us  imaginatively  in  their  worlds  and  therefore  perceptually.  
They  construct  many  of  their  fictional  truths  by  showing  them.  They  express  via  editing  
techniques  that  are  constructed  and  conventional  (and  therefore  nonnatural)  as  well  as  capable  
of  direct  showing  (and  therefore  natural).  What  we  see  and  hear  isn’t  all  there  is—we  do  much  
extrapolating  and  inferring,  bringing  in  conventional  and  real-­world  knowledge,  as  we  do  in  
ordinary  communicative  situations.  But  there  are  important  and  interesting  intertwinements  
between  what  we  know,  what  we  see,  what  we  imagine,  and  what  we  cognize  during  film-­viewing.  
We  can’t  reach  a  full,  adequate  theory  of  film  meaning  unless  we  acknowledge—and  build  
upon—the  interactions  I’ve  laid  out  in  these  chapters.  Movies  are  multi-­modal.  They  are  
aesthetically  complicated.  And  they’re  complicated  in  ways  that  other  art  forms  are  not.  Film  
theory  and  philosophy  of  film  need  to  reflect  this.  I  hope  I’ve  paved  the  way  for  this  further  work,  
and  I  hope  I’ve  motivated  corresponding  directions  of  research  in  theories  of  art  more  generally.          
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